Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Tax-foreclosure sale; MCL 211.78m(1); Takings claim under Const 1963 art 10, § 2; Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Cnty; Effect of the absence of surplus proceeds; Unjust enrichment; Karaus v Bank of NY Mellon; Declaratory judgment
Given that it was undisputed there were no surplus proceeds from the tax-foreclosure sale where defendant-county purchased the property from defendant-county treasurer for the minimum bid amount, the court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff-former property owner’s (Kakalia) takings claim. It also affirmed dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, concluding plaintiff failed to show “the county received a ‘benefit’ from” plaintiff. Finally, plaintiff was not entitled to a declaratory judgment. Plaintiff asserted that because the county “purchased the property under the then-existing version of MCL 211.78m(1) and the property was not sold at a public auction,” plaintiff was entitled to compensation “for the fair market value of its property, less the tax liability owed[.]” It sought to distinguish its “case from Rafaeli by arguing that ‘the property improperly taken was Kakalia’s real property, not the surplus proceeds from a public auction.’” But the court found it failed to show “that its real property was improperly taken. Pursuant to MCL 211.78k(5), absolute title to the subject property vested to the Otsego County Treasurer when the foreclosure judgment became effective. Because Kakalia did not challenge the foreclosure proceedings, there is no dispute that the Otsego County Treasurer properly acquired title to the property. Once absolute title vested to the Otsego County Treasurer with no further rights of redemption, Kakalia no longer had a vested property right to the real property itself.” The court noted the Supreme Court stated in Rafaeli, albeit arguably in dictum, “that it is ‘unaware of any authority affirming a vested property right to equity held in property generally.’” In addition, Justice Viviano stated “in his concurrence that ‘the majority’s view of the case would seemingly be that if the property does not sell at auction and is simply transferred to a governmental unit, the taxpayer is out of luck: no proceeds, let alone a surplus, have been produced or retained by the government.’” The court adopted this Rafaeli dictum. As to the unjust enrichment claim, Rafaeli “made clear that a plaintiff’s only ‘property interest’ surviving a tax-foreclosure is not in the real property itself, but only in the surplus proceeds resulting from the tax-foreclosure sale, if any.” Further, there was no evidence the county “unjustly benefited by its legal purchase of the property for the minimum bid amount.”
Dispute over the denial of marijuana licenses; Due process; Effect of a waivers in the applications; The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions; AFT MI v Michigan; Barden Detroit Casino, LLC v Detroit (ED MI); Town of Newton v Rumery; Whether the waivers violated public policy; Brooklyn Sav Bank v O’Neil; Cudnik v William Beaumont Hosp; Whether summary disposition is premature; Marilyn Froling Revocable Living Trust v Bloomfield Hills Country Club; Enforceability of the waivers under the Michigan Regulation & Taxation of Marijuana Act (MRTMA) & city ordinances; Evaluation & scoring of applications under the MRTMA; MCL 333.27959(4); Yellow Tail Ventures, Inc v City of Berkley; General limitations on municipal powers; MCL 333.27956; Preemption; DeRuiter v Byron Twp; Applicability of the Open Meetings Act (OMA); Pinebrook Warren, LLC v City of Warren
The court held that the waivers in plaintiffs’ applications for licenses to sell marijuana in defendant-city were valid and enforceable. In addition, they failed to show they were entitled to relief on the ground that the city’s adopted criteria for evaluating applications conflicted with the MRTMA. Finally, the OMA did not apply. Plaintiffs (and intervening plaintiffs) sued defendants after their applications for licenses to sell marijuana in the city were denied. The trial court found the city and intervening defendants were entitled to summary disposition on the basis of waivers in the application forms. It also ruled that the OMA was not violated and that the city’s ordinance did not conflict with the MRTMA. On appeal, the court first agreed with the trial court that the waivers were valid and enforceable. Even on appeal, plaintiffs “have not offered any factual reasons why the waivers would not be enforceable.” As such, the court was “not persuaded that summary disposition on the basis of the waiver provisions was either inappropriate or premature.” In addition, they did not show “that any provision of the MRTMA clearly prohibits the waivers adopted by the” city. The court next rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that the city was not permitted to adopt criteria for evaluating an applicant’s suitability to operate a marijuana business within the community that were not directly relevant to the applicant’s suitability to operate a business in compliance with the MRTMA. “There is nothing in the language of MCL 333.27956 or MCL 333.27959(4) that suggests that the state intended to restrict the criteria a municipality can consider when evaluating competing licensing applications, other than those limitations specifically prescribed in MCL 333.27956. Thus, a municipality may consider criteria unique to its own community and citizens, subject to the restrictions in MCL 333.27959(4).” Finally, the court found that because the city’s selection committee “was not operating as a public body, it was not required to comply with the OMA.” And plaintiffs failed “to establish an independent claim for breach of contract.” Affirmed.
