Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Applicability of provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA); MCL 24.264; MCL 24.306; Contempt judgments; In re Contempt of Dudzinski; Johnson v White; In re Contempt of Pavlos-Hackney; Michigan Department of Agriculture & Rural Development (MDARD); Temporary restraining order (TRO)
In this case arising from the suspension of a food establishment license, the grant of injunctive relief, and entry of contempt judgments, the court affirmed the circuit court’s challenged rulings. Plaintiff-MDARD suspended Marlena’s Bistro and Pizzeria’s license. Defendant-Zante owned the restaurant. “Because Pavlos-Hackney is the sole owner of both enterprises,” the court referred to her as the defendant. When she kept the restaurant open, MDARD sought a court order enjoining its operation. The circuit court entered a TRO, “which Pavlos-Hackney also defied. [It] held her in contempt and converted the TRO into a preliminary injunction. [She] kept the restaurant open and the circuit court entered a second contempt judgment and a permanent injunction.” The circuit court later granted MDARD summary judgment and denied Pavlos-Hackney’s motion for a declaratory judgment. The court found that because “she did not appeal the administrative order upholding the food license suspension, Pavlos-Hackney may not now relitigate that decision. The merits of the administrative proceedings and license suspension were not at issue in the circuit court; the question before [it] was whether an injunction closing the restaurant was warranted.” She cited two APA sections, MCL 24.264 and 24.306, in arguing otherwise. The court held that neither applied. As to her challenge to the validity of the contempt judgments, the court noted the “Supreme Court has reiterated that the principles enunciated in Dudzinski apply to civil contempt.” And the court found that its decision in Johnson was “a far narrower holding than Pavlos-Hackney claims. It does not stand for the proposition that courts lack contempt jurisdiction when an underlying law is subsequently declared unconstitutional. Johnson’s holding applies only if a statute has been declared to be unconstitutional before a contempt judgment is entered. That is not what happened here. When the circuit court enjoined Pavlos-Hackney, found her in contempt, fined and jailed her, it did so in full conformity with then-existing law.” She could have challenged the validity of the administrative “order by pursuing an appeal from the administrative proceedings. She did not do so. [She] elected to bypass the administrative and subsequent judicial processes that would have afforded her a full hearing on her constitutional claims. Instead she deliberately violated two lawful court orders.”
Breach of contract; Intended third-party beneficiary; MCL 600.1405; Koenig v City of S Haven; Brunsell v City of Zeeland; Nuisance; Nuisance per se & nuisance in fact; Ford v City of Detroit; Public nuisance & private nuisance; Adkins v Thomas Solvent Co; Negligence; Premises liability; Finazzo v Fire Equip Co; Duty owed to a licensee; Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship; Principle that property owners generally owe no duty to supervise minor children of guests on their property; Ji Liang by Shaw v Guang Hui Liang; Open & obvious danger; Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc; Negligent supervision; Gross negligence & willful & wanton misconduct
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition for defendants-homeowners (the Talans) and the manufacturer (Backyard), seller (Costco), and assembler (WA) of the playset at issue in this case. Plaintiff sued defendants for injuries her daughter (AK) sustained when she fell from a slide at a birthday party. The court rejected plaintiff’s argument the trial court erred by dismissing her breach-of-contract claim against WA because AK was an intended third-party beneficiary. It found she failed to show that “the installation agreement between Backyard and WA included any provision incorporating children who would play on the playset as intended third-party beneficiaries to the agreement.” Moreover, there was no “material distinction between the class of child users of the playsets and the class of members of the public who would use the piers in Koenig, or the class of pedestrians who would use the sidewalk in Brunsell.” Plaintiff did not “identify any contractual language indicating that the contracting parties intended for child users of the equipment to be beneficiaries of the agreement.” The court also upheld the dismissal of her nuisance claim against WA, finding she could not show “the residential playset posed an unreasonable risk of harm to members of the public, or that AK was using the playset in the exercise of a public right when she was injured.” And because AK was a social guest, plaintiff’s allegations also did not support a valid claim of public nuisance. The court further rejected plaintiff’s contention the trial court erred by dismissing her negligence claim against WA. “Although WA may have had temporary control of the property while it was installing the playset, there is no question of fact that it did not have control of the property when AK was injured six years later.” Moreover, the trial court properly dismissed the nuisance claims against Costco and Backyard, and the negligence claim against Costco. Finally, the court held that the trial court did not err by dismissing the premises liability, negligent supervision, and gross negligence claims against the Talans. There was “no genuine issue of fact whether the playset on the Talan defendants’ grassy property was unreasonably dangerous in the first instance[.]” The negligent supervision claim failed because plaintiff “was present at the birthday party when AK fell off the slide.” Lastly, the Talans “had no reason to expect that serious harm would result from the children’s ordinary use of the playset mounted on grass.” Affirmed.
