Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Dispute over payment for Medicaid-eligible mental health services under MCL 330.1308 & 330.1310, Const 1963, art 8, § 8 & art 9, § 29; “Net cost”; The DHHS’s funding of prepaid inpatient health plans (PIHPs) for mental health treatment; MCL 400.109f; PIHP contracts with community mental health services programs (CMHSPs); CMHSP expenditures; MCL 330.1240; MCL 330.1242; Principle that a constitutional provision is not self-executing when it merely indicates principles without laying down rules by means of which they may be given the force of law; Rusha v Department of Corrs; Whether a party is a third-party beneficiary of a contract; Shay v Aldrich; Mandamus; Lakeshore Regional Entity (LRE)
Holding that defendant-DHHS bore no responsibility to pay plaintiff-HealthWest for its provision of mental health services, and that HealthWest had to seek redress from its PIHP (LRE), the court affirmed the Court of Claims’ ruling. Plaintiffs sued defendants seeking reimbursement for more than $12 million in services funded by Medicaid. The DHHS disclaimed liability, contending it bore no responsibility to pay HealthWest for those services, and that HealthWest had to seek redress from LRE. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that “DHHS approval is implicit because, according to deposition testimony, payment is always eventually made on Medicaid claims.” It noted “the very testimony cited by plaintiffs also reveals that payment for shortfalls is sometimes made with money from the PIHP in accordance with the risk-sharing agreement between the PIHP and the DHHS.” In addition, “[a]ll of the Medicaid services for which HealthWest seeks reimbursement from the DHHS are ‘paid for by federal funds and state funds’ that flow through LRE.” As such, it found plaintiffs’ statutory arguments for reimbursement unavailing. The court also rejected plaintiffs’ claim that the DHHS violated two provisions of the Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 8, § 8 and art 9, § 29, by refusing to provide reimbursement to HealthWest for Medicaid-funded services. “[P]laintiffs cannot present a freestanding claim under Const 1963, art 8, § 8. Instead, they must style their claim as a violation of the Mental Health Code, but they cannot do so because” MCL 330.1308 and MCL 330.1310 “afford them no succor.” As to Const 1963, art 9, § 29, “neither the State of Michigan nor the DHHS required plaintiffs to provide new or increased services when money stopped flowing through LRE.” Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs’ contention that HealthWest is a third-party beneficiary of the bilateral contract between the DHHS and LRE and, in that capacity, they were entitled to have a section of that contract declared void. “Because plaintiffs’ interpretation of MCL 330.1308 and MCL 330.1310 is incorrect,” their argument to void the section at issue was necessarily unavailing. Further, “the statutes cited by plaintiffs manifestly do not impose a duty upon the DHHS to provide the reimbursement demanded by plaintiffs for Medicaid-funded services, so mandamus is not available to force the DHHS to reimburse plaintiffs.” They have “no right to mandamus based upon Const 1963, art 8, § 8.”
Whether evidence a victim viewed lawful pornography, without more is “sexual conduct” subject to the exclusionary bar of the rape-shield statute; “Sexual”; People v Arenda; Basham v Commonwealth (KY); State v Rorie (NC); People v Mason (IL); Whether the evidence was otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence; MRE 401-403; Prior sexual abuse; In camera hearing; Sexual conduct between complainants; Right to present a defense; Discovery of the complainants’ privileged records
The court concluded that evidence “a victim viewed lawful pornography, without more, is not ‘sexual conduct’ subject to the exclusionary bar of the rape-shield statute.” Thus, it remanded the case “to the trial court for consideration whether evidence that” one of the complainants, SU, “viewed pornography is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence.” The court affirmed “the trial court’s orders excluding evidence of prior sexual conduct by the complainants and denying discovery of the complainants’ privileged records.” This interlocutory appeal arose out of the alleged sexual assault of the minor complainants—AU, MU, and SU—by defendant-Masi. Masi argued that the trial court erred by excluding evidence AU and SU had, at various times, viewed pornography. Masi initially asserted that this evidence “is not subject to the rape-shield statute because it is not ‘sexual conduct’ under the law.” The court held that while “the act of viewing pornography constitutes conduct, definitions of ‘sexual’ leave ambiguity about whether the Legislature intended for the phrase ‘sexual conduct’ to pertain to evidence that a victim viewed lawful pornography.” The question was “not whether lawful pornography itself involves content of a sexual nature—we agree that it does—but whether mere exposure or viewing of lawful pornography constitutes sexual conduct. The dictionary definitions do not offer a conclusive resolution of this question. Put another way, while lawful pornography traditionally involves images or videos of individuals engaged in sexual activity, it does not necessarily follow that the individual watching the pornography is engaged in sexual conduct. Particularly with minor victims, viewing pornography could be evidence of a variety of things, including curiosity or accident, that are not sexual in nature.” Our Supreme Court in Arenda “suggested that the sources of a victim’s sexual knowledge may not themselves constitute evidence of ‘sexual conduct.’” The evidence Masi sought to admit included evidence SU viewed pornography on her own. “Without more, such as evidence that the viewer engaged in acts of sexual gratification, evidence of viewing pornography is not ‘sexual conduct’ prohibited under MCL 750.520j.” Further, the court gave “persuasive value to caselaw from sister states that has reached a similar conclusion.” The court emphasized that its “conclusion is confined to the circumstances before us, where there is no evidence that the viewer engaged in sexual acts.”
