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Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA); A “free appropriate public education” (FAPE); Failure to identify & evaluate a student for special education services; The “child-find mandate”; 34 CFR § 300.111; Wilson County Schools (WCS); Administrative law judge (ALJ); Individualized education program (IEP)
The court affirmed the district court’s ruling that defendant-school district (WCS) did not deny plaintiff-student (Ja. B.) a FAPE by failing to identify and evaluate him for special education services. Plaintiffs-parents filed an administrative due process complaint alleging that WCS failed to provide Ja. B. with a FAPE “by failing to identify and evaluate him for special education services and failing to design and implement IEPs for the 2017 through 2019 school years.” WCS then evaluated him and concluded he “was eligible for special education and related services.” The ALJ determined that WCS did not deny Ja. B a FAPE. Plaintiffs then sued WCS under the IDEA. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s order. Ja. B. previously attended school in Illinois, where he did not have a safety plan, IEP, or section 504 plan, and met behavioral and academic expectations. When the family moved to Tennessee, he began acting out in class, refusing to do his homework, and being disrespectful to school personnel. After his behaviors escalated, he was hospitalized. His discharge papers listed various diagnoses. He was later charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest for an incident at school, but the charges were dropped. He was suspended. His parents withdrew him from the school and placed him in a private school. The court explained that to find a violation of the child-find mandate, “‘the claimant must show that school officials overlooked clear signs of disability and were negligent in failing to order testing, or that there was no rational justification for not deciding to evaluate.’” The court concluded WCS took “some action to support Ja. B” and after he was discharged from the hospital, “began the section 504 process.” Also, several teachers testified that his “behaviors in fall 2017, while enough to warrant disciplinary referrals, were not yet to the point of requiring a special education referral.” The court noted that it has in the past “acknowledged that a school did not violate its child-find responsibilities by first attempting other interventions for a student instead of immediately referring for an evaluation.” It further noted that he only attended the school for a few months and in “cases that have found child-find violations, the observed behaviors that indicated a possible disability occurred over a longer time-frame—usually multiple years.”
Summary proceedings; MCL 600.5735; MCR 4.201(C)(1); Procedural due process; Expedited proceedings; Distinguishing Lindsey v Normet; Motion to adjourn; MCR 4.201(J); Harmless error; Alleged implied-in-fact land contract; Statute of frauds (SOF); Partial performance; Effect of the existence of a written lease
The court held that because the parties’ relationship was governed by a written lease, a land contract could not be implied in fact. As a result, any procedural error due to defendants’ inability to offer fact-specific evidence about “the alleged implied-in-fact land contract was harmless error.” Thus, the court affirmed the circuit court’s order that affirmed the district court’s order awarding plaintiff possession of the property at issue. Defendants leased the property pursuant to the written lease but claimed “there was an understanding among the parties at the time that they would be purchasing the” property via land contract. When defendants stopped making payments to plaintiff, she initiated summary proceedings to evict them. Defendants argued on appeal that “the summary proceedings violated procedural due process because they were not allowed a realistic time period to present fact-specific evidence showing that the parties’ relationship was governed by an implied-in-fact land contract, not the written lease.” The court found that they had “a reasonable argument that the expedited proceedings violated procedural due process. While the seven-day period complied with the relevant statutes and court rules, that may not be sufficient time to prepare evidence, witnesses, and so forth to determine whether the parties had an implied-in-fact land contract.” However, they failed to “explain how this arguable violation of procedural due process would entitle them to relief.” In addition, they did not “show that an implied-in-fact land contract would be enforceable. Simply put, defendants’ fact-specific arguments are beside the point because the terms of the written lease control.” To the extent they asserted they spent $40,000 improving the “property in reliance on that implied-in-fact land contract, defendants may maintain a separate action for unjust enrichment.” Thus, the court held that any possible procedural due process violation was harmless error. Any error in denying their motion to adjourn to permit them to gather evidence about the home improvements they made was also harmless given that “the terms of the written lease controlled the parties’ relationship.” Finally, their argument that partial performance removed the oral land contract from the SOF was “meritless because a contract cannot be implied in fact when there is an express contract covering the same subject matter.”
