Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Subject-matter jurisdiction as to a challenge to the classification of the manner of death on a death certificate; MCR 2.116(C)(4); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Detroit Edison Co.; The Michigan Administrative Procedure Act (APA); MCL 24.301; Agency defined; MCL 24.203; League Gen. Ins. Co. v. Michigan Catastrophic Claims Ass’n; Whether a medical examiner meets the definition of an agency; MCL 52.201 et seq.; MCL 52.201(1); MCL 52.201c(1); MCL 52.201e; MCL 52.207; MCL 52.212; Contested case defined; MCL 24.203; Rule as to requesting a change to a registered death record; MI Admin R 325.3266(2)(a); Effect of an evidentiary hearing not being required; J & P Mkt., Inc. v. Liquor Control Comm’n
The court held that because this was not a contested case under MCL 24.203(3), the circuit court properly concluded that MCL 24.301 did not apply and thus, it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claim as to the classification of the manner of death on a death certificate. The case arose from the alleged misclassification of plaintiff’s child’s (D) manner of death as classified by defendant-DeJong on D’s death certificate. After reviewing the materials surrounding the investigation of the death, DeJong determined that the death was a suicide. Plaintiff disagreed and requested that DeJong change the manner of death on the “death certificate from ‘suicide’ to ‘accident.’” The court concluded that even if it assumed, “like the trial court did, that medical examiners are an ‘agency’ under the APA, the trial court nonetheless lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because this case is not a ‘contested case’ under the APA.” Assuming without deciding that Rule 325.3266(2)(a) grants the next of kin—in this case, “plaintiff—the right to challenge a medical examiner’s finding of the manner of death on a death certificate, there is no procedure that a medical examiner must follow to entertain such a challenge. In other words, the medical examiner is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing or some other similar procedure in response to the next of kin’s challenge.” In J & P, in the context of proceedings before the Liquor Control Commission, the court held that, because “an evidentiary hearing is not required by statute in connection with a transfer request, such a proceeding is not a contested case and therefore is not covered by the appeals procedure of the APA.” Applying the same reasoning in this case, “because an evidentiary hearing is not required by statute or rule in response to a request to change a death certificate, plaintiff’s request to change” the death certificate was also not a contested case. Affirmed.
The Highway Advertising Act (HAA) (MCL 252.301 et seq.); MCL 252.307b; MCL 252.323(3); 23 USC § 131; Directional sign defined; MCL 252.302(j); Directional & direction defined; Judicial review of an agency’s decision; Wescott v. Civil Serv. Comm’n; The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) (MCL 24.201 et seq.); MCL 24.306(1); VanZandt v. State Employees Ret. Sys.; Romulus v. Department of Envtl. Quality; Substantial evidence; Department of Cmty. Health v. Risch; Principle that a reviewing court cannot set aside an agency decision if it finds it inequitable; Huron Behavioral Health v. Department of Cmty. Health; Effect of a reviewing court’s application of incorrect legal principles; Dignan v. Michigan Pub. Sch. Employees Ret. Bd.; Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT); Federal Highway Administration (FHWA)
Holding that the circuit court clearly erred in reviewing the ALJ’s decision and applied incorrect legal principles, and that the ALJ’s decision was supported by law and should have been upheld, the court reversed the circuit court’s decision and reinstated the ALJ’s decision in this dispute under the HAA. The ALJ determined that petitioner-Wolverine Sign Works owned six signs that were out of compliance with § 7b (MCL 252.307b) of the HAA, and ordered that they “be brought into compliance or removed.” The circuit court reversed the ALJ’s decision. The court concluded that the circuit court clearly erred “by disregarding the ALJ’s factual findings and failing to apply the appropriate standard of review. Essentially, the circuit court substituted its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Its decision was based largely “on its conclusion that MDOT had allowed the signs to contain phone numbers, websites, and more for several years. After concluding that MDOT was responsible for the nonconforming signs,” the circuit court determined that “MDOT was estopped from enforcing” the HAA’s restrictions. However, the court noted that “the APA does not allow the reviewing court to ‘set aside an administrative decision it finds inequitable.’” Further, it appeared that the circuit court did not “consider whether the ALJ committed an error of law or whether its decision was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence.” As the circuit court applied incorrect legal principles when it failed to review the ALJ’s decision under the proper standard, its decision was clearly erroneous. The court held that, “as a matter of law, the ALJ appropriately concluded that MDOT’s decision was appropriate, and that the expansion of items permissible on directional signs, such as the use of websites, phone numbers, and slogans, did not fit within the limitations established by the HAA.” To the extent the circuit court determined that “the ALJ’s decision was arbitrary and capricious,” the record did not support this conclusion. “The ALJ correctly found that MDOT’s decision was based on a sound determining principle, namely, that the signs were not in compliance with the relevant statutes. Additionally, the ALJ correctly held that MDOT’s interpretation of the law was supported by the guidance provided by FHWA.”
