Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Sentencing; Departure sentence; Reasonableness & proportionality; People v Lydic; Presumption of a nonjail nonprobation sentence; MCL 769.5(3) & (4); People v Mason; Principle that driving while license suspended (DWLS) is not a serious misdemeanor for purposes of MCL 769.5(3); Acquitted conduct; People v Beck
Holding that the trial court failed to address how defendant’s departure sentence was proportionate to her conduct (i.e., driving without a license), the court vacated her sentence and remanded for resentencing. She was convicted of DWLS, second offense, after she failed to produce a valid driver’s license during a traffic stop. The jury found her not guilty of a separate CCW charge. The trial court sentenced her to 93 days in jail, noting she appeared to be “brainwashed” by the “sovereign citizen movement” and referencing the CCW charge. On appeal, the court agreed with defendant that the trial court abused its discretion by departing from the “presumption of a nonjail, nonprobationary sentence for a nonserious misdemeanor conviction” because it did not provide reasonable grounds for the departure sentence. “DWLS is not a serious misdemeanor for purposes of MCL 769.5(3). So, there was a rebuttable presumption that the trial court sentence [her] ‘with a fine, community service, or other nonjail or nonprobation sentence.’” Because it “departed from the presumptive sentence set forth in MCL 769.5(3) when it imposed a sentence of 93 days in jail, it was required to explain on the record ‘why the sentence imposed [was] more proportionate to the offense and the offender than a different sentence . . . would have been.’” The trial court’s statements arguably provided “an explanation for why [it] believed the departure sentence was more proportionate to [defendant] than the presumptive sentence would have been. But, the trial court failed to weigh the seriousness of the offense itself.” Because it “failed to consider the proportionality of the sentence relative to the offense itself, [it] did not adequately justify the departure sentence imposed.” The court also agreed with defendant that, given the repeated references to her CCW charge and its “limited explanation for imposing the departure sentence, it appears that the trial court relied, at least in part, on acquitted conduct when imposing the departure sentence.” But she failed to show that this error affected her substantial rights, and thus, could not meet her burden of showing that the “error prejudiced her by affecting the outcome of sentencing.”
Relevance; MRE 402; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; The rape shield statute (MCL 750.520j); People v Hackett; “Sexual conduct”; Distinguishing People v Dabb (Unpub)
After remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing regarding evidence that defendant sought to admit involving complainant-MG’s sexual conduct, the court held that “the trial court abused its discretion by ordering admission of the evidence.” The court found that “the proposed evidence falls under the rape-shield statute as it relates to her sexual conduct.” Although her “sneaking out to get her father’s attention would not in and of itself fall under the rape-shield statute, and defense counsel seemingly did not intend to focus on the details of what occurred in the truck, the proposed evidence involved sexual conduct and does not fall under an exception to the rape-shield statute. Accordingly, the trial court properly found that the proposed evidence fell under the rape shield statute, but it erred by determining that the evidence was otherwise admissible.” There was “no evidence that MG lied to the person, her parents, or the deputy.” At most, there was the act of her “leaving her house without telling one of her parents.” But, there was “no indication that it was the act of sneaking out—the only arguably deceptive act by MG—that she committed to get attention from the father. Rather, it was the meeting up with and kissing the person (who she thought was a boy). MG’s actions here are simply too attenuated to support defendant’s argument for admissibility. Thus, the evidence was not relevant to MG’s credibility and ‘would have only created a real danger of misleading the jury and an obvious invasion of the victim’s privacy.’” Defendant contended “that when MG’s attempt to get her father’s attention failed in [3/20], she ‘upped the ante by making false allegations against [defendant].’” While he relied on Dabb, the court found that case significantly different. “MG was not deflecting blame to cover up for a serious offense against another person. MG’s act of sneaking out with a person she thought was close to her age bears no similarity to the conduct of which MG accuses defendant.” As the prosecutor argued, the evidence was “only marginally relevant, if at all. The marginal probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues. Further, excluding the evidence does not violate the Confrontation Clause.” Reversed and remanded.
