Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Inconsistent-verdict claim; People v Montague; People v Vaughn; Conviction of first-degree premeditated murder & acquittal of related firearm charges; Sufficiency of the evidence for convictions of first-degree premeditated murder & conspiracy to commit it; People v Oros; People v Jackson; Identity; Sufficiency of the evidence for a retaliation against a witness conviction; MCL 750.122; Judicial bias; People v Stevens
The court held that defendant was not entitled to relief based on allegedly inconsistent jury verdicts convicting him of first-degree premeditated murder but acquitting him of felony-firearm and FIP. Further, there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions of premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit it, and retaliation against a witness. Finally, the court rejected his judicial bias claim. The victim was murdered after her preliminary exam testimony related to a carjacking. The court first determined that even if it assumed “the verdicts were factually inconsistent, defendant is not entitled to any relief on the basis of an alleged inconsistency in the verdicts because juries are permitted to reach inconsistent verdicts.” It noted that he did “not offer any evidence to show that there was juror confusion, that the jury misunderstood its instructions, or that there was an impermissible compromise that occurred in relation to the verdict, which is the only basis on which” it could grant relief for inconsistent verdicts. The jury was “not required to explain its decision, and the fact that [it] may have shown defendant some leniency on the weapon charges cannot form the basis for relief.” The court found the case analogous to Vaughn, where the Michigan “Supreme Court held that an acquittal of felony-firearm did not mandate a reversal of the underlying felony conviction, in part because the jury was able to show the defendant leniency.” As to his sufficiency challenges, the victim’s “autopsy revealed she suffered 12 gunshot wounds, including three to the head, three to the chest, and others in various parts of her body. The evidence also supported that the shooter was lying in wait behind a garbage can, and continued shooting at the victim even after she fell.” As to the identity element, “DNA evidence tied defendant to the shooting. At trial, there was expert testimony that the DNA sample from the garbage can handle was ‘at least 40 octillion times more likely’ to have originated from [him] and one other person than if the DNA originated from two unknown individuals.” Further, other circumstantial evidence supported his identity as the perpetrator. The evidence also supported that he “engaged in a criminal conspiracy by voluntarily agreeing to effectuate the commission of the” murder. Numerous phone calls and statements he made to two other people “both before and after the victim’s murder supported that [he] had specific intent to collaborate with [them] to pursue the crime.” Affirmed.
Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present evidence of defendant’s mental capacity; People v Yost; Failure to present a diminished capacity defense or an insanity defense; Conspiracy; Failure to make a futile objection; Prejudice; Voluntary intoxication (marijuana use); Prosecutorial error; Tether references & gun evidence; Sentencing; Reasonableness of a within-guidelines sentence; Proportionality
The court held that: (1) defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel; (2) he was not entitled to a new trial based on prosecutorial error; and (3) his sentence was not disproportionate. He was convicted of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and third-degree fleeing and eluding for his role in driving several assailants to an apartment they robbed before leading police on a high-speed chase. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 240 to 450 months for the former and 30 to 60 months for the latter. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not present expert testimony as to his mental capacity. Because he “substantively argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a diminished-capacity defense, this argument” was meritless. In addition, because “the only purpose for which this evidence would be presented would be to negate the intent element of the charged offense,” it was inadmissible at trial. Further, to the extent he claimed counsel was ineffective for failing to subject him to an “evaluation to determine if he lacked criminal responsibility,” he implicitly argued that “counsel was ineffective for failing to raise an insanity defense.” This, too, was meritless. Defendant “presented no evidence linking his mental health history to a lack of substantial capacity, nor [did] he present[] an expert who, on the basis of the circumstances surrounding the offense and defendant’s mental health history, could opine that defendant was not criminally responsible.” He also “was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to raise an insanity defense on the basis of” cannabis use. As to his prosecutorial misconduct claims, although the prosecution “erred by using the term ‘tether’ during closing arguments” he could not “establish that he was denied a fair and impartial trial.” And he “offered no evidence to support a conclusion that the prosecutor did not act in good faith when he elicited testimony regarding the unique attributes of” a gun. Finally, the court rejected his contention that his sentence for conspiracy to commit armed robbery was disproportionate. “Because the Legislature has determined that a defendant convicted of conspiracy does not have less culpability than one convicted of the underlying substantive offense, defendant’s alleged lesser culpability is not an unusual circumstance and does not overcome the presumption that his” within-guidelines sentence was proportionate. Moreover, he failed “to explain why the fact that the extent of his mental health history was not before the trial court was an unusual circumstance.” Affirmed but remanded solely for the ministerial task of correcting the judgment of sentence.
