Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
Full Text Opinion
Statute of limitations (SOL); Conversion; Fraudulent misrepresentation; Breach of contract; Unjust enrichment; Breach of fiduciary duty; Limited liability company (LLC) member oppression; MCL 450.4515(1); Civil conspiracy; Fraudulent concealment; MCL 600.5855
Holding that plaintiff-Balsamo filed this action after the applicable SOLs expired, the court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition for defendants. The wrongful conduct that was the basis for Balsamo’s claims occurred in 6/14, “when defendants refused to restore his membership interest in” defendant-Dalcoma, an LLC organized to own and operate a multi-unit commercial property, “after he cured his immigration issues.” As to Count I of his amended complaint, the court concluded that because he did not file his claim until 1/22/21, the trial court did not err in holding that his conversion claim was barred by the three-year SOL. As to Count II, the court determined that because “defendants failed to restore Balsamo’s membership interest when he fulfilled his part of the agreement in [6/14], the trial court did not err in concluding that the fraudulent misrepresentation claim accrued in” 6/14 and thus, was also time-barred. As to Count IV, the court found that because “defendants failed to restore Balsamo’s membership interest when he fulfilled his part of the agreement in [6/14], the trial court did not err in concluding that the breach of contract claim accrued in” 6/14 and was likewise time-barred. Also, as to Counts V and VI, the court held that the trial court did not err in concluding that the unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary claims accrued in 6/14 and were time-barred. As to Count VII, the court determined that accepting “Balsamo’s allegations as true, defendants’ substantial interference took place in 2009 when defendants colluded to extinguish his interest in Dalcoma, and in 2014 when defendants did not restore his membership interest after he became a United States citizen.” Given that both dates were well outside the three-year SOL, the court found “that the trial court did not err in concluding that Balsamo’s member oppression claim was time-barred.” Further, as to Count VIII, “the trial court properly dismissed all of Balsamo’s claims that purportedly supported his civil conspiracy claim.” Thus, it also properly dismissed his civil conspiracy claim. Lastly, Balsamo failed to plead “a claim of fraudulent concealment that would have tolled the applicable” SOLs for his claims.
Speedy trial; People v Williams; Use of interactive video technology in jury selection; MCR 6.006(A); Jury instructions on first-degree home invasion; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to the jury instructions & to request an accidental-entry instruction; Sentencing; Reliance on acquitted conduct; People v Beck; Scoring of OV 3
Rejecting his speedy trial, jury selection, and jury instruction claims, the court affirmed defendant-James’s convictions. But it reversed his sentences and remanded for resentencing where “the trial court clearly fashioned a sentence based upon acquitted conduct.” He was convicted of first-degree home invasion and assault and battery. He was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender to concurrent prison sentences of 150 months to 20 years for home invasion, and 93 days for assault and battery. “James had a period of incarceration of 17 months and 18 days between arrest and trial. This delay was more than the 180 days that the Legislature has deemed reasonable for a person in custody to be brought to trial, . . . but less than the 18-months that courts presume prejudicial.” As to the reasons for the delay, it was “undisputed that the COVID-19 pandemic and our Supreme Court’s orders in response to it were responsible for the greater part of it.” The delay from arrest to trial was not imputed to the prosecution. And any personal prejudice he “experienced was attributable at least in part to his own behavior that compromised his prospects for release on bond.” He failed to show “how the pretrial delay prevented him from presenting evidence that could have supported his defense, and otherwise hampered his ability to adequately prepare or present his defense.” Also, based on a review of the record, it did “not appear probable that the use of interactive video technology to voir dire most of the jury affected the outcome of the trial or otherwise resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” The court concluded “that James, despite identifying an irregularity in the voir dire procedure,” did not rebut the presumptions that jurors follow their instructions and are impartial. The court further held that “the trial court did not plainly err” in instructing the jury on the elements of first-degree home invasion. But it “violated Beck when it stated that it found that James committed aggravated assault and used that finding as a basis for assessing OV 3 at 10 points.”
