Termination of parental rights; Reasonable reunification efforts; Exception; MCL 712A.19a(2)(a); Aggravated circumstances; MCL 722.638(1) & (2); In re Simonetta; Whether a parent has subjected their child to aggravated circumstances under MCL 722.638(1)(a)(ii) when the parent facilitates criminal sexual conduct involving penetration of the child but he or she does not commit the alleged act; “Child abuse,” “sexual exploitation,” & “prostitution”; A parent’s failure to take reasonable steps to intervene to eliminate the risk to the child; Advice of rights; MCR 3.965(B)(15); Prejudice

The court held that a parent who facilitates criminal sexual conduct involving penetration of a child but does not personally commit the act has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances alleviating the DHHS from making reunification efforts before termination. Thus, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights. The DHHS filed a permanent custody petition alleging it was contrary to the children’s welfare to remain with respondent because of improper supervision, sexual abuse, sex trafficking, threatened harm, and drug abuse. The trial court terminated her parental rights. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the trial court erred when it held that aggravating circumstances existed and that the DHHS did not need to offer reunification services to the mother. The court disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ statutory interpretation. “MCL 722.638(1)(a)(ii) is satisfied when a parent or other listed individual is the perpetrator of abuse, and the abuse ‘included’ criminal sexual conduct involving penetration; however, that does not mean that the parent must have committed the act of criminal sexual conduct involving penetration.” The child’s testimony confirmed the “abuse included criminal sexual conduct involving penetration.” In this case, “both MCL 722.638(1)(a)(ii) and MCL 722.638(2) were satisfied.” As such, “MCL 712A.19a(2)(a) applies, and reasonable efforts to reunify the children and family were not required.” The trial court “was permitted to terminate respondent’s parental rights at the initial dispositional” hearing, and the “Court of Appeals erred by holding otherwise.” Finally, although the trial court plainly erred “by failing to advise respondent of her right to appeal the removal decision, the error was not prejudicial.” She could not “show that, had she been advised of her appellate rights after the preliminary hearing, the outcome of these proceedings would have been different.”

Concurring, Justice Bolden agreed “fully with the majority’s recitation of facts and determination that in this set of circumstances—where a trial court has found there was clear and convincing evidence that respondent sexually abused her child” by exploiting the child “through prostitution to obtain drugs—aggravated circumstances were present.” But she wrote “separately to clarify that aggravated circumstances are found only in rare situations and must be considered on a case-by-case basis.”