Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
View Text Opinion Full PDF Opinion
Action under 42 USC § 1983 alleging due process violations; Procedural due process claim based on not receiving timely notice of a relative’s death to prevent decomposition; Whaley v County of Tuscola; Qualified immunity; Whether the asserted procedural due process rights were “clearly established” at the time of the conduct; Municipal liability under Monell v Department of Soc Serv; Arrington-Bey v City of Bedford Heights; Wayne County Medical Examiner’s Office (WCMEO)
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that plaintiffs’ (the Martinez family) procedural due process claim against defendants for not timely informing them of their son’s death to prevent decomposition failed because the alleged right was not “clearly established.” Since there was no constitutional violation, defendant-Wayne County was also entitled to dismissal of the Monell claim. Luis Martinez Jr. died and the WCMEO took control of the body. Although it found his next of kin, it failed to contact them. His family hired someone to find him but when they did, his body was severely decomposed. The family was unable to view the body before cremation. They sued alleging a procedural due process violation under § 1983 and asserting liability under Monell. The district court dismissed the case. The court first considered the procedural due process claim. The family argued that, as next of kin, they had a property interest in Luis’s body protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. They claimed that defendants violated that interest by not informing them of his death so that they did not learn about it “until the body was severely decomposed. And that the lack of a a pre- or post-deprivation hearing violated their procedural due process rights.” But the court held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because the right that was allegedly violated was not “clearly established” when the conduct occurred. In Whaley the court stated, “the Michigan courts have held that the ‘next of kin have a right to possess the body for burial and prevent its mutilation.’” But the court found that “this statement defines the right at too high a level of generality to put WCMEO officials on notice that their conduct here violated the family’s constitutional rights.” Two things formed the basis of the underlying alleged constitutional violation here: “(1) delayed notification of the decedent’s death and (2) severe, natural decomposition of the corpse.” None of the cited cases dealt with these issues. Thus, “the Martinez Family did not have a clearly established constitutional right to timely notice of Luis Jr.’s death to prevent decomposition of his body,” and as a result defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on the due process claim. In addition, there “‘can be no liability under Monell without an underlying constitutional violation.’” Further, the court agreed with the district court that there were insufficient factual allegations to support a Monell claim. Affirmed.
Alleged violation of a city ordinance prohibiting physically obstructing, resisting or hindering an officer in the discharge of their lawful duties; Failing to provide identification upon an officer’s request; People v Murawski; Stop under Terry v Ohio
Concluding that defendant’s conduct did not violate the city ordinance at issue, the court reversed and remanded with the instruction to dismiss the charge against her. The ordinance in question was East Lansing City Ordinance § 26-52(18). Defendant argued “that her conduct did not rise to the level of physical obstruction, resistance, or hindrance, and, therefore, she was not in violation of the ordinance.” The court’s “holding in Murawski indicates that a police officer may arrest an individual who refuses to provide identification during a Terry stop for the underlying offense, but not for the failure to provide identification alone. Obviously, disputing the amount of a bill with a vendor that provided goods and/or services was not a crime, i.e., it was not an underlying offense in this case.” Based on the record before the court, there “is no suggestion that defendant attempted to leave the restaurant without paying her bill, nor is there evidence of any other crime. There was simply a dispute between the hotel and a group of people that included defendant, i.e., a civil dispute between the people in the group and the establishment. Accordingly, defendant’s conduct of refusing to provide identification and allowing herself to be arrested did not rise to the level of physically obstructing, resisting, or hindering an officer in the discharge of their lawful duties because the command of requesting identification was not a command upon which the officer could lawfully arrest defendant, and it was not a command that would likely involve a physical confrontation if defendant refused to comply.” Finally, the court noted that “at the end of the prosecution’s brief on appeal, there is some brief discussion about the alleged potential consequences that may result from this Court ordering the trial court to dismiss the present case, which involves only a misdemeanor charge.” The brief noted that it was possible the police would seek to pursue a charge for violating MCL 750.81(d)(1), a felony. While the issue of whether she violated that statute was not before the court, it noted “that such a charge would be brought in direct defiance of the binding precedent set by this Court in Murawski, and thus, would clearly be improper.”