Action for mandamus to require disqualification of a candidate & voiding of votes; Incompatible offices; MCL 168.558(5); Rebuttable presumption of laches in certain election actions; MCL 691.1031
Holding that MCL 691.1031’s rebuttable presumption of laches applied to plaintiff’s claim in this mandamus action, and that she did not rebut it, the court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal under the doctrine of laches. She sought to have the trial court order defendant-county clerk to disqualify a specified candidate (R) and void all votes for her for the offices of county treasurer and school board member in the 11/24 general election. Plaintiff asserted that “school board member and county treasurer were incompatible offices under MCL 168.558(5).” She filed this case “65 days after the primary election, 26 days before the general election, and at a time after absentee ballots had already begun to be circulated to voters.” At the time the trial court dismissed her complaint, “MCL 691.1031 provided a rebuttable presumption of laches in certain election actions . . . .” The court noted that plaintiff sought relief under the Michigan Election Law, and she sought to have R disqualified and all votes for R to be void. Thus, her action was “an action that affects the [11/5/24] election. Plaintiff brought her action on [10/10/24], which was 26 days before the [11/5/24] election. The rebuttable presumption of laches, therefore, applied to plaintiff’s claim, and plaintiff did not rebut the presumption.” While she tried “to argue that MCL 691.1031 did not apply to her claim because she was bringing her action under MCL 168.558(5), the plain language of MCL 691.1031 clearly states that the rebuttable presumption of laches applies to ‘all civil actions . . . affecting elections’ . . . .” In addition, it was not relevant that the relief she sought “would be granted after the election because MCL 691.1031 makes no such exception.”
Government seizure of personal property; Conversion; Mandamus; Notice of a claim against the state; MCL 600.6431; Principle that MCL 600.6431 applies to all claims against the state; Christie v Wayne State Univ; Elia Cos, LLC v University of MI; Retroactivity of Christie; Flamont v Department of Corrs; Landin v Department of Health & Human Servs; Hudson v Department of Corrs (Hudson I & II); Court of Claims jurisdiction; Signature & verification requirements; MCL 600.6431(2)(a)-(d)
The court held that plaintiff’s claims were barred for failure to comply with the notice and verification requirements of MCL 600.6431. Plaintiff sought the return of over $100,000 in cash, electronic devices, marijuana trimming equipment, and other property seized by defendant. He alleged claim and delivery, statutory and common-law conversion, and mandamus. He contended defendant was required to return the property because no forfeiture action was filed, no criminal charges were brought, and statutory deadlines under the forfeiture scheme had expired. The Court of Claims eventually granted defendant’s renewed motion for summary disposition, relying on Christie and Elia. It noted plaintiff’s accrual date was no later than 8/18/21, but he failed to file a verified complaint or verified notice of intent within the statutory one-year window. On appeal, the court found plaintiff’s failure to comply with MCL 600.6431 was fatal to his claim. It rejected his argument that the accrual date was unsettled. Plaintiff “could not maintain an action against the state because he failed, within one year of the claim accrual, to file a written claim or a written notice of an intention to file a claim against the state or its departments or agencies. This claim or notice had to include a statement of the time and place of where the claim occurred, a detailed statement of the nature of the claim and the damages, an identification of the state entity involved with the claim, and the claimant’s signature and verification before an officer authorized to administer oaths. Plaintiff was required to comply with MCL 600.6431 and could not cure any defects during the pendency of the action.” In light of the holding in Hudson II “that the Christie decision is given full retroactive effect,” the Court of Claims did not err in granting defendant summary disposition “after concluding that it lacked jurisdiction.” Affirmed.