Sufficiency of the evidence for convictions of involuntary manslaughter & felony-firearm; MCL 750.329; People v Smith; People v Bass; Sentencing; MCL 769.34(10); Presumptive proportionality of a within-guidelines sentence; Cruel & unusual punishment
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s involuntary manslaughter and felony-firearm convictions, and that his within-guidelines sentence for manslaughter was reasonable and not cruel or unusual punishment. The victim (B) “died from a gunshot wound to the head. There was no evidence presented that suggested there was a lawful justification or excuse for defendant shooting” her. Rather, he asserted there was a reasonable doubt “whether he intentionally pointed the firearm at” B. The court disagreed. “The prosecution established that defendant and [B] were alone together when the firearm was discharged. The firearm was registered to defendant. [B’s] gunshot wound was above her ear on the right side of her head.” The court noted that the fact the medical examiner “could not determine whether the trigger was pulled intentionally or accidentally is not relevant; involuntary manslaughter does not require that defendant intentionally pulled the trigger, only that defendant intentionally pointed the firearm at the victim.” It further concluded that his “act of holding the gun flush against [B’s] head establishes that he intentionally pointed it at” her. In addition, no evidence was presented suggesting that she was suicidal. As the court concluded “it was defendant who possessed the firearm” and that he committed the felony of involuntary manslaughter, there was also sufficient evidence to support his felony-firearm conviction. He next contended he was entitled to a reasonableness review of his within-guidelines 29-month minimum sentence for the manslaughter conviction, and that it was cruel and unusual. The court again disagreed, noting that his minimum guidelines range for the conviction was 29 to 57 months. Thus, his minimum sentence was at the bottom of the range and presumptively proportionate. He did not claim that the trial court made a guidelines scoring error or relied on inaccurate information. Instead, he argued “his age and the fact he will spend at least 29 months in prison away from his family and children are circumstances that make the sentence imposed disproportionate; neither fact, however, is an unusual circumstance, nor a circumstance that renders his sentence disproportionate.” As to his cruel and unusual punishment claim, “a proportionate sentence is not cruel or unusual.” Affirmed.
Divorce; Equitable distribution of marital property; Sparks v Sparks; Retirement accounts; The marital home
The court held that the trial court did not err in its distribution of the parties’ marital property. When they divorced for a second time, the trial court found they were equally at fault for the breakdown of the marriage. On appeal, the court first found that the trial court’s decision to award defendant-ex-husband 50% of the marital coverture of plaintiff’s 401(k) and 50% of the value that accrued on the IRA accounts and an American Fund account during the marriage was fair and equitable. “In light of the extensive record showing that both parties were hostile toward one another and that they both frequently accused the other of misconduct, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred by finding the parties equally at fault for the breakdown in the marriage.” Given that the trial court appeared “to have addressed the only relevant Sparks factor, and given that [its] findings on that factor” were not erroneous, the court rejected plaintiff’s assertion that the trial court did not adequately address the Sparks factors in distributing the retirement accounts. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its rulings as to the marital home. The trial court’s “determination that the property should be split equally is fair and equitable,” and given that it “decided that the parties were entitled to an equal share of the equity in the house, [its] decision to award” plaintiff only a $31,000 offset for her down payment on the home was also fair and equitable. In addition, its “decision to order that the property be listed for sale and for a purchase offer to be used to indicate the” fair market value was not unwarranted. As the trial court explained, “the purpose was to ‘receive an appropriate offer and go step-by-step’ from there.” Further, it did not err by finding plaintiff “intentionally hindered potential buyers from making reality offers on the house.” And defendant’s “alleged fault for the delay is not a basis for reversing the” trial court’s determination. Finally, plaintiff did not offer any factual support for her contention that the decision not to allow an offset “for the costs of maintaining the marital home after the parties’ separation” was inequitable because she had to pay more. Affirmed.
