Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Waiver of jurisdiction; Statutory factors; MCL 712A.4(4); Right to a jury trial; Distinguishing Apprendi v New Jersey
The court affirmed “the order of the family division of the circuit court waiving jurisdiction in this matter to the court of general criminal jurisdiction for arraignment of respondent as an adult.” Respondent argued “that the family division incorrectly evaluated the statutory factors when determining whether to waive its jurisdiction, and” that the waiver violated his constitutional right to trial by jury. The court concluded “that the circuit court thoroughly addressed the statutory factors, including the inadequacy of programing options in the juvenile system, made findings based upon the record, and correctly gave the greatest weight to factor (a), the seriousness of the offense, and factor (c) the juvenile’s prior record of delinquency.” It further concluded “that the trial court did not err by finding that the statutory factors favored waiver, and” thus, it did not abuse its discretion by waiving jurisdiction. As to his right to trial by jury argument, he asserted “that he is likely to receive a harsher penalty if convicted as an adult than he would receive in juvenile court, and that therefore he is entitled to have the waiver determination made by jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The family division’s waiver of respondent to the criminal court, however, is not a fact. The waiver determination has no bearing on any element of the offense and is not a ‘factual determination’ that increases respondent’s penalty ‘beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.’” The court noted that he “has not yet been tried, with or without a jury, nor has he been convicted of or sentenced for any offense. The task before the family division of the circuit court was to determine whether to waive its jurisdiction over [him] in this case. The waiver of a juvenile respondent to criminal court is a procedural mechanism by which jurisdiction is transferred from the family division of the circuit court to the general criminal court; it is not a finding of any fact bearing on any element of the offense, nor is it a determination of guilt or the imposition of a sentence. By waiving its jurisdiction over respondent in this case, the circuit court did not stray into the realm of fact-finding addressed by the Court in Apprendi, nor did [it] otherwise violate respondent’s right to a jury trial on whatever charge he may face in criminal court. Rather, the circuit court followed the procedure mandated by statute when a prosecutor seeks traditional waiver of a juvenile respondent to general criminal court, which does not include a jury trial on the issue of waiver.”
Sufficiency of the evidence; Felony murder; People v Gillis; Insanity defense; Great weight of the evidence; Sentencing; Life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP); Cruel or unusual punishment; People v Taylor
The court affirmed defendant’s convictions, but reversed and remanded his LWOP sentence for resentencing consistent with Taylor. He was convicted “of first-degree murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, carjacking,” also known as felony murder; second-degree murder; and felony-firearm. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of LWOP for the crime of felony murder and 525 months to 90 years for second-degree murder. The trial court also sentenced him to two years for each of the felony-firearm convictions, to be served consecutive to the felony murder and second-degree murder sentences, respectively. As to felony murder, the court concluded that viewing “the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Gillis factors of (1) time; (2) place; (3) causation; and (4) continuity of action, reasonably support a finding that defendant murdered [victim-J] in the perpetration of a carjacking. The murder and carjacking took place within a short period of time; both crimes occurred in the same physical location; the jury could reasonably infer that defendant murdered [J] to effectuate the carjacking; and the crimes occurred in a continuous course of action (i.e., without defendant having reached a point of ‘temporary safety’ in the interim . . . .” Thus, the court concluded that sufficient evidence supported his conviction of felony murder. Defendant next argued that that Dr. W’s (Ph.D. psychologist) “testimony proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was suffering from organic schizophrenia, which made him legally insane at the time of the murders.” He essentially asked the court “to reweigh the credibility of the respective expert opinions to discount [Dr. S’s (a Ph.D. forensic psychologist)] conclusion that defendant’s legal insanity was the result of voluntary use of controlled substances in favor of [W’s] conclusion that [it] was a psychotic break caused by his first episode of emerging paranoid schizophrenia. However, ‘[i]t is the province of the jury to determine questions of fact and assess the credibility of witnesses.’” There was no basis to find S’s “testimony was without probative value or contrary to physical reality, despite defendant’s disagreement with his methods and conclusions.” The court concluded that regardless of why the jury found he “was not legally insane at the time of the murders, [his] motion for a new trial was based solely on conflicting testimony and the credibility of the expert witnesses. It was the jury’s role to evaluate the evidence, weigh the credibility of the witnesses, and make the ultimate findings of fact.” Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying his “motion for a new trial because defendant failed to show that the verdict was against the great weight of evidence.” As to the LWOP sentence, Taylor “expressly applies retroactively to cases on collateral review, and, therefore, applies to this case because defendant received a mandatory LWOP sentence, and he was 19 years old when he committed the felony murder of” J.