Whether defendant was unlawfully seized & interrogated; Traffic stop; Miranda v Arizona; Motion for a new trial; People v White; MCL 257.697(b); Prosecutorial vindictiveness; Sentencing; Scoring of 30 points for PRV 2 & 10 points for OV 19; Inaccurate information; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to challenge the lawfulness of the traffic stop; Failure to file a pretrial motion
The court held, among other things, that because the trial court properly found “there was probable cause to make the traffic stop, defendant was not seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment,” the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial. Further, the circumstances did not warrant a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Thus, it affirmed both the conviction and the sentence but remanded for correction of the judgment. He was convicted for possession of a controlled substance (meth)—second offense, and sentenced to 18 months to 12 years. Defendant contended that “he was unlawfully seized and interrogated in violation of constitutionally protected rights.” He contended that the Michigan Vehicle Code “does not require that the center, high-mount, stop lamp on the back window of a truck must be in working order.” Thus, defendant asserted that the trial court erred when it determined that Deputy O “had probable cause to make a traffic stop on the basis that the stop lamp on defendant’s truck was not working.” It was undisputed the lamp on the truck was not working. At issue was “whether the light’s failure to activate violated MCL 257.697(b), thus providing probable cause to make the traffic stop.” The court held that “because defendant’s nonfunctioning light was not in good working condition, the fact that one of the stop lamps on defendant’s truck was not working violated the Vehicle Code and afforded [O] probable cause to make a traffic stop. And because the trial court properly found that there was probable cause to make the traffic stop, defendant was not seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” He insisted that O “violated the Fifth Amendment by subjecting him to custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings.” The court concluded that none of the factors discussed in White was present here. Nothing in the record suggested that O “was aware of a particular susceptibility that defendant had. The deputy made one brief remark in defendant’s presence, not a lengthy harangue. And defendant has not established that the deputy’s remark was ‘particularly evocative.’” He did not establish that O “should have known that his words or actions were ‘reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.’” Also, the court held that “merely informing defendant of inculpatory evidence, by itself, does not constitute an interrogation.” He did “not articulate how the facts of this case reflected ‘a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself’ so as to bring the deputy’s comment within the Miranda rule.” As a result, the court concluded “the trial court did not err in concluding that defendant was not interrogated.” Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial.
Jury instructions; Denial of a proposed “good faith” instruction on defendant’s unlawful distribution charge (21 USC § 841(a)); United States v Godofsky; Whether the requested instruction comported with Ruan v United States; Admission of expert testimony; Sufficiency of the evidence; Conspiracy to distribute controlled substances & unlawfully distributing controlled substances; Healthcare fraud
The court rejected defendant-Anderson’s argument that the district court abused its discretion by failing to give a "good faith" instruction where the instructions given comported with Ruan. It also rejected his challenges to the admission of expert testimony and to the sufficiency of the evidence for his convictions. A jury convicted Anderson, a medical doctor, of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, unlawful distribution of controlled substances, and healthcare fraud. He argued that the district court abused its discretion by not giving the jury a proposed good faith instruction relevant to his unlawful distribution charge. At the charge conference, the government requested that the district court remove the good faith instruction per Godofsky, which held that a doctor’s subjective good faith “was irrelevant to the ‘except as authorized’ clause for physicians tried under § 841(a).” The district court removed the good faith paragraphs from the instructions. After briefing was completed in this case, the Supreme Court held in Ruan that “the mens rea standard of ‘knowingly or intentionally’ applies to the entirety of § 841(a)—including the ‘except as authorized’ clause.” This meant that “‘once a defendant meets the burden of producing evidence that his or her conduct was “authorized,” the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly or intentionally acted in an unauthorized manner.’” The court first noted that Anderson’s proposed instruction did not mention knowledge or intent. It then considered “whether a good faith instruction can comport with Ruan.” The court held that “the instruction given to the jury specifically covers the holding of Ruan, by referring continuously to the ‘knowledge of the defendant,’ his ‘deliberate ignorance,’ and if he ‘knew’ that the prescriptions were dispensed illegitimately.” The instruction focused attention to his “subjective mindset in issuing the prescriptions.” The court also rejected Anderson’s challenge to the admission of testimony by a government expert, finding no merit to his contention about the scientific inadequacy of the expert’s reports and agreeing with the district court’s observation “that courts frequently admit expert testimony on the question of whether medications were prescribed with a legitimate medical purpose.” Further, Anderson had the opportunity to challenge the expert during cross-examination. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions. Affirmed.
