Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Action under 42 USC § 1983; Municipal liability; Monell v Department of Soc Servs; Morgan by Next Friend Morgan v Wayne Cnty; Whether a policy of inadequate training or supervision existed; Whether a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations existed; D’Ambrosio v Marino
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendant-county summary disposition of plaintiffs-inmates’ § 1983 claims. Plaintiffs sued defendant for injuries they sustained when their overloaded jail elevator “plummeted to the basement level[.]” On appeal, the court found there was no genuine issue of material fact that defendant “did not maintain a custom, policy, or practice of overloading jail elevators, nor did it fail to provide training and supervision for the prevention of overloading elevators.” The court could not see how the testimony established “a genuine issue of material fact that [the jail] maintained a custom or practice of overloading elevators that was clear and persistent, or of which the municipality had notice and tacitly approved at the time of the subject incident.” Nor could it “be said that testimony regarding two instances of overloading an elevator by the same individual establishes a genuine issue of material fact of ‘a clear and persistent pattern of unconstitutional conduct by municipal employees.’” Similarly, the testimony failed “to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding improper supervision or training.” Although there was testimony “that elevators would be overloaded every day in the [jail] as part of a custom and practice that supervisors were aware of,” the testifying witness “had not worked as a deputy in the [jail] for over 20 years prior to the subject incident . . . .” And the portion of another witness’s “testimony plaintiffs cite to regarding one prior instance of overloading she experienced, has not convinced us that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether [defendant] had a policy for improper training or supervision with regard to overloading elevators.” Affirmed.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) “three-strikes” rule; 28 USC § 1915(g); Crump v Blue; Whether the district court had jurisdiction to issue a clarifying order
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that the district court erred by denying plaintiff-Taylor’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis where the PLRA’s “three-strikes” rule did not apply because he only had two PLRA strikes. Taylor, a prisoner, sued several prison employees for allegedly violating his constitutional rights. He moved to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court denied his motion under the “three-strikes” rule, finding that Taylor had previously filed four lawsuits that were dismissed for being frivolous, malicious, or for failing to state a claim. It then dismissed the case when he did not pay his filing fee. He timely appealed. Nearly two months later, the district court entered a second order attempting to clarify its three-strike ruling. Taylor admitted on appeal that two of his prior cases were valid strikes. The court first considered the issue of jurisdiction. Generally, filing the appeal would end the district court’s jurisdiction. But a district court “retains limited jurisdiction to take actions ‘in aid of appeal.’” The court held that the district court did not have “jurisdiction to issue its clarifying order. In its original order,” it ruled that either one of two of Taylor’s prior suits could constitute his third PLRA strike. It reversed course in its clarifying order, asserting for the first time that a third suit, not either of the two it previously relied on, “was strike three. In doing so, the clarifying order sought to materially revise [its] earlier written decision.” Thus, this clarifying opinion was “‘null and void” and could not be considered on appeal. That left the court to consider only the two cases the district court cited in its original order. Pursuant to Crump, the court held that neither case qualified as a strike. One was dismissed based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, and dismissal on this basis “is not a PLRA strike unless a court otherwise determines that the action is frivolous or malicious.” No such finding was made in the case at issue, so that suit was not a strike. As to the other case, “for a suit to constitute a PLRA strike, a court must have dismissed ‘all of its claims’ for being frivolous, malicious, or for failing to state a claim.” The district court in the second case “dismissed at least some of Taylor’s claims—those for damages—on Eleventh Amendment grounds. So” this case also did not constitute a strike. Vacated and remanded.