Divorce; Spousal support; MCL 552.28; Award of nonmodifiable alimony in gross; Bonfiglio v Pring; Staple v Staple; Award of two bank accounts as separate property; Cunningham v Cunningham
The court rejected defendant-ex-wife’s claim that the trial court erred in ordering nonmodifiable alimony in gross, concluding that its “findings of fact were not clearly erroneous, and its ruling was not inequitable.” It also upheld the award of two accounts to plaintiff-ex-husband as separate property, determining that defendant did not support her argument in the trial court “with sufficient evidence, and she failed to satisfy her burden of proof.” Thus, it affirmed the divorce judgment. The “trial court specifically provided in the judgment that it was not awarding spousal support to either party, but that it was ‘increas[ing] the property settlement by $12,000 as alimony in gross.’ [It] clearly expressed, on the trial date and during the subsequent motion hearing, that it was ordering a nonmodifiable $12,000 award as alimony in gross, rather than as spousal support.” The court explained in Staple “that ‘alimony in gross is not really alimony intended for the maintenance of a spouse, but rather is in the nature of a division of property. Accordingly, alimony in gross is considered nonmodifiable and exempt from modification under MCL 552.28.’ Here, although the trial court noted that defendant had immediate need for the money, the award was not intended for [her] ongoing maintenance and was, instead, part of the property division, as [it] explicitly stated.” She further asserted that it “considered the spousal-support factors, but failed to comply with MCL 552.13 and 552.28[.]” The court noted that it “was appropriate for the trial court to consider these factors to determine whether it should award spousal support, but the trial court’s thorough consideration did not require it to order ongoing, modifiable spousal support. Instead, that decision was within [its] discretion.” As to the award of the accounts, plaintiff owned them “before the marriage, they were only in his name, and only he deposited into the accounts, which included his military pay and disability. Funds from the accounts were used for some marital expenses, but defendant did not have access to the accounts and did not know how much money was in them when the parties got married.” While she produced evidence of the account values as of 4/23, there was no indication whether they “differed from when the parties got married or if [they] held employment, retirement, or disability pay.”
Custody; A mother’s ex parte motion for the return of her child from a putative father; The Child Custody Act (CCA); Frowner v Smith; “Parent” (MCL 722.22(i)); “Natural parent”; “Third person” (MCL 722.22(k)); Statutory presumption that custody with the parent is in the child’s best interests; MCL 722.25(1); Howard v Howard; The Acknowledgement of Parentage Act (APA); Effect of the absence of an acknowledgement of parentage; The Paternity Act; Established custodial environment (ECE)
The court held that “the trial court committed clear legal error by failing to apply the parental presumption or otherwise make a best-interests determination as required by MCL 722.25(1) before ordering that” plaintiff-mother’s child (JH) remain placed with defendant, who is one of JH’s two putative fathers. Due to an unstable housing situation, plaintiff asked defendant to temporarily take care of JH. She asserted that a month or two later, she asked him to return JH because housing had ceased to be a concern, but he refused. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for JH’s return. The court noted that defendant “was not listed on the birth certificate, did not sign an affidavit of parentage, and has not participated in genetic paternity testing.” After reviewing the CCA, APA, the Paternity Act, and case law, it found that the “trial court could award defendant ongoing custody of JH over plaintiff only if defendant ‘prove[d] that all relevant factors, including the existence of an [ECE] and all legislatively mandated best interest concerns within MCL 722.23, taken together clearly and convincingly demonstrate[d] that the child’s best interests require placement with’ [him] rather than plaintiff.” Further, in conducting this analysis, it had “to bear in mind Michigan’s ‘important public policy favoring the return of children to custodial parents who have temporarily transferred custody in order to meet those children’s needs.’” The court found that not “only did the trial court wholly fail to conduct such an evaluation, its determination was otherwise unsupported by the slim testimony at the hearing.” The court also noted that “defendant did not contest the return of JH to plaintiff, had no concerns about returning JH to [her] so long as plaintiff had ‘a place where [JH] can lay his head,’ and indicated that he could return JH to plaintiff that day if necessary. And plaintiff . . . testified she had a place to stay with her best friend, including a shared room for JH.” Reversed and remanded. To the extent JH was still in defendant’s custody “(as appears to be the case), a best-interests hearing must be held as soon as possible, and no later than 28 days from the issuance of” the court’s opinion, “to determine whether continued custody with defendant is warranted under the proper legal standards . . . .” The court retained jurisdiction.
Custody; The Child Custody Act (CCA); Modifying prior custody orders; The best-interest factors (MCL 722.23); Proper cause or a change of circumstances; Allegations of parenting time violations
The court concluded “that the trial court erred by modifying the custody order and by failing to consider the best-interest factors” in MCL 722.23 “before modifying the prior custody orders.” Because it found that the trial court misapplied the law, the court vacated the trial court’s order that denied plaintiff-mother’s motion to show cause defendant-father for violating the trial “court’s parenting-time order and awarded defendant sole physical and legal custody of” their child, and remanded. The court recognized the trial “court’s desire to address the outstanding custody questions arising from plaintiff’s 2022 motion to modify custody, the temporary language of [its] 2018 and 2022 orders, and the referee’s 2023 recommendation and order.” However, the record was “not clear that the parties agreed to have the [trial] court address those custody questions. Instead, the only issue properly noticed for hearing before [it] was plaintiff’s motion to show cause, asking the [trial] court to address defendant’s alleged parenting-time order violations.” Thus, the trial “court legally erred in failing to address plaintiff’s motion to show cause under the legal standards applicable to contempt proceedings.” The court added that the trial “court compounded its legal error by imposing a new custody order without complying with the” CCA. It instructed the trial court on remand “to decide plaintiff’s motion to show cause based on the evidence presented during the [3/22/24] hearing.”