Consecutive sentencing; People v Ryan; MCL 750.520b(3); Adequate justification; People v Norfleet (Norfleet I & II)
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a consecutive sentence for one of defendant’s eight CSC I convictions. He was originally sentenced to 10 to 20 years for each conviction, with the sentences for 3 convictions to run consecutive to those for 3 of the others. The court previously remanded for “the trial court to provide a sufficient justification for imposing consecutive sentencing, or for resentencing.” Defendant argued in this appeal that the trial court on remand failed to give an adequate justification for imposing the consecutive sentence. But the court found that the trial court’s conclusion the “guidelines did not adequately take into account the number of convictions defendant received was not outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Eight crimes against a person are significantly more than three crimes against a person, and eight concurrent convictions are significantly more than two concurrent convictions. None of the variables specifically took into account all eight counts at once.” In addition, the trial court explained that “the circumstances of defendant’s convictions, as well as the wide-reaching effect of his actions, were not adequately reflected in the” guidelines. Defendant was correct “that OV 10 was assessed at 15 points (the maximum possible points) for all the counts because the trial court concluded that [he] engaged in ‘predatory conduct[.]’ However, the trial court’s conclusion that OV 10 (and the scoring guidelines as a whole) did not adequately take into account the extent of [his] predatory conduct, the aggravating circumstances surrounding the convictions, and the wide-reaching effect of [his] actions, was not outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. The trial court listed several specific” surrounding circumstances that could merit a consecutive sentence – the CSC took place “over a period of two to three months;” the victim (AM) was only 15 years old when it occurred; “AM’s mother was pregnant with defendant’s child at the time of the conduct; and his actions broke up a family. These circumstances go beyond predatory conduct, showing a pattern of behavior and aggravating circumstances.” The court found that the “trial court’s reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence” were at least as specific as those given by the trial court in Norfleet II.
Payment of PIP benefits; Priority defense; MCL 500.3114(4); “Eligible injured person”; “Insured person”; Applicability of the mend-the-hold doctrine; Mootness; Proposed complaint amendment to add a promissory estoppel claim
In these consolidated appeals arising from defendant-Progressive’s denial of PIP benefits to plaintiff-Ridenour, the court held that given the absence of any indication in the policy language that Progressive intended for Ridenour to be an insured for purposes of PIP coverage, Progressive was not his “insurer for purposes of determining priority for payment of his PIP benefits under MCL 500.3114(4).” Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to Progressive, denial of Ridenour’s cross-motion for summary disposition, and denial of his motion to amend his complaint to add a promissory estoppel claim. The trial court properly granted Progressive summary disposition because Progressive was “not the insurer of the owner, registrant, or operator of the vehicle involved in the accident.” Ridenour contended the mend-the-hold doctrine precluded “Progressive from prevailing on its priority defense because it did not reference that defense in its pre-suit correspondence denying his claim for PIP benefits.” The court noted that “Progressive’s stated reason for denying the claim was that there was fraud in the procurement of the policy.” Ridenour argued “under the general rule of the mend-the-hold doctrine, Progressive’s failure to fully apprise [him] of additional defenses that it intended to rely upon was a waiver that estops it from maintaining its priority defense.” But the court concluded that “Progressive is not in the order of priority to pay no-fault benefits on Ridenour’s claim because, under the terms of the no-fault policy, Ridenour is not an individual eligible for benefits, nor is Progressive the insurer of Ridenour, i.e., the owner, registrant, and operator of the motor vehicle involved in the crash. Application of the mend-the-hold doctrine would, therefore, broaden the coverage of the no-fault policy to protect against a risk that was not included in the policy. As a result, the priority defense falls within the exception to the mend-the-hold doctrine and is permissible in this case.”
