Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Admissibility of defendant’s police statements; Whether defendant was “interrogated” for Miranda purposes; People v Anderson; Harmless error; Sufficiency of the evidence for a first-degree murder conviction; Premeditation & deliberation; People v Oros; Jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter; People v Yeager; People v Pouncey
The court held that defendant was not “interrogated” for Miranda purposes when he made the statements at issue, and that there was sufficient evidence to support his first-degree murder conviction. It also concluded that a rational view of the evidence did not support a voluntary manslaughter jury instruction and thus, the trial court did not err in denying his request for the instruction. He was also convicted of unlawful imprisonment and felony-firearm. After committing the crimes, he “entered Lake Michigan, ostensibly to drown himself.” Police in dive boats that happened to be in the water for dive team training went to his location. He argued that he “was the subject of a custodial interrogation while treading water in Lake Michigan; therefore, his statements made to officers while he was in the water should have been suppressed because he had not been given his Miranda warnings beforehand.” He also asserted that this Miranda violation tainted his later statements made in an ambulance and at the police station. The court disagreed. As to his statements made while in the water, it was clear “that the sole focus of the police officers’ communications with defendant was on safely coaxing [him] out of the cold water and preventing him from committing suicide. [They] did not expressly question defendant as in a standard interrogation, nor did they engage in any effort to employ words or actions reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses.” As to his statements made in the ambulance, he plainly volunteered them “without prompting from the accompanying officer.” The court added that, “even if there were Miranda violations in relation to” his statements, “they were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” The surviving victim’s “testimony, defendant’s Mirandized statements made at the police station, and [his] own trial testimony largely tracked the un-Mirandized statements regarding the events that occurred before, during, and after the homicide and overwhelmingly established the crime of first-degree premeditated murder.” As to his sufficiency of the evidence challenge, the court found “there was more than sufficient evidence to establish the elements of premeditation and deliberation.” Affirmed.
Jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of second-degree murder; People v Mendoza; Intent; People v Henderson; Sentencing; Reasonableness & proportionality; People v Steanhouse; Cruel & unusual punishment; People v Brown; Speedy trial; MCL 768.1; MCR 6.004(A); Prejudice
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant an involuntary manslaughter instruction, that his sentences were not unreasonable or disproportionate and did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and that he was not denied his right to a speedy trial. He fired a gun into another vehicle, killing a 3-year-old child in the back seat. He was convicted of second-degree murder, discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle causing death, FIP, and felony-firearm. The trial court sentenced him as a third-offense habitual offender to concurrent prison terms of 66 to 100 years for the murder conviction, 30 to 60 for discharging a firearm from a vehicle causing death, 5 to 10 for FIP, and 2 years for each felony-firearm, with the latter to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively with the sentences for their respective underlying felonies. The court rejected his argument that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter as to his murder charge. “That defendant wantonly and willfully disregarded the obvious possibility that shooting at the backseat window of another vehicle would cause great bodily harm or death was amply supported by the evidence.” The evidence did not support a conclusion that his “actions were merely negligent or careless, given the fatal consequences of discharging a gun at an occupied vehicle in freeway traffic.” As such, it did not support his theory that the child’s death was not the result of malicious action. The court also rejected his claim that his within-guidelines sentences for murder and discharging a firearm were disproportionate to his crime. “The sentence was reasonable in light of the seriousness of the offense, defendant’s failure to take responsibility for the shooting, and his demonstrably poor potential for rehabilitation. The trial court’s sentence, therefore, was ‘proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.’” The court next rejected his cruel and unusual punishment argument, noting there was “little support for the theory that [his] second-degree murder was less severe than other second-degree murders, given [he] shot a firearm in anger and retaliation at an area of an occupied vehicle that obviously had the potential to contain a passenger.” Finally, as to his claim he was denied his right to a speedy trial, because he did not offer “any basis for concluding that his ability to adequately prepare or present his defense was prejudiced by the delay,” there was no evidence he suffered any prejudice from it. Affirmed.
Sentencing; Reasonable & proportionate upward departure
Holding that defendant was entitled to resentencing because the trial “court failed to expressly explain the extent of the departure and the reasons why it resulted in a more proportionate sentence under the circumstances,” the court vacated and remanded. Following a nolo contendere plea, he was convicted of FIP and OWI, third offense. He was sentenced as a habitual offender, fourth offense, to concurrent terms of 10 to 30 years for each offense. In imposing his sentence, the trial court cited his “lengthy criminal history and incarcerations, the potential seriousness of the present offenses, and defendant’s failed benefits from prior treatment programs. We recognize that the trial court was entitled to determine that defendant’s repetitive commission of the same offenses, including driving while intoxicated and being a [FIP], as well as the danger posed by the nature of the offenses were inadequately reflected in the calculation of the sentencing guidelines range. Indeed, the trial court may determine that these factors were given inadequate weight.” But, after the trial “court examined the four goals of sentencing, it failed to expressly explain the extent of the departure and the reasons why it resulted in a more proportionate sentence under the circumstances.”