Sufficiency of the evidence for an assaulting, resisting, or obstructing an officer conviction; People v Vandenberg; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request a jury instruction as to the officers’ legal authority to act
Holding that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s assaulting, resisting, or obstructing an officer conviction, and rejecting her ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court affirmed. Her arguments concerned the first and third elements of the offense. The court found that the “record, viewed as a whole,” did not support her version of events. The officer (R) “testified that defendant, despite being told multiple times to stay back, made repeated contact with him in trying to go up the stairs to reach the boyfriend, and that defendant attempted to grab at the boyfriend as he was being led down the stairs. [R] then blocked [her] from grabbing the boyfriend, and defendant shoved [R] in response. This version of events” was supported by another officer’s testimony and was “consistent with the body camera recordings that were admitted into evidence. While the boyfriend testified that he did not see defendant shove [R], his testimony on that point was admittedly uncertain and the verdict reflects that the jury did not find it credible—an assessment to which” the court had to defer. Defendant did “not meaningfully acknowledge the evidence presented at trial that she repeatedly pushed up against and then shoved [R], and she does not explain—nor do we see—why that evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, would be insufficient to satisfy the first element of the charged offense.” Further, she did not show “the evidence was insufficient to prove that [R] was performing his duties lawfully.” The court noted that she “called law enforcement to remove her boyfriend from the house that they were both in at the time.” Trial evidence showed that she “was upset and yelling, was accusing the boyfriend of attempting to take things that were hers, and was trying to grab at [him] as he was leaving. Under the circumstances, keeping the peace and ensuring the safety of all parties at the scene fell within the officers’ lawful caretaking duties,” and the court found that “the evidence amply supported the conclusion that [R] was acting consistently with those duties in seeking to prevent defendant from escalating the situation into a physical confrontation with the boyfriend.” It also determined she did not show that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing “to request an additional jury instruction on the applicable law regarding the lawfulness of her arrest.”
Sufficiency of the evidence for a first-degree premeditated murder conviction; Premeditation; People v Oros; People v Walker; Self-defense; Search of defendant’s Facebook account; Search warrant’s validity; Probable cause; Distinguishing United States v Brown (6th Cir); Particularity requirement; People v Hughes; People v Mahdi
The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict convicting defendant of first-degree premeditated murder. It also found that he was not entitled to relief based on his challenges to the search warrant for his Facebook account because even if the particularity requirement was not met, he could not establish prejudice given the other evidence against him. It concluded the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that “the elements of first-degree premeditated murder were established beyond a reasonable doubt and that the prosecution disproved self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Gas station surveillance videos, a witness’s testimony, “and statements made by defendant, showed defendant and the victim initially confronted each other when defendant was pulling out of the gas station. The victim was upset and yelled at defendant, who proceeded to exit the” vehicle he was in. After defendant got back inside his vehicle, the victim exited the vehicle he was in, “when a ‘couple of F-bombs’ were exchanged. The evidence showed that after defendant exited the gas station, he promptly returned to the parking lot using another driveway. [He] pulled to the ‘end pump to clear [his] head for a minute’ and considered his confrontation with the victim to be ‘over,’ maintaining he was not ‘thinking about [the victim].’ Defendant stated he returned to ‘warn’ the staff at the gas station about the victim and call the police. However, sometime after the first encounter, [he] took the revolver out of his vehicle’s center console and placed it in his pocket.” The court found no merit in his “contention that the victim was the aggressor during the second confrontation . . . . The evidence presented showed that defendant initiated the second confrontation by (1) electing to return to the gas station after having left and then (2) aiming the revolver at the victim.” Importantly, he “had the opportunity to avoid further confrontation with the victim by, for example, driving away and not returning to the gas station. Further, there was no evidence the victim had a gun or that defendant received any injuries. Quite simply, there was no evidence justifying the use of deadly force in self-defense by defendant.” As to his illegal search claim, even without the Facebook evidence, the “surveillance videos, the revolver recovered at the scene, and the bullets retrieved from the victim, provided ample evidence for the jury to convict” him. Affirmed.