Right against self-incrimination; People v Dennis; Due process right to a fair trial; Sufficiency of the evidence; First-degree felony murder; Armed robbery
Concluding that (1) “defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination or his due process right to a fair trial” were not violated and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s first-degree felony murder conviction, the court affirmed. He first argued “that he was deprived of a fair trial and his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when the prosecution elicited testimony from Detective [L] at trial that defendant ‘didn’t want to talk’ when [L] met with defendant at the police station.” The court assumed “without deciding that defendant had been Mirandized and was ‘in custody’ at the time in question, thereby triggering Fifth Amendment protections.” Applying the Dennis factors here, the court first found that L’s testimony as to “defendant’s silence was short, not mentioned again by the prosecution, and defense counsel’s objection was made outside the jury’s presence.” Second, the prosecution did not attempt to use his “silence against him on cross-examination or in argument.” Third, it found “the trial court provided a strong curative instruction, which was substantively identical to the instruction in Dennis that was held to cure the error in that case.” Fourth, although defendant did testify, the record showed “that the prosecution did not refer to defendant’s silence on cross-examination.” Given these facts, the court was “not persuaded that the prosecution’s fleeting reference to defendant’s silence during its examination of [L] violated defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination or his due process right to a fair trial.” Defendant next argued “that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence for a jury to convict him of first-degree felony murder based on an underlying felony of larceny.” The prosecution alleged that he “committed armed robbery, enumerated in MCL 750.316(1)(b), under an aiding-and-abetting theory.” The court concluded “that it was reasonable for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed armed robbery under an aiding-and-abetting theory. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence demonstrated that” defendant’s brother, codefendant-S “committed armed robbery by carrying something from [victim-TS’s] vehicle, reasonably inferred to be the marijuana for the transaction, when he ran back to defendant’s vehicle after both he and defendant shot [TS], in the thigh and head, respectively.” The evidence also indicated “that defendant actively assisted and participated in the armed robbery by shooting [TS] and driving the getaway vehicle.” The court found that in “light of the video footage showing that defendant shot [TS] in the head multiple times after running up to him while [TS] tried to flee his vehicle, it was reasonable for the jury to discredit defendant’s self-defense argument and find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intended to, and did, shoot and kill [TS] during the commission of an armed robbery with” S.
Sufficiency of the evidence; First-degree felony murder; MCL 750.316; Malice; Aiding & abetting; MCL 767.39; Robbery; MCL 750.529; Torture; MCL 750.85; AWIM; MCL 750.83; Upward departure sentence; Proportionality; People v Steanhouse; Justification for an upward departure; People v Dixon-Bey; Cruel or unusual punishment; People v Taylor; Resentencing on a concurrent sentence where it was based on a legal misconception that defendant was required to serve a mandatory LWOP sentence on the greater offense; People v Turner
The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions, but that the trial court did not properly justify its upward departure as to three of the sentences. He was convicted of first-degree felony murder, armed robbery, AWIM, torture, unlawful imprisonment, and felony-firearm in the fatal and nonfatal shooting of two victims, A and H. The trial court sentenced him to life for felony murder, 30 to 45 years for armed robbery, AWIM, and torture, and 10 to 15 for unlawful imprisonment, to be served concurrently, and a consecutive 2-year term for felony-firearm. On appeal, the court found that the evidence was sufficient “to support a jury finding that defendant aided and abetted both an assault with intent to murder [H] and the first-degree felony murder of [A] by establishing [he] ‘had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that [he] gave aid and encouragement’ and that ‘the charged offense was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the intended offense.’” However, it found that the trial court erred by failing to state its rationale for its upward sentence departure for the armed robbery, AWIM, and torture convictions. “Although [it] identified a factor accounted for by the guidelines but given inadequate weight, it failed to explain why its imposed sentence was more proportionate to defendant and his conduct than a different sentence would have been, and it failed to explain the extent of its departure independent of its reasons to depart.” As such, the court vacated those sentences and remanded for resentencing. It noted it did “not foreclose the possibility that such sentences would comply with the principle of proportionality, but defendant must be resentenced under the correct legal standard and with an opportunity for the trial court to explain the sentence imposed.” Finally, in light of Taylor’s “holding that MCL 750.316’s mandatory life sentence for first-degree murder violates the . . . prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment when applied to anyone under the age of 21 at the time of” the offense, and the fact that “defendant was 19 years old at the time of” his offense, he was “automatically entitled to resentencing on his first-degree murder conviction consistent with Taylor.” And in light of Turner, the trial court may exercise its discretion to resentence him if his sentence was based on a legal misconception that he was required to serve a mandatory LWOP sentence on the greater offense. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to the scoring of OV 13; MCL 777.43(1)(c); “Pattern”; People v Carll; Sentencing; Proportionality of a within-guidelines sentence; People v Ventour; Waiver of challenge to the scoring of OVs 13 & 17