Sentencing; Proportionate & reasonable; People v Stovall
The court found no merit in defendant’s claims “that the trial court did not undertake a careful assessment of the circumstances of this case, and that the sentence imposed was unreasonable[.]” It noted “that, as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Stovall, and the resentencing order entered by the trial court, defendant went from facing a life sentence for his second-degree murder conviction to a sentence that would make him eligible for parole approximately two years after resentencing.” Any suggestion by him “that he has been treated unreasonably in this matter rings hollow.” A jury convicted defendant, who was 17 years old at the time of the offenses, of second-degree murder; armed robbery; and felony-firearm. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of life with the possibility of parole for his murder conviction, 39 to 75 years for the armed robbery, and 32 to 48 months for the larceny, plus 2 years for his felony-firearm conviction, to run consecutively to his other sentences. Following Stovall, he was resentenced to concurrent terms of 24 to 45 years for second-degree murder, 15 to 24 years for armed robbery, and a consecutive 2-year term for felony-firearm. He claimed that his “sentence for second-degree murder was disproportionate to his circumstances and the offense.” He contended that the “guidelines did not consider [his] recent behavior in prison, [his] education achievements, or other positive factors.” This argument was not supported by the record. The court held that in “light of the trial court’s statements during resentencing, the record demonstrates that [it] appropriately balanced the seriousness of the offense, defendant’s conduct in custody, and [his] potential for rehabilitation.” Defendant did not show “that the trial court failed to consider relevant factors when resentencing him or that [it] improperly considered and balanced these factors when sentencing” him. He next argued “that his sentence was disproportionate and unreasonable because the sentencing guidelines range was too wide, leaving the trial court with no real guidance when sentencing” him. However, his guidelines range of 225 to 375 months was a result of his “criminal history and the nature of the offense.” The court held that the “trial court was authorized to impose a sentence that was within the range of 225 to 375 months as provided by MCL 777.61.” Finally, defendant argued “that the trial court lacked any guidance as to a ‘typical’ sentence for [his] second-degree murder conviction because comparable defendants in second-degree murder cases within Genesee County received significantly different sentences than he did.” But the circumstances of his “case are different from those of the five cases he uses to support his argument, and he cannot establish that these cases are ‘typical’ for purposes of his argument.” Thus, he did “not overcome the presumption that his within-guidelines sentence is proportionate and reasonable in light of [his] conduct in prison, [his] likelihood of rehabilitation, and the nature of the offense.” Affirmed.
Sufficiency of the evidence for CSC II convictions under MCL 750.520c(1)(a) & (b)(i); Acting for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or another sexual purpose; Objective, reasonable-person standard
The court held that there was sufficient evidence “for a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or another sexual purpose” to support his CSC II convictions. The case arose from “the prolonged sexual abuse of KP, the victim, by her stepfather, defendant.” He argued on appeal that “his actions could not be reasonably considered grooming because his contact with KP never escalated to more serious sexual contact.” The court concluded that while he “presented alternative purposes for his conduct in his testimony, i.e., concern for her hygiene, it is still reasonable for a jury to infer from KP’s testimony that a stepfather who touches his stepdaughter’s intimate areas almost daily for several years, intrudes on her in the shower to touch her genitals, pressures her to kiss him, and comments on her breasts and buttocks does so because he has a sexual purpose.” The court noted that it “must make all credibility determinations in favor of the verdict.” It also determined that the record “supported that defendant’s behavior was consistent with grooming; [his] contact with KP escalated in frequency and sexual intrusion over time, particularly when he began feeling her genitals for unshaven hair. The fact that [he] never had an erection or stimulated himself while performing his acts does not preclude a reasonable jury from finding that he acted for sexual arousal or sexual gratification.” The court noted that “MCL 750.520(a)(q) does not require that sexual contact be for immediate sexual arousal or gratification. A reasonable jury could conclude that defendant acted for his own sexual arousal and gratification at a later time outside of KP’s presence. A reasonable jury could also conclude that [his] purpose was to gratify a sexual desire that was not physical.” Affirmed.
Constitutionality of the carrying a concealed weapon in a vehicle (CCW-auto) statute; MCL 750.227; New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc v Bruen; People v Langston; Sufficiency of the evidence to support a CCW-auto conviction; People v Brown; Constructive possession; People v Hill; Sufficiency of the evidence to support a fleeing & eluding conviction; MCL 257.602a(1); People v Grayer
Applying the binding holding in Langston, the court denied defendant relief on his constitutional challenge to MCL 750.227. It also held that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions. After “a strange car chase, defendant” was convicted CCW-auto and fourth-degree fleeing and eluding, but acquitted of second-degree child abuse. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that his CCW-auto conviction must be overturned because MCL 750.227 is unconstitutional. In Langston, the court “noted ‘that a shall-issue statutory scheme [like the one in Michigan] requiring a concealed pistol license does not inherently violate the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.’” In addition, “in language applicable to the instant case, this Court stated that ‘the requirement of MCL 750.227 that a person must possess a valid CPL [i.e., a concealed pistol license] in order to carry a pistol in an automobile does not violate the Second Amendment.’” As such, “and as defendant seems to acknowledge, his constitutional challenge is foreclosed by Langston, which constitutes binding precedent.” The court also rejected his claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. As to his CCW-auto conviction, it found that “sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant possessed the 9mm Smith & Wesson M&P handgun recovered by the police.” As to his fleeing and eluding conviction, the evidence “allowed a rational trier of fact to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant committed fourth-degree fleeing and eluding, regardless of whether [he] accelerated or took any evasive measures in response to” the trooper’s directions to stop the car. Affirmed.