Sentencing; Revocation of probation & imposition of a sentence of incarceration for a probation violation; MCL 771.4b(1) & (4); Plea agreement; MCR 6.302(B)-(D); People v Plumaj; Effect of a guilty or no-contest plea; People v Guyton; Principle that defendants must be fully informed about the consequences of the plea; Principle that a plea is not knowing & voluntary if the defendant is misinformed about its benefits; Remedy; Plea withdrawals; MCR 6.310; Principle that a trial court may not vacate a plea on its own motion; People v Martinez; Contracts against public policy; People v Smith
The court held that the trial court correctly ordered that defendant’s plea agreement must be vacated on the basis of his request for withdrawal. He pled guilty to larceny from the person as a second-offense habitual offender for hitting the victim with a board to get money. The trial court initially sentenced him to 12 months in jail to be followed by 3 years’ probation, but later revoked his probation and sentenced him to a minimum of 30 months in prison. On appeal, the court noted that neither party disputed that the amended statute applied, and “because defendant pleaded to his second technical probation violation, the penalty of probation revocation and 30 months to 15 years’ imprisonment violated MCL 771.4b(1) and (4).” But the parties disagreed about whether the proper remedy was for defendant to be resentenced to continued probation with incarceration for no more than 30 days, or for the plea to be vacated. The court declined “to speculate whether defendant has chosen not to seek, or accept, the remedy of plea withdrawal because he believes further negotiations would be less favorable to him.” However, in taking this position “and asking instead for resentencing, defendant is essentially asking this Court to order the trial court to reform the plea agreement in a manner that would allow him to keep the plea but change the penalty.” The court could not do so. When a trial court “rejects a sentence ‘while keeping the rest of the agreement, the trial court essentially imposes a different plea bargain on the prosecutor than he or she agreed to.’ The Smith majority held that a trial court cannot simply reject or change a term in the plea agreement without allowing the prosecutor an opportunity to withdraw from the agreement.” In these circumstances, the trial court “must give the prosecutor the opportunity to withdraw the plea.” Affirmed.
Motion for removal from the registration requirements of the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA); Whether lifetime registration under SORA constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution for juvenile offenders convicted & sentenced as adults; People v Betts; People v Lymon; Presumptive proportionality & validity of a sentence mandated by the Legislature; Facial & as-applied challenges
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for removal from the SORA’s registration requirements for his CSC II conviction, concluding lifetime SORA registration is not cruel or unusual punishment for juvenile offenders convicted and sentenced as adults. It applied the four factors set forth in Lymon. As to the first factor, he was sentenced “to a juvenile facility in accord with Public Act 150. Thereafter, he did not comply with the rules of his juvenile placement, began to groom peers that were younger or suffered from emotional issues, engaged in inappropriate sexual behaviors, and failed to obey staff. It was determined that [he] could not be released because he failed to incorporate his training into daily life and that he presented a high risk of reoffending.” Further, the court found “the gravity of the offense was the most heinous. [He] removed the victim from the care of an adult and took him into another room” where he removed “the victim’s pajamas and diaper to penetrate the victim.” The 14-month-old victim “was limited in the ability to ascertain what was transpiring as well as to articulate the need for help.” The court also noted “defendant had been in the treatment and care of mental health professionals for a number of years. Yet, it did not appear that he benefited from medication and treatment. He committed this offense at the age of 16, was sentenced to a juvenile facility at the age of 17, and resentenced as an adult at the age of 19. At the time of his adult sentencing, [he] was deemed a high risk to reoffend.” The record did not support his claim “the severity of the offense does not equate with the harshness of the penalty . . . .” Given the gravity of his “offense, mandatory lifetime registration is a proportionate punishment.” As to the second factor, lifetime registration “is not the only mandatory penalty imposed in Michigan” and a legislatively mandated sentence is presumptively proportional and valid. As to the third factor, he “received an individual assessment of risk, and it was determined that an adult sentence and mandatory SORA registration was required when the diversionary juvenile program failed.” As to the fourth factor, regardless of whether the penalty advanced the rehabilitation goal, he did not meet his burden of showing the mandatory lifetime registration requirement was invalid. Finally, the court disagreed that remand was “warranted for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether mandatory lifetime SORA registration is cruel or unusual punishment as applied to” him. Affirmed.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to introduce the victim’s search history; Failure to introduce additional medical records & doctor testimony; Failure to introduce the victim’s recantation; Failure to interview defendant’s daughter; Failure to object to the prosecution’s late addition of a witness; Failure to object to the prosecution’s line of questioning in cross-examining defendant; Sufficiency of the evidence for convictions of accosting a child for immoral purposes & CSC I; Credibility