The court held that (1) defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile objection to the scoring of OV 13 and (2) he failed to show “any unusual circumstances sufficient to rebut the presumption of proportionality” accorded to his within-guidelines sentence. He was convicted of carjacking, felonious assault, third-degree fleeing and eluding, and resisting or obstructing a police officer. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 14-1/2 to 30 years for carjacking, 3 to 8 for felonious assault, 4 to 10 for fleeing and eluding, and 2 to 4 for resisting or obstructing. On appeal, the court first found that his challenges to the scoring of OVs 13 and 17 were waived. It rejected his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the 25-point score for OV 13. He asserted his carjacking, felonious assault, and resisting or obstructing “offenses arose from a single criminal act and therefore cannot establish a ‘pattern’ under” Carll. However, his “conduct involved three distinct acts: (1) attempting to stab [victim-L] with a sharp wooden dowel (felonious assault); (2) taking and driving away in [L’s] truck (carjacking); and (3) resisting a police officer during arrest (resisting or obstructing).” While they took place “close in time, they involved different conduct, legal elements, and victims. They were distinct both in nature and effect, and therefore qualify as separate crimes for” OV 13 purposes. Thus, “the trial court did not err in scoring OV 13,” making any objection futile. As to his proportionality challenge to his carjacking sentence, he did not identify any unusual circumstances. Rather, he asserted it was disproportionate because of the alleged error in scoring OVs 13 and 17, and “that the trial court improperly relied on juvenile adjudications from 2006 in sentencing him. Both contentions lack merit.” He could not circumvent his waiver of the OV scoring issue by presenting it as a proportionality challenge. And “the trial court did not reference” his 2006 juvenile adjudications in sentencing him. “Given the violent nature of the offense—a carjacking involving a dangerous weapon, a high-speed pursuit, and resistance to law enforcement—the sentence was proportionate to the offense and the offender. It fell near the lower end of the guidelines and reflected the [trial] court’s consideration of both aggravating and mitigating factors.” Affirmed.
Due process; Right against self-incrimination; Miranda warnings; People v Cortez; Validity of a Miranda waiver; People v Eliason; Renewed Miranda warnings; People v Ray; Coercion; People v Stewart; Custodial interrogation; People v Raper; Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion to suppress; Failure to file a futile motion
The court held that: (1) defendant’s statements to police “were properly admitted because he provided voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waivers of his Miranda rights when he was subject to custodial interrogation, and the evidence [did] not suggest that [his] statements throughout the investigation were involuntary or coerced”; and (2) he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. He was convicted of CSC II for sexually assaulting his daughter’s friend. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that his Miranda waiver was involuntary because the police chief made several statements that were coercive and deceptive while advising him of his rights. “Under the totality of the circumstances . . . defendant’s waiver was valid and made of [his] ‘own free and deliberate choice, rather than the product of intimidation.’” The court also rejected his claim that his inculpatory statement during the postpolygraph interview was involuntarily coerced and that he should have been issued renewed Miranda warnings after the polygraph examination concluded. “The circumstances between defendant’s valid waiver of his rights and the postpolygraph questioning did not change so seriously that his answers were no longer voluntary, and [the police chief] was not required ‘to rewarn [him] of his constitutional rights in the limited exchange that ensued immediately after the polygraph.’” The court next rejected his contention that his privilege against self-incrimination was violated because the officer failed to advise him of his Miranda rights before he made inculpatory statements. “The record does not suggest that this information was the product of an unwarned interrogation . . . .” Further, the court rejected his argument that additional statements he made were inadmissible because they were the product of his prior involuntary statements and elicited through an entire course of coercive police conduct. “This argument is meritless because, as noted above, defendant’s several waivers were valid and his inculpatory statements were voluntarily given.” Finally, the court rejected his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress his inculpatory statements based on his other claims of error. “Defendant would not have prevailed on a motion to suppress at trial because his statements to law enforcement were properly admitted.” Affirmed.