Wrongful death; Common-law negligence claim; Duty to rescue; Special relationships giving rise to a duty to aid or protect another from foreseeable harm; Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc; Murdock v Higgins; Comparing Farwell v Keaton; Foreseeability; Personal representative (PR)
On remand from the Supreme Court, the court held that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff-PR’s negligence claim because she raised questions of fact to support it. She sued defendant for the decedent’s “wrongful death based on negligence and premises liability.” The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court “with directions ‘to consider whether plaintiff’s negligence claim based on failure to rescue was separate and distinct from the pleaded premises liability claim.’” The court concluded on remand that plaintiff “alleged negligence separately from the premises-liability claim. For purposes of the negligence claim, the injury arose, allegedly, out of defendant’s conduct in inviting the decedent to his property for counseling and failing to respond properly to the circumstances presented, unrelated to [his] duty as an owner, possessor, or occupier of the property.” It further determined that “there was [a] question of fact about whether defendant had a duty to rescue in this situation.” Plaintiff asserted that “defendant and the decedent had a special relationship to support defendant’s duty.” She argued that this case was “factually analogous to Farwell” and the court agreed. “Likewise, in this case, plaintiff has raised a genuine question of fact about whether defendant should have sought assistance for the decedent. [He] invited the decedent to his remote property, and [she] wanted to talk with him about her struggles. After [she] became upset, defendant told her to leave. Plaintiff argues that the decedent was in her right mind when she arrived at defendant’s home, but his spiritual counseling was disturbing to her, which resulted in the decedent ‘flee[ing] whereupon she became tangled in heavy brush, in a swamp, on a dark cold night.’ Defendant admittedly saw [her] standing in swamp water while emotionally distressed, with nobody else around who could have helped.” The court also found there was “a genuine question of material fact about whether the risk was foreseeable. Defendant knew that the decedent could not walk out of the property and that she was in mental distress, and he did not contact anyone to help her. The burden on him was minimal compared to the risk faced by the decedent, who was in swamp water, in the dark, on a property with which she was unfamiliar.” Reversed and remanded.
Trade secrets under the Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act (MUTSA); MCL 445.1902(d)(i) & (ii); Herald Co, Inc v Tax Tribunal; Radiant Global Logistics, Inc v Furstenau (ED MI); Independent economic value; Giasson Aerospace Sci, Inc v RCO Eng’g, Inc; Protective order; MCR 2.302(C)(8); Whether information under a protective order constituted a trade secret; Closed session under the Open Meetings Act (OMA); MCL 15.268(1)(h); Appellate jurisdiction; MCR 7.203(B); Tax Tribunal (TT); Taxable value (TV)
The court held that the TT abused its discretion by (1) finding that petitioner’s confidential documents did not derive independent economic value and were not trade secrets under the MUTSA, and (2) denying the parties’ stipulated motion to hold a closed session under the OMA. Petitioner challenged respondent’s TV assessment and later moved for a protective order in response to a request for discovery, which was granted. The TT later “issued an order stating that trade secrets submitted to the []TT were exempt from disclosure, but because petitioner’s confidential information did not derive independent economic value, it did not fall within the definition of trade secrets under the MUTSA, and a closed hearing under OMA was not warranted.” On appeal, the court agreed with petitioner that the TT erred by finding its confidential materials were not trade secrets under the MUTSA, and thus, by denying the parties’ stipulated motion to hold the hearing as a closed session under the OMA. The record supported petitioner’s argument and showed that the information afforded it “a competitive advantage because it has value to petitioner and potential competitors.” The TT’s “factual findings that petitioner’s information did not derive independent economic value was not supported by substantial evidence on the whole record.” In addition, “the fact that two factors did not weigh in petitioner’s favor did not necessarily mean that petitioner’s information did not fall within the definition of a trade secret under the MUTSA.” Further, the “fact that the confidential information qualifies as a trade secret under MUTSA— a state statute—and is, therefore, exempt from disclosure, means that the []TT, as a public body, may meet in a closed session to consider such material.” Finally, the court rejected respondent’s argument that petitioner did not properly seek relief and that the court did not have jurisdiction to grant petitioner’s application for leave to appeal. Reversed and remanded.