Sufficiency of the evidence; First-degree murder; Premeditation; Self-defense; Rule of completeness; MRE 106
Holding that: 1) there was sufficient evidence “to support a conviction of first-degree murder under a theory of premeditation[,]” 2) there was sufficient evidence to disprove his theory of self-defense, and 3) the “rule of completeness [was] not implicated, and defendant has failed to show error on its basis[,]” the court affirmed. He was convicted by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder, FIP, and felony-firearm. The record demonstrated “that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial from which a reasonable jury could determine that defendant ‘had an opportunity to think about, evaluate, or take a second look at [his] actions.’” The court noted that “the parties had a preexisting relationship; defendant and the victim were friends before the killing, and the victim regularly sold defendant marijuana. At the time of the victim’s death, defendant owed the victim $625 for unpaid marijuana sales.” Moreover, they “exchanged text messages in the week leading up to the victim’s death, which indicated that the victim was seeking out the unpaid debt and that defendant had attempted to visit the victim on the day before the killing. Defendant also admitted that he deliberately brought a gun to the victim’s home on the night he shot the victim. And, the evidence presented at trial would allow a reasonable jury to infer that, contrary to defendant’s version of events, the victim was unarmed at the time of his death—the only weapons found in the victim’s home were two handguns stored in lockboxes inside a closet, and police found only a vape pen in the hand of the victim.” Finally, the court noted that “the evidence established that defendant fired his gun several times (the victim’s autopsy report revealed seven gunshot wounds) and from as close as 2½ to 3 feet away from the victim.” It concluded that the “evidence, when viewed (as it must be) in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to permit a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted with premeditation in shooting the victim.” Next, the court found that from the “evidence, a reasonable jury could conclude that defendant’s self-defense theory was not credible.” The court noted that it “will not interfere with such a credibility determination.” It concluded that the “record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, shows that the prosecution satisfied its burden of disproving defendant’s self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Sentencing; Motion for early termination of supervised release under 18 USC § 3583(e)(1); Whether § 3742(a) impeded the court’s review of the district court’s summary order; Denial of a motion for termination of supervised release without explicitly addressing or indicating that the district court had considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors; Denial of access to probation officer documents; FedRCrimP 32.1(c)
In an issue of first impression in this circuit, the court held that district courts are required to consider the relevant § 3553(a) factors when deciding a § 3583(e)(1) motion for early termination of supervised release. Defendant-Tavarez pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine and possession with intent to distribute. He was sentenced to 18 months in prison and 4 years of supervised home detention with location monitoring. This sentence was subsequently modified. He then filed a pro se motion for early termination of supervised release “based on his good behavior on release and the Board of Prison’s mishandling of his earned time credit while in custody.” The district court denied the motion by summary order. Tavarez then moved to obtain copies of the documents the probation officer provided to the district court when recommending that his motion be denied. The district court likewise denied this motion along with his request for an extension to file a notice of appeal. The court first held that because Tavarez’s early termination motion did “not challenge or seek review of the validity of the sentence itself[,]” § 3742(a) did not limit the court’s jurisdiction to review the summary order or limit the relief granted. As for the denial of the motion, Tavarez argued that the district court abused its discretion by not explicitly considering the relevant § 3553(a) factors. The court noted that the Supreme Court has not yet considered whether a district court must consider these factors when ruling on a § 3853(e)(1) motion, nor has the Sixth Circuit in a published opinion. Joining other circuits, the court held that the record must show “that the district court considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors before denying” a § 3583(e)(1) motion for early termination of supervised release. Further, the court found “no indication that the district court considered the relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors when denying Tavarez’s Early Termination Motion.” Thus, it concluded that the district court abused its discretion. It vacated the district court’s summary order and remanded for reconsideration of the early termination motion. But it affirmed the district court’s denial of his document access motion where it “had no obligation to disclose the Supervision Report” Tavarez sought or any of its contents.
