Lesser offense jury instructions; Voluntary manslaughter instruction; People v Mendoza; “Heat of passion” killing; Maher v People; People v Yeager; People v Pouncey; Harmless error; People v Cornell

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed Part II of the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 82205 in the 9/11/24 edition), holding that the trial court erred in refusing to give a voluntary-manslaughter instruction and that the error was not harmless. It also vacated the remainder of the Court of Appeals’ opinion because the instructional error was dispositive, vacated defendant’s second-degree murder conviction, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The court concluded “there was evidence to support each prong of voluntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals majority erred by discounting the provocation presented here based on defendant’s role as an initial aggressor. Michigan caselaw does not per se bar an instruction on voluntary manslaughter in cases where the defendant is the initial aggressor or where there is mixed evidence regarding who initiated the circumstances that led to the provocation.” The court noted that “viewing the entire transaction—including defendant’s role in the affray at the bar and his aggressive acts of tire slashing—may ultimately not be beneficial to [him]. But as a matter of law, a rational view of the evidence supports providing the voluntary-manslaughter instruction and allowing the jury to make this determination.” The court also concluded that it could not say the error was harmless. The “fact that the jury chose to convict defendant of second-degree murder” did not necessarily indicate what it would have done if it had been properly instructed on voluntary manslaughter. And while it “was given information about the existence of voluntary manslaughter” the jury was not “given the opportunity to adopt that charge.”

Justice Welch agreed with the majority that a rational view of the evidence supported a voluntary manslaughter instruction and that the trial court erred in failing to give it, but believed that the error was harmless. Thus, she joined Part III of Justice Bernstein’s dissent (concerning harmless error) and would not reverse defendant’s conviction.

Justice Bernstein, joined by Justice Zahra, found that the facts showed “defendant was not objectively provoked by a minor shove and that any heat of passion on [his] part clearly existed long before his encounter with” the victim. Thus, “considering the factual circumstances as a whole, a rational view of the evidence does not support a voluntary-manslaughter instruction.” He further concluded that, even “if the trial court erred, any error is harmless in this case.”