Whether MCL 750.527 (commonly referred to as the “riot act”) provides a legal defense or immunity; Krickovich v State (FL App)
In an issue of first impression, the court concluded that “MCL 750.527, commonly referred to as the ‘riot act,’ provides a legal defense at trial instead of immunity.” Thus, it affirmed the circuit court’s appellate order that reversed the district court’s dismissal order. It remanded to the district court for determination of whether there is probable cause defendant-DeBono committed felonious assault. It took no position on whether he “is entitled to a jury instruction on the potential defense under MCL 750.527 because that question is not presently before us.” DeBono claimed that “MCL 750.527 provides officers with immunity at law, rather than creating an issue for a jury.” The court held that the “circuit court correctly concluded that the statutory language, particularly the phrase ‘shall be held guiltless and fully justified in law,’ provides an affirmative defense, not immunity.” The circuit court correctly interpreted MCL 750.527 as providing a defense at trial for three reasons. “First, and most critically, the Michigan Legislature typically uses explicit language to provide immunity as a matter of law.” Secondly, apart “from omitting an explicit grant of immunity, MCL 750.527’s language appears to implicate fact questions for a jury.” And third, “other jurisdictions interpreting nearly identical language have reached this same conclusion.” The court concluded that “the similarity of MCL 750.527 to the Florida Statute, combined with the omission of the term ‘immunity,’ persuades us that the reasoning in Krickovich is sound and the circuit court correctly looked to it as persuasive authority.” On the other hand, the court determined that “DeBono’s reliance on an advisory opinion from the Kent County Prosecutor is not persuasive for three reasons. First, it is not binding on this Court. Second, the letter appears to explain the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in not charging ostensibly similar conduct by an officer in Kent County, which is an altogether different inquiry.” Third, the letter did “not clearly state that MCL 750.527 provides immunity.” Thus, the court found that it was “unclear if the Kent County Prosecutor was stating MCL 750.527 provides immunity, or acknowledging a viable defense at trial.”
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Trial strategy; Failure to call a particular witness; People v Seals; Prejudice; People v Isrow
The court held that the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for a new trial because he failed to show he was denied the effective assistance of counsel or that he was prejudiced by defense counsel’s alleged mistakes. He was convicted of CSC I, CSC II, and aggravated indecent exposure for molesting his stepdaughter. On appeal, the court rejected his argument the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial because defense counsel was ineffective. “The record does not provide enough evidence for defendant to overcome the ‘strong presumption’ that defense counsel’s decision not to investigate or call” defendant’s son to testify was a sound trial strategy. “Defense counsel made a strategic choice not to waste time and resources investigating [this] potential testimony after defendant represented that [his son] would not know anything.” As such, the trial court did not err when it found “defense counsel’s decision to forego investigating or calling” defendant’s son as a witness did not constitute deficient performance. In addition, defendant failed to show there was a reasonable probability that his son’s testimony would have changed the outcome of his trial. And his arguments fell “short of overcoming the strong presumption that defense counsel’s decisions were the product of sound trial strategy”. Further, even if the court were to find “defense counsel’s performance was deficient because he did not adequately discuss trial strategies with defendant or prepare defendant to testify, defendant cannot show that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for the deficient performance.” Affirmed.
Garnishment; Whether a garnishee defendant may file an objection to a writ of garnishment; MCR 3.101(A)(1)-(3); MCR 3.101(E)(3), (K), & (J); Effect of an amendment to the court rule; Availability of an alternative mechanism for a garnishee to contest the writ of garnishment; MCR 3.101(M)
In an issue not previously addressed in a published opinion, the court held that a garnishee defendant may not file an objection to a writ of garnishment. Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of garnishee defendant-Auto-Owners’ objection and denial of its motion to quash the writ. The trial court ruled “that only a defendant, not a garnishee defendant, could file an objection to a writ of garnishment.” The court agreed. It noted that throughout “MCR 3.101, ‘plaintiff’ refers to the judgment creditor, ‘defendant’ refers to the judgment debtor, and ‘garnishee’ refers to the garnishee defendant.” MCR 3.101(E)(3), which provides the instructions the writ must give the garnishee, “makes no mention of the garnishee filing an objection.” MCR 3.101(K) governs the procedure for objections. “MCR 3.101(K)(1) does not specify who may file an objection with the court.” Due to the use of passive voice in the rule, the court had “to determine whether the drafters of the court rules intended to permit a garnishee to file” an objection. It concluded that while “MCR 3.101(K)(1) does not identify the objecting party, additional language within that subrule and other provisions gives context to the drafter’s intent that the defendant is the only party who may file an objection. First, the time limits for filing an objection refer to the date of service of the writ on the defendant, or the date of the most recent statement sent to the defendant.” The court determined that “using service on the defendant as the trigger for time limits on the filing of objections suggests that only defendants—and not garnishees—may file an objection.” In addition, the court rules set forth “particular grounds on which an objection must be based.” The court noted that “MCR 3.101(K)(1) contemplates the objections of a defendant—a party who might otherwise attempt to challenge the validity of the underlying judgment had the court rules not prohibited that.” It also concluded a plain reading of “MCR 3.101(J), as with other subrules, supports the interpretation that only defendants may file objections.” It further noted that “express language recognizing that a garnishee could raise an objection” was removed by amendments to MCR 3.101. And there are provisions in the rule “providing an alternative mechanism for a garnishee to contest the writ of garnishment.”