Holding that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel and there was sufficient evidence to support his accosting a child for immoral purposes and CSC I convictions, the court affirmed. Defendant argued, among other things, that “counsel provided ineffective assistance because he did not introduce evidence that the victim searched ‘adult pornography sites [for] sexual encounters like ‘step-daddy’ sex and/or ‘stepbrother’ pornography.’” The court found that rather “than substantively addressing the trial court’s reasoning, defendant merely reiterates his belief that it was unreasonable for counsel to not admit the victim’s search history as evidence.” The court concluded “that counsel’s decision to not admit evidence of the victim’s search history was reasonable trial strategy. Accordingly, for the reasons explained by the trial court, we reject this claim of ineffective assistance.” Next, defendant argued his trial counsel was ineffective “because he failed to introduce additional medical records and doctor testimony documenting defendant’s erectile dysfunction.” But he failed “to meaningfully explain why the trial court erred by rejecting this claim of ineffective assistance.” He simply asserted, “without any citation, that if a defense is based on a medical diagnosis, defense counsel ‘CANNOT simply accept documents from a client without seeking all of the relevant documents from the medical provider(s) directly.’ Obviously, no such blanket rule exists; counsel is only required to conduct a reasonable investigation.” The court concluded “that defense counsel’s performance in this respect was objectively reasonable; defense counsel adequately investigated defendant’s medical condition and presented to the jury both medical records confirming defendant’s medical condition and testimony from multiple witnesses confirming” it. The court further noted “that even if defense counsel should have investigated this matter further, defendant has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by that failure. Defendant has not provided an offer of proof of what the additional medical records would have shown or what the content of the unidentified doctors’ testimonies would have been. Without such evidence we have no way of determining whether defense counsel’s alleged failure to present the evidence would have prejudiced defendant. In other words, this ineffective-assistance claim must fail because defendant has failed to establish the factual predicate of his claim.”
Paternity action; Failure to include a notice of hearing with filed motions; MCR 2.119(C); Procedural due process; Claim that an individual cannot be held responsible for child support absent evidence of a promissory note or contract; The Paternity Act; MCL 722.717; Personal & subject-matter jurisdiction; MCL 600.701; MCL 722.714
The court found that defendant (who was proceeding in propria persona) abandoned all his arguments on appeal in this paternity action, and further concluded none of them had merit. The trial court did not err in failing to address his motions where they did not comply with the applicable court rules, his due process rights were not violated, and the trial court had both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. Further, there “is no requirement in MCL 722.717 that the trial court require proof of a contract or promissory note in order to enter a paternity judgment and child support order.” Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment of paternity and uniform child support order setting defendant’s child support obligation. He did not “include a notice of hearing with any of the motions he filed in the trial court.” Without a notice of hearing, none of his motions were “filed in accordance with MCR 2.119 and were not properly scheduled to be heard by the trial court.” He failed to explain how the trial court’s failure to hear or respond to his motions violated his due process rights, and the court held that his “rights were not violated as he had notice of the hearing regarding the prosecutor’s motion for child support on [12/9/22], and the opportunity to be heard at the hearing.” He also appeared to contend “that without evidence of a promissory note or contract, he cannot be held responsible for child support.” However, pursuant to MCL 722.717, “the trial court had the authority to enter the judgment of paternity and uniform child support order.” It determined that he was the child’s father “and entered the paternity judgment after defendant was properly served with the summons and failed to file an answer.” As to personal jurisdiction over defendant, he “was domiciled in Michigan at the time he was served at his verified address in Muskegon, Michigan. As a result, the trial court had general personal jurisdiction over” him under MCL 600.701. It also had subject-matter jurisdiction under MCL 722.714 “to determine the paternity of a child born out of wedlock and to order child support.”