Appellate jurisdiction following resentencing; MCR 7.203(A)(1); MCR 7.202(6)(b)(iii) & (b)(iv); Principle that the scope of a second appeal is limited by the scope of the remand
The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider defendant’s appeal after remand. He was convicted of AWIM, FIP of a firearm, FIP of ammunition, and felony-firearm, second offense. The trial court sentenced him as a fourth-offense habitual offender to concurrent terms of 20 years to 20 years and 1 day for the assault conviction, and 2 to 5 for each FIP, to be served consecutively to a 5-year term for felony-firearm. In a prior appeal, the court affirmed his convictions, but remanded for resentencing because the trial court used an incorrect sentencing guidelines range. On remand, the trial court resentenced defendant as a fourth-offense habitual offender to concurrent terms of 15 to 20 years for the assault conviction, and 2 to 5 for each FIP, to be served consecutively to a 5-year term for felony-firearm. The trial court later denied his motion to correct an invalid sentence and to vacate his convictions. In the present appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion to vacate his convictions where he was indicted by a one-man grand jury and did not receive a preliminary exam. But the court found it lacked jurisdiction to consider this issue. “Despite the label attached to the motion, the motion did not seek to correct any sentence, but instead only challenged the validity of defendant’s convictions on the basis of an issue related to the initiation of charges. Because the scope of this appeal is limited by the scope of the remand, and defendant’s attack on the validity of his convictions is beyond the scope of the remand, it is not properly before us.” Affirmed.
Termination of employment; Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA); Henry v Detroit; “Public body” (MCL 15.361(d)); Causal link; Shaw v City of Ecorse; Public policy violation claim; Kimmelman v Heather Down Mgmt Ltd
In this case that arose from the termination of plaintiff’s employment as an investigator with defendant-public defender’s office, the court affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to defendants. He first argued that his termination was the result of improper retaliation under the WPA. But the court concluded he failed to present “evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that he was engaged in protected activity or that there was causal connection between his participation in such activity and [the county administrator’s] decision to terminate his employment.” Thus, he did not “establish a prima facie case that his termination was the result of improper retaliation under the WPA.” Plaintiff next argued that his termination violated public policy. The parties did not dispute that he “was an at-will employee at the public defender’s office.” He contended “that his termination violated public policy because his employment with the public defender’s office was conditioned on his concealment of unlawful activity. Assuming that the refusal to conceal unlawful activity is a situation in which the public-policy exception to at-will employment applies,” there was no evidence that he “was terminated for refusing to conceal unlawful activity.” The court noted that his discharge “would not conceal any alleged wrongdoing by the sheriff’s office. As a result, even if plaintiff’s claims were not preempted by the WPA, his termination did not violate public policy.”
Freedom of Information Act request seeking a city police force’s use-of-force policy; Exemptions from disclosure; MCL 15.243(1)(s)(vi)
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed Footnote 7 of the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 78991 in the 2/23/23 edition for the published opinion), concluding it was not necessary for defendant-city to file a cross-appeal “to propose an alternative ground for affirmance.” The court remanded the “case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration.” It directed that on “remand, while retaining jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals shall remand this case to the” circuit court to consider the issue raised by defendant but not addressed by the circuit “court during its initial review of this case, regarding the staff manual exemption of MCL 15.243(1)(s)(vi). The circuit court shall then forward its decision to the Court of Appeals for its consideration of the issue.” The court denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining question presented.
Whether the commercial insurance policy (the Policy) at issue covered business-income losses resulting from a sewer backup
Holding that the plain language of the Policy that plaintiff-Winfire held with defendant-Massachusetts Bay excluded coverage for the type of claim at issue (business-income losses for a sewer backup), the court reversed the trial court’s judgment for plaintiff. There was “no dispute that evaluating Winfire’s claim for business-income losses begins with the” Business Income (And Extra Expense) Coverage Form (BI form). “The BI form governs business-income coverage and states that a claimed business-income loss ‘must be caused by or result from a Covered Cause of Loss.’” Interpreting the applicable provisions, the court held “that the Policy explicitly excluded coverage for business-income losses from a sewer backup.” The court further concluded that “Winfire’s argument misunderstands the scope of the” Gold Property Broadening Endorsement’s sewer backup coverage. The court noted that the “sewer backup amendment was added to ‘Additional Coverages’ in the 'Building and Personal Property Coverage Form'; it was not added to the BI form.” It concluded that the “Policy unambiguously excluded coverage for Winfire’s business-income losses stemming from the” sewer backup. It noted that it “must enforce ‘clear and specific exclusions’ as written.” Remanded for entry of an order granting defendant summary judgment.
