Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Sufficiency of the evidence to support the defendant’s CSC I convictions under MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(i); People v. Phillips; Sexual penetration defined (MCL 750.520a(r)); Members of the same household; People v. Garrison; Principle that no physical evidence is required to establish the elements of CSC I; People v. Szalma; Principle that a victim’s testimony may be sufficient in CSC cases to support a defendant’s conviction; People v. Solloway; MCL 750.520h; Credibility; People v. Harrison; People v. Noble; Effect of the fact the victim could not remember all the details of the assaults; Distinguishing People v. Callahan; Sentencing; Principle that a reasonableness & proportionality argument only applies to minimum sentences that depart from the recommended guidelines sentence range; People v. Schrauben; Claim that the trial court gave no reasoning for the sentences as required by People v. Lockridge; People v. Conley
Holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s CSC I convictions under MCL 750.520b(1)(b)(i) and rejecting his challenges to his sentences, the court affirmed his convictions and sentences. The victim was his fiancé’s 14-year-old daughter. He did not contest her age or the fact that they were members of the same household. The issue was whether there was sufficient evidence that sexual penetration occurred. While he argued that there was insufficient evidence because there was no physical evidence, physical evidence is not necessary to establish the elements of CSC I. As to his challenge to the victim’s credibility, the jury heard the testimony of the victim and her school social worker, and determined their credibility when it found defendant guilty. He also contended that the victim was not credible because she could not recall all the details of the assaults. The court found the case on which he relied, Callahan, was distinguishable. In Callahan, the victim was not unable to remember “any additional acts of penetration beyond the first act, and there was insufficient circumstantial evidence” for the court to “conclude the additional acts took place.” In this case, the victim remembered “each act of penetration (specifically more than 10 acts, one of which involved fellatio and one of which involved cunnilingus, and multiple penetrations with his penis);” she did not recall “the details surrounding the acts. Thus, since the victim was able to recall the multiple acts of penetration, her testimony provided sufficient evidence for the jury to make its credibility determination.” While defendant also claimed his sentences were unreasonable and disproportionate, his minimum term of 132 months’ imprisonment fell within his applicable guidelines range (81 to 135 months). “A reasonableness and proportionality argument only applies to minimum sentences that depart from the recommended guidelines sentence range.” As to his argument that the trial court failed to comply with Lockridge because it gave no reasoning for his sentences, the court disagreed, concluding that “the trial court satisfied its articulation requirement.”
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas; Whether he was entitled to withdraw his pleas because he did not understand what a “consecutive sentence” meant; MCR 6.302(B); People v. Cole; People v. Johnson; People v. Fonville; Factual predicate; People v. Hoag; Whether there was a sufficient factual basis for his pleas; MCR 6.302(D); People v. Eloby (After Remand); People v. Downey; Aiding & abetting three counts of CSC I; MCL 767.39
The court held that because the trial court followed the procedures set forth in MCR 6.302 to ensure a voluntary, understanding, and accurate plea during the plea hearing, it did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. He pleaded guilty to three counts of CSC I, four counts of armed robbery, and one count of first-degree home invasion. He claimed that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. He argued that he was entitled to withdraw his pleas because he did not understand what a “consecutive sentence” meant. “However, the trial court is only required to disclose the direct consequences of a defendant’s plea that automatically affect the range of his sentence.” As consecutive sentencing “was discretionary, i.e., not mandatory,” here, the trial court was not required to inform him of the possibility that the sentences for his convictions would run consecutively. Further, defendant’s argument was not supported by anything in the record. At the plea hearing, the trial court discussed consecutive sentencing with him and both attorneys. It “reiterated the portion of the plea agreement relating to consecutive sentencing, and defendant stated on the record that it was consistent with his understanding of the plea agreement.” Had he “truly not understood the term, this would have provided an opportunity for him to articulate any confusion. But, he did not do so.” Thus, because the record lacked support for his argument, it failed. In addition to advising him of the maximum potential sentence and any minimum sentence requirements, the trial court was also required to “establish support for a finding that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged or the offense to which defendant is pleading.” He argued that he was entitled to withdraw his pleas because there was an insufficient factual basis for them. The court held that based on the facts elicited from him at the plea hearing, he “could have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aiding and abetting three counts of CSC I.” Affirmed.