Effect of Medicare Part C coverage; “Qualified person” under MCL 500.3107d; Opting out of personal injury protection (PIP) benefits to reduce premium payments; Whether the Medicare Advantage Plan was “qualified health coverage” under MCL 500.3107d(7)(b)(ii); Commonwealth ex rel Kane v UPMC (PA); Medicare Advantage Organizations (MAO)
The court concluded the trial court did not err in holding that nonparty-Seguna “was a qualified person under MCL 500.3107d, and that he effectively opted out of PIP coverage benefits to reduce his premium payments.” The claim arose from injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident where he lost control of his vehicle. Plaintiff-University Neurosurgical Associates argued that the trial court erred when it held “that Seguna’s Medicare Part C coverage met the statutory definition of ‘qualified health coverage,’” and that he “effectively elected to opt out of PIP medical coverage.” Specifically, plaintiff argued “that while MCL 500.3107d unambiguously identifies Parts A and B of the Medicare program, the statute does not mention Medicare Part C as meeting the statutory definition of qualified health coverage. Because the Medicare Advantage Plan through Blue Cross was under Part C, plaintiff argues that Seguna was not a qualified person who was eligible to opt out.” The court held that contrary “to plaintiff’s interpretation of MCL 500.3107d, a Medicare Advantage Plan obtained under Part C of Medicare is qualified health coverage under the statute since Medicare Advantage Plans provide coverage for services required under Medicare Parts A and B, albeit through a private health insurance company.” It concluded that “a person like Seguna who is enrolled under Part C receives the benefits that are required under Parts A and B, but just not directly from the government.” The court further determined that it “is true, as plaintiff argues, that Parts A, B, and C are separate statutory parts, and that the benefits available under both Parts A and B are paid for by the government, while Part C benefits are paid for by an MAO. And, it is equally true that Seguna did not elect to receive benefits directly from the government under either Part A or B, instead choosing to receive those benefits under Part C through Blue Cross.” But, as defendants argued, the dispositive question was “not whether Seguna elected to receive benefits under Parts A and B (and have them paid by the government), but whether he was receiving the benefits provided ‘under’ Parts A and B of the Medicare statute.” And, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized in Commonwealth ex rel Kane, “in the view of the federal government, if an individual is enrolled in [a] Medicare Advantage program, that individual is still considered to be in the federal Medicare program. As such, a person who is enrolled in Medicare Advantage receives their Medicare Part A and B benefits through the Medicare Advantage program.” The court held that when “Seguna filled out the waiver form, he provided proof that he had a Medicare Advantage Plan, which qualified as health coverage, because Seguna’s plan provided him with coverage for the benefits required under Medicare Parts A and B, albeit through a private health insurance company under Part C. Thus, Seguna effectively opted out as permitted under MCL 500.3107d.”
First-party no-fault action for personal injury protection (PIP) benefits; Whether the pre-amendment version of MCL 500.3174 barred plaintiff’s claim; Whether the amended version of the statute applied; Accrual; Spine Specialists of MI, PC v MemberSelect Ins Co; Determining whether a statutory amendment applies retroactively; LaFontaine Saline, Inc v Chrysler Group, LLC; Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility (MAIPF)
Holding that the trial court did not err in determining the pre-amendment version of MCL 500.3174 (§ 3174) applied and as a result, defendant-Farmers was entitled to summary disposition, the court affirmed. This first-party action for PIP benefits arose from a 2016 auto accident. The MAIPF assigned plaintiff-Hauanio’s benefits claim to Farmers. Plaintiff argued the trial court erred in not applying MCL 500.3174 as amended by 2019 PA 21 (effective 6/11/19) when it ruled her claims against Farmers were time-barred. The court noted “‘PIP benefits accrue when they are incurred, MCL 500.3110(4), and are incurred when the insured receives medical treatment and becomes obligated to pay.’” There was no dispute that all the benefits claimed here were incurred before the 2019 amendment’s effective date. It was also undisputed that plaintiff’s complaint “would be untimely under the pre-amendment version of § 3174.” The 2019 amendment removed the 30-day time limit in the statute. The only way for her claims to survive was “if the 2019 amendment to § 3174—which occurred after her claims accrued—applies retroactively.” The court applied the factors set forth by the Supreme Court in LaFontaine to determine whether a statutory amendment should be applied retroactively. It first found that nothing in MCL 500.3174’s language indicated “the Legislature intended that the law apply retroactively.” Rather, the amendment appeared on its face to be prospective. Thus, the first LaFontaine factor did not support retroactive application. Second, the statute “does not directly relate to an antecedent event. While the amended statute indirectly relates to antecedent automobile accidents and injuries, which triggered Hauanio’s rights to make a claim for PIP benefits through the MAIPF, this is not enough on its own to render the statute retroactive as to the deadline to make a claim.” As to the third factor, plaintiff sought “to use the post-amendment version of § 3174 to expand her rights and, potentially, resurrect a cause action that was undisputedly time-barred. Retroactive application of the post-amendment version of § 3174 would effectively rewrite history.” Thus, this factor also did not favor retroactive application. The same was true of the fourth factor. Statutes “of limitations that have completely run, as in this case, do not fall into the ‘remedial-procedural exception to prospective application.’”