Fall on a public sidewalk; “Sidewalk exception” to governmental immunity; MCL 691.1402a; Presumption in MCL 691.1402a(3); Whether a signpost stub was part of the sidewalk as defined by the Governmental Tort Liability Act; MCL 691.1401(f); Mann v Detroit; LaMeau v Royal Oak; Setting aside a default; Service of process
The court concluded that “plaintiff overcame the presumption in MCL 691.1402a(3) that defendant maintained the sidewalk in reasonable repair, and the trial court did not err by denying” defendant-city’s summary disposition motion. Also, it found that because “defendant was not served with process and the default entered against it was void,” the trial court did not abuse “its discretion by setting aside the default.” Plaintiff fell and suffered personal injuries on a public sidewalk in the city. Because the court concluded “that there is at least a factual question of whether or not the signpost stub was a ‘dangerous condition in the sidewalk itself’ under MCL 691.1402a(3)(b),” it disagreed with defendant’s argument “that plaintiff’s claim was barred by governmental immunity.” It found that the “Mann Court’s analysis of MCL 691.1401(f) and LaMeau is applicable to the facts of this case. Similar to the defect in Mann, the signpost stub in this case is a metal protrusion embedded in the middle of a pedestrian walkway. Accordingly, defendant’s argument that liability for defects in the sidewalk are limited to the pavement itself is without merit.” On cross-appeal, plaintiff argued “the trial court abused its discretion by granting defendant’s motion to set aside the default because defendant did not establish it had good cause for its failure to respond to” his complaint. The court disagreed. There was no dispute “that plaintiff only attempted to effectuate service on defendant by sending the summons and complaint by certified mail to the mayor. This did not comply with the court rule. Therefore, defendant was not served with the summons and complaint in this case.” The court found that because “plaintiff did not serve defendant with a copy of the summons and complaint, the trial court never obtained personal jurisdiction over defendant.” It concluded that without “personal jurisdiction over defendant, the default entered against it was void.” In addition, “because the trial court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over defendant, defendant was not required to demonstrate ‘good cause’ or a ‘meritorious defense’ in order for the trial court to grant its motion to set aside the default.” Affirmed.
Notice requirements of MCL 124.419; Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (SMART)
The court concluded that plaintiff timely notified defendant-SMART “of his claim in the manner SMART requested plaintiff communicate with it by e-mailing notice of his claim to SMART’s agent.” Thus, it agreed that the trial court erred by holding “that plaintiff did not provide written notice of his claims to SMART pursuant to MCL 124.419 and dismissing the action.” It reversed the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in defendants’ favor and remanded. Plaintiff, a passenger on a SMART bus, alleged that he sustained injuries when the driver “suddenly braked causing plaintiff to fall out of his seat and hit a wall barrier in the bus.” He argued “the trial court erred by finding that he did not comply with the notice requirements of MCL 124.419 because he served two letters on the Senior Claims Examiner [an employee of the ASU Group, a third-party administrator on behalf of SMART] within the 60-day time frame of MCL 124.419.” Because the 7/18/23 “letter informed SMART of plaintiff’s claim against it within the 60-day time frame and defendants acquiesced to notice via e mail,” the court agreed. Because the 7/18/23 “letter substantively informed SMART of plaintiff’s claim against it, we need not address the second letter.” Finally, the court held that “SMART acquiesced to notice via e-mail and plaintiff otherwise complied with the notice requirements of MCL 124.419. Through his counsel, plaintiff sent a letter describing his intent to bring a liability claim against SMART based on the injuries he sustained in the” 6/4/23 incident “He delivered this letter to defendant’s agent in the manner an employee of the ASU Group requested that plaintiff communicate with it within 60 days of the incident. This was sufficient to notify SMART of the claim against it. For these reasons, the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiff did not serve notice of his claim on SMART until [11/23] and that defendants were immune from suit.”
Motion to terminate an ex parte PPO; Whether the trial court relied on false information; Nondomestic PPO statute (MCL 600.2950a); “Stalking” (MCL 750.411h(e)); “Course of conduct” (MCL 750.411h(1)(a)); “Harassment” (MCL 750.411h(1)(d)); Unconsented contact; Hayford v Hayford; Judicial misconduct; Grounds for disqualification; MCR 2.003(C); Defamation; American Transmission, Inc v Channel 7 of Detroit, Inc; Absolute privilege
The court held that respondent did not “show that the trial court lacked a reasonable basis for issuing, and continuing, the PPO” at issue. It also rejected her judicial misconduct claim, concluding that the trial court’s order denying her motion to terminate the PPO was “fully supported by the facts of record and the law.” Petitioner obtained the PPO ex parte on behalf of his son (RM), respondent’s great-grandson. The record reflected “that respondent was repeatedly told not to have contact with RM and that she was not welcome at RM’s events. Despite” this, she “continued to insert herself into RM’s extracurricular activities. The trial court correctly reminded [her] that being RM’s great-grandmother did not give her the right to have time with him. Ultimately, RM’s father and step-mother were in control of whom they wanted around RM, and because that wish was not respected, the trial court properly issued the PPO.” The court noted that she did not testify before the trial court and thus, “did not deny that she was told to stay away from RM or deny that she continued to appear at his extracurricular activities.” She also acknowledged on appeal “‘the rights of the parent of [RM] to determine who[m] [RM] can see.’” Her judicial misconduct argument was unpreserved because she “did not raise any claim of judicial bias or misconduct in the trial court[.]” In addition, her “only basis for alleging bias on” the part of the trial court judge (Judge C) “was that she had gained access to certain information from the custody case, but” she did not specify “any instance of such impropriety, nor cite[] authority in support of her position.” Respondent also asserted “that innuendoes about [her] drug use in the custody case, and such allegations in the petition of this case, as accepted by Judge [C], were false and defamatory.” The court noted that statements “made by judges, attorneys, and witnesses during the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged if they are relevant, material, or pertinent to the issue being tried.” In this case, Judge C “made clear that her findings were based on the stalking statute and the notice respondent received to stay away from RM. Respondent cites no authority according to which Judge [C] was not acting within her authority.” Affirmed.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) & (c)(ii); Waiver & abandonment of appellate arguments; Failure to participate in or benefit from services; Children’s best interests; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Olive/Metts; Domestic violence; In re White; Relative placement; In re Mason; Children’s need for permanency & stability
Holding that §§ (c)(i) and (c)(ii) were met, and that termination was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed termination of respondents-parents’ parental rights. The children were removed because of domestic violence, lack of supervision, and deplorable living conditions. On appeal, the court rejected respondent-father’s argument that a statutory ground was not met. As to §§ (c)(i) and (ii), given his documented lack of progress with the services he was provided, and his unaddressed domestic violence, the court was “not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred when it found no reasonable likelihood existed that the conditions that led to the adjudication would be rectified . . . within a reasonable time considering the children’s ages.” The court also rejected respondent-mother’s argument that a statutory ground was not met. “The barriers that led to adjudication, such as substance abuse, mental health, lack of parenting skills, lack of financial support, and criminal activity continued to exist without a reasonable likelihood that [she] would rectify them considering the children’s ages.” Finally, the court rejected both parents’ argument that the trial court erred by finding termination of their parental rights was in the best interests of their respective children. When considering the “father’s lack of appropriate bond with his children, his lack of progress in his parent-agency agreement, and the children’s need to be in a stable and permanent placement, a preponderance of the evidence in the entire record supported the trial court’s determination that termination of [his] parental rights served the children’s best interests.” As to the mother, when considering her “lack of progress in her parent-agency agreement, her failure to benefit from it, her inappropriate and at times dangerous behavior, and the children’s need to be in a stable and permanent placement, a preponderance of the evidence in the entire record supported the trial court’s determination that termination of [her] parental rights served the children’s best interests.”