Action for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits; Eligibility; MCL 500.3113(b); MCL 500.3173; Whether plaintiff was a constructive “owner” of the uninsured vehicle involved in the accident; MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i); “Having the use”; Ardt v Titan Ins Co; Twichel v MIC Gen Ins Corp; Kessel v Rahn; Detroit Med Ctr v Titan Ins Co; Chop v Zielinski; Michigan Assigned Claims Plan (MACP); Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF)
Concluding there was a fact question as to whether plaintiff was a constructive owner of the uninsured vehicle involved in the accident giving rise to his claim for PIP benefits, the court reversed in part the grant of summary disposition to defendants-MACP and MAIPF. But it affirmed summary disposition for MACP based on case law holding that it lacks the capacity to be sued. Defendants asserted there was “no genuine issue of material fact because plaintiff’s use of the vehicle indicates he was the constructive owner, making him ineligible for PIP benefits.” The court noted that it and the Supreme Court have considered several “factors in determining whether a person’s use of a vehicle is sufficient to establish constructive ownership[.]” The court found that the trial court’s conclusion “the facts were unrebutted based on plaintiff’s deposition and application was incorrect in part. Plaintiff’s application was contradicted on three points—[he] denied that he contributed money toward the purchase of the vehicle, that he used the vehicle daily, and that he purchased” gas for it. But he “did not contradict his application on five points—[he] used the vehicle, not daily as initially reported, but a couple of times over the course of the eight days; [he] had access to a set of keys, but later testified that he did not have his own set of keys; [he] had not ever had to ask for permission to use the vehicle; [he] had never been denied permission to use [it]; and [he] gave himself permission to use [it] on the date of the accident.” However, he identified his girlfriend (L) as the only owner of the car “on his application and, during his deposition, plaintiff denied that he owned a car.” He additionally explained that it “was there for him to drive if he ‘needed to, like if [he] need[ed] to do something . . . .’ Thus, although plaintiff had access to the car’s keys, he did not have unfettered use of the vehicle as an owner would.” The court noted that he used it “sporadically, albeit apparently without securing [L’s] permission given their relationship.” Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to him, the court found a fact question existed on the constructive ownership issue. Remanded.
Governmental immunity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA); MCL 691.1407(2) & (3); Odom v Wayne Cnty; Application to intentional torts; Bad faith or malice; Gross negligence claim
The court held that the trial court erred by granting defendants-city, city crime analyst (Marshall), and city police officer (Ball) summary disposition of plaintiffs-the accused’s and his parents’ claims based on governmental immunity. The police broke into the accused’s home pursuant to a no-knock warrant, handcuffed his parents, arrested him on suspicion of a shooting, and searched the home. The accused’s parents explained he was hospitalized at the time of the shooting and provided supporting documentation, which the police used only to verify his identity before taking him to jail. After surveillance video confirmed he could not have been the assailant, the charges were dismissed. Plaintiffs then sued defendants asserting several federal and state law causes of action. Ultimately the case was remanded to the trial court to proceed with claims for malicious prosecution, false arrest, false imprisonment, and gross negligence. On appeal, the court found that the trial court “erred by concluding that defendants were entitled to immunity with respect to the intentional torts because it erroneously applied the GTLA, and because it erroneously shifted the burden of proof to plaintiffs.” The court first noted, “the party asserting the defense has the burden of establishing it. In other words, defendants must establish that they acted in good faith or without malice; instead, the trial court placed the burden on plaintiffs to establish that Marshall and Ball acted in bad faith or with malice. Second, as the Supreme Court made abundantly clear in Odom, the GTLA applies only to negligent torts, not intentional torts.” The trial court’s decision that “defendants were immune from the intentional torts under the GTLA was a legal error warranting reversal.” The court also found that the trial court erred by concluding defendants were entitled to immunity as to the gross negligence claim “because it erroneously applied the standard for governmental immunity that applies to intentional torts and because it erroneously shifted the burden of proof to plaintiffs.” It noted the brevity of the trial court’s conclusions were “particularly harmful with respect to the gross negligence claim because there were numerous factors that arguably could amount to gross negligence.” The court drew no conclusions as to whether investigative failings amounted to gross negligence, but found it was important for the trial court to consider whether the circumstances “could lead to a finding of gross negligence. A conclusory statement that there was no gross negligence will not suffice.”