Modification of a spousal support award; MCL 552.28; Luckow v Luckow; Modification of a child support award; MCL 552.517(1); Brendel v Morris; “Changed circumstances”; Laffin v Laffin; Security bond; MCR 2.109; In re Surety Bond for Costs; “Substantial reason”; Hall v Harmony Hills Recreation, Inc; Judicial bias; MCR 2.003(C)(1)(a) & (b)(ii); Kern v Kern-Koskela; Caperton v Massey; Reassignment to another judge; Swain v Morse
The court held that: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant-ex-husband’s motion for leave to proceed without posting bond, and (2) the trial court judge was not biased against him. During the parties’ contentious divorce proceedings, the trial court made several rulings, including ordering defendant to attend anger management and requiring him to post security. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his ex parte request to proceed with his motion to modify child and spousal support without first posting security. It was not left with a “definite and firm conviction” that the trial court erred by “rejecting defendant’s contention that plaintiff’s alleged actions to sabotage his employment in the bankruptcy field amounted to a changed circumstance that would require the [trial] court to revisit child and spousal support.” Because he “did not present the trial court with evidence of changed circumstances or new facts arising after entry of the support orders,” it did not err by “holding that his motion to modify the trial court’s orders of child support and spousal support was without merit.” The court also rejected his claim that the trial court displayed bias against him by “(1) referring him to an anger management course, (2) failing to set aside its own ideals when making certain rulings, and (3) shaming and attacking” his mental health. “[R]ather than reflecting a favoritism for plaintiff, or antagonism against defendant, the trial court’s ruling reflected a fair judgment in an effort to help the parties coparent in a more effective manner. Notably, [it] also ordered both parties to enroll in a coparenting course.” In addition, “particularly after defendant informed the trial court that he was not able to sign up for any of the anger management programs recommended by the court, the trial court’s decision to refer him to Step Forward for an anger management course in no way appeared improper.” Further, rather than “reflecting an antagonism against defendant and an intention to humiliate and shame him by having him enroll in a program for which he was ineligible, the record demonstrates that the trial court referred [him] to the Step Forward program in an effort to accommodate both [his] schedule and his financial circumstances.” Moreover, contrary to his “assertions, the record was replete with evidence of defendant’s impulsivity and his inability to control his anger, particularly toward plaintiff.” Finally, remand (and reassignment to a new judge) was not necessary. Affirmed.
Legal sufficiency of a complaint; Prima facie negligence claim; Respondeat superior; Motor vehicle owner’s liability; MCL 257.401; Failure to properly address plaintiff’s request for leave to amend his complaint; MCR 2.116(I)(5); MCR 2.118(A)(2) & (C)(1)
While the court held that defendant was properly granted summary disposition on the ground that plaintiff’s first amended complaint was legally insufficient, it concluded that “the trial court abused its discretion by failing to properly address plaintiff’s request for leave to amend his complaint.” Plaintiff asserted that he sustained a serious impairment of body function due to an accident while riding in a vehicle driven by defendant-Marina Transportation’s employee and that defendant “was vicariously liable for the driver’s negligence.” After a prior remand from the court, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition “under MCR 2.116(C)(8), but never addressed plaintiff’s request to amend his complaint.” On appeal, the court noted that his “first amended complaint indicates that he listed John Doe and Marina under the heading ‘vehicular negligence.’ Plaintiff then asserted that Marina drove the vehicle in which he rode on the day of the collision. Although Marina’s driver need not be specifically named in the complaint under the owner’s liability statute . . . Marina is correct that the complete lack of reference to negligence committed by a driver employed by Marina in the first amended complaint suggests that plaintiff failed to plead a valid negligence claim under a theory of respondeat superior.” Plaintiff also conceded that the complaint alleged “that Marina violated MCL 357.402, which does not exist.” But the court found that, regardless of any typographical errors, his claim as to MCL 257.401 asserted that Doe and Marina “are liable for vehicular negligence because they each negligently operated vehicles and left the scene of the collision. There is no mention of Marina Transportation’s employee negligently operating the vehicle, which would result in [its] liability under respondeat superior or the owner’s-liability statute.” Thus, the court held that the trial court did not err in granting Marina’s motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8). But it noted that plaintiff made his “respondeat-superior argument in everything but name—as evidenced by the fact that Marina consistently defended against [his] negligence claim by arguing that [he] could not establish a question of fact as to whether Marina’s driver was negligent.” And there was no evidence the trial court entertained plaintiff’s request to amend at all. “On remand, [it] must specifically address whether [he] should be permitted to amend his complaint.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA); Compliance with the verification & notice requirements of MCL 600.6431; Effect of a plaintiff’s compliance with the notice requirements in MCL 691.1406 (the public-building exception to governmental immunity); MCL 691.1404(2); Goodhue v Department of Transp; Fairley v Department of Corrs; Christie v Wayne State Univ; The Court of Claims Act (COCA)
