Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Contractual attorney fees; Failure to pursue this claim for damages during the trial; Pransky v Falcon Group, Inc; Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV); Award of damages for a lost opportunity
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff-TRG’s posttrial motion for contractual attorney fees because, given “TRG did not pursue this claim for damages during the trial, the trial court lacked the authority to award attorney fees under the lease.” Further, the trial court did not err in denying defendant-M.G. Realty’s motion for JNOV because the jury’s verdict did not indicate “that it engaged in speculation when awarding damages for the lost opportunity to rent the adjacent suite below market value.” The case arose from a commercial lease between M.G Realty, the landlord, and TRG, the tenant. The 2013 lease included “the option to rent an additional adjacent suite in the Building should it become available during TRG’s lease term.” In 2017, TRG’s sole shareholder and president “learned that M.G. Realty leased the adjacent suite to a third-party without offering TRG the right of first refusal.” This breach of contract action was later filed. A “jury found that M.G. Realty had materially breached the lease agreement and constructively evicted TRG from the premises. The jury awarded TRG the sum of $123,157, which included $45,486 in damages for the lost opportunity to rent the adjacent suite at below market rates. Because the jury found that M.G. Realty’s first material breach of the lease excused TRG from the obligation to pay rent, a judgment of no cause of action was entered on M.G. Realty’s counterclaim.” On appeal, the court found Pransky instructive as to TRG’s attorney fee argument. Under the circumstances here, the court concluded that “had the trial court granted TRG’s motion, it would have entered judgment against M.G. Realty on a claim that was never actually pursued or proven at trial. As this Court found in Pransky, ‘a trial court may not enter judgment on a claim that was not brought in the original action in the guise of a postjudgment proceeding.’” As to M.G. Realty’s cross-appeal, the court determined that, viewing “the evidence in the light most favorable to TRG, the nonmoving party, reasonable inferences would permit the jury to find that had M.G. Realty complied with the lease terms and offered TRG the right of first refusal, TRG would have exercised the option and leased the additional office space.” Affirmed.
Calculation of damages in a breach of contract action; Doe v Henry Ford Health Sys; Common law conversion; Department of Agric v Appletree Mktg, LLC; Embezzlement; Damages for embezzlement or conversion; MCL 600.2919a; Shareholder oppression; MCL 450.1489(1); Double recovery; Principle that the Revised Judicature Act (RJA) does not preclude other remedies; MCL 600.2919a(2); MCL 450.1489(1)(f); Requirements for defendant’s brief on appeal; MCR 7.212(C)(6)
The court held that the trial court did not err in its calculation of damages or issue an improper double recovery. Plaintiff-Atto sued defendant on behalf of himself and the corporate entity in this case (Soo Hotels), raising claims of embezzlement, statutory and common-law conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and shareholder oppression. The trial court found in favor of plaintiff and Soo Hotels. As an initial matter, the court noted that defendant’s brief on appeal did not comply with the court rules as it “identified the witnesses that testified at trial and did not summarize their testimony or cite to the transcripts.” Turning to the merits, it rejected defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in its calculation of damages and improperly issued a double recovery for a single injury. “The trial court’s calculation of damages was within the range of the evidence presented, and [it] was aware of the issues involved and correctly applied the law.” In addition, despite “defendant’s acknowledgment and claimed entitlement to taking nearly $800,000, the trial court simply held him to this testimony as an admission, but reduced the damage award to $676,412.45 before imposing treble damages.” Further, it “was not required to address every line-item requested by plaintiff or claimed deduction by defendant.” Moreover, in “light of the evidence that Soo Hotels was merely a management operation and would not derive a benefit from improvements to the building,” it did not err by “failing to offset $170,000 purportedly made by defendant.” Finally, the court rejected his claim that the trial court improperly awarded a double recovery for a single injury, noting the issue was waived, and, in any event, recovery under the RJA “does not preclude other remedies.” Affirmed.
Motions for relief from judgment; MCR 6.508(D)(3); “Good cause” & “actual prejudice”; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Hill v Lockhart; Claim that counsel misadvised defendant as to potential immigration consequences of his pleas; Padilla v Kentucky; Lafler v Cooper; Lee v United States; Distinguishing People v Brito-Custodio (Unpub); Lawful permanent resident (LPR); Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE); Presentence Investigation Report (PIR)
In these consolidated appeals in which defendant sought relief from judgment based on his claims that his attorneys were ineffective for misadvising him about potential immigration consequences, the court held that he did not meet his burden of showing he was entitled to relief under MCR 6.508(D). He is an Iraqi national who has lived in the U.S. as an LPR. After orders of removal were issued against him, he unsuccessfully moved for relief from judgment as to his plea-based convictions relating to 1998 and 1999 marijuana cases. The court noted that because he “could have, but did not, raise errors in a previous appeal” he had to show good cause. He did not specifically address this requirement in the trial court. He argued on appeal here “that he did not become aware that he would be actually deported until 2017, when ICE agents detained Iraqi nationals convicted of crimes.” But the record was contrary to this assertion because he “was aware in 1999 that his crimes had immigration consequences, even though he apparently believed the United States government would not enforce those consequences.” His PIR reflected “that he told his probation officer in [9/99] that he could be deported if he received a sentence exceeding 11 months in jail. At his [10/99] sentencing, the trial court asked whether [he] wished to withdraw his plea in light of the fact that his sentence would exceed 11 months in jail, and, after a discussion off the record, defense counsel indicated defendant did not wish to withdraw his plea. Although the trial court did not expressly reference deportation, the record” reflected that his trial counsel, “specifically intending to avoid deportation, challenged the OV 13 scoring to circumvent a guidelines range and sentence over 12 months.” Thus, the court held that defendant did not show good cause. It added that, even assuming he did, he also had to show actual prejudice, and he did not. In 1999, his attorneys “were not obliged to advise defendant on immigration, a collateral matter.” And he was not entitled to relief under the 2010 decision in Padilla because the court “has ruled that Padilla applies only prospectively under both federal law and Michigan law.” The court found that his argument was “not so much that counsel misadvised him, but that [he] had no reason to believe he actually would be deported years later.” But this argument did “not pertain to his counsels’ performance; it” related to his subjective belief and this did not support an ineffective assistance claim. Affirmed.
