Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Whether a state law prescriptive easement claim was preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA); The Surface Transportation Board’s (STB) exclusive jurisdiction; Whether the “categorical” or “as-applied” framework applied; Whether defendant was seeking an “exclusive” easement
Noting that it had “not previously examined ICCTA preemption in the context of easements,” the court held that defendant-Dille Road Recycling Center’s prescriptive easement claim was preempted by the ICCTA where the easement sought was “exclusive and incompatible with rail use.” Plaintiff-Norfolk owns a parcel of land adjacent to its railway line. Dille, who owns adjacent property, has used the parcel at issue for years, primarily as a weighing station and scrap dump. After a dispute arose, Dille sought adverse possession or, in the alternative, a prescriptive easement. Norfolk argued that Dille’s claim was preempted by the ICCTA. Relying primarily on STB decisions, the district court disagreed and granted Dille an easement. It ruled that although adverse possession claims are categorically preempted, this did not hold true for prescriptive easement claims because in contrast to adverse possession, “‘a prescriptive easement does not take railroad property [but] allows co-existing rail and non-rail uses.’” On appeal, the court concluded that “whether an easement is preempted is a factual determination based on the specific nature of the easement sought and how it would affect railroad operations broadly. On one end of the spectrum are routine, nonexclusive easements such as at-grade crossings and aerial easements. These are generally not preempted. . . . On the other end, easements that are exclusive or deemed adverse possession by another name are often preempted.” After considering the STB’s approach, as well as the rulings in other circuits, the court held that “proper evaluation of ICCTA preemption for prescriptive-easement claims is the as-applied framework.” It noted that the touchstone of this analysis “is ‘whether the state regulation imposes an unreasonable burden on railroading.’” In turn, reasonableness “is a question of the scope of the ‘taking.’” The court rejected Dille’s argument that it was not seeking an “exclusive” easement. It concluded that “the record and the relevant case law confirms that Dille’s prospective easement would be so exclusive and conflicting that it would be essentially adverse possession by another name. The Parcel is, and must remain, fenced off to the exclusion of Norfolk.” The court found that “Dille’s easement no doubt excludes Norfolk and Norfolk has no conceivable way to reclaim any real use of its own property.” Reversed.
Divorce; Spousal support; MCL 552.23(1); Olson v Olson; The trial court’s factual findings on spousal support; Butler v Simmons-Butler; Effect of the trial court’s failure to follow its remand instructions; Glenn v TPI Petroleum, Inc; Whether a trial court may consider prior periods of cohabitation to justify an award of spousal support; Korth v Korth; Attorney fees; Reasonableness; Smith v Khouri
Holding that the trial court failed to make the required findings on the relevant spousal support factors, but that its determination of reasonable attorney fees fell within the range of principled outcomes, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The trial court awarded spousal support and attorney fees for defendant-ex-wife. In a prior appeal, the court ordered the trial court to justify or modify its award of spousal support with sufficient factual findings and to conduct a hearing to determine the reasonableness of services rendered by defendant’s attorney. On remand, the trial court again awarded spousal support and attorney fees for defendant. In the present appeal, the court agreed with plaintiff-ex-husband that the trial court failed to adequately address the spousal support factors. “On remand, the trial court legally erred by failing to comply with” the court’s instructions. Its “opinion again ‘listed facts that corresponded to some of the relevant factors’ but did not explain how those facts justified the five-year award of spousal support. [It] also failed to make adequate findings on several relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the parties’ ability to work, their past relations and conduct, their needs, their prior standard of living, and principles of equity.” The court also agreed with plaintiff that the trial court may not consider prior periods of cohabitation to justify an award of spousal support. “On a second remand, the trial court must articulate its findings on all relevant spousal support factors and explain whether those factors justify the current five-year award or warrant modification of the award.” In doing so, it “should not rely on the length of the parties’ relationship as a basis for a longer award of spousal support.” Finally, however, the court rejected plaintiff’s request that it set aside the award of attorney fees because the amount ordered by the trial court was unreasonable. “Plaintiff’s argument goes no further than emphasizing the disparity in attorney fees incurred by the parties. But plaintiff fails to acknowledge that the trial court reduced the amount requested in defendant’s bill of costs by nearly $13,000. In addition, by disclaiming any challenge to the reasonableness of specific services performed by defendant’s counsel, plaintiff has provided no basis by which we could conclude that the trial court’s reasonableness determination fell outside the range of reasonable outcomes.” The court retained jurisdiction.