Attorney fees for representing a criminal defendant in post-conviction proceedings; Capping fees pursuant to a county fee schedule without considering whether additional requested fees were reasonable; In re Foster Attorney Fees; MCL 775.16; In re Ujlaky; In re Attorney Fees of Jamnik
Agreeing with the appellant-attorney that the trial court abused its discretion by capping attorney fees pursuant to the county fee schedule without considering whether his additional requested fees were reasonable, the court reversed the order granting in part his motion for reconsideration and awarding him $1,000 in fees, and remanded. The case arose from fees he charged for his representation of the defendant in her post-conviction proceedings. The court noted that although the “trial court expressed some concern about the 10.1 hours spent on the delayed application for leave,” it did not determine that this or any other amount of time appellant spent on the “case was unreasonable. However, it clearly relied on the Kalamazoo County policy capping compensation for appeals involving guilty pleas.” Appellant asked the trial court at the hearing “to consider whether the hours spent in each category on his itemized billing statement were reasonable.” But it declined to do so on the record, instead agreeing to examine his “itemized hours and issue a written opinion. In the written opinion, the trial court concluded that [he] was entitled to the maximum amounts allotted by” the county for representing defendant “at her plea-withdrawal hearing and her appeal, but it did not determine that any of the additional time” appellant spent on the case, for which he requested additional fees, was unreasonable. Thus, the court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to either award the full amount of his requested fees “or determine its basis for concluding that the amount was not reasonable.” The court remanded for such a determination.
Felonious assault; People v. Chambers; People v. Meissner; Sufficiency of the evidence; People v. Gonzalez; Intent; People v. Kanaan; Sentencing; People v. Hardy; People v. Francisco; Scoring of 15 points for OV 1; People v. Brooks; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Unger (On Remand); People v. Taylor; People v. Rodgers; Right to the counsel of choice; People v. Ackerman; Right to effective assistance of counsel; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Const. 1963 art. 1, § 20; People v. Cline; Venue; People v. Webbs; People v. Houthoofd; Absence of any apparent reason to challenge venue; People v. Jordan; Ignoring a request to object to certain questions posed by the prosecutor; Mentioning three times that defendant had previously been to jail; Conflict of interest; People v. Smith; Right to an impartial jury; People v. Budzyn; People v. Jendrzejewski; Cause under MCR 2.511(D); People v. Walker; MCR 2.511(D)(3); Presumption that jurors are impartial until shown otherwise; People v. Miller; People v. Hughes; Deference to the trial court’s superior ability to assess a venireman’s demeanor; People v. Williams; Jury instructions; People v. McFall; People v. Mills; People v. Clark; Denial of access to legal resources; People v. Mack; Proctor v. White Lake Twp. Police Dep’t
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of felonious assault, that OV 1 was correctly scored, and it rejected his claims as to the effective assistance of counsel, the makeup of the jury, and the jury instructions. He was sentenced as a fourth habitual offender to serve 3 to 15 years in prison. The gas station attendant “was ‘concerned’ when defendant instructed him to call 911 before” he told him that he was being robbed and pulled out knives. He recalled that “defendant then opened both knives and pointed the open blades at him from four or five feet away. He said he took defendant ‘seriously’ and thought that defendant wanted to rob him. He described being ‘a little nervous’ when defendant pulled out the knives, and did not run because he did not want to encourage defendant’s retaliation or cause panic for those around. He said that he did not know what would happen, or what defendant would do.” Defendant argued that there was insufficient evidence that he committed an assault. He claimed that “the attendant only felt intimidated, or concerned, rather than fearful, and that defendant did not make a threat.” However, it was “reasonable to infer that the attendant, who had knives drawn on him and then pointed at him, was placed in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery.” It could