Effect of an adverse party’s failure to file a response to a summary disposition motion; MCR 2.116(G)(4); Failure to address the merits of the trial court’s ruling; Intervention; MCR 2.209(A) & (B); Effect of the case being assigned to the business court; MCL 600.8031; MCL 600.8035(1) & (3)
The court rejected plaintiffs’ contention they were entitled to summary disposition on the basis that defendant-Weick did not file a response to their motion. It also found that appellate relief was precluded by their failure to address the merits of the trial court’s decision. It further held that the trial court did not err in granting two insurance companies’ motions to intervene and concluded “the fact that this case was assigned to business court did not preclude the trial court from considering or granting” the motions. Thus, the court affirmed summary disposition for Weick and the insurance companies. Plaintiffs sued Weick, a former employee, related to her offering “testimony in other cases involving litigation of” no-fault claims. In moving to intervene, the insurance companies alleged “plaintiffs’ lawsuit against Weick was impacting other litigation involving both” companies. On appeal, the court noted that, contrary “to plaintiffs’ argument, MCR 2.116(G)(4) does not require a trial court to grant summary disposition in favor of the moving party whenever the nonmoving party” does not respond to the motion. In addition, in their brief on appeal, plaintiffs did not address any of the several reasons the trial court gave for rejecting the merits of their claims and granting Weick and the insurance companies summary disposition. As to intervention, the court concluded “the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the requirements of MCR 2.209(A)(3) were satisfied[.]” MCR 2.209(B)(2) also supported the trial court’s decision. Finally, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that intervention was inappropriate because the motions “involved an insurance dispute, which is expressly excluded from a business court’s jurisdiction under MCL 600.8031(3)[.]” The court determined that this “case did not involve an insurance dispute.” The insurance companies were not seeking “to litigate any insurance coverage claims or disputes by intervening” – they only sought to rebuff “plaintiffs’ efforts to prohibit Weick from participating as a witness and testifying about plaintiffs’ conduct in other cases.” The court added that, even if the “motions to intervene involved claims excluded under MCL 600.8031(3), that would not prevent the claims from being adjudicated in business court. This action was already assigned to the business court on the basis of plaintiffs’ allegations against Weick.”
Slip & fall on ice; Premises liability; Benton v Dart Props, Inc; Duty owed to an invitee; Hoffner v Lanctoe; Open & obvious danger; Lugo v Ameritech Corp, Inc; Wintry conditions; Principle that black ice is open & obvious when there are indicia of a potentially hazardous condition, including the specific weather conditions present at the time of plaintiff’s fall; Janson v Sajewski Funeral Home, Inc; Effective unavoidability
Holding that the snow and ice on which plaintiff fell was an open and obvious condition that was not effectively unavoidable, the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition for defendant-management company. Plaintiff sued defendant for injuries she sustained when she slipped and fell on ice as she exited a vehicle her fiancé had parked under a carport in the parking lot of her fiancé’s mother’s apartment complex. The trial court found the snow and ice was an open and obvious hazard and granted summary disposition for defendant. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that black ice beneath the snow was not an open and obvious condition and that, even if it was, it was effectively unavoidable. “Plaintiff admitted that she observed a layer of snow on the parking lot before she stepped from the vehicle. Even if the ice had not been covered with snow, these wintry conditions presented indicia of a potentially hazardous condition in the parking lot to alert an average person with ordinary intelligence to the potential danger of slipping.” As such, the ice was open and obvious. In addition, the hazard was not effectively unavoidable. “There are a number of possibilities that plaintiff could have chosen to avoid the snow and ice condition. [She] could have asked her fiancé to park in a different location, or she could have arranged to have the social visit on a different day. Plaintiff was not ‘required or compelled to confront’ a dangerous hazard.”
