Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Disciplinary proceedings against a nurse; MCL 333.16221; Probation & fines under MCL 333.16221(a) (negligence or failure to exercise due care) & (b)(i) (incompetence); Board of Nursing Disciplinary Subcommittee (the Subcommittee)
The court held that “a reasonable person could find that substantial evidence supported the Subcommittee’s conclusion that respondent[-nurse’s] conduct constituted a violation of MCL 333.16221(a) and (b)(i).” The Subcommittee placed respondent on probation for one to three years and fined her $500 under MCL 333.16221(a) and (b)(i). Her discipline arose out of two incidents in which she failed to change a patient’s dressings and then made late entries into the patients’ records indicating they had refused dressing changes. In a prior appeal, the court vacated the Subcommittee’s order and remanded for elaboration. On remand, the Subcommittee clarified its findings, again found her conduct violated MCL 333.16221(a) and (b)(i), and placed her on probation for a minimum of one year, not to exceed three years, and ordered her automatic discharge from probation after one year, upon her completion of the probationary terms set forth in the order. In the present appeal, the court found the “Subcommittee’s final order and conclusions of law on remand were supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence.” The Subcommittee’s “findings of fact and conclusions of law on remand clarified that [it] did consider the testimony and evidence favorable to respondent and that it found” her testimony to be credible. But it “decided that respondent’s admitted conduct constituted a violation of MCL 333.16221(a) and (b)(i) based upon the expert’s testimony at the administrative hearing.” Affirmed.
The General Property Tax Act (GPTA); Exemptions; Qualified Agricultural Exemption (QAE); MCL 211.7ee(1) & (2); Effect of parcels qualifying as “agricultural” under MCL 211.34c; “Agricultural operation” (MCL 211.34c(2)(a)(ii)(G)); “Qualified agricultural property” (MCL 211.7dd(d)); “Agricultural use” (MCL 324.36101(b)); “Farming operations”; The Right to Farm Act (RTFA); MCL 286.472(b); Whether the GPTA & RTFA should be read in pari materia; Michigan Tax Tribunal (MTT)
The court held that competent, material, and substantial evidence supported the MTT’s finding that only parts of petitioner-Blake’s Farm’s parcels qualified as agricultural property entitled to a QAE. Further, “the MTT did not misapply the law or adopt a wrong principle by applying the definitions set forth in the GPTA and not relying upon the definitions in the RTFA.” Thus, the court affirmed the MTT’s ruling that the parcels were only entitled to a partial QAE under GPTA § 7ee. They were “classified as agricultural and contain an apple orchard. In addition, Blake’s Farm operates a farm market, a year-round restaurant, and a gift shop; hosts seasonal events throughout the year; stores equipment, packs and cans apples for sale, and stores cider for sale.” The court first noted that petitioner seemed to suggest it was “entitled to a 100% QAE under § 7ee(2) so long as its parcels qualify as ‘agricultural’ under MCL 211.34c. However, MCL 211.34c requires that the property (1) be qualified agricultural property, and (2) that it be classified as agricultural under MCL 211.34c. Thus, merely being classified as agricultural does not warrant a 100% QAE.” Given that the GPTA does not define “farming operations,” petitioner argued the court should “adopt the definition of ‘farm operations’ as set forth in the RTFA.” The court disagreed, noting that by “its express language the definition of ‘farm operation’ in MCL 286.472 is limited to that term as it is used in the RTFA.” It also rejected petitioner’s contention that the GPTA and RTFA should be read in pari materia. While “both the RTFA and § 7ee of the GPTA refer to agriculture, it cannot be said that they relate to the same subject or share a common purpose.” It found that resolving the appeal turned “on whether the parcels are qualified agricultural property as that term is defined in MCL 211.7dd(d).” It noted that expressly excluded from the definition “is ‘[p]roperty used for commercial storage, commercial processing, commercial distribution, commercial marketing, or commercial shipping operations or other commercial or industrial purposes . . . .’” The MTT determined “that the various buildings and structures on the two parcels of land owned by Blake’s Farm were being used for a ‘commercial or industrial purpose.’” The court noted that respondent’s evidence as to “the existence of the various buildings and structures, as well as the uses that could be inferred from the evidence, was unrebutted” before the MTT.
Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy; 18 USC §§ 1962(c) & (d); United States v Hills; Hobbs Act extortion; 28 USC § 1951; Evans v United States; Honest services fraud; §§ 1343 & 1346; Jury instructions; Sufficiency of the evidence; Money laundering; Sixth Amendment right to counsel; Dismissal of a juror; Ability to speak with counsel; Co-conspirator evidence; Relevance; Unfair prejudice; Judicial bias; Sentencing; Procedural & substantive reasonableness; Enhancement for a bribery-related conviction based on the value of the bribe; USSG § 2C1.1(b)(2); Obstruction of justice enhancement (§ 3C1.1); Other evidentiary challenges
The court affirmed defendants-Householder’s and Borges’s convictions for RICO conspiracy, holding among other things that there was sufficient evidence to support the racketeering acts. There was evidence that Householder received millions of dollars in exchange for passing certain legislation and saving it from a voter referendum, and that “Borges knew and agreed to facilitate the illegal activity involved in the Householder enterprise.” Householder was a member of the Ohio House of Representatives and former House Speaker. A jury convicted him “of conspiring to solicit and receive almost $60 million in return for passing a billion-dollar bailout of a failing nuclear energy company” – FirstEnergy, an Ohio-based public utility holding company. Borges was found guilty of playing a role in the conspiracy. The court first considered Householder’s claim that the jury instructions as to a quid pro quo in exchange for an official act were improper. The court disagreed, noting that the district court’s jury instruction came “straight from” the Supreme Court’s holding in Evans, and mirrored the court’s pattern jury instructions. As to his challenge to the timing instruction, the court recently said in Hills that the “exact same ‘as opportunities arise’ bribery instruction was proper.” The court also held that there was sufficient evidence that Householder’s enterprise committed racketeering acts the government divided “into three broad categories: public-official bribery, private-citizen bribery, and money laundering.” As to extortion and honest services fraud, there was evidence that “he solicited and received millions of dollars from FirstEnergy in exchange for passing the bailout legislation and saving that bailout from a voter referendum.” The court also held that his claim for denial of the right to counsel could not be supported by the dismissal of a juror related to COVID-19. His evidentiary claims likewise failed, and the court found no judicial bias. Further, his sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable, with any errors being harmless. As for Borges, the court noted that “a conspiracy charge rests on the unlawful agreement to further an endeavor which, if completed, would satisfy all the elements of a substantive criminal offense.” It held that the evidence showed “Borges had a deep knowledge of (and involvement in) Householder’s bribery scheme.” As to his evidentiary challenges, the “district court didn’t abuse its discretion when it sustained the prosecution’s objections to” testimony about “meeting with lawyers during the attempt to pass House Bill 6” where it was “concerned that Borges was attempting to raise a pseudo-advice of counsel defense.”
Whether defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated; Barker v Wingo; Length of the delay; Responsibility for the delays; Assertion of the right to a speedy trial; United States v Williams; United States v Allen; Whether defendant was prejudiced by the delays
The court held that “under the totality of the circumstances,” defendant-Schuster was not denied his right to a speedy trial where he was more to blame for the overall trial delay, he “failed to sincerely assert his right to a speedy trial in a timely manner,” and he did not show prejudice resulting from the delay. He moved to dismiss three felony child pornography charges that he had been indicted for six years prior, alleging a violation of the right to a speedy trial. After initially denying the motion, the district court reconsidered and dismissed the charges. Applying the Barker factors, the court held that although the district court was responsible for some of the delay, “Schuster is more to blame for the overall delay. Perhaps most importantly, [he] failed to sincerely assert his right to a speedy trial in a timely manner[.]” The parties disputed who was “properly assigned responsibility for the periods of delay in which” Schuster had motions “pending before the district court without action. In [his] view, nearly all of the delay is attributable to the government. And in the government’s view, nearly all of the delay is attributable to Schuster. Both views miss the mark.” The court found that the question was “whether the time taken to adjudicate pretrial motions is reasonable or justified.” It noted that its precedent did “not provide clear guidance for evaluating when a district court unreasonably delays in its adjudication of pretrial motions.” As to one of the periods at issue, the “district court explained that the main driver of its delay was its desire to await the outcome of several Sixth Circuit cases that may have shed light on Schuster’s [10/18] motions.” The court found that while “waiting for some other court to act may be unreasonable in other speedy-trial cases, the record here demonstrates that Schuster was complicit in this delay. Whether or not the district court’s decision to await the Sixth Circuit cases was reasonable, Schuster did not object to the delay and indeed acquiesced. Worse still, he may have been at fault for part of” it. The court concluded that his “litigation conduct over the entire case indicate[d] that he ‘did not want a speedy trial.’” It rejected his reliance on his lengthy incarceration, especially during the pandemic, to support a finding of prejudice, holding that through “his substantial contributions to the delay, Schuster himself precipitated much of the general harm coming from his pretrial detention.” Further, his “threadbare assertions of his right to a speedy trial also undermine his prejudice claim.” Reversed and remanded.