reasonably be inferred from his testimony that he “did not know what defendant was going to do and did not want to alarm defendant by trying to flee, and that he complied with the demand to call 911 out of reasonable fear that he could be assaulted with the knives that defendant was pointing at him.” Thus, the evidence supported the jury’s finding that “defendant’s actions placed the attendant in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery.” As to intent, he noted that “he was several feet away from the attendant at the time he drew and pointed the knives at” him. But from the evidence that he “was pointing knives at and telling the attendant that he was going to rob the store, and that defendant told the police that he wanted to be incarcerated, a reasonable inference arises that he intended to instill fear in the attendant so that he would be compelled to call 911. Despite the distance, the attendant did not know what defendant would do and he could have feared that defendant would lunge at him with the knives or chase him. The situation was sufficiently compelling for the attendant to call the police and activate a silent alarm, as defendant intended.” Affirmed.
Sanity; MCL 768.21a; Mental illness defined; MCL 330.1400(g); Insanity as an affirmative defense; People v. Mette; People v. Kolanek; Credibility determinations; People v. Kanaan; Sufficiency of the evidence of intent for assault with intent to commit murder; People v. Brown; Adequacy of the trial court’s factual findings in a bench trial; MCR 6.403; People v. Legg; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Sabin (On Second Remand); Factual predicate; People v. Putman; Whether remand for an evidentiary hearing was warranted; People v. McMillan; Denial of request for substitution of counsel; People v. Traylor; People v. Buie (On Remand); People v. Ginther; Good cause; People v. McFall; Sentencing; Fourth-habitual offender enhancement; MCL 769.12; Failure to comply with the notice provisions of MCL 769.13; In re Forfeiture of Bail Bond; Applicability of the harmless-error analysis; People v. Cobley; The drug Lean (a mixture of cough syrup containing promethazine with codeine)
In an order, the court granted the motion to file a late answer, accepted the answer filed with the motion, granted the motion for reconsideration, and vacated its opinion in this case (see e-Journal # 70341 in the 5/9/19 edition.) A new opinion will be issued.
Sufficiency of the evidence to support defendant’s conviction for assault with intent to murder (AWIM); People v. Henderson; People v. Lundy; People v. McKinney; People v. Hardiman; People v. Warren; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. LeBlanc; People v. Hurst; People v. Toma; People v. Carbin; Evidence of the victim’s age; Other acts evidence; MRE 402; MRE 401; MRE 404(b)(1) & (2); People v. Ericksen; MRE 403; People v. Cameron; Failure to raise an objection; Failure to obtain an eye examination
Holding that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction for AWIM and that he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, the court affirmed. He was convicted of AWIM, assault with a dangerous weapon, and domestic violence. The case arose out of an incident in which defendant hit the victim with his car. Both testified that they were in a divorce and custody dispute. Also, she testified that he called her job and threatened to kill her. Similarly, an officer “testified that defendant stated that he would do anything necessary to get his son back and that ‘he was not afraid to go back to prison.’” Also, “an eyewitness testified that she heard the victim yelling. The victim was backing away from the car.” It then struck her, “pushed her over a curb, and came to a stop after hitting the light pole in the grass. The victim was trapped between the car and the light pole.” She testified that “defendant exited the car after hitting her. She heard him say something ‘about making [her] pay.’ He then got down on the ground and placed both hands around her throat like he was trying to strangle her, but he did not apply any pressure. Defendant left the scene without offering any assistance or calling for help.” Also, it appeared that he “did not stop his car after striking the victim. Instead, he drove over the curb and pinned her against the light pole in the grass.” Seconds before impact with the light pole, he “pressed the accelerator at 48%. The prosecution’s expert opined that defendant could have stopped the car before hitting the light pole if he had fully deployed the brakes.”