Resentencing; Reasonableness; Consideration of a defendant’s health issues; 18 USC § 924(c) (using or possessing a firearm in the course of drug trafficking or some other violent crime); United States v Davis
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that defendant-Johns’s sentence was reasonable where it was within the Guidelines range and the district court adequately explained why it did not impose a lower sentence based on her health problems. When the law rearrested Johns after her 16-year years on the lam, she was convicted and sentenced to 168 months for kidnapping, failing to appear following pretrial release, and for using or possessing a firearm in the course of drug trafficking or some other violent crime. The district court vacated her conviction for § 924(c) pursuant to Davis and resentenced her to 151 months on the other convictions. The Guidelines range for those convictions was 121 to 151 months. Johns argued that the district court’s sentence was procedurally unreasonable because it failed to “‘adequately explain’” why it did not impose a lower sentence based on her health problems (“‘severe back and foot pain’” and other conditions). But the court noted that, under plain error review, the district court was not required “to discuss generally Johns’s many arguments for mitigation” or required to “specifically address each potential ground she raised for leniency . . . .” It noted that “Johns’s recently developed health issues would never have been a subject at the resentencing hearing had Johns not absconded from justice for nearly 16 years, a period that well exceeded her final time to be served here. Put differently, had Johns never fled, her sentence would have finished before the onset of her health issues.” The court rejected her claim that her sentence was too long considering her health, explaining that sentences within the Guidelines are “presumptively reasonable,” and that it would not “second guess” the district court, which “thoughtfully considered the grave nature of Johns’s offenses and balanced those concerns against the mitigating arguments Johns raised to arrive at an appropriate sentence.” Affirmed
Postelection relief through quo warranto; MCL 600.4505; MCL 600.4545; Doctrine of laches; Frivolous appeal; MCR 1.109(E); MCL 600.2591
The court affirmed “the dismissal of plaintiff’s pursuit of postelection relief through quo warranto under the doctrine of laches.” Also, it did not believe that an award of sanctions for filing a frivolous action was appropriate here. The “case is one of several brought by plaintiff challenging the legitimacy of judicial incumbent candidates on the [11/22] general election ballot for failure to comply with candidate certification requirements.” Assuming, without deciding, “plaintiff had standing to bring a petition under MCL 600.4505 and MCL 600.4545, and made a sufficient showing of ‘material fraud or error’ related to the [11/22] election of judicial candidates for the Wayne Circuit Court,” the court concluded that plaintiff’s quo warranto application was barred by the doctrine of laches. It determined that plaintiff’s “preelection suit was barred by laches because he unreasonably delayed his pursuit of preelection relief, and granting his belated requested relief would have been unduly disruptive to the Secretary of State’s election preparation and planning, resulting in significant additional expense and expenditure of resources, and would prejudice the judicial candidates, who had expended significant time, energy, and resources on their judicial campaigns. These same factors do not cease to exist after the election. Indeed, plaintiff’s postelection attempt to pursue the same relief would be even more disruptive to defendants and prejudicial to the judicial candidates.” The court was not persuaded that the relevant cases demonstrated this appeal was frivolous. Nor could it conclude that any of the conditions in MCL 600.2591(3)(a) were met. It could not “conclude that plaintiff’s claim was devoid of arguable legal merit or that he had no reasonable basis to believe that the underlying facts were true, or that the action was meant to harass the other parties.”
Child custody; The trial court’s findings of fact; Rittershaus v Rittershaus; Established custodial environment; MCL 722.27(1)(c); Bofysil v Bofysil; Best-interest factors; MCL 722.23; Factors (d), (f), (g), (h), & (l); Burden of proof; In re Anjoski; Parental presumption; MCL 722.25(1); Child Custody Act (CCA)
The court held that the trial court did not err in its custody decisions as to the parties’ four children. After the parties’ divorce, defendant-mother’s family members sought custody of their four children. In 2014, plaintiff-Williamson successfully petitioned for custody of BF and KF. In 2015, plaintiff-Heinz successfully obtained custody of LF2, and mother’s parents (plaintiffs-Greg and Nicole Morin) were granted custody of LF1. In 2021, defendant-father sought sole legal and physical custody of the children. During this process, Greg died, and Nicole, who was having health issues, agreed that mother should have custody of the children. The trial court ultimately granted sole physical custody of LF1 to mother, and granted father and mother joint legal custody. However, it granted Williamson sole physical custody of BF and KF, and granted mother, father, and Williamson joint legal custody. It also granted sole physical custody of LF2 to Heinz, and granted mother, father, and Heinz joint legal custody. On appeal, the court first rejected father’s argument that the trial court failed to make adequate factual findings concerning the best-interest factors. “While some of the trial court’s findings may appear brief to father, the entirety of the record reveals that the trial court gave each party ample opportunity to present their case and intently listened and then issued its findings and ultimate ruling.” It next rejected his challenge to the trial court’s custody decision as to LF1, noting that, “[g]iven the record evidence, father failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it was in LF1’s best interests to grant him sole legal and physical custody. Clear and convincing evidence established joint legal custody was in LF1’s best interests and sole physical custody with mother was in LF1’s best interests.” The court also rejected his challenge to the trial court’s custody decision as to LF2, BF, and KF, noting the trial court “was aware of the parental presumption contained in MCL 722.25(1), and that Williamson and Heinz were required to establish by clear and convincing evidence that custody in their favor was proper.” It found they met that requirement. The court then explained that “unlike cases involving termination of parental rights, which require the balancing of the best interests of the children with a parent’s constitutional rights, the CCA requires trial courts to focus on the children ‘to promote the best interests of the child and to provide a stable environment for children that is free of unwarranted custody changes.’” Affirmed.