Negligence & gross negligence action arising from a snowmobile/Department of Natural Resources (DNR) vehicle collision; The Natural Resources & Environmental Protection Act (NREPA); Applicability of the assumption-of-the-risk provision (MCL 324.82126(8)); The Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA); The motor vehicle exception (MCL 691.1405)
On remand from the Supreme Court to consider the applicability of MCL 324.82126(8), in an issue of first impression the court harmonized the NREPA and the GTLA and held that “the GTLA remains intact and the motor vehicle exception applies to injuries caused by” a government employee’s negligent operation of a motor vehicle. Further, even “if the NREPA were to supersede the GTLA, the collision between” plaintiff-Goss’s snowmobile and defendant-DNR’s vehicle “was not a risk inherent in the sport of snowmobiling.” Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of summary disposition to the DNR. This case arose after Goss’s snowmobile collided with a crossover utility vehicle operated by a DNR Ranger. Goss was seriously injured and the Ranger died at the scene. The trial court ruling at issue was “that Goss did not assume the risk of the accident under MCL 324.82126(8),” part of the NREPA. The DNR asserted MCL 324.82126(8) supersedes the GTLA and “Goss assumed the risk of the accident under the statute.” The court noted that “GTLA and the NREPA have never before been harmonized, making this a matter of first impression” as well as “a difficult task” as the two “have little in common.” While both “reorganized and consolidated existing legislation into one statutory scheme, there is no direct connection between” them. That the NREPA was enacted later did not support that it was intended to limit the GTLA’s exceptions, nor did it appear there was “any limiting language in either statute to suggest that the Legislature intended for the NREPA to supersede the GTLA in places where they conflict.” Their purpose and subject matter also greatly differ. The court could not find “anything about the nature of the NREPA that would eliminate or alter the” GTLA’s exceptions to governmental immunity. “And while the NREPA is certainly a longer statute than the GTLA, neither statute is inherently more specific than the other for the subject matter they govern.” It concluded that reading them “as harmoniously as reasonably possible, the scope and purpose of each statute” supported that the GTLA’s motor-vehicle exception “remains intact even in accidents where the plaintiff is riding a snowmobile.” Further, even if it assumed MCL 324.82126(8) superseded or overrode “the GTLA under the circumstances presented here, the standard of care remains one of negligence.” And there was “no evidence that Goss assumed the risk of the accident.”
Interpretation of the No-Fault Act (NFA); “Medically indigent”; Hicks v Citizens Ins Co of Am; Botsford Gen Hosp v Citizens Ins Co; MCL 400.106(1)(b)(ii); Apportioning the available personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under MCL 500.3112; MCL 500.3142; “First in, first out” (FIFO)
In these consolidated cases under the NFA, the court concluded the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff-Crane was medically indigent. It “did not err by declining to require [defendant-]Nationwide to distribute the available PIP benefits based upon which claimant first submitted a claim to Nationwide.” However, it “abused its discretion by awarding PIP benefits for future attendant care.” Plaintiffs-Michigan Head & Spine and McLaren Macomb (referred to as the providers) appealed the trial court order granting Nationwide’s “motion to interplead funds and apportioning the available funds between the providers and” Crane. They first challenged “the trial court’s finding that Crane is medically indigent.” Crane argued that Hicks and Botsford did not apply “because, at the time that they were decided, PIP benefits under the [NFA] were unlimited.” He suggested “that because there are finite benefits available and because his medical expenses for his catastrophic injuries far exceed them, he should be considered medically indigent. Yet, at the time that the providers received payment from Medicaid, Crane’s PIP benefits had not been exhausted. Indeed, the trial court ultimately ordered that a portion of the funds be paid to the providers and a portion be paid to Crane.” The trial “court would not have been able to order a distribution of PIP benefits to either Crane or the providers if such medical benefits were not available to Crane.” Thus, because he “was entitled to medical assistance ‘available through a legal obligation of a contractor, public or private,’ he did not qualify as a medically indigent person under MCL 400.106(1)(b)(ii).” The trial court erred in this regard. The providers also argued it “erred in its interpretation of and application of the” NFA. Because the statutory maximum no-fault benefits available are limited to $250,000, “and because the claims submitted to Nationwide exceed that maximum, the question is how the available funds should be dispersed.” The court held that “because MCL 500.3112 authorizes the trial court to apportion the available PIP benefits, and because MCL 500.3142 does not require payment on a FIFO basis, the trial court did not err” in this regard. But as to the award of PIP benefits for future attendant care, the NFA “does not authorize payment of PIP benefits for losses that the injured person has not yet incurred[.]” The court reversed “in part, the trial court’s order apportioning the available PIP benefits,” and remanded “for an equitable apportionment under MCL 500.3112.”