Motion to suppress; Terry stop; Terry v. Ohio; People v. Williams; Whether the officer had an articulable & reasonable suspicion for the initial traffic stop; People v. Dillon; People v. Christie (On Remand); Credibility; People v. Davis; Whether the officer’s detention of defendant after returning his documentation was reasonably related to the underlying reason for the stop; Rodriquez v. United States; “Seizure”; People v. Jenkins; People v. Shankle; Whether defendant’s consent to search his vehicle was voluntary; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte; Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress. The trial court properly concluded that Trooper G had articulable and reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle, that he was no longer “seized” pursuant to the Fourth Amendment once G returned defendant’s documentation and advised him that he would not be writing a ticket, and that defendant voluntarily consented to answering G’s additional questions and to the vehicle search. He was convicted of possession with intent to deliver 45 kilograms or more of marijuana. He challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress. He argued that G did not have an articulable and reasonable suspicion for the initial traffic stop, i.e., that G’s action in pulling him over was not justified at its inception. The record supported the trial court’s finding that G “had an articulable and reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle.” G testified that “he observed defendant’s vehicle cross the fog line and divider lines several times. Video footage from his patrol vehicle supported this testimony.” The trial court found G’s testimony credible, and the court deferred to the trial court’s determination in this regard. Thus, G had articulable and reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. The fact that defendant found the “reasons” for the stop “trivial” had no impact on the court’s analysis. Also, the trial court properly concluded that defendant was no longer seized after G returned his documentation and advised him that he would not receive a ticket. Further, the trial court properly concluded that his consent to search his vehicle was voluntary. There was no evidence that G coerced or threatened him in any way.
Claim that an 18-month delay in effecting the defendant’s arrest violated his rights to due process, to a fair trial, to present a defense, & to confrontation; People v. Musser; United States v. Marion; United States v. Lovasco; People v. Woolfolk; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Carbin; Strickland v. Washington; Failure to make a meritless motion; People v. Comella; Sentencing; Reasonableness; People v. Lockridge; Principle of proportionality; People v. Steanhouse; People v. Milbourn; Effect of the trial court’s consideration of defendant’s motion for resentencing; People v. Masroor & the federal “reasonableness” standard articulated in Gall v. United States; Assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH); Felon in possession (FIP)
Concluding that the defendant presented no evidence of actual and substantial prejudice, and instead generally speculated that the passage of time affected his ability to locate evidence or witnesses, the court rejected his claim that the approximately 18-month delay in his arrest violated his rights to due process, to a fair trial, to present a defense, and to confront the evidence and witnesses against him. It also held that he failed to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test as to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and that his sentencing challenges had no merit. Thus, it affirmed his convictions and sentences for armed robbery, unlawful imprisonment, CSC II, AWIGBH, FIP, felonious assault, and felony-firearm, second offense. He claimed that the arrest delay prejudiced him because (1) it prevented him from being able to prove that he had entered into a relocation agreement to establish that the house where the crimes occurred (the Linda Vista house) was no longer his and (2) “he was unable to obtain evidence or witnesses from Fed Ex to establish that the victim had arranged to have a package delivered to the Linda Vista address.” He did not claim that “the police or prosecution intentionally delayed his arrest in order to gain some tactical advantage.” Further, assuming that there was a relocation agreement and that “the victim was awaiting a Fed Ex package, this would not establish that someone other than defendant beat the victim. She graphically described the beating she received from defendant. Evidence that defendant did not own the Linda Vista home (which was not disputed) and that the victim had requested delivery of a Fed Ex package to that address (if true) did not negate the incontrovertible facts that she was severely beaten, that the scene at the home supported her claim that she was beaten there,” and that her purse was found in the trunk of the car he had been driving. Further, her mother “supported her explanation of why she had gone to the Linda Vista house and her claim that she and defendant had gone into the house together,” and “she unequivocally and immediately named defendant as her assailant and the man who took her property.” It also would not explain why he “evidently hid from the police for almost 18 months or why he initially denied his identity when he was finally apprehended.”
Reversal of the district court’s order granting the plaintiff’s motion to preliminarily enjoin the State of Michigan from enforcing a ban on “ballot selfies”
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] In an order, the court reversed the district court’s order granting the plaintiff’s motion to preliminarily enjoin the State of Michigan from enforcing a ban on ballot exposure and photography at the polls against voters who take “ballot selfies.” The court stayed the injunction before the 2016 election. The parties “agree that summary reversal of the preliminary injunction is appropriate in light of [the] stay and the merits proceedings in the district court.” The court already considered the arguments regarding the plaintiff’s likelihood of success when it issued the stay, and full briefing would be unlikely to alter its determination.
Claim under a homeowner’s policy for a fire loss; Applicability of the doctrines of estoppel or waiver of defenses; Harbor Ins. Co. v. Continental Bank Corp. (7th Cir.); E Tackels v. Fantin; Castner v. Farmers’ Mut. Fire Ins. Co.; Smith v. Grange Mut. Fire Ins. Co.; Smit v. Kaechele; Effect of a blanket reservation of rights; Meirthew v. Last; Principle that the doctrines will not be applied to broaden a policy’s coverage; Kirschner v. Process Design Assoc., Inc.; Ruddock v. Detroit Life Ins. Co.; Insured’s burden to establish that the policy covers the loss; Distinguishing Heniser v. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. & McGrath v. Allstate Ins. Co.; Banks v. Auto Club Group Ins. Co. (Unpub.)