Alleged malicious prosecution & violation of constitutional rights; Governmental immunity; MCL 691.1407; Exceptions; Gross negligence; MCL 691.1407(2); Tarlea v Crabtree; Vicarious liability; Mays v Governor; Absolute immunity; MCL 691.1407(5); Petipren v Jaskowski; Municipal liability under 42 USC § 1983; Johnson v Vanderkooi; Qualified immunity; Holeton v City of Livonia; Principle that a public prosecutor is not liable for malicious prosecution; Matthews v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of MI; Failure to state a claim
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendants summary disposition of plaintiff’s malicious prosecution and constitutional claims on the basis of immunity and failure to state a claim. In 2014, plaintiff was charged with eavesdropping. The prosecution “filed a nolle prosequi and the charges were dismissed.” Plaintiff sued the prosecutor’s office and several other defendants “who allegedly were involved in her arrest and prosecution, ostensibly asserting claims of malicious prosecution and violations of her constitutional rights.” Defendants moved for summary disposition based on governmental immunity, prosecutorial immunity, judicial immunity, and quasi-judicial immunity. They also argued that any claim based on plaintiff’s arrest was barred because the arrest was made pursuant to a lawfully issued warrant, and that “any federal claims were barred by various immunities and the failure to state a claim.” The trial court granted defendants’ motion. On appeal, the court first found that the trial court did not err by granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition on the basis of immunity. Because plaintiff’s complaint did not specifically refer to the sheriff or the police chief she failed to allege “they were not acting within the scope of their authority or that they violated any constitutional rights.” And the prosecutor was not liable for malicious prosecution. As to the police department, the sheriff’s office, and the prosecutor’s office, because plaintiff did not allege any exception to governmental immunity, “they cannot be held vicariously liable for any gross negligence by their employees. Nor can they be liable for the intentional torts of their employees.” Further, as to plaintiff’s constitutional claims, the court noted that, while perhaps alleging a pattern of conduct, her allegations failed “to sufficiently allege an officially adopted or widespread practice.” As such, the trial court properly found “the municipal defendants were immune from any alleged constitutional violations.” Moreover, as to the remaining defendants, including two judges, the trial court properly found the judges were entitled to judicial immunity and the other defendant was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Affirmed.
Premises liability; Special relationship between landlords & tenants giving rise to a duty of care; Duty owed to an invitee; Open & obvious danger; “Special aspects”; Hoffner v Lanctoe; Lessor’s duty under MCL 554.139; Intended use of a front porch
The court held that while defendant-Metro Detroit Property Management was plaintiff-tenant’s landlord, her premises liability claim should have been dismissed because the alleged hazard was open and obvious. But it was properly denied summary disposition of her claim under MCL 554.139(1)(a). Plaintiff “fell off the right side of the front porch while attempting to enter” the home, which was managed by Property Management and owned by the other defendant. The porch had a handrail on the left side, but none on the right side. The trial court denied Property Management summary disposition. On appeal, the court rejected Property Management’s argument “that it did not owe a common-law duty to plaintiff because it did not own, possess, or control the” property. The lease clearly stated that it “was the ‘landlord’ with respect to the property at issue and plaintiff was the ‘tenant.’ And throughout the leasing documents, Property Management repeatedly referred to itself as the ‘landlord’ to whom plaintiff was to pay rent.” It also reserved various rights as the landlord. But the court agreed that her premises liability claim should have been dismissed because “the danger posed by the front porch entryway was open and obvious as a matter of law and plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether there were special aspects that made it unreasonably dangerous.” As to her statutory claim, Property Management’s argument that it owed her no duties under MCL 554.139 because it was not her landlord again failed – “the only parties to the lease agreement were plaintiff and Property Management; therefore, Property Management owed plaintiff duties under” the statute. And in light of “the totality of the circumstances in this case, and the aggregate of factors,” the court agreed with the trial court “there could be a reasonable difference of opinion regarding whether the front porch entryway was fit for its intended use as a reasonable means of ingress to and egress from the home. And because the open and obvious doctrine does not apply to a defendant’s statutory duty to ensure that the leased premises were fit for their intended use, . . . Property Management may be liable even if the dangerous condition of the front porch entrance to the home was known or obvious to plaintiff.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.