Modification of a guardianship for a developmentally disabled person; MCL 330.1604(2); In re Geror; Preference for partial guardianship; MCL 330.1602(2); MCL 330.1618(4); Powers & duties of a partial guardian; MCL 330.1620(1); Removal of a guardian; MCL 330.1626(3); MCL 330.1637; “Suitability” to serve as a guardian; MCL 330.1628; In re Guardianship of Redd; In camera interview to ascertain a disabled person’s preference under MCL 330.1628; In re Guardianship of AMMB; Right result; Messenger v Ingham Cnty Prosecutor
Finding that the trial court reached the correct result, albeit under the improper statutory framework, the court affirmed the order removing appellant as partial guardian of her daughter, IS, and naming appellee as her sole partial guardian. On appeal, the court agreed with appellant that “the trial court failed to properly account for MCL 330.1637 in its analysis, but” disagreed that relief was warranted. “[T]he pertinent statutory framework governing the modification of a guardianship or the dismissal of a guardian remains MCL 330.1637, which was entirely omitted from the instant trial court’s analysis, despite this Court’s previous instruction.” As the “trial court failed to address the principal issue under the proper statutory provision, it necessarily abused its discretion.” However, the court affirmed “on alternate grounds, in light of the procedural history of the case and the trial court’s extensive findings regarding the propriety of the guardianship.” The trial court “thoroughly detailed the witnesses’ testimonies, addressed the various facets of the partial guardianship, examined the parties’ conduct throughout the underlying guardianship proceedings and in their respective roles as guardians, and considered which form of guardianship would best promote IS’s independence. While appellant” claimed it erred by finding she “was unsuitable to serve as IS’s partial coguardian, the record provides ample evidence regarding [her] improper conduct in overseeing IS’s care, in conjunction with IS’s preference for appellee to solely serve as partial guardian.” In addition, “the broad language of MCL 330.1637 provides courts with significant discretion, particularly under MCL 330.1637(4), to” modify guardianships “beyond the presence of changes of the legally protected person’s capacity.” Because the trial court “reached the proper result albeit on improper grounds, we conclude the contested opinion and order should be sustained.”
Property damage claims under the Sewage Disposal System Event (SDSE) exception to governmental immunity; The Governmental Tort Liability Act; MCL 691.1417; Whether further discovery was warranted; Pleading notice of the sewer defect; Evidence that defendant had notice of the defect; Reasonable steps within a reasonable time to remedy the defect(s); Ypsilanti Community Utilities Authority (YCUA)
The court held that: (1) the trial court was correct that defendant-YCUA’s summary disposition motion was premature as discovery was incomplete; (2) plaintiffs “pled sufficiently to avoid governmental immunity” in this consolidated case arising from sewer backups; and (3) questions of fact existed as to whether YCUA “knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, about the” defect or defects and whether it “took reasonable steps to remedy the defect or defects in a reasonable time.” Thus, it affirmed the denial of YCUA’s motion. It first found there was no merit in YCUA’s argument that further discovery was not warranted, and that its actions in the case were “incongruous with its argument.” YCUA also argued there was “no actual identification in the Litwalk plaintiffs’ complaint of any alleged defect or any way in which [it] knew or should have known of a defect.” The court disagreed. It also disagreed with YCUA’s claim “that the allegations in the Stone plaintiffs’ complaint are insufficient to show knowledge of the defect by YCUA.” Next, YCUA contended that “plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law because” it presented evidence (the affidavit of its expert witness, B) that it “lacked the notice required by statute and plaintiffs failed to present evidence to the contrary.” But the court noted that plaintiffs rightly countered this “argument by noting that [YCUA] relied upon an affidavit signed by a defense witness that [it] refused to present for deposition, despite the fact that” they sent YCUA “a notice for the taking of his deposition” before the close of discovery. They also countered B’s affidavit with their own expert’s affidavit, which detailed “the defects that caused plaintiffs’ damages and” supported their notice argument. As to YCUA’s claim that it took reasonable steps, the actual issue was whether it “took reasonable steps within a reasonable time to remedy the defect or defects that caused plaintiffs’ damages. The collapsed pipe was not the sole defect” – the defects consisted of “design defects and other matters that caused the pipe to collapse, which resulted in the flooding. While” YCUA offered evidence of steps it took to try “to remedy the issues caused by the pipe after its collapse, [it] offered no evidence that it took steps to remedy the defects that led to the” collapse. And as to the steps it took “after it became aware of the collapsed pipe, questions of fact exist as to whether they were reasonable or made within a reasonable time.”