Temporary guardianship; MCL 700.5312(1); Request for dismissal of the petition for guardianship; MCL 700.5303(1) & MCL 700.5306(1); Special conservatorship; MCL 700.5401(3); MCL 700.5408; The Estates & Protected Individuals Code (EPIC)
In these consolidated appeals, the court vacated the trial court’s order appointing appellee-Marine-Adams as special conservator and temporary guardian of JEK, a legally incapacitated person, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with EPIC. While still of sound mind, JEK appointed respondent as his attorney-in-fact and patient advocate. Respondent was sometimes difficult to contact when JEK’s senior living residence struggled to care for him. The “trial court suspended respondent’s authority to act for JEK and appointed Marine-Adams, an independent third-party, as JEK’s temporary guardian and special conservator.” Respondent argued on appeal that “the trial court abused its discretion by appointing a temporary guardian under the circumstances,” and encouraged the court “to instruct the trial court to dismiss the petition for guardianship on remand.” The court agreed in part and disagreed in part. It concluded that the “trial court abused its discretion when it appointed a temporary guardian for JEK without legal authority to do so.” The record supported “only one possible conclusion—the trial court entered the order appointing Marine-Adams as JEK’s temporary guardian under MCL 700.5312(1).” The court concluded that considering “respondent had apparent authority to act on behalf of JEK, the trial court did not have authority to establish a temporary guardianship under MCL 700.5312.” But it declined respondent’s request that the trial court dismiss the petition for guardianship. It determined that at best, respondent “identified a factual dispute in the record, which the trial court will be tasked with deciding after an evidentiary hearing, should the case not be settled during mediation.” Next, the court agreed that “the trial court legally erred when it appointed a special conservator for JEK when there was no statutory authority to do so under the circumstances.” The conservatorship appeared “to have expired on its own terms and, thus, this issue may be moot.” However, because it appeared “that the trial court intended to establish the special conservatorship until the case is decided on the merits or settled,” the court addressed this issue. It concluded that the “trial court abused its discretion when it appointed Marine-Adams as special conservator for JEK without considering evidence or making factual findings.” The trial court could not “appoint a conservator or make a protective arrangement including appointment of a special conservator without first satisfying the requirements of MCL 700.5401(3).”
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(g) & (j)
Holding that § (j) was met, the court affirmed termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights. Her rights were terminated based primarily on substance abuse, neglect, and inadequate supervision. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the DHHS failed to prove a statutory ground for termination. At the outset, it noted that “[b]ecause the trial court failed to comply with the mandates of the revised statute,” it could not affirm the trial court’s findings as to § (g). However, because it “did not err by finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was appropriate under” other grounds, the error as to § (g) was “not dispositive because only one statutory ground for termination must be proven.” It then found that § (j) was met. “It is abundantly clear from the record that respondent has been battling a chronic substance abuse problem for years and that this problem has been detrimental to her ability to parent the children.” The court found that, “[l]ikely as a result of [her] addiction, she wholly failed to comply with the services provided her during that period. While sustaining sobriety for three months is a good start, the trial court did not err by being unconvinced that she could permanently refrain from falling back into her pattern of substance abuse.” In addition, the court could not reasonably “dispute that young children in the care of a person using” meth and heroin “are at risk of being harmed.” And based on her “substance abuse history, without a longer period of success in recovery a reasonable likelihood remained that respondent would fall back into substance abuse.” As such, the trial court “did not err by finding that there was a reasonable likelihood that the children would be harmed if returned to respondent.”
Termination under § 19b(3)(g); Reasonable reunification efforts; Effect of the existence of “aggravated circumstances”; MCL 712A.19a(1)(a); MCL 722.638(1)(a)(i) & (2); Children’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts Minors; Effect of relative placement; In re Atchley
The court held that there was no plain error in terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights without offering reunification services because aggravated circumstances existed under MCL 722.638(1)(a)(i) and (2). Further, the evidence established § (g) as a statutory ground for termination, and the trial court did not clearly err in finding that it was in the children’s best interests. As to the lack of reasonable reunification efforts, “the record thoroughly and unequivocally established that respondent abandoned all five of her children.” She left three of them with their biological father (M) and the other two with her mother (B) without providing “the appropriate legal authority needed to take care of them; she did not execute a power of attorney, she did not establish a guardianship, and she did not establish [M] as a legal father. She also provided no financial support and went months at a time without visiting them.” Further, the children left with M “were placed at an unreasonable risk of harm by respondent leaving them in the care of a person who sexually abused her younger sister while she and the children were at the home with him.” As to § (g), clear and convincing evidence showed “that respondent disengaged from her children’s lives almost two years before DHHS became involved. She did not visit them regularly or check on them, and did not maintain regular contact with her family, who often did not know” where she was. This continued after the petition was filed. She did not regularly visit her children or maintain contact with the caseworker, and did not attend several court hearings. Under the “circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that respondent failed to provide proper care and custody for her children and would not do so within a reasonable period of time.” As to the children’s best interests, they referred to B as their mother and she “was willing to care for them long term.” The caseworker did not believe respondent and the children had a bond, and testified that termination was in the children’s best interests due to respondent’s not visiting them and not providing contact information. Further, the trial court considered their relative placement in “its analysis, but it also observed that respondent had not made any meaningful effort to engage with the children during their placement, both before and after the petition was filed.” Affirmed.