Court costs; Constitutionality of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii); People v Johnson; Sentencing pursuant to a plea agreement; People v Killebrew; Scoring of OV 10; People v Russell; People v Wiley; SORA registration; Distinguishing People v Nunez. Judgment of sentence (JOS)
The court affirmed defendant’s convictions for child sexually abusive activity and lying to a peace officer, and his sentences, but remanded for correction of his sentencing guidelines calculation and for amendment of his JOS. He first challenged the constitutionality of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii), arguing “it incentivizes trial courts to convict defendants and impose costs against them, thus undermining a defendant’s due-process rights.” The court held that it was “bound by Johnson which established that MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) is not facially unconstitutional regarding a defendant’s due-process rights.” Thus, defendant’s argument failed. He also argued “that MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional separation-of-powers requirement by preventing trial courts from remaining neutral and impartial.” The court again disagreed. In Johnson, it “considered and rejected this same argument. [It] concluded that, even though MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) generates revenue, ‘nothing in the plain language of the statute directs the flow of money or creates a funding system for the trial courts.’” Thus, defendant’s constitutional claim on this ground also failed. He next argued “that he was not sentenced in accord with his plea agreement and” that he was entitled “to specific performance of the agreement or resentencing to a 36-month cap on his sentence.” The court noted that the “prosecution extended a plea offer to defendant that included a sentencing agreement of ‘36 months on the minimum pursuant to’” Killebrew. The court found that at “the plea hearing, defense counsel initially indicated confusion regarding the terms of the agreement. The record reflects that the prosecution, defense counsel, and the trial court discussed the matter to clarify the terms of the sentencing agreement. At the conclusion of that discussion, the parties and the trial court were of the same understanding that, for his two guilty pleas, the trial court would impose upon defendant a minimum 36-month prison term for his conviction of violating MCL 750.145c(2).” The court was “not persuaded that, after the trial court clarified the sentencing agreement’s terms and the parties agreed to those terms, defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily agree to the 36-month minimum sentence.” Thus, he was not entitled to relief. But he was “entitled to have the trial court perform a ministerial correction of the guidelines minimum sentence range calculation for his conviction of violating MCL 750.145c(2).”
Sentencing: Upward variance; 18 USC § 3553(a) factors; The Assimilative Crimes Act; §§ 13 & 7(3); Substantive reasonableness; 40%t upward variance from the advisory guideline range; Whether the district court overemphasized defendant’s criminal history; Sentencing disparities; Blood alcohol concentration (BAC)
The court held that the district court did not err by varying upward from the Guidelines advisory range by approximately 40% in sentencing defendant-Axline where it offered an extensive explanation for why it found the § 3553(a) factors warranted it. While traveling at over 90 miles per hour in the Great Smoky Mountains National Park, Axline, who was 19 years old, drove off the road into an embankment, killing one of his 19-year-old passengers and significantly injuring another. His BAC was found to be 0.02, exceeding “the per se intoxication level for someone under 21.” He was charged with vehicular homicide and vehicular assault on federal lands. The Guidelines recommended a range of 37 to 46 months. The government moved for an upward variance, arguing the § 3553(a) factors warranted a higher sentence given his prior drug and alcohol related history and the need to deter drunk driving. The government argued that had Axline been prosecuted in state court, his sentence would have been more severe, and under the Assimilative Crimes Act, “state law is applicable to guide the proper punishment for conduct occurring on lands reserved by the federal government, such as the Great Smokey Mountain National Park.” The district court sentenced Axline to 65 months in prison, followed by 3 years of supervised release. He argued that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. Axline asserted that the district court placed too much emphasis on the seriousness of the offense where the Guidelines already accounted for this. The court disagreed, holding that “the Involuntary Manslaughter Sentencing Guideline does not necessarily contemplate the lethal combination of Axline’s decision to drink underage and his decision to fully accelerate his car at over 90 miles an hour on a winding mountain road.” The court also concluded that the “grouping rules” in Chapter Three of the Guidelines “do not necessarily contemplate the degree of severity attributable to multiple deaths or multiple injuries.” Further, the district court did not put undue emphasis on Axline’s minimal criminal history. The court concluded “the combination of his criminal history with his characteristics fairly paints a picture of a young man ‘display[ing] a pattern of intentional and reckless conduct leading up to the [instant] extremely serious felony offenses,’ further warranting an upward variance.” Finally, the court rejected his argument that his sentence created “‘an acute risk of unwarranted disparities.’” Affirmed.