Sufficiency of the evidence for an AWIM conviction; Self-defense; The Self-Defense Act; MCL 780.972(2)
The court concluded that, based on the record, the trial court’s rejection of defendant’s claim of self-defense in his bench trial was not clearly erroneous. He was convicted of AWIM and felony-firearm. His appellate counsel argued there was insufficient evidence to sustain his AWIM conviction because the prosecution did not “prove beyond a reasonable doubt defendant’s actions were not in self-defense.” Defendant asserted that he acted in self-defense because the victim (K), “who was known to be violent, was in possession of a gun and intent on harming” him. Defendant contended “he tried to leave the altercation, and after having to return, tried again to extricate himself by going inside the house. When” the property owner (D) forced him outside, he asserted “the impending dangerous confrontation placed him in fear for his life.” But the court concluded the record contained “sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that [he] did not have an honest or reasonable fear of imminent harm when he shot [K]. When defendant returned to the scene with a shotgun,” K and a woman had left D’s “property and were across the street, dissipating any imminent threat of harm.” He contended K “was armed, and while he and [K] offered contradictory versions of events, all other testimony indicated [K] was never in possession of a weapon.” The court noted that it “‘is for the trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine what inferences may be fairly drawn from the evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded those inferences.’” In this case, the “trial court explained it gave the most weight to [D’s] testimony and found [K] did not have a weapon when defendant shot him.” The court noted that it “defers to the trial court’s assessment of the evidence.” Affirmed.
Exculpatory evidence (Brady violation) claim for failure to disclose untested DNA swabs; Brady v Maryland; Whether evidence would have been “favorable” to the defense; Principle that possession can be “actual or constructive” & “joint or exclusive”; People v Johnson; Materiality; People v Chenault; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to make a futile motion; Prejudice; Constitutionality of the FIP statute; MCL 750.224f; New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc, v Bruen; Search & seizure; Terry stop; Terry v Ohio; Reasonable suspicion; Credibility
The court held that: (1) the trial court did not err by denying defendant’s motion for a new trial on the basis of a Brady violation, (2) he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, and (3) the trial court did not err by denying his motion to suppress. He was convicted of FIP, CCW, and felony-firearm (second offense) after he was caught with a revolver under his shirt while working an event as an “unarmed” security guard. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a new trial on the basis of an alleged Brady violation where the prosecution failed to disclose the existence of the DNA swabs that were never tested. It noted that: (1) “no definitive evidence yet existed as to whether defendant’s DNA was on the firearm”; (2) he failed to “establish that the DNA swabs would have been favorable to his defense”; and (3) “even if the DNA swabs would have excluded the presence of defendant’s DNA on the firearm, this evidence would not have been material at trial or in the plea negotiations before trial.” The court also rejected his claims that his trial counsel was ineffective: (1) as to the alleged Brady violation; and (2) for failing to move to suppress the firearm on Second Amendment grounds. “Because defendant cannot establish that the DNA swabs were material, he also cannot establish prejudice arising from trial counsel’s alleged failure to investigate the DNA swabs.” Further, he did not show “the outcome of the suppression hearing would have been different because the gun would not have been suppressed on these grounds, and would still have been used as evidence in defendant’s CCW trial.” And counsel “was not ineffective for failing to make a futile motion.” Finally, the court rejected his contention that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the firearm evidence on the basis it was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. “Under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable suspicion existed to stop defendant for a limited search.” Affirmed.
Termination; Children’s best interests
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the part of the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 82973 in the 1/24/25 edition) that affirmed the termination of respondent father’s parental rights and remanded the case to that court for reconsideration. It directed the Court of Appeals on remand to allow the father to file a supplemental brief and consider the claims raised in it.
Termination of parental rights; Whether the trial court violated MCL 712A.17b(5) by reading quotations from a child’s forensic interview to the jury & referencing the interview during adjudication; Pretrial discovery; MCR 3.922(A); Grubor Enters, Inc v Kortidis; Substantially justified delay; Harmless delay
Holding that the trial court did not violate MCL 712A.17b(5) or err by allowing a piece of delayed discovery to be used during adjudication, the court affirmed termination of respondent-father’s parental rights. His rights to the children were terminated on the basis of his sexual abuse of his daughter. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court violated MCL 712A.17b(5) because quotations from her forensic interview were read to the jury and the forensic interview was referenced during adjudication. “[N]o violation of MCL 712A.17b(5) occurred because a video recording of [the child’s] forensic interview was not admitted into evidence during adjudication. [She] provided live testimony, recounting her allegations against” her father. The court also rejected his claim that the trial court erred by allowing a police report to be used during adjudication, which he “received only 4 days prior to adjudication, i.e., less than 21 days before adjudication.” The delay “in discovery was substantially justified because DHHS made a continuous effort to obtain the report. DHHS did not receive the report until after the 21-day discovery deadline had passed. Further, the discovery delay was harmless.”