Retroactive application of Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Cnty; Proctor v Saginaw Cnty Bd of Comm’rs; Federal & Michigan Takings Clauses; Hall v Meisner (6th Cir); Retroactive application of the amended language in MCL 211.78m & 78t; The doctrine of stare decisis; Inverse-condemnation claim; Res judicata; Unjust-enrichment & civil-conspiracy claims; General Property Tax Act (GPTA)
In this putative class action as to tax-foreclosure and sale procedures, the court held that to the extent the trial court declined to retroactively apply Rafaeli, it erred given that there is binding precedent. Further, the trial court improperly concluded the U.S. “Constitution failed to recognize a protected property interest in the equity plaintiffs had in their homes.” And the trial court improperly concluded Michigan “Supreme Court’s decision in Rafaeli did not permit plaintiffs’ takings claims against” defendant-Oakland County under the state constitution. Finally, the “trial court erred by refusing to give retroactive application to the amended language in MCL 211.78m and 78t.” As to retroactive application of Rafaeli, the court concluded the decision in Proctor, “on its own, was determinative of the issue of whether Rafaeli should be applied in the present case, because plaintiffs raised a similar argument at a similar time.” As to plaintiffs’ federal takings claims, the court determined that “Oakland County’s argument that Hall was wrongly decided has lost nearly all of the minimal weight it carried at the time Oakland County raised it.” The court held that Hall “applies in this case and stands for the proposition that Oakland County committed a taking under the United States Constitution when it took title to plaintiffs’ properties under the GPTA without paying plaintiffs just compensation for their equity in the subject properties. Because the trial court determined plaintiffs had not pleaded an unjust-takings claim under the United States Constitution, it erred.” As to plaintiffs’ takings claims against Oakland County under the state constitution, the court held that Rafaeli applied here and did “not preclude plaintiffs’ unjust-takings claims under the Michigan Constitution. Instead, in situations when there is not a public tax-foreclosure sale, Rafaeli requires the ‘surplus’ to be calculated on the basis of the value of the property retained, less what was legally owed. Because the trial court erred in ruling otherwise and granting Oakland County’s motion for summary disposition,” the court reversed. As to plaintiffs’ argument related to retroactive application of the amended language in MCL 211.78m and 78t, under the doctrine of stare decisis, Proctor was binding and required the court to vacate “the trial court’s dismissal of any of plaintiffs’ claims reliant on the retroactive application of the amended version of MCL 211.78m and 78t.” Reversed in part, vacated in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
Use tax audit; Industrial processing exemption; MCL 205.94o(1)(c) & (3)(b); Research or experimental activities; MCL 205.94o(3)(b); “Industrial processor”; MCL 205.94o(7)(b); “Product”; MCL 205.94o(7)(c); “Necessary”; The Tax Tribunal’s (TT) subject-matter jurisdiction; MCL 205.22(1); Toaz v Department of Treasury; Whether a claim was fraudulently pled; MCR 1.109(E)(5)
The court held that the TT had subject-matter jurisdiction over this case, and did not err by finding petitioner-Strata was not entitled to the industrial processing use tax exemption, denying petitioner’s summary disposition motion, and granting summary disposition for respondent-Treasury. Respondent conducted a tax use audit on petitioner and determined it owed a balance for failure to pay tax for purchases of capital assets and expenses. Petitioner claimed the assets and expenses were exempt as materials used in industrial processing. The TT found petitioner was not entitled to a use tax exemption. On appeal, the court first rejected respondent’s contention that the TT lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear this case. The TT found petitioner sufficiently pled its petition to invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the TT. It “contested the entire tax assessment in its petition.” Respondent did not allege petitioner “fraudulently pleaded that claim.” As such, the TT had subject-matter jurisdiction over the claim when the petition was filed. The court then rejected petitioner’s claim “that its purchases were eligible for the industrial processing exemption to the use tax under MCL 205.94o(1)(c) and (3)(b) because it performed research or experimental activities for or on behalf of an industrial processor.” First, the court found petitioner’s “provision of trial patients was not incident to the development, discovery, or modification of trial drugs.” Second, it failed to show “its activity was ‘necessary’ for the trial drug to ‘satisfy a government standard or to receive government approval.’” Given this, and the fact that “the formulation of the trial drug’s compound generally does not change after Strata provides patients for drug trials,” the court concluded that petitioner’s “activity is not required for its pharmaceutical company partners to obtain FDA approval. Instead, Strata is merely a service provider that may enhance the likelihood that the drug trials succeed.” Thus, petitioner “failed to meet its burden to show that its activity was necessary for a drug to satisfy a government standard or receive governmental approval.” Affirmed.