Sufficiency of the evidence; People v. Murphy; People v. Wolfe; People v. Nowack; Whether defendant possessed & used a gun during the incident; Felonious assault; MCL 750.82(1); People v. Avant; Felon in possession (FIP); MCL 750.224f(1); Carrying a concealed weapon (CCW); MCL 750.227(2); Felony-firearm; MCL 750.227b(1); Juror bias; People v. Miller; People v. Bryant; People v. Schaw; Ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on failing to immediately request permission to conduct necessary follow-up as to alleged juror bias out of the presence of the rest of the jury; Strickland v. Washington; Speedy trial; People v. Williams; U.S. Const. amend. VI; Const. 1963, art 1, § 20; Barker v. Wingo; People v. Collins; United States v. Marion; People v. Waclawski; Doggett v. United States; MCR 6.004(A); Sentencing; People v. McGraw; People v. Hardy; People v. Lopez; Scoring of 10 points for OVs 4; People v. White; Whether resentencing was required; People v. Francisco
Rejecting defendant’s claims of juror bias, ineffective assistance of counsel, and violation of the right to a speedy trial, the court also held that there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that he possessed and used a gun during the incident that led to his convictions. Thus, it affirmed his felonious assault, FIP, CCW, and felony-firearm convictions. However, it reversed and remanded for resentencing. He argued that there was insufficient evidence that a gun was actually involved in the “road rage” incident and thus, that he was improperly convicted of felonious assault and the firearm offenses flowing from that charge. “The victim testified that defendant put his head and right hand out the window, waved ‘a pistol’ around that he held with his right hand, and then pointed the gun at the victim. The victim described the gun with specificity as a small, semiautomatic, ‘subcompact style gun’ with a ‘large barrel hold’ and a black matte finish. A police officer that responded to the victim’s 911 call testified that the victim reported that defendant pointed a gun at him.” In light of this testimony, “a rational trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed a gun.” Although he argued that the victim could have mistaken black gloves for a gun and noted that no gun was ever recovered from him, the prosecutor was “only required to ‘convince the jury in the face of whatever contradictory evidence the defendant may provide’” and did not have to “negate every reasonable theory consistent with innocence.” Further, the testimony reflected that he “was not apprehended until several hours after the assault occurred, which would have allowed him plenty of time to dispose of the weapon.” As to defendant’s challenge to the victim’s credibility given his inconsistent descriptions of the incident, defense counsel “cross-examined the victim and the responding police officer regarding inconsistencies between the victim’s trial testimony, his preliminary examination testimony, and his report to the police officers.” It was for the jury to determine the witnesses’ credibility “and the weight to be given to the evidence.” However, the court remanded for resentencing because the trial court erred in scoring 10 points for OV 4 and correcting this altered his guidelines range.
Prosecutorial error; People v. Dobek; People v. Brown; People v. Unger; People v. Watson; People v. Thomas; Ineffective assistance of counsel; People v. Heft; Failure to make a meritless argument; People v. Payne
The court held that the prosecution did not commit misconduct and counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the alleged misconduct. However, the court remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing and appropriate findings as to “whether defense counsel’s failure to investigate and present expert testimony at trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.” He was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder, assault with intent to commit murder (AWIM), felon in possession (FIP), and felony-firearm, second offense. The trial court sentenced him as a fourth-offense habitual offender to life in prison without parole for the first-degree murder conviction, 15 to 30 years for the AWIM conviction, 5 to 15 years for the FIP conviction, and a consecutive 5-year prison term for the felony-firearm conviction. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that he was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor’s improper comments and arguments and that defense counsel’s failure to object to those comments and arguments constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. It noted that the comments and arguments were not improper, and thus, any objection by defense counsel would have been futile. “Defense counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s use of the term ‘forthright’ in her opening statement, use of the term ‘courageous’ in her closing argument, and argument that [defendant] terminated his cell phone service the same day he provided the phone number to the police was not ineffective because none of these instances involved improper conduct on the part of the prosecutor.” Affirmed in part and remanded. The court retained jurisdiction.