Dispute over real property interests; Constructive trust; Unjust enrichment; Distinguishing Takacs v Takacs; Partition; Findings of fact; Judicial bias
The court held that the trial court did not clearly err in concluding “plaintiff met her burden for establishing a constructive trust.” Also, it rejected defendant’s efforts to frame the case “as one involving a claim for breach of contract.” Further, the trial court did not err by dismissing his claim for partition of the real property at issue. Finally, the court rejected his claim the trial court was biased. The parties, while involved in a romantic relationship, purchased the property with the intent to build a home. Plaintiff, who provided the funds, agreed to add defendant’s name to the deed. When the relationship ended, defendant refused to sign a quitclaim deed. The evidence showed “that plaintiff allowed defendant’s name to be placed on the deed because he agreed to contribute his time and labor toward building a house on the property.” It was undisputed he failed to build the house. The trial court properly could find “it would be inequitable to allow defendant to retain an interest in the property where he did not perform the task that was the basis for granting him a shared interest in the property in the first instance.” Defendant claimed “he made considerable contributions” toward satisfying the parties’ agreement. But because $22,429.32 of his “claimed expenses were for items still in his possession, which he testified he could sell, the trial court did not clearly err by determining that these expenditures did not hold any current value for the property or provide a benefit to plaintiff.” It also did not clearly err by finding that his “remaining expenditures had no current value to the property because the clearing that was done in 2018 would have to be redone.” Thus, the trial court did not err by holding “that defendant would be unjustly enriched if he were allowed to retain half of the value of the property.” As to his reliance on Takacs, the court held that the trial court could properly find this case was factually distinguishable “because, although love and affection can constitute adequate consideration for a conveyance, that was not the consideration for plaintiff’s agreement to place defendant’s name on the deed in this case. Considering the evidence, the trial court did not err by imposing a constructive trust on defendant’s interest in the property and ordering [him] to convey his 50% interest in the property to plaintiff where [she] contributed 100% of the funds to purchase the property and defendant’s name was added to the title only because he agreed to build a home on the property, which never happened. Although defendant contributed toward some of the costs in preparing to build a home, so did plaintiff, in addition to the purchase price of the property, and those contributions did not add any current value to the property.” Affirmed.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(i) & (j); Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Hicks/Brown; MCL 712A.19a(2); Whether aggravating circumstances existed; Absence of a case service plan
Holding that the DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify respondent-father with his child in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the court reversed the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights, and remanded. The trial court found that reasonable efforts were made to prevent the child’s removal “because there was a family team meeting, a Kids Talk interview, therapy was provided for [the child], and respondent was ‘encouraged to participate in therapy.’” It added that “‘the main thing’ [the DHHS] did was to encourage respondent to ‘engage in mental health services,’ but that he did not do so.” The trial court found that giving him a case service plan “would ‘cause more harm’” to the child, and it “expressly stated that it had ‘no reason to believe that if he was offered a case service plan that anything would be different.” As such, it “determined that—notwithstanding that no case service plan had been offered and although there were no aggravating circumstances so as to justify the denial of reasonable efforts—termination” was in the child’s best interests. On appeal, the court agreed with respondent that termination was premature because the DHHS did not prepare a case service plan for him. The DHHS “did not provide [him] with a case service plan outlining the steps that it and [he] would take to rectify the issues that led to court involvement and to achieve reunification. Nor did it make any reasonable efforts to reunify him with his child.” Although the caseworker “might not have believed any services would be effective, the legislature determined that [the DHHS] is required to make reasonable efforts to reunify parents in respondent’s position with their children. That is, even if [the DHHS] itself believes that such services will ultimately be futile, it must nevertheless make the statutorily mandated reasonable efforts to achieve reunification.” The trial court erred by finding “a case services plan was not necessary because it would not have ‘made any difference.’ Our Legislature made the determination that reasonable efforts to achieve reunification must be made in all cases except those involving enumerated aggravating circumstances.” As those circumstances were not present here, “the trial court erred by excusing [the DHHS] from making reasonable efforts.” Moreover, to the extent it found the DHHS, “in fact, made reasonable efforts by ‘encouraging’ respondent to seek therapy on his own,” it clearly erred.