Termination of parental rights in a stepparent adoption proceeding; MCL 710.51(6)(a); “Substantially comply” with the child support order; “Substantial” & “comply”; Use of dictionary definitions to define terms undefined by statute; In re CDO (OK Civ App)
Noting that there had been no published decision defining “substantially comply” for purposes of MCL 710.51(6)(a), the court held that the trial court did not err in finding respondent-father (Riley) substantially complied with the order of child support. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s order granting a directed verdict to him in this stepparent adoption case. Petitioner-mother (Amanda) argued “that the trial court employed the incorrect legal standard when evaluating the motion for directed verdict under the two-pronged analysis of MCL 710.51(6).” She offered a definition for the term “substantially comply” relying on a case from Oklahoma and argued “the trial court erred when it did not comport its analysis with her definition.” After reviewing dictionary definitions, the court held that, “under MCL 710.51(6)(a), a parent substantially complies with a child support order when they have made a considerable quantity of the payments required by the order.” It concluded that because its definition employed “the correct principles of statutory interpretation, we need not rely on another state’s opinion to reach our decision.” The next question was whether the trial court erred in finding that Amanda and her husband (C) failed to “establish the requirements of subsection (6)(a)—specifically, that Riley had not substantially complied with the support order.” The evidence showed he “made many of his child support payments, that he often caught up with arrearages by making lump sum payments, and at the time the petition was filed his arrearage totaled only $146. This small arrearage in relation to the thousands of dollars in child support Riley paid in the preceding two years is insufficient to show Riley failed to substantially comply with his child support obligation. Amanda and [C] failed to meet their burden under subsection (6)(a) and the trial court did not err in granting Riley’s motion for directed verdict.” Given that the court concluded “the trial court correctly granted the motion for directed verdict because Amanda failed to satisfy subsection (6)(a),” it did not need to consider whether she satisfied the requirements under subsection (6)(b).
Motion for sole custody & a change of domicile; Entitlement to a de novo hearing; MCR 3.215(E)(4); Imposition of a requirement the objecting party request a copy of the referee hearing transcript from the court recorder & submit it to the trial court before the de novo hearing; Interpretation of MCR 3.215(F)(2)(d)
[This opinion was previously released as an unpublished opinion on 2/16/23.] The court held that the trial court exceeded its authority by declaring plaintiff-father’s right to a de novo hearing forfeited for failing to submit a transcript of the referee proceedings before the hearing. Nothing in the language of MCR 3.215(F) indicates it authorizes trial courts “to impose additional requirements a party must fulfill before being entitled to a de novo hearing[.]” The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion for sole custody of the parties’ child and a change of domicile. “The trial court interpreted MCR 3.215(F)(2)(d) as authorizing it to deem a party’s right to object to the FOC referee’s recommendations and receive a de novo hearing forfeited if the party did not submit a transcript of the referee proceedings” before that hearing. The court rejected “this broad interpretation. Not only does no such language appear in the court rule, but MCR 3.215(F)(2) explicitly requires the trial court to permit the parties to present ‘live evidence’ at the de novo hearing; in other words, the trial court is not permitted to decide the issue on the basis of the record alone, without providing the parties some opportunity to supplement that record at the hearing if they wish to do so. Moreover, the structure of MCR 3.215(F)(2)(d) suggests that the ‘reasonable restrictions and conditions’ to which it refers are restrictions and conditions placed on the evidence that may be presented at the de novo hearing to which the party is entitled.” That MCR 3.215(F)(2)(d) permits trial courts “to ‘impose any other reasonable restrictions and conditions’” implies that the restrictions it authorizes “would be of the same kind as those found in” subrules (a)-(c). None of those subrules “suggest that a party could be sanctioned in such a drastic manner for failing to comply with a condition imposed by the trial court.” Reversed and remanded for a de novo hearing.
