Personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; Effectiveness of an opt out of PIP benefits under MCL 500.3107d; Northland Radiology v Allstate Fire & Cas Ins Co; Award of attorney fees under MCL 500.3148; Reasonableness of an insurer’s refusal to pay; Qualified health coverage (QHC)
Concluding that the facts here were indistinguishable from Northland, the court held that the insured’s election to opt out of PIP benefits was ineffective and defendant-Pioneer was liable to pay plaintiff-hospital (Bronson) allowable medical expenses and interest. But attorney fees should not have been awarded “under MCL 500.3148 because Pioneer’s refusal to pay the claim was not unreasonable as a matter of law.” Bronson provided treatment to the adult son of Pioneer’s insured (B) after he was injured in a pedestrian/motor vehicle accident. He had no QHC or auto “insurance policy providing PIP benefits of his own.” He regularly slept on B’s couch, but she did not mention him when she renewed her policy before the accident. “She elected to opt out of PIP medical expense benefits by utilizing the ‘Medicare Opt Out’ option.” The court noted that here, as in Northland, “the named insured was a qualified person, meaning that she had health coverage under parts A and B of Medicare; however, her election to opt out was not effective because her resident relative was neither a qualified person, nor did he have QHC or an alternative auto insurance policy that provided PIP medical coverage. Because her opt-out option was not effective, the policy was ‘considered to provide [PIP] benefits under section 3107c(1)(d).’” The court noted it was bound by Northland as a prior, published opinion. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s order granting Bronson’s summary disposition motion and denying Pioneer’s motion as to liability for the son’s medical expenses. But it reversed the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Bronson. When it “sent its letter demanding payment and filed its complaint, Pioneer’s refusal to pay Bronson’s claim was the product of either a legitimate question of statutory construction and/or factual uncertainty. There was factual uncertainty as to whether” the son was B’s resident relative. He was 49 years old, and during “the six years this policy had been in place, he was never mentioned to Pioneer; in fact, [B] testified that she intentionally did not discuss him with either Pioneer or her insurance agent.” Further, Pioneer denied the claim because of B’s election based on its “interpretation of MCL 500.3107d—albeit an interpretation” the court now had to conclude was incorrect based on binding precedent. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
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