Double jeopardy; Scoring of OV 19; Interference with the administration of justice; MCL 777.49(c); People v Hershey; People v Sours; Failure to appear at sentencing; Principle that an OV score is not a form of punishment; People v Gibson; An appellant’s failure to develop an argument

Holding that the assessment of points under OV 19 was not a form of punishment and did not implicate defendant’s double-jeopardy protections, the court affirmed her conviction and sentence. She pled guilty to conducting a criminal enterprise for operating a prostitution ring. After she failed to appear at sentencing, the trial court sentenced her to 60 days in jail for contempt, which it later reduced to 30 days. It later sentenced her as a second-offense habitual offender to 5 years and 10 months to 30 years. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the trial court violated double jeopardy by assessing points under OV 19 on the basis that she interfered with the administration of justice by failing to appear at sentencing. She claimed it had already considered her failure to appear and sentenced her to jail for that conduct. “In accordance with Gibson, the trial court’s assessment of 10 points for OV 19 did not constitute punishment and therefore did not implicate” defendant’s double-jeopardy protections. Further, although she did “not contend that the assessment of 10 points for OV 19 was itself improper,” the trial court did not err by scoring 10 points on the basis that she “‘interfered with or attempted to interfere with the administration of justice.’” It noted that “‘[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of “interfere with the administration of justice” for purposes of OV 19 is to oppose so as to hamper, hinder, or obstruct the act or process of administering judgment of individuals or causes by judicial process.’” In addition, OV 19 “‘is generally scored for conduct that constitutes an attempt to avoid being caught and held accountable for the sentencing offense.’” By failing “to appear at sentencing and fleeing the jurisdiction for approximately seven months, [defendant] obstructed the trial court’s ability to administer judgment and hold her accountable for the sentencing offense.”