Termination at initial disposition; Required judicial determination; MCL 712A.19a; §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) & (j); Failure to challenge an alternative statutory ground; Children’s best interests; Reasonable reunification efforts; Department of Health & Human Services (DHHS)
The court held that the trial court erred by terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights to her two youngest children at initial disposition without making the judicial determination required by MCL 712A.19a, but it did not err in terminating her rights to the six older children or in finding that the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts. The six older children were removed after concerns involving unsafe housing, including respondent’s decision to live with her father, who had sexually abused her as a child. The twins were born during the proceedings and became subject to a separate petition. On appeal, the court sua sponte determined that termination as to the twins was erroneous because “[n]either the trial court’s order nor findings made at the termination hearing include the judicial determination required by law” concerning reasonable efforts or whether such efforts were unnecessary. As to the six older children, respondent challenged § (c)(i) but not § (j). Because “[o]nly one statutory ground is required for termination,” her failure to challenge § (j) independently defeated her statutory-grounds argument. The court nonetheless found no error as to § (c)(i), concluding that the trial court’s finding “that the conditions leading to the adjudication continued to exist and there was no reasonable likelihood that they would be rectified within a reasonable time is supported by factual findings made based on the record as a whole.” Her housing remained inadequate, she had not sufficiently benefited from counseling or parenting services, and she continued to have limited parenting abilities. Those circumstances also supported the best-interest determination because “there was no evidence that respondent-mother significantly benefited from the services in which she participated.” Finally, the court rejected her reasonable-efforts challenge. The DHHS offered psychological evaluation, counseling, parenting services, supportive visitation, and other assistance, and her “failure to fully comply with counseling was not a failure of the DHHS.” The court affirmed termination as to the six older children, vacated as to the twins, and remanded for reasonable reunification efforts unless the trial court properly determines they are not required.
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