The court held that “under MCL 691.1404(2)’s plain and unambiguous language, a claimant under the public-building exception” to governmental immunity (MCL 691.1406) “who complies with the notice requirements in MCL 691.1404(2) is deemed to have satisfied the notice requirement in the COCA.” Thus, it concluded the trial court erred in summarily dismissing plaintiff-Noyes’s complaint asserting a claim under MCL 691.1406 for failure to comply with MCL 600.6431. Defendant-Oakland University argued that Noyes’s claim was properly dismissed because it was undisputed that he “did not sign or verify his notice as required by MCL 600.6431(2)(d).” Noyes contended “that his compliance with the notice requirements in MCL 691.1406 constituted compliance with MCL 600.6431.” The court noted that resolving this issue turned “on the proper interpretation and application of the relevant statutory provisions.” Apart from the plain language of MCL 691.1404(2), the court found that statutory context also supported its interpretation. Reading the GTLA as a whole, it appeared “that the Legislature deliberately chose to treat claims under MCL 691.1404 and MCL 691.1406 differently from other claims under the GTLA with respect to sworn statements before litigation. That difference expressly includes deeming a notice filed under MCL 691.1404 as constituting compliance with the notice requirements in MCL 600.6431.” In reaching the opposite conclusion, the trial court primarily relied on Fairley, which concerned the motor-vehicle exception. But “unlike the public-building exception at issue in this case, the statutory language addressing notice under the motor-vehicle exception to governmental immunity, MCL 691.1405, is silent on how to proceed with a claim against the state.” Thus, the court found that Fairley was “not dispositive to the proper interpretation of the interplay between the notice requirements in MCL 600.6431 and MCL 691.1406.” It further determined that defendant’s reliance on Christie was misplaced. While “Christie states that a party suing the state must comply with MCL 600.6431, the Supreme Court also acknowledges that, by operation of law as set forth in MCL 691.1404, following the requirements of MCL 691.1404 itself constitutes such compliance.” Reversed.
Termination under § 19b(3)(b)(i); Due process; In re Rood; Right to be present at a hearing; MCR 3.972(B)(1); In re Sanborn; Use of videoconferencing; MCR 6.006(D); Children’s best interests; In re White; Anticipatory neglect; In re Kellogg; Relative placement; In re Atchley
Holding that: (1) respondent-mother was not denied due process, (2) § (b)(i) was met, and (3) termination was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed termination of her parental rights. Her rights were terminated on the basis of her untreated mental illness and her physical abuse of two of the children. The court rejected her argument that she was deprived of due process when the trial court declined to adjourn the bench trial after she had technical difficulties with her Zoom videoconferencing connection. She “was present at the bench trial via Zoom and confirmed that she could see and hear the proceedings, but indicated that she could not be heard while speaking.” The trial court “declined to adjourn the trial, stating that it did not need to hear mother unless and until she was called to testify. Mother was represented by counsel at the hearing. Counsel did not call her to testify, nor [did] she argue on appeal that she wished to testify, but was unable to do so.” Further, despite the technical problem she “had with her phone, she was able to communicate with counsel when the [trial] court placed them in a Zoom breakout room.” As such, there was no evidence that its “decision to proceed with the virtual hearing despite mother’s technical difficulties resulted in fundamental unfairness.” The court also rejected her claim that a statutory ground was not met. “Because both children suffered nonaccidental injuries while in mother’s care, there was clear and convincing evidence to establish statutory grounds for termination under” § (b)(i). Further, under “a theory of anticipatory neglect,” her abuse of two of the children was probative of how she may treat the other child “if she were to be reunited with the children.” Finally, the court rejected her contention that termination was not in the children’s best interests. The record showed her severe physical abuse of two of the children posed a significant risk of harm to them in the future. As such, the trial court found no bond existed between them. She also “suffered from untreated mental health issues, lacked suitable housing, and lacked employment. Her primary source of income came from SSDI payments.” Thus, the trial court “concluded that she would not be able to provide the children with stability, permanency, and finality in the near future.” It also found “termination was appropriate despite the children’s placements with relatives, largely based on mother’s severe abuse of” two of the children, reasoning “that a guardianship would not be appropriate for the same reason and because all three children were very young.” The record also showed that their “placements were able to care for their needs, . . . and were willing to adopt them.”