Jurisdiction; Whether the notice of appeal included additional plaintiffs; FedRAppP 3(c)(1)(A); Prohibition on pro se litigants trying to assert the rights of others; 28 USC § 1654; FedRCivP 17(c); Timeliness of 42 USC § 1983 claims; § 1988(a); Applicability of Rule 15’s relation-back provision; FedRCivP 15(c)(1); Zakora v Chrisman; Municipal liability claim; Monell v Department of Soc Servs

The court held that plaintiffs-Wrights’ § 1983 claims against defendants-police officers were untimely and that the district court also properly dismissed their Monell claims against defendant-Louisville Metro Government. It concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the claims of their great-nephews because the notice of appeal only designated the Wrights as appellants. The Wrights sued Louisville and the police officers on behalf of themselves and the nephews (who were minors at the time) in state court for violating their constitutional rights by searching their home. Louisville removed the case to the district court and it was dismissed. Proceeding pro se, the Wrights filed an amended complaint naming the previously unnamed police officers. The nephews were also named as plaintiffs. Defendants moved to dismiss the Wrights’ claim but not the nephews’ claim. Yet the district court dismissed both. On appeal, the court first noted that “by the time the district court ruled on the defendants’ motion to dismiss,” the nephews were no longer minors and were representing themselves. Whether they were included in the notice of appeal was “a critical threshold question . . . .” The court held that given “the caption, the body, and the signatures, the notice of appeal designated only” the Wrights as appellants. They were “legally incapable of asserting” their nephews’ rights at the time. The court noted that the nephews could still “move for relief from the district court under Rule 60(b)(1) in light of the district court’s dismissal of their claims even though no motion to dismiss their claims was before it.” Turning to the Wrights’ claims, the court agreed with the district court that the § 1983 claims were untimely where the amended complaint was filed over three years after the incident. The court rejected the Wrights’ argument that it could “relate back” to the initial complaint. It found that they were “wrong about the sorts of mistakes of law that Rule 15 covers. Rule 15’s plain text allows for relation-back when, among other things, one party was mistaken as to the identity of a proper party.” They contended “they were mistaken as to whether they were allowed under pre-Zakora Sixth Circuit precedent to substitute named defendants for ‘unknown’ defendants. That’s a mistake of law with respect to the legal meaning of ‘mistake’ in Rule 15, not a mistake of law as to ‘the legal requirements of [the plaintiffs’] cause of action.’” As to their Monell claims, their “threadbare assertions failed to adequately allege a policy or custom, nor did they connect [their] injuries to such a policy or custom.” The court affirmed the district court’s judgment as to the Wrights’ claims.