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Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.

 

 

Case Summary


Cases appear under the following practice areas:

  • Contracts (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Insurance

    e-Journal #: 75171
    Case: Director of the Dep't of Ins. & Fin. Servs. v. Pavonia Life Ins. Co. of MI
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Boonstra, Borrello, and Rick
    Issues:

    Rehabilitation proceeding under Chapter 81 of the Insurance Code; MCL 500.8106(1) & (3); Motion for specific performance of a stock purchase agreement (SPA); Contractual right to terminate the SPA; The Ingham Circuit Court’s exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over the supervision & rehabilitation of insurers; MCL 500.8104(3) & (4); The power of the Director (or rehabilitator) of the Michigan Department of Insurance & Financial Services (DIFS) to act on its own; MCL 500.8121(1)(g) & (s); MCL 500.8114(2); MCL 500.8113(1); Ripeness of constitutional issues

    Summary:

    The court held that the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that petitioner-DIFS Director (the director or rehabilitator) could stand in the shoes of appellant-GBIG Holdings and force a sale in this rehabilitation proceeding under Insurance Code Chapter 81. It further erred in failing “to determine under MCL 500.8104(4) whether substantial justice required a New York court to decide matters concerning the effectiveness of GBIG’s notice of termination and questions” about breach of the SPA incorporated into the rehabilitation plan. Thus, the court reversed the trial court’s grant of specific performance of the SPA, and remanded for it to resolve the jurisdictional issue. By consent, the director initiated the court-supervised rehabilitation proceeding over respondent-Pavonia to separate and disassociate it from “financially-troubled North Carolina insurer affiliates, and the legal and financial issues generated by the actions of its ‘upstream owner’” and his holding company, GBIG. The rehabilitation plan incorporated the SPA, under which GBIG agreed to sell its stock in Pavonia to appellee-Aspida Holdco. GBIG appealed the trial court’s order granting Aspida’s motions for specific performance of the SPA and moving up the closing date. It asserted that it contracted in the SPA to have certain issues “addressed by the courts of New York and that the trial court usurped the jurisdiction of these courts.” Pursuant to MCL 500.8104(3), the trial court (the Ingham Circuit Court) has “exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over the supervision and rehabilitation of insurers.” MCL 500.8104(4) provides that if it finds on a party’s motion “that any action should as a matter of substantial justice be tried in a forum outside this state, the court may enter an appropriate order to stay further proceedings on the action in this state.” The plain language of this statute “leaves it to the trial court to make the determination in the first instance regarding whether substantial justice requires another court to decide a matter in the midst of rehabilitation proceedings. The trial court did not make this ‘substantial justice’ determination.” Further, under the circumstances, “the rehabilitator did not have the authority to sell the Pavonia shares on its own.” Holding otherwise would essentially “nullify the SPA, which was entered into by GBIG and Aspida, not by the rehabilitator and Aspida.”

    Full Text Opinion

  • Criminal Law (3)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75156
    Case: People v. Brown
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Borrello, Beckering, and Swartzle
    Issues:

    Sufficiency of the evidence; Aiding & abetting; Intent; AWIM; Intentional discharge of a firearm from a vehicle; Felony-firearm; Severance of trials; Self-defense jury instruction; Sentencing; People v Tanner; Applicability of the two-thirds rule; People v Floyd

    Summary:

    The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant-Brown’s convictions of AWIM, intentional discharge of a firearm from a vehicle, and felony-firearm as an aider and abettor. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendants’ motions for separate trials. The court also rejected defendant-West’s claim that the trial court erred in denying his request for a self-defense jury instruction as to the intentional discharge of a firearm from a vehicle charge. Finally, they were not entitled to sentencing relief pursuant to the two-thirds rule. Defendants are brothers. The court concluded that while Brown did not fire a gun at victims-AB and LB, “the jury heard testimony indicating that he threatened to kill [AB], who antagonized West, then drove West to where [AB] was, and handled his car in a way that enabled West to fire a weapon multiple times at [AB] through the sunroof. The jury could reasonably infer from the brothers’ close association, from Brown’s facilitation of West’s shooting at [AB], including stopping in front of [LB’s] house after the shooting began, and from Brown’s attempt after the shooting to help West avoid detection, that he aided and abetted in an assault on [AB] with an intent to kill him.” As to the intentional discharge of a firearm from a vehicle conviction, while Brown asserted he did not know West had a gun, the jury found this testimony not credible. In addition, even if he did not know initially that West had a gun, “the jury heard testimony from which it might reasonably infer that Brown drove in a manner that enabled West to shoot multiple times at [AB], and even stopped in front of [LB’s] house after the shooting began.” If believed, this testimony was sufficient to show “that, after he discovered West had a gun, Brown nevertheless took measures to assist West in his intentional discharge of the firearm from the vehicle.” The evidence was also sufficient to support his felony-firearm conviction. The court further held that severance was not warranted because their defenses were not mutually exclusive. As to sentencing, although “at first blush, a sentence of 35 to 50 years appears to violate the Tanner rule,” the court noted that in Floyd the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the two-thirds rule “does not apply to sentences where the statutory maximum is ‘life or any term of years.’” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75214
    Case: United States v. Booker
    Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
    Judges: Larsen, Gibbons, and Cook
    Issues:

    Sentencing; Career-offender status; USSG § 4B1.1; United States v Havis; Prior conviction under MCL 333.7401 for the delivery or manufacture of a controlled substance; United States v Thomas; “Delivery”; MCL 333.7105(1); Conviction under 21 USC § 841(a)(1) for distribution of a controlled substance; “Distribute”; § 802(8) & (11); A “controlled-substance offense”; § 4B1.2(b); Special conditions for supervised release; Adequate explanations; Procedural reasonableness; Analysis of the 18 USC § 3553(a) factors; Whether there was a discrepancy between the conditions in the written judgment & those announced at sentencing

    Summary:

    [This appeal was from the WD-MI.] Concluding that its prior reasoning as to MCL 333.7401 applied to § 841(a)(1), the court held that defendant-Booker’s § 841(a)(1) conviction was a predicate controlled-substance offense for career-offender status under § 4B1.1. It also rejected his claims that the district court made procedural errors in addressing his arguments at sentencing, and his challenges to the special conditions of his supervised release. He pled guilty to distributing a controlled substance in violation of § 841(a)(1) and was sentenced as a career offender to 188 months. On appeal, he argued that his prior conviction under MCL 333.7401 and his § 841(a)(1) conviction were “not valid career-offender predicates.” But he admitted Thomas foreclosed his claim as to the Michigan statute. While he suggested that the court had “not yet decided whether the federal statute qualifies as a predicate offense[,]” it concluded that its prior reasoning as “to the Michigan statute maps squarely onto” § 841(a)(1), and it had “recently rejected an identical argument about § 841(a)(1)” in an unpublished opinion. The court found that Thomas illustrated why Booker’s § 841(a)(1) conviction was a predicate controlled-substance offense. For “the same reasons that ‘delivery’ of a controlled substance under” MCL 333.7401 is such an offense, “so is ‘distribution’ of a controlled substance under” § 841(a)(1). Thus, the court held that the district court properly sentenced him as a career offender. His challenges to the special conditions on his supervised release also failed. The court found that the district court gave “a thorough analysis of the § 3553(a) factors” and noted that there was no need for it “to tie its discussion of the sentencing factors explicitly to Booker’s supervised release conditions.” Its concerns about his recidivism risk “and the need to promote public safety formed the basis for both the prison term and the supervised release conditions it imposed, as the nature of the selected conditions” made clear. The court held that the supervised release component of his sentence was not procedurally unreasonable. It added that even if it agreed with him “that the district court’s explanation was inadequate, any error would be harmless because the record” showed why it believed each condition was necessary. Further, there was no discrepancy between the conditions in the written judgment and those announced at sentencing. Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75182
    Case: United States v. Reed
    Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
    Judges: Murphy and Readler; Dissent – Clay
    Issues:

    Search & seizure; The “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule; United States v. Leon; Inference of a nexus between defendant & his residence; United States v. Williams

    Summary:

    The court reversed the district court’s order suppressing the evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant of defendant-Reed's residence and the inculpatory statements he made after the search, holding that the affidavit identified a minimal nexus between the criminal activity and the place to be searched that was sufficient to trigger the Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The police executed search warrants relating to Reed’s suspected drug activity. He was charged with drug and firearm offenses. He moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search of a home (on Kate Bond Road) he shared with his girlfriend, claiming that the affidavit “failed to identify a ‘nexus’ between his drug dealing and the home so as to raise an inference that drug records or proceeds would be found there.” Ruling that the affidavit failed to contain evidence that Reed conducted drug activity from that home and that Leon’s good-faith exception did not apply, the district court granted his motion. On appeal, the court noted that many courts have considered it “common sense” that a suspect’s home would “be a likely place” for that suspect to keep evidence of a crime. It observed that there is a line of cases that “suggest that courts generally may find a nexus to search a drug dealer’s home ‘even “when there is absolutely no indication of any wrongdoing occurring”’ there.” But it noted there is another line of cases requiring that the affidavit “‘include facts that directly connect the residence with the suspected drug dealing activity[.]’” The court concluded that it did not have to resolve the probable cause question here, where the facts “sit on the hazy constitutional border between a sufficient nexus and an insufficient hunch[,]” because in this case, the Leon good-faith exception applied. An informant had recently made controlled buys from Reed at the other searched locations and Reed was seen engaged in suspicious activity near those sites; the police had probable cause to believe that Reed lived on Kate Bond Road; he was seen engaging in drug transactions near one of the other searched locations; and he had “many prior drug convictions.” The court also saw relevance in the prior training and experience of the officer who provided the affidavit. It held that he “did not behave recklessly by relying on the state judge’s conclusion that Reed’s drug activity sufficed.” Remanded.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Insurance (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Contracts

    e-Journal #: 75171
    Case: Director of the Dep't of Ins. & Fin. Servs. v. Pavonia Life Ins. Co. of MI
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Boonstra, Borrello, and Rick
    Issues:

    Rehabilitation proceeding under Chapter 81 of the Insurance Code; MCL 500.8106(1) & (3); Motion for specific performance of a stock purchase agreement (SPA); Contractual right to terminate the SPA; The Ingham Circuit Court’s exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over the supervision & rehabilitation of insurers; MCL 500.8104(3) & (4); The power of the Director (or rehabilitator) of the Michigan Department of Insurance & Financial Services (DIFS) to act on its own; MCL 500.8121(1)(g) & (s); MCL 500.8114(2); MCL 500.8113(1); Ripeness of constitutional issues

    Summary:

    The court held that the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that petitioner-DIFS Director (the director or rehabilitator) could stand in the shoes of appellant-GBIG Holdings and force a sale in this rehabilitation proceeding under Insurance Code Chapter 81. It further erred in failing “to determine under MCL 500.8104(4) whether substantial justice required a New York court to decide matters concerning the effectiveness of GBIG’s notice of termination and questions” about breach of the SPA incorporated into the rehabilitation plan. Thus, the court reversed the trial court’s grant of specific performance of the SPA, and remanded for it to resolve the jurisdictional issue. By consent, the director initiated the court-supervised rehabilitation proceeding over respondent-Pavonia to separate and disassociate it from “financially-troubled North Carolina insurer affiliates, and the legal and financial issues generated by the actions of its ‘upstream owner’” and his holding company, GBIG. The rehabilitation plan incorporated the SPA, under which GBIG agreed to sell its stock in Pavonia to appellee-Aspida Holdco. GBIG appealed the trial court’s order granting Aspida’s motions for specific performance of the SPA and moving up the closing date. It asserted that it contracted in the SPA to have certain issues “addressed by the courts of New York and that the trial court usurped the jurisdiction of these courts.” Pursuant to MCL 500.8104(3), the trial court (the Ingham Circuit Court) has “exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over the supervision and rehabilitation of insurers.” MCL 500.8104(4) provides that if it finds on a party’s motion “that any action should as a matter of substantial justice be tried in a forum outside this state, the court may enter an appropriate order to stay further proceedings on the action in this state.” The plain language of this statute “leaves it to the trial court to make the determination in the first instance regarding whether substantial justice requires another court to decide a matter in the midst of rehabilitation proceedings. The trial court did not make this ‘substantial justice’ determination.” Further, under the circumstances, “the rehabilitator did not have the authority to sell the Pavonia shares on its own.” Holding otherwise would essentially “nullify the SPA, which was entered into by GBIG and Aspida, not by the rehabilitator and Aspida.”

    Full Text Opinion

  • Wills & Trusts (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 75164
    Case: In re Estate of Schmunk
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Beckering, Swartzle, and Rick
    Issues:

    Appointment of a PR; MCL 700.3203(1)(a); Disqualification; MCL 700.3204; Suitability; In re Redd Guardianship; In re Stan Estate; Statutory grounds for removing a PR; MCL 700.3611(2)(a); Objection to appointment of a particular PR by an “interested person”; MCL 700.3203(2)

    Summary:

    The court held that appellant-Johnson’s “suitability” to serve as PR was properly considered pursuant to MCL 700.3203(1), and rejected her argument that the probate court abused its discretion by appointing appellee-Brooks as PR because the heir to the estate (nonparty-Cody) failed to meet his burden to show Johnson’s unsuitability. Further, it was “not left with a definite and firm conviction that the probate court made a mistake in appointing Brooks” as PR for the estate. The decedent’s (Rolland) will designated Johnson to serve as PR. Brooks was Rolland’s ex-wife and Cody’s mother. After Rolland died, she helped “Cody by paying expenses related to Rolland’s house, as well as Rolland’s funeral and burial expenses.” The court rejected Johnson’s argument “that the probate court violated MCL 700.3203 and improperly imposed a ‘suitability’ requirement when appointing Brooks” as PR. It noted that her argument ignored that the priority order provided in MCL 700.3203 “applies to ‘persons who are not disqualified . . .’ MCL 700.3203(1), and that an individual may be disqualified” if a probate court finds him or her “unsuitable” in formal proceedings. Further, the court determined in Redd Guardianship “the plain and ordinary meaning of ‘suitable’ as ‘fit and appropriate for [its] intended purpose,’ ‘adapted to a use or purpose,’ or ‘able/qualified.’” It further held in Stan Estate “that any statutory basis sufficient to remove a [PR] is also sufficient to support an interested person’s objection to the appointment of a” PR. The court held that a preponderance of the evidence supported the probate “court’s conclusion that Johnson was unsuitable because her appointment would come at a price of losing at least one of the estate lands that Rolland had left for Cody.” The probate court found that appointing her PR “would inherently result in Johnson committing waste because” she would have to sell one of the properties to pay her estate administration fees, while Brooks would serve without compensation, and thus, “be in a better position to preserve the property for her son, the estate recipient. And Cody wanted to continue to live on and keep the land.” The record did not leave the court “with a definite and firm conviction that the probate court made a mistake by finding Johnson unsuitable to serve as” PR because it would not be in the estate’s best interests. Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

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