Search & seizure; Investigatory stop; Terry v Ohio; Reasonable suspicion; Scope of detention; De facto arrest; Probable cause; Search incident to arrest; Search warrant for blood draw; Custodial interrogation; Miranda v Arizona; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Jury instructions; Unanimity; Cumulative error; Sentencing; Refusal to admit guilt; People v Pennington

The court held that defendant’s detention and arrest were lawful, the search of his wallet and the warrant for his blood draw were valid, and his remaining claims involving Miranda, jury instructions, ineffective assistance of counsel, cumulative error, and sentencing did not warrant relief. He was convicted of OWI, third offense, resisting or obstructing, and driving with a suspended license after a single-vehicle crash. Trooper-B encountered him walking alone away from the direction of the crash on a rural road in below-freezing weather. He was staggering, smelled strongly of alcohol, and repeatedly tried to leave. On appeal, the court concluded the initial detention was supported by reasonable suspicion. The trooper “possessed a reasonable suspicion that defendant had been driving while intoxicated, which justified a temporary seizure to verify or dispel the suspicion of criminal activity.” Although handcuffing defendant and placing him in the patrol vehicle made the detention more restrictive, “the increase in both the length of the stop, and the necessity of more restrictive methods for accomplishing it, are primarily attributable to defendant.” Even if the detention became an arrest, the facts “were sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that defendant had been driving while intoxicated and there was probable cause to arrest.” The wallet search was consequently “a valid search incident to arrest,” and the blood-warrant affidavit supported a finding that evidence of his blood-alcohol content would be discovered. The court deemed his Miranda claim abandoned because he focused on custody while “completely ignoring the equally important issue of ‘interrogation.’” His requested unlawful-police-conduct instructions were likewise abandoned, while a specific unanimity instruction was unnecessary because “the alternative acts were part of the same course of conduct and were not materially distinct.” Finally, the sentencing court “was not chastising defendant for exercising his right to have a jury trial” but was reacting to his efforts to assert innocence “in a disingenuous and dishonest manner.” Affirmed.