Exculpatory evidence (Brady violation) claim for failure to disclose untested DNA swabs; Brady v Maryland; Whether evidence would have been “favorable” to the defense; Principle that possession can be “actual or constructive” & “joint or exclusive”; People v Johnson; Materiality; People v Chenault; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to make a futile motion; Prejudice; Constitutionality of the FIP statute; MCL 750.224f; New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc, v Bruen; Search & seizure; Terry stop; Terry v Ohio; Reasonable suspicion; Credibility

The court held that: (1) the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for a new trial on the basis of a Brady violation, (2) he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, and (3) the trial court did not err by denying his motion to suppress. He was convicted of FIP, CCW, and felony-firearm (second offense) after he was caught with a revolver under his shirt while working an event as an “unarmed” security guard. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial on the basis of an alleged Brady violation where the prosecution failed to disclose the existence of the DNA swabs that were never tested. It noted that: (1) “no definitive evidence yet existed as to whether defendant’s DNA was on the firearm”; (2) he failed to “establish that the DNA swabs would have been favorable to his defense”; and (3) “even if the DNA swabs would have excluded the presence of defendant’s DNA on the firearm, this evidence would not have been material at trial or in the plea negotiations before trial.” The court also rejected his claims that his trial counsel was ineffective: (1) as to the alleged Brady violation; and (2) for failing to move to suppress the firearm on Second Amendment grounds. “Because defendant cannot establish that the DNA swabs were material, he also cannot establish prejudice arising from trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate the DNA swabs.” Further, he did not show “the outcome of the suppression hearing would have been different because the gun would not have been suppressed on these grounds, and would still have been used as evidence in defendant’s CCW trial.” And counsel “was not ineffective for failing to make a futile motion.” Finally, the court rejected his contention that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the firearm evidence on the basis it was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. “Under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable suspicion existed to stop defendant for a limited search.” Affirmed.