Vacation & modification of arbitration awards; MCL 600.5081; MCR 3.602(K)(2); Whether an arbitrator exceeded his authority when interpreting a lease agreement; Mistake of law; Washington v Washington; Request for attorney fees under the lease & MCL 691.1705; “Prevailing party”; Ronnisch Constr Group, Inc v Lofts on the Nine, LLC; Pontiac Country Club v Waterford Twp; Common area maintenance (CAM) fees; CAM, insurance, & taxes (CIT)

Concluding that the arbitrator did not make a mistake of law in interpreting the parties’ lease agreement, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. On defendant’s cross-appeal, it held that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s request for attorney fees under the lease and MCL 691.1705. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s denial of plaintiff’s motion to vacate an arbitration award and grant of defendant’s competing motion to confirm the award, and its denial of defendant’s request for attorney fees. Plaintiff contended “the arbitrator erroneously read language into the contract allowing defendant to combine its CIT costs.” Plaintiff specifically asserted “that the arbitrator misinterpreted the word ‘cumulative’ and should have given the word its technical definition in the field of real estate taxation.” Plaintiff argued that had the arbitrator done so, “defendant would have been prevented from combining its CIT costs over multiple lease years.” The court noted that a “facial review of the lease agreement and award” provided it “no indication of how the arbitrator defined ‘cumulative,’ or what definition he used in his interpretation. Our facial review of the agreement does not consider the arbitrator’s mental indicia.” It further noted that because “the arbitrator did not provide his reasoning,” it could not “infer what that reasoning would have been. Even if that were not the case, plaintiff provides no evidence demonstrating that the arbitrator was required to utilize a technical definition of the word ‘cumulative.’ Rather, plaintiff merely presumes that the arbitrator erred in his interpretation because the technical definition of” the word supported its interpretation of the lease. “But the lease agreement itself does not contain a provision mandating technical definitions for its words.” As to defendant’s cross-appeal, plain language in the lease established “that the prevailing party is entitled to the reimbursement of attorney fees.” But the lease did not define the term. And case precedent (Ronnisch and Pontiac Country Club) requires “some change in the parties’ positions after the litigation” for there to be a prevailing party. “Here, there was no change in the parties’ positions.” And under MCL 691.1705(3)’s plain language, “only a prevailing party can request attorney fees and costs.”