Whether a party was the decedent’s surviving spouse; Validity of a marriage; MCL 551.18; MCL 551.103a; Applicability of equitable estoppel; Standing to challenge the validity of a deed; Evidentiary rulings; Relevance; MRE 401 & 402; MRE 403; Authentication; MRE 901(a); Hearsay; Exception for records of a regularly conducted activity (MRE 803(6)); Whether an adverse inference should have been applied; Personal representative (PR)
Considering the totality of the evidence, the court concluded the probate court did not err by finding that the marriage between the decedent and appellant-Mack Murray was invalid. Thus, she “was not the decedent’s surviving spouse or an heir to his estate,” and she did not have standing to challenge the validity of a quitclaim deed. The decedent’s daughter, appellee-Benson, was appointed special PR and filed a petition to determine the decedent’s heirs after Mack Murray claimed to be the decedent’s surviving spouse. “Mack Murray also petitioned to determine title to the decedent’s residence, claiming that a quitclaim deed conveying the property to decedent’s son was forged.” The court first found the probate court did not err by holding that there were issues of material fact precluding summary disposition. “It was undisputed that the marriage ceremony for Mack Murray and the decedent was held one day after the marriage license had expired. Although Mack Murray argued that other circumstances established the validity of the marriage, including that she and the decedent intended to marry and that they were advised by a clerk that it was unnecessary to renew the license before the ceremony, there were questions of fact about the veracity of Mack Murray’s claims. Benson presented evidence that Mack Murray and the decedent did not intend to be legally married and intentionally waited until after the license expired for that reason. The parties also offered conflicting evidence about whether, after the ceremony, Mack Murray and the decedent lived together as a married couple and whether they held themselves out to friends, family, and government agencies as a married couple.” Thus, the validity of the marriage depended on “unresolved questions of fact that could not be decided on summary disposition[.]” Mack Murray also challenged “the probate court’s decision following the evidentiary hearing that her marriage to the decedent was invalid.” She contended “that because marriage is a contract, the acceptance of the marriage certificate by the clerk’s office, despite the expired license, was effective to ratify the license and certificate as valid.” But the court concluded that the “probate court properly considered all the circumstances to determine whether any presumptive validity of the marriage was overcome by contrary evidence introduced by Benson.” Further, the court held that “the probate court did not err by finding that Benson presented ‘clear and positive proof’ that Mack Murray’s marriage to the decedent was not valid.” Affirmed.
Entry of a default judgment as a discovery sanction; MCR 2.313(B)(2)(c); Thorne v Bell; Imposition of monetary sanctions for issuing an improper subpoena & related to a motion to compel; MCR 2.313(A)(5)(a); Electronically stored information (ESI)
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it entered a default judgment against appellant-Kenneth Hall as a discovery sanction based on “persistent, willful, egregious” discovery violations. The case arose from a dispute among siblings over the assets of their father’s trust. The court noted the factors that should be considered before imposing the sanction of a default judgment, set forth in Thorne. It concluded that each of those considerations supported imposition of the default judgment sanction here. “First, Kenneth’s failure to comply with his discovery obligations extended over years. Second, Kenneth violated at least two discovery orders. Third, many months elapsed between his violations and the entry of a default judgment. Fourth, petitioners were severely prejudiced because, in spite of their persistent efforts, they could not obtain most of the ESI to which they were entitled. Finally, the trial court found that Kenneth’s discovery violations were willful and wanton.” The court noted that the trial court initially did not impose any “sanctions and then imposed lesser sanctions, such as financial penalties, before ultimately turning to the drastic sanction of a default judgment.” In addition, before entering that default judgment at a hearing, it “found that Kenneth and his counsel displayed willfulness rising to the level of a flagrant and wanton refusal to facilitate discovery. The record bears out that conclusion.” The court further noted that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial branch to police and penalize abuses of the discovery process concerning ESI. The trial court quite appropriately did just that.” As to the monetary sanctions imposed on Kenneth, the court first held that “the trial court acted well within its discretion in sanctioning” him for issuing an improper subpoena. The trial court also ordered him to pay petitioners reasonable attorney fees and costs related to their motion to compel. The court noted that “Kenneth sat on his hands for months until petitioners’ motion to compel spurred him to do something with” a report on the unallocated data retrieved from his work computer. It found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning him under MCR 2.313(A)(5)(a). Affirmed.