Right to a speedy trial; People v Williams; People v Gilmore; People v Quatrail Smith; Sentencing; Scoring of OVs 7, 8, & 10; MCL 777.37(1)(a); MCL 777.38(1)(a); MCL 777.40(1)(b); “Exploit” (MCL 777.40(3)(b)); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to OV scoring; Futile objection
The court held that: (1) defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated; (2) the trial court did not err in scoring OVs 7, 8, and 10 in sentencing him; and (3) defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile objection to the OV scoring. He was convicted of AWIGBH and aggravated domestic violence, and sentenced to 47 months to 15 years in prison for the former and a year in jail for the latter. Because the delay between his arrest and trial was 4 years, it was presumed to be prejudicial and the prosecution had the burden to prove lack of prejudice. As “to the reasons for the delay, some delays were attributed to each party, but the majority of [them] were neutral or attributable to defendant. The three-month period between” his arrest and preliminary exam “may partially be attributable to the prosecution, but with minimal weight, because these were ‘delays inherent in the court system.’” The court also noted some of the delay appeared “related to a request for evaluation of competency and criminal responsibility. . . . Further, delays resulting from the withdrawal of defense counsel cannot be attributed to the prosecution.” In addition, delays due to “defense counsel’s request for adjournment and additional discovery is not attributable to the prosecution. As for the delays resulting from the pandemic,” the court held in Quatrail Smith that these “‘are not attributable to the prosecution for purposes of a speedy-trial claim.’ Overall,” the record did not show “that the majority of the delay was attributable to the prosecutor.” The factor of defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial weighed in his favor. As to prejudice, he contended “he suffered untreated dental problems and sleep apnea, plus the anxiety of awaiting trial.” However, anxiety alone “is not sufficient to establish a speedy-trial violation.” As to prejudice to the defense, he asserted “one of his primary witnesses died” before trial. But he did not explain “what this witness would have presented.” He also failed to identify unnamed witnesses, “describe the nature of their testimony, or offer proof that he” tried unsuccessfully to call them as witnesses. Thus, while he established a level of prejudice, he did not show “that the delay impaired his defense to such an extent that his right to a speedy trial was violated.” The court also upheld the trial court’s scoring of 50 points for OV 7, 15 points for OV 8, and 10 points for OV 10. Affirmed.
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