Breach of an employment contract; Whether the contract was void as against public policy; Hazel Park v Potter; Davis v Public Sch of Escanaba; Terrien v Zwit; A township board’s statutory power to select & appoint a township employee under MCL 41.75a; MCL 41.187; The Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA); MCL 15.362; McNeill-Marks v Midmichigan Med Ctr-Gratiot; Causation; “Adverse employment action”; “Employer” (MCL 15.361(b)); The “economic-reality” test; Public policy-based retaliation claim; Distinguishing Janetsky v Saginaw Cnty
Holding that plaintiff’s employment contract was void as against public policy, the court affirmed summary disposition of his breach of contract claim. It also concluded that his WPA claim against defendant-Township failed on the causation element, that he could not show an adverse employment action by defendant-former township supervisor, and that defendant-township clerk “was not an ‘employer’ or an ‘agent of an employer’ for purposes of the WPA.” Finally, finding Janetsky distinguishable, the court upheld summary disposition of his public policy-based claims. Plaintiff was formerly the Township’s general counsel and human resources director. The trial court granted defendants summary disposition of all his claims. As to his breach of contract claim, the trial court ruled that his “employment contract violated public policy under the reasoning of” the court’s decision in Potter, “because the ‘just-cause’ provision . . . improperly bound successor township boards.” He contended its reliance on Potter was error because it was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s earlier ruling in Davis. The court disagreed. “Under the rule established in Potter, plaintiff’s contract is void because it deprived the Board of its statutory power to select and appoint a township employee under MCL 41.75a.” That case was “binding precedent and analogous to the facts” here. And the court determined that the “trial court did not err by applying Potter, rather than Davis. The facts of Davis are distinguishable because that case concerned a school superintendent, rather than a township attorney, and the Court’s analysis was dependent on a statute that has since been repealed.” In addition, “Davis did not involve a ‘just cause’ termination provision, which is before us in this case, and which made plaintiff’s contract indefinite in nature in the absence of just cause.” He alternatively relied on an exception recognized in Potter, “that a contract authorized by statute is exempt from the majority rule that an employment contract that extends past the life of the board is void as against public policy.” He cited MCL 41.187 as such a statute. But “because the plain language of MCL 41.187 does not give the Board authority to enter contracts extending beyond the terms of the members, the exception does not apply.” As to his WPA claim against the Township, the vote that resulted in his termination occurred about 10 months after he distributed his memo and the “Board that actually voted to terminate plaintiff was comprised of several new members[.]” Affirmed in all respects.
Motion to change children’s domicile; MCL 722.31(4)
Given that plaintiff-mother had another motion to change domicile pending before the trial court, in lieu of deciding the merits of this appeal from the denial of her prior motion, the court remanded the case to the trial court to decide her pending motion. This appeal was from the trial court’s 12/24 decision denying plaintiff’s prior motion to change the domicile of the parties’ children. The court noted that, ordinarily, it “would decide the merits of plaintiff’s appeal at this time by addressing whether the trial court erred in its [12/24] written opinion and order denying her motion to change the domicile of the children.” But according to the trial court record before it, she filed another motion to change the children’s domicile on 4/25/25. “Some of the allegations therein are similar to the ones raised in her earlier motion, while other allegations are new. Further, according to the publicly available register of actions for this case, it appears that the trial court has not yet decided the motion notwithstanding that it would have jurisdiction to do so.” The court noted that whichever party loses in regard to the current motion may seek the court’s review of that decision, if he or she chooses. It retained jurisdiction.
Minor-guardianship proceeding; MCL 700.5204(2)(b); Appellate jurisdiction; MCR 5.801(A); In re Guardianship of Bazakis; A probate court’s authority to order visitation between a ward & his or her relatives; In re ADW; Distinguishing between the probate court’s legal authority & its subject-matter or personal jurisdiction
Holding that the probate court lacked legal authority to order and enforce sibling visitation, the court reversed and remanded. Respondents adopted the children, but their relationship with one of the children broke down and he was eventually placed in the care of petitioner, his great aunt, who sought appointment as his guardian