Copyright infringement; Whether plaintiff had a valid copyright in the car dealer loyalty program certificates at issue; Infringement; Calculation of the amount of profits for disgorgement; Statutory attorney fees; 17 USC § 505
The court held that the car dealer loyalty program certificates at issue constituted an “original expression” entitled to copyright protection, and that defendant-Allegiance violated plaintiff-Premier’s copyright by incorporating Premier’s material into Allegiance’s own certificates. The parties each operate car-dealership loyalty programs that provide services for cars after they are sold. The terms and conditions of the programs are provided to the customers on “loyalty certificates.” Allegiance got the account of a former Premier client, and “incorporated Premier’s Lifetime Powertrain Loyalty Program certificates into its own plan.” Premier had obtained a copyright for its certificate. Premier sued Allegiance for infringing on its copyrighted certificates. The district court found for Premier and ordered Allegiance to disgorge any profits obtained from using this material ($441,239). It also awarded Premier $577,736 in attorney fees. On appeal, Allegiance challenged the “originality” of Premier’s copyright. The court explained that copyright laws “protect all manner of works—mundane and lofty, commercial and non-commercial, even the dull and workaday—so long as they satisfy the modest imperatives of originality.” It rejected Allegiance’s challenge to the originality of Premier’s copyright and held that Premier had a valid copyright. The loyalty certificates were original to the author “because Premier designed them ‘in-house’ and ‘independent of forms used by competitors[.]’” Further, they presumptively possessed “a ‘minimal creative spark,’ . . . by showing some ‘inventiveness and imagination[.]’” The court noted that the copyright covered “a particular auto maintenance program, the customized expression and organization of which places the certificates beyond the kinds of highly abstracted descriptions typical of uncopyrightable facts and ideas. . . . The run-of-the-mine subject matter of the certificates does not detract from Premier’s creative choices in crafting them.” The court upheld the district court’s disgorgement award where “Premier satisfied its burden of establishing that Allegiance’s revenues reasonably relate to its use of the certificate.” It also upheld the award of statutory attorney fees. Affirmed.
Action seeking declaratory & mandamus relief as to the Michigan income tax rate; MCL 206.51(1); “If” & “current rate”; Subject-matter jurisdiction; MCL 205.22(1); Standing; Ripeness
In an order, the court vacated its published opinion (see e-Journal # 81184 in the 3/11/24 edition) due to typographical errors. In a new opinion, the court again held that the trial court did not err by granting defendant-State Treasurer summary disposition of plaintiffs' claims related to the Michigan income tax rate, by denying their countermotion for summary disposition, or by denying their motion for a show cause order.
Slip & fall on snow-covered ice in an apartment complex parking lot; Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc
On remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Kandil-Elsayed, the court held that reasonable minds could disagree as to whether defendant-apartment complex management company “took appropriate measures to reduce the hazard posed by the snow-covered ice in the” complex’s parking lot at the time of plaintiff’s fall. Thus, the court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary disposition for defendant and remanded. It concluded that under the new Kandil-Elsayed standards, there was a question of fact “as to whether defendant breached its duty to plaintiff” and additional factual development was required. The court found that under the “Supreme Court’s application of the newly outlined standards to the facts of Kandil-Elsayed, it is clear that the existence of a duty owed by defendant turns on plaintiff’s status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee on the property.” The court noted that the status of an invitee “is generally afforded to a landlord’s tenants and the tenant’s social guests, like plaintiff.” As a result, defendant’s duty here mirrored “the duty at issue in Kandil-Elsayed, i.e., ‘to take reasonable care to protect against the hazards of the nature accumulation of ice and snow on the property.’” Defendant did not present any “evidence to identify what, if any, measures were taken to clear the ice in the parking lot. Further, although defendant focuses on the fact that snow was actively falling at the time of plaintiff’s fall, it does not automatically follow that defendant fulfilled its duty to plaintiff. The owner of the snow removal company responsible for tending to the parking lot testified that fluctuations in temperature often lead to ice formation. It therefore follows that the weather conditions preceding plaintiff’s fall may have been indicative of the need for deicing measures. Alternatively, they may have suggested that it was reasonable to forgo salting at the relevant time.” The court determined that it lacked “sufficient evidence to support either theory at this time.”