Sentencing; United States v. Angel; Grouping of defendant’s conduct under the Guidelines; USSG § 3D1.2; United States v. Bivens; Stinson v. United States; Undue-influence enhancement; § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B); United States v. Farmer (Unpub. 6th Cir.); United States v. Reid; United States v. Willoughby; Procedural reasonableness; Gall v. United States; Factual findings; United States v. Straughter; Whether the district court was free to change the sentence after it was orally pronounced in open court; Moot issue; Effect of a remand for resentencing; United States v. Garcia-Robles
Although the court held that the district court did not err by grouping defendant-Davis’s conduct into three groups instead of a single group under the Guidelines, it vacated his sentence where the district court failed to consider all the facts when enhancing his sentence under § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) for “undue influence.” He was convicted of various crimes related to sex trafficking of a minor. He argued that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court improperly grouped his conduct into three groups under the Guidelines—one for each day of prostitution. This ruling increased his offense level by three levels. He claimed that because “his conduct involved a single scheme, with a single victim,” and occurred over a short period of time, it should have constituted a single group. The court affirmed the district court’s decision in this regard, holding that even though the case “involved ‘a single course of conduct with a single criminal objective’—selling sex with a minor[,] . . . each of the three counts of sex trafficking of a minor involved separate instances of harm. . . . Because each of the three counts of sex trafficking of a minor relates to a separate day and harm, the commentary to § 3D1.2 dictates that they should be grouped separately.” However, the court reversed the district court’s application of the two-level undue-influence enhancement. Under § 2G1.3, there is a rebuttable presumption that undue influence exists where a defendant “‘is at least 10 years older than the minor[.]’” The court concluded that the district court “relied almost exclusively on this rebuttable presumption” without considering other facts in the case, such as the victim’s testimony that she “previously engaged in prostitution,” and willingly took part in the offenses. The court vacated Davis’s sentence and remanded for the district court to reconsider the evidence, including the apparent discrepancies between the victim’s trial testimony and her victim-impact statement. Although the court was “inclined to agree with the Government that the court lacked the authority to change its mind and impose a different sentence once it had orally pronounced a sentence in open court[,]” the issue was moot because the sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.
Class-action settlement; International Union, UAW, et al. v. General Motors Corp.; In re Dry Max Pampers Litig.; Likelihood of success on the merits; Poplar Creek Dev. Co. v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C.; Carson v. American Brands, Inc.; Whether the settlement agreement undercompensated the class; Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of City & Cnty. of San Francisco (9th Cir.); Shane Group, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of MI; Risk of arbitration; Epic Sys. v. Lewis; Gaffers v. Kelly Servs.; McGrew v. VCG Holding Corp. (Unpub. 6th Cir.); Valuing the settlement agreement’s benefits in the form of injunctive & monetary relief; The Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) (28 USC § 1712); Distinguishing In re Easysaver Rewards Litig. (9th Cir.); The risk of fraud or collusion; Effect of a “clear-sailing clause”; Gooch v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am.; Waters v. International Precious Metal Corp. (11th Cir.); Discovery engaged in by the parties; In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. (5th Cir.); Public interest; In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig. (ED MI); Levan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (ED TN); Procedural requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. (2d Cir.); Moulton v. U.S. Steel Corp.; Vassalle v. Midland Funding LLC; Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mtg. Corp. (7th Cir.); Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by approving the class-action settlement where the direct benefits provided by the Settlement Agreement (SA) outweighed the value of plaintiffs’ claims. Several years ago, a group of dancers sued defendant-Déjà Vu and another dance club for misclassifying them in an attempt to avoid the requirements of the FLSA and the Michigan Minimum Wage Act. A settlement was reached. The current case was substantially similar. Again, a settlement was reached, including injunctive and monetary relief, and attorney fees. Four dancers (the Objectors) objected. The court applied UAW’s