Alleged violation of the anti-lockout statute (MCL 600.2918); Conversion; Brennan v Edward D Jones & Co; Applicable limitations periods; Accrual
Holding that plaintiff-Carpenter’s claims for violation of the anti-lockout statute and conversion of his personal property were time-barred, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant-landlord (Cedar Springs). The dispute between the parties began as a landlord-tenant matter in district court, related to a mobile home. “Cedar Springs obtained an order for eviction against Carpenter” in 2012. Since then, he has filed several “actions against various parties, including several against Cedar Springs.” He filed this lawsuit in 2022. The trial court granted Cedar Springs summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) and (7). As to his claim “that Cedar Springs wrongfully locked him out of his mobile home in violation of MCL 600.2918[,]” the court noted that a claim for damages for violating this “statute ‘must be commenced within 1 year after the time the cause of action arises.’” It further noted that a “claim accrues when the wrong upon which the claim is based is done, not when damage results.” A 4/13 police report filed by Carpenter showed that “he reported that Cedar Springs placed a padlock on the mobile home.” Thus, the court concluded his “claim accrued, at the latest, in [4/13].” As a result, the present action was filed after the applicable limitations period expired. As to his conversion claim, he asserted “Cedar Springs illegally rented his mobile home out to occupants. He further alleges that he was granted possession of the mobile home in [12/13] and was granted judgments against the former occupants of the mobile home in 2014. Cedar Springs obtained title to the mobile home on [8/26/14]. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Carpenter, his conversion claim accrued in 2013, or 2014 at the latest.” Thus, this action was filed well after the applicable three-year limitations period expired.
Termination under §§ 19b(3)(a)(ii), (c)(i), (h), (j), & (k)(i); Best interests of the child; In re Keillor; History of substance abuse; In re Rippy; Parent-child bond; In re White; Relative placement
Holding that termination was in the child’s best interests, the court affirmed termination of respondent-father’s parental rights. His rights were terminated on the basis of domestic violence against the child’s mother, forfeiture of his parental rights to two other children, neglect and improper supervision, substance abuse, noncompliance with prior treatment plans, and untreated mental health issues. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that termination was not in the child’s best interests because the child had a bond with him and he was attempting to reform his behavior. The trial court did not err by finding the child’s “bond with her grandmother and lack of a bond with respondent weighed in support of [its] decision to terminate respondent’s parental rights.” In addition, its “finding that respondent’s failure to reunify with his other children as well as his failure to address his mental health issues negatively impacted his ability to parent was” also not erroneous. Further, respondent’s drug use, history of domestic violence, noncompliance with his treatment plan, and sporadic visitation history also supported the trial court’s determination that termination was in the child’s best interests. Finally, the “fact that, throughout the entire case, [the child] did well in her placement with her grandmother, also supported the trial court’s decision to terminate respondent’s parental rights.”
Children’s best interests; In re Mota; Effect of a parent’s drug use; In re Moss; Guardianship alternative; In re Prepodnik; Relative placement; In re Olive/Metts Minors; Guardian ad litem (GAL)
Holding that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed the trial court’s order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights. She did not challenge the existence of a statutory ground for termination. The court concluded the trial court did not err in its best-interests analysis given that the mother “continued to use drugs and did not have suitable and appropriate housing for the children even at the time of the termination hearing. The trial court acknowledged that [she] had a bond with the children, noting that she visited [them] regularly. The trial court also recognized that [she] showed that she could be a good parent when she maintained sobriety. But, as [it] observed, despite the bond with her children, [she] was unable to remain sober and drug-free, nor did she stop fighting with respondent-father in front of the children.” In addition, she was unable to provide them with the permanency and stability they needed. They “received DHHS services for half of their young lives, and their only extended periods of relative calm and stability were when they were in the care of their grandmother, who intends to adopt [them]. All reports indicated that the grandmother’s home is safe, loving, and appropriate, that the girls are strongly bonded with her, and that they are consistently well cared for in her home. [She] also has a track record of keeping [them] safe and away from both” respondents when they are using drugs. Further, “the foster-care worker and GAL agreed that the grandmother provided the girls with the love, support, and stability they needed.” As to the mother’s guardianship argument, “the trial court properly determined that it was not safe for the children to be returned to [the] mother’s care and that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. Therefore, a guardianship would not have been appropriate.” As to the effect of their relative placement, in light of “the extensive history of abuse of controlled substances, domestic violence, and housing instability,” the court could not find clear error in the trial court’s “best-interests ruling simply because the children had been placed with their grandmother.”