Grant of a request for declaratory relief; MCR 2.605(A); Whether there was still an actual controversy before the trial court; PT Today, Inc v Commissioner of Office of Fin & Ins Servs; Mootness; League of Women Voters v Secretary of State
The court held that the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs declaratory relief in this property dispute “because there was no longer an actual controversy before [it] on the date it entered its declaratory-judgment order, thereby rendering the case moot.” The case concerned seven contiguous parcels of property on a riverbank. “A privately-constructed road spans all seven parcels and provides access to the riverbank. Each parcel is subject to an easement permitting access to the road.” Plaintiffs sought “a declaratory judgment establishing their right to relocate a portion of the road in order to accommodate the construction of a home. Following a bench trial, the trial court” ruled in their favor. It directed them to prepare and file a proposed construction plan for approval and a proposed order for entry. They instead later moved to voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice due to a change in plans. Defendants opposed this motion. The trial court denied it “and instead entered an order effectuating its factual findings and legal conclusions articulated during the bench trial. In doing so, the trial court granted declaratory relief in plaintiffs’ favor.” The court concluded that the moment they “informed the trial court that they no longer planned to relocate a portion of the road, there was no longer an actual legal controversy before the [trial] court.” In moving for voluntary dismissal, plaintiffs asserted that plaintiffs-Lichtermans “decided to build their home on the portion of Lot 7 that was previously intended to accommodate the relocated portion of the road. They explained that the Lichtermans did not wish to wait until the conclusion of the trial court proceedings and potential appellate process before beginning construction. Therefore, the trial court’s declaratory-judgment order could no longer have any practical legal effects upon the existing controversy. In the absence of an actual plan to relocate a portion of the road, the interests of the parties were no longer adverse, and no declaratory judgment was necessary to guide their future conduct. The parties wished to maintain the road’s then-existing construction,” making the legal dispute hypothetical. In granting plaintiffs declaratory relief, “the trial court erroneously granted relief” as to a moot issue. Vacated and remanded “for entry of an order granting plaintiffs’ motion for voluntary dismissal.”
Condemnation; Const 1963, art 10, § 2; The Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act; MCL 213.56(1), (5), & (6); MCL 213.62; Consumers Energy Co v Storm; Motion for a necessity hearing; Subject-matter jurisdiction; Failure to make a statutorily compliant good-faith offer to acquire the easements; MCL 213.55(1); Lenawee Cnty v Wagley; Appellate jurisdiction; MCR 7.203(B)(4); MCR 7.205(A)
The court held that it had jurisdiction to grant the parties’ various applications for leave to appeal, but the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff-gas company’s condemnation complaints because plaintiff “did not make a statutorily compliant good-faith offer to acquire the easements.” Plaintiff sought condemnation of easements for a natural-gas pipeline to replace an existing pipeline. It sued defendants-Trust and cotrustees, because the Trust owned two parcels of land through which plaintiff wished to build the replacement pipeline. Defendant-Double Eagle also contested the condemnation. The trial court found none of the defendants was entitled to a necessity hearing. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that it lacked jurisdiction to consider these appeals because the Trust failed to timely appeal the first order denying its motion to challenge necessity, which also bound Double Eagle. “Because the individual applications for appeal were filed within 21 days of entry of the respective orders at issue, this court had the authority to grant the applications.” The court then agreed with defendants that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the condemnation complaints because plaintiff failed to submit a written good-faith offer to Double Eagle to acquire the easements. Plaintiff “did not secure relevant information regarding Double Eagle’s interest in the easements before making its initial offer as permitted by MCL 213.55(2).” And the “Trust’s failure to disclose Double Eagle’s farming lease thus did not excuse [plaintiff’s] failure to provide a good-faith written offer to acquire Double Eagle’s interest in the easements before filing its condemnation complaint. [It] therefore failed to satisfy the necessary condition precedent to invoking the trial court’s jurisdiction in the condemnation proceedings.” Reversed and remanded.