Validity of a search warrant; The particularity requirement; Cell phone searches; People v Hughes; Riley v California; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Strickland v Washington; Motion to suppress

The court’s lead opinion held that the search warrant for defendant’s cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. But he raised this claim through a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and the lead opinion concluded he did not establish “that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel under the” Strickland standard. Thus, while it agreed “with the Court of Appeals on the underlying merits,” it disagreed that he was “entitled to reversal of his convictions on this basis.” As a result, it reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment in that regard and remanded the case to that court to consider his remaining issues. The lead opinion found it “difficult to conclude that the first sentence” of the search warrant at issue, “which arguably has some limiting language, provides any meaningful affirmative limitation on the remaining sentences—most importantly, the fourth sentence, which allows a search for ‘any and all data.’” It could not “conclude that a practical reading of the search warrant at issue would sufficiently inform an executing officer how to reasonably conduct a limited and constitutionally particular search. The lack of instruction on the scope, breadth, or focus of the search shifts the particularity requirement from the warrant, where it belongs, to the executing officer’s discretion.” The lead opinion rejected the prosecution’s assertion “that a warrant that specifies the items to be seized by their relation to designated crimes provides sufficient guidance to the executing officers,” finding that specifying “the crime under investigation is necessary, but not usually sufficient to ensure adequate particularity in the context of a cell-phone search warrant.” The lead opinion noted that it could not and did “not create a per se rule of specificity that applies to all cell-phone searches.” But it stated that “when information concerning the relevant time frame of the criminal activity exists, this time limitation should be included in the search warrant to ensure adequate particularity.” It also noted that another common particularity limit found in other states’ case law “focuses on the categories of data to be searched.” It determined that “the degree of particularity required to adequately direct a search depends on the crime being investigated and the items sought.” Turning to the ineffective assistance of counsel aspect, the lead opinion found that defendant did not show “that it was objectively unreasonable for [his] attorney not to have filed a motion to suppress on” the basis of the particularity requirement.

Concurring in the result only, Justice Zahra agreed with the lead opinion that defendant was “not entitled to relief based on his ineffective-assistance challenge.” But he disagreed with it on two points. He found it (1) overreached “by addressing the Fourth Amendment particularity issue” and (2) erred in concluding “that the warrant was insufficiently particular.”

Concurring in the result, Justice Bernstein agreed with the decision to reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand “because defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim” failed under the Strickland standard. He wrote separately because he disagreed “with the lead opinion’s decision to reach the” particularity requirement question.

Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Justice Bolden agreed with the lead opinion that the search warrant violated the particularity requirement but disagreed as to the ineffective assistance of counsel issue. She would affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment in full.