Notice of claim against the state; MCL 600.6431(1); Principle that plaintiffs always must comply with MCL 600.6431(1) to sue the state, regardless of the forum; Christie v Wayne State Univ (overruling Tyrrell v University of MI); Retroactivity of Christie; Flamont v Department of Corrs, Landin v Department of Health & Human Servs, & Hudson v Department of Corrs (Hudson I); Stare decisis; MCR 7.215(C)(2); Obiter dicta; Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)

Holding that its decision in Flamont bound the panel in Landin to apply Christie, the special conflict panel affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s lawsuit in this case. Plaintiff filed her claim against defendant-MDOC in the circuit court after the court’s decision in Tyrrell and before the Supreme Court’s decision in Christie, and she did not comply with the notice requirement in MCL 600.6431(1). The MDOC sought dismissal on the basis of governmental immunity, and the circuit court, reasoning that Christie applies retroactively, granted the motion and dismissed the case. On appeal, in Hudson I the court acknowledged that, given the procedural posture, it was bound by Landin to reverse the grant of summary disposition and remand for the lawsuit to proceed. However, “because the panel believed that Landin conflicted with Flamont, it ‘call[ed] for the convening of a special panel under MCR 7.215(J)(3) to consider the conflict between Flamont and that of Landin relative to the retroactivity of Christie.’” Noting that its task was “to analyze whether the panel deciding Landin was bound by” Flamont, the special conflict panel concluded that it was. In Flamont, the court “declared that Christie has ‘full retroactive effect.’ The analysis in Landin regarding Christie’s application to post-Tyrrell cases was thorough, detailed, and well thought out; however, it was irreconcilable with Flamont’s holding that Christie is fully retroactive.” The only way “Landin and Flamont could coexist is if the statement in Flamont that Christie is entirely retroactive can be construed as dictum.” It cannot be. In Flamont, the court “was squarely presented with the question of whether Christie’s application was retroactive or prospective.” The court’s “answer that Christie is fully retroactive was directly germane to the question with which it was presented.” As such, although the court “raised important questions in Landin about the equity of enforcing Christie against those whom lost their claims in reliance on Tyrrell, the Landin panel was nevertheless bound by the Flamont panel.”