Allegedly anonymous jury; Use of juror numbers; Due process; People v Williams; People v Hanks; Hearsay; Statements for medical treatment or diagnosis; MRE 803(4); Sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) examination; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Sufficiency of the evidence; Unlawful imprisonment; MCL 750.349b; Jury unanimity; Alternative means of sexual penetration; People v Cooks; People v Chelmicki
The court held that: 1) referring to prospective jurors by number did not violate defendant’s due-process rights, 2) the complainant’s statements during her SANE examination were admissible under the medical-treatment hearsay exception, 3) sufficient evidence supported unlawful imprisonment, and 4) a specific unanimity instruction was not required for the CSC I charge. He was convicted of CSC I and unlawful imprisonment arising from a violent sexual assault. On appeal, defendant first asserted that using juror numbers created an anonymous jury. The court disagreed because no biographical information was shown to have been withheld, counsel’s questioning demonstrated familiarity with jurors’ backgrounds, and nothing suggested the numbering practice impaired meaningful voir dire or undermined the presumption of innocence. “Where the record reflects that jurors were referred to by number, rather than by name, solely for logistical convenience,” without withholding material information, “no due process violation occurs.” The complainant’s statements to the SANE nurse were also admissible. She sought emergency medical treatment shortly after the assault and received medication for potential disease exposure. Thus, “the record supports that the complainant sought medical treatment, and her statements to medical personnel fall within” MRE 803(4). Counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile objection. As to unlawful imprisonment, evidence that defendant carried the complainant into another room, physically restrained her, and held her down while sexually assaulting her permitted a rational jury to find the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, the general unanimity instruction was sufficient. CSC I requires sexual penetration, which can be accomplished by alternative means, and “this case did not involve allegations of multiple, distinct incidents of nonconsensual sexual penetration.” Because the evidence concerned a single violent sexual assault and there was no basis to conclude the jurors were confused about the factual basis of guilt, “jury unanimity as to the specific means of penetration was not required.” Affirmed.
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