Concluding that a genuine issue of material fact existed and that estoppel or waiver of defenses applied, the court reversed the trial court’s order granting the defendant-insurer summary disposition in this action on a claim under a homeowner’s policy for a fire loss, and remanded for further proceedings. Defendant asserted that the loss was not covered because the property was not at the time of the loss being used by plaintiffs as their residence. Plaintiffs contended that defendant waived this defense by not asserting it in the first letter denying coverage. The 10/22/13 rescission letter alleged “misrepresentation at the time the policy was ‘accepted’ or renewed” on 11/ 9/12, “not the condition of the residence at the time of the loss. The part of the policy that defendant relied on to rescind the policy was General Policy Condition No. 4, Fraud and Concealment. The trial court ruled there was no evidence to support that plaintiffs committed fraud or concealed material facts.” While the rescission letter concerned whether the property was “owner-occupied,” it did not reference the date of fire. Because the 10/22/13 rescission letter did “not notify plaintiffs of the residency defense, the general rule of estoppel would preclude defendant from asserting this unstated defense to an action on the policy.” The court noted that defendant “denied the claim after a full investigation, so it had knowledge of all necessary facts to assert its residency defense when it denied plaintiffs’ claim.” Thus, it could be said that the “failure to assert the residency defense was a knowing waiver.” Further, the blanket reservation of rights in a 10/24/13 letter “provided absolutely no notice to plaintiffs of the later asserted defense.” Plaintiffs were correct that this case was readily distinguishable from Heniser and McGrath. Because the policy language here covered “the residence premises stated in the declarations, ‘used as a private residence by you,’ and grants permission to the insureds to leave the premises ‘unoccupied without limit of time,’ a genuine question of material fact” remained for a jury to decide whether plaintiffs continued to use the home “principally as a private residence” when the fire loss occurred.
Whether the intervening plaintiffs-providers had an independent cause of action for reimbursement for medical & transportation services provided to the plaintiff; Effect of the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; MCL 500.3112; Wyoming Chiropractic Health Clinic, PC v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.; Covenant Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; Bahri v. IDS Prop. Cas. Ins. Co.; TBCI, PC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; Dawoud v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; Chiropractors Rehab Group, PC v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.; Order dismissing the case under MCR 2.504(B)(1), MCR 2.313(B)(2)(c) & (D)(1)(a) with prejudice as an adjudication on the merits; Washington v. Sinai Hosp. of Greater Detroit; Whether plaintiff’s claim was properly dismissed; Woods v. SLB Prop. Mgmt., LLC; Trial courts’ inherent authority to sanction litigants & their counsel; Maldonado v. Ford Motor Co.; Dismissal as a drastic sanction; Vicencio v. Jaime Ramirez MD, PC; Requirement that the trial court evaluate all available options on the record; Grimm v. Treasury Dep’t; Consideration of possible lesser sanctions; Grimmer v. Lee; Whether the providers could challenge the dismissal of plaintiff’s claim; Spires v. Bergman; “Aggrieved party”; Department of Consumer & Indus. Servs. v. Shah
The court rejected the intervening plaintiffs-providers’ argument that they had an independent cause of action against defendant-Farm Bureau regardless of the fact plaintiff-Perryman’s claim for PIP benefits was dismissed with prejudice for violating a court order and failing to attend her deposition. However, it concluded that they had standing to challenge Perryman’s dismissal and that the trial court should have at least considered the impact of the dismissal sanction “on all affected parties and whether a lesser sanction would have better served the interests of justice.” Thus, the court reversed the trial court’s order dismissing all claims and remanded for further proceedings. It first concluded that the dismissal of Perryman’s claim was considered an adjudication on the entire merits of her claim, and as the intervening plaintiffs would stand in her shoes, they would not be entitled to recover PIP benefits for the medical and transportation services they had provided. As in Bahri, “if Perryman, the injured insured, is not entitled to PIP benefits, then intervening plaintiffs, as medical providers, will not be entitled to reimbursement.” However, while the trial court could order the sanction of dismissal for Perryman’s failure to attend her deposition, the court “has upheld the longstanding principle that, when a trial court imposes the sanction of dismissal with prejudice for procedural violations, the trial court is required to carefully evaluate all available options on the record.” Although the trial court briefly explained its decision to dismiss Perryman’s claim, “it did not consider any lesser sanction on the record.” The intervening plaintiffs “presented proof that they were entitled to reimbursement, complied with the trial court’s orders, and in no way delayed or disregarded their obligations to the trial court or defendants. Given that the trial court must evaluate other available options on the record and determine ‘whether a lesser sanction would better serve the interests of justice,’ the trial court abused its discretion when it did neither.”