seven-factor test, beginning with the “most important” factor—the likelihood of success on the merits. It agreed with the district court that the direct benefits provided by the SA “outweighed the value of the Dancers’ claims.” The Objectors argued that the SA undercompensated the class. But the court held that the district court adequately reviewed the “damages model” and accounted for all available factors. The district court also considered the possibility of possible counterclaims, an “unfavorable verdict,” and the chance that plaintiffs would be forced into mandatory arbitration. The court held that it did not abuse its discretion when evaluating the SA’s provisions for injunctive and monetary relief. It rejected the claim that “the credits available through the secondary pool function as coupons that cannot be counted toward the total value of” the SA under the CAFA because “the secondary pool does not require class members to ‘hand over more of their own money’ to be eligible to redeem the benefits of” the SA. They also were not required to continue to work for Déjà Vu in order to receive compensation. The SA also offered tangible benefits in the form of injunctive relief. Considering the remaining UAW factors, the court found no “risk of fraud or collusion” as to attorney fees. In the SA’s “clear-sailing clause,” Déjà Vu agreed “‘not to object to a request’ for up to $900,000 of direct attorneys’ fees and up to $300,000 of indirect attorneys’ fees.” The Objectors argued that the fees “dwarf[ed]” the class members’ recovery. But the fees amounted to “only 20% of the combined value of the cash pool and the district court’s approximation of the value of the injunctive relief.” Further, the complexity, expense, and likely duration of the litigation factor supported the SA. The district court also did not err in its rulings as to the other UAW factors. Finally, the court rejected the Objectors’ claims that the SA violated Rule 23’s procedural requirements.
Request to modify an easement; Easement; Delaney v. Pond; Schadewald v. Brulé; Scope; Blackhawk Dev. Corp. v. Village of Dexter; Prescriptive easement; Lamkin v. Hartmeier; Heydon v. MediaOne; Mumrow v. Riddle; An easement holder’s right to use the land burdened by the easement; Department of Natural Res. v. Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc.; The fee owner’s use of the land; Cantieny v. Friebe; Maintaining the easement; Morse v. Colitti
The court held that the trial court did not err by denying in part plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief related to modifying and maintaining an existing prescriptive easement. Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief allowing them to make modifications to an easement and prohibiting defendants from interfering with their maintenance of it. The trial court held that “because the improvements were unnecessary, and only desirable or convenient because of conditions created by plaintiffs, they were not permissible.” The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred by finding they were not permitted to make these improvements because widening the cul-de-sac roadway within the boundaries of the prescriptive easement was permissible, as was “paving their driveway into the easement and installing a basketball court and water faucet” by their new garage. It agreed with the trial court that they failed to show that it was necessary to make the improvements for their “reasonable use of the easement for ingress and egress to their home, for parking, and other activities for which a residential driveway is commonly used.” While their “decision to add a second garage may have made their use of the easement less than optimal or inconvenient,” the court was “not persuaded that the trial court made a mistake when it concluded that the proposed improvements [we]re unnecessary to the effective use of the easement as granted . . . .” It also rejected their claim that the trial court erred by concluding defendants could place boulders and landscaping items on the easement because they have the unfettered right to maintain it, noting “defendants as owners of the property have rights that plaintiffs do not enjoy as easement holders.” As long as they “do not interfere with plaintiffs’ limited rights to use the easement,” they may “exercise their ownership rights through the landscaping of their property. Defendants’ property rights must be thoughtfully balanced with plaintiffs’ privilege to burden their estate.” Plaintiffs had “an obligation to maintain the roadway so that it is fit for vehicular travel and parking, as well to mow the grass as plaintiffs’ predecessor did, but defendants as the property owners have the right to landscape the property for beautification, aesthetic, and conservations purposes irrelevant to the purpose of the easement.” The court found that the placement of boulders was within the rights of defendants, but cautioned that “the boulders must not interfere with plaintiffs’ right to use the easement as granted.” Affirmed.