Termination under § 19b(3)(c)(i); In re Williams; Reasonable reunification efforts; A parent’s responsibility to engage in & benefit from the services offered by the DHHS; In re Fried; Accommodations for a parent’s disability; In re Hicks/Brown; Best interests of the children; In re White; Parent-child bond; In re Olive/Metts Minors
Holding that the trial court did not err by finding the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, that § (c)(i) was met, and that termination was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed termination of respondents-parents’ parental rights. Their rights were terminated based primarily on substance abuse, mental health issues, and failure to maintain stable housing. On appeal, the court rejected their argument that the DHHS did not provide reasonable reunification efforts, noting they “failed to uphold their ‘commensurate responsibility’ to engage in and benefit from the services offered by” the DHHS. The court failed to see how they would have fared better if the DHHS had offered other services. It also rejected their claim that no statutory ground for termination existed, finding that § (c)(i) was established where “respondents had not accomplished any meaningful change in the condition that led to adjudication, i.e., their inability or unwillingness to properly care for the children.” The record supported that the condition leading “to adjudication continued to exist and there was no reasonable likelihood respondents would rectify it within a reasonable time.” Finally, the court rejected their claim that termination was not in the children’s best interests. “[T]he children’s bond with respondents was not healthy for the children, who desperately needed permanency and stability respondents could not provide.” In addition, respondents “failed to address their issues during the lengthy proceedings and were unable or unwilling to effectively parent the children.” And the children were doing well in their placements.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(b)(ii), (i), (j), & (k)(iii); Child’s best interests
Holding that §§ (b)(ii), (i), (j), and (k)(iii) existed and termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in the child’s (PES) best interests, the court affirmed. The evidence established that he “had a history of physically and emotionally abusing PES’s siblings and half-siblings, that he lost parental rights to three other children because of that conduct, and that he was criminally convicted of child abuse. Accordingly, the trial court reasonably concluded that respondent had not rectified the conditions that led to the prior termination of his parental rights and that PES would be harmed if returned to respondent’s home and care.” Despite this conclusion, he argued “that the trial court should have more closely scrutinized the prior termination of his parental rights.” However, he “provided no authority for the proposition that one trial court is required to review the efficacy of another trial court’s order.” The court held that respondent’s “arguments related to the trial court’s consideration of his prior termination of parental rights and criminal convictions are legally and factually without merit.” Respondent also made “a cursory argument that DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification.” However, because his “parental rights to PES’s siblings had been involuntarily terminated, and there was no evidence that he had rectified the conditions that led to this prior termination of his parental rights, reasonable efforts were not required.” Finally, he argued “that there was no evidence that he would harm PES or that he was unfit to parent this child. Respondent completely ignores the evidence that he physically and emotionally abused PES’s siblings and half-siblings, that he had his rights to those children terminated, and that he was convicted of second-degree child abuse arising from his abuse of the children.” This evidence supported “the trial court’s finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that PES would be at risk of similar harm in respondent’s care, and that respondent was unfit to parent any child.”