Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Parole; MCL 791.234; MCL 791.233(1)(a); Parole guidelines; MCL 791.233e(1); Departure from the guidelines; MCL 791.233e(6); Whether the parolee made threats & would be a threat to public safety; MCL 791.233e(7)(d) & (j)
The court held that the circuit court abused its discretion by reversing the Parole Board’s decision to grant appellant-Luckett parole. He was convicted of AWIM for slitting his ex-wife’s throat with a pocket knife. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison. He was denied parole multiple times. In 2020, after nearly 30 years, the Parole Board granted his parole. The prosecution appealed to the circuit court, which found the Parole Board abused its discretion, emphasizing the fact that appellant allegedly threatened to kill the victim upon his release. On appeal, the court found that the circuit court erroneously substituted its judgment for that of the Parole Board. “[W]hile the circuit court faulted the Parole Board for failing to consider threats made by Luckett years ago and whether those threats made [him] a continuing threat to public safety, it appears that the Parole Board did in fact consider the information as well as information regarding Luckett’s current attitude toward the victim and her family.” And while the circuit court “faulted the Parole Board for failing to explore whether [he] currently posed a threat to the victim, it appears that the Board did question [him] about his current attitudes and that it tried to determine whether [he] remained a threat to society.” It appeared that the Parole Board “simply assigned different meaning to the information than did the circuit court.” In addition, there appeared “to have been factors taken into consideration by the circuit court that do not appear in the record.” Reversed and remanded to the circuit court for the limited purpose of reinstating appellant’s parole.
Right to self-representation; Faretta v California; Waiver; MCR 6.005(D); People v Anderson; Whether defendant knowingly, intelligently, & voluntarily waived his right to counsel; People v Williams; The trial court’s duty to explain the dangers & disadvantages of self-representation; Iowa v Tovar; Whether defendant was entitled to a new trial; Principle that denial of counsel at a critical stage of a criminal proceeding is a structural error; Principle that trial & sentencing are critical stages; Whether the denial of defendant’s right to counsel had “a serious effect on the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the trial”
The court held that defendant was entitled to a new trial because the trial court “did not follow the requisite procedure to ensure [he] knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.” He was convicted of AWIGBH and reckless driving after encountering a group of protestors and striking one of them with his vehicle. Defendant waived his right to counsel after he was bound over to the trial court. On appeal, defendant argued his trial was constitutionally deficient because during his waiver of counsel, the trial court did not follow the requisite procedure to ensure he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The prosecution agreed that the trial court erred, but contended defendant was not entitled to relief because the error did not ultimately affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding. The court concurred with the parties that there was no dispute that defendant’s waiver of counsel was ineffective, finding it was “obvious the trial court failed to substantially comply with” the requirements of MCR 6.005(D) and Anderson. It then found that defendant was entitled to a new trial. “[D]efendant’s ineffective waiver denied him the effective assistance of counsel throughout the majority of proceedings in the trial court. The ineffective waiver resulted in [his] not being able to pursue plea negotiations, properly introduce evidence or otherwise conduct effective trial proceedings testing the veracity of the evidence against him or even develop and argue an effective defense to the charges against him.” And the prosecutor “failed to rebut the presumption that the deprivation of defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel had a serious effect on the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the trial.” Vacated and remanded.
Habeas corpus: Confessions; Miranda v Arizona; Antiterrorism & Effective Death Penalty Act “deference”; 28 USC § 2254(d); Whether the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts; Whether petitioner’s confession was “voluntary”; US Const amend XIV, § 1; Lynumn v Illinois
The court affirmed the denial of petitioner-Michael’s habeas petition, holding that the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision denying his appeal did not involve an unreasonable determination of the facts or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. After unsuccessfully moving to have his statements suppressed as involuntary, he pled guilty to first-degree sexual abuse and first-degree sodomy for crimes involving children in his family. The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that even though four of the officers’ statements made during his first interview “‘were delivered in a threatening manner[,]’” they did not induce his confession where he “‘did not make any incriminating statements in response to’” the officers’ comments (that he would be prevented from seeing his children unless he confessed to sexual abuse). The Kentucky Supreme Court also “noted that before the officers made any coercive statements Michael had admitted to touching [one child’s] vagina area three times. Importantly, those three occasions constituted three acts of first-degree sexual abuse.” Viewing the totality of the circumstances, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. In seeking habeas relief, he argued that it “made an unreasonable fact determination by saying that Michael had not made ‘any incriminating statements in response’” to the officers’ comments. He argued that his confession, made two-and-a-half minutes after the officers’ coercive statements, constituted a response and supported a causal connection. However, the court held that it was not unreasonable for the Kentucky Supreme Court to adopt a different interpretation—that he “‘did not make any statements in response to the complained-of comments, despite their confession-inducing design, and remained silent’” after each one. Instead, he responded to other comments they made. Michael also argued his confession was involuntary. But the court held that under the “totality of the circumstances,” it was voluntary. First, it considered his waiver of his Miranda rights. And it rejected his argument that Lynumn, a pre-Miranda case where a woman was threatened with losing her children, was on point, noting there was no Miranda warning in that case and it was otherwise distinguishable. Michael was “a former Marine with a high IQ.” He admitted he had not consumed alcohol or drugs within 24-hours of the interview, and significantly, “[h]e admitted to three acts of first-degree sexual abuse before any of the officers’ coercive statements.”
Custody; Proper cause or a change of circumstances; Established custodial environment (ECE); MCL 722.23; Best-interest factors (a), (b), (c), & (j)
Holding that the trial court’s decision to award sole legal and physical custody of the child-AH to defendant-mother was not an abuse of discretion, the court affirmed. Based upon the consent order entered on 12/4/18, the parties “shared joint legal custody of AH, but defendant had ‘sole physical custody.’” Plaintiff-father sought a modification granting him sole legal and physical custody. “In his ‘motion for order to show cause and to modify custody’ filed on [1/21/20], plaintiff demanded that the trial court ‘[m]odify the Custody Order in this matter, to provide Plaintiff Father with physical and legal custody’ of AH.” The trial court held that an ECE existed only with defendant. “The undisputed evidence revealed that AH spent the majority of his time in defendant’s care throughout his life, and that defendant was his primary caregiver during that time. Defendant ensured that AH’s physical needs were met, that AH was enrolled in school, and that AH received medical care. In contrast, plaintiff agreed that he had never transported AH to dental appointments. Plaintiff also did not attend most of AH’s medical appointments. According to defendant, when plaintiff attended appointments, he interfered while in AH’s presence and made it very difficult to discuss ‘what’s going on.’ This made AH uncomfortable.” The court noted that defendant’s testimony was “supported by the 2019 custody evaluation, which indicates that AH felt more ‘unconditional love’ from defendant and considered her as the ‘more supportive, trustworthy, patient, and comforting’ parent.” AH also considered defendant “the parent who most reliably meets his needs.” In contrast, the court noted “plaintiff doubted AH’s Tourette’s Syndrome diagnosis over several years, and evidence showed that he denigrated defendant in AH’s presence, which is not behavior that would foster a secure relationship. Thus, AH felt more secure in his relationship with defendant, with whom he spent the majority of his time and to whom he looked ‘for guidance, discipline, the necessities of life, and parental comfort.’” As a result, the trial court’s conclusion an ECE “existed only with defendant was not against the great weight of the evidence.” Finally, the court found that the “trial court considered the best-interest factors and the facts and circumstances of this acrimonious case in great detail.”
Boundary dispute; Adverse possession; MCL 600.5801(4); The hostility element; Gorte v Department of Transp; Whether possession was open, visible, & continuous; Acquiescence for the statutory period; Houston v Mint Group, LLC
While the court held that defendants established their adverse possession counterclaim as to a concrete parking area and a landscaping area, it disagreed with the trial court’s ruling that they adversely possessed the whole “Disputed Area.” As to acquiescence for the statutory period, there were genuine issues of material fact as to “whether the parties treated the boundary of the Disputed Area as the property line for 15 years.” Thus, the court affirmed the order quieting “title for defendants in the concrete parking pad and landscaping area identified in” a survey (the Kem-Tec survey) but reversed the order quieting title for them in the rest of the Disputed Area, and remanded. The record showed “defendants, by relying on the plantings, parking area, and red fence left by the previous owners, ‘respected a line that they believed to be the true boundary, but which proved not to be the true boundary.’” A mistake as to the true boundary line does not defeat an adverse possession claim. “Defendants showed that their encroachments onto the Ginotti Property were ‘inconsistent with the right of the owner’ and therefore sufficiently established” the hostility element. Plaintiff conceded “the concrete parking area installed by defendants was open, visible, and continuous.” And the court found that “while the extent of visibility of the landscaping may have varied throughout the year, there is no genuine issue of material fact that the boundaries of the landscaping area were visible for at least 15 years.” But as to the sprinkler system, they did not establish “a claim of adverse possession. Crucially, nowhere in the record is there any clear indication where the underground sprinklers are even located.” In the absence of “clear and cogent evidence that the sprinkler heads even encroach on the Ginotti Property, defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their claim of adverse possession over the property on which the sprinkler system sits.” The court rejected the trial court’s determination they “adversely possessed the entire Disputed Area identified in the Kem-Tec survey.” It noted that their “counterclaim did not even seek possession of the Disputed Area as relief, and thus on that basis alone,” it questioned whether they should have been granted summary disposition as to “this larger strip of land. But even assuming that defect is not fatal, the record” lacked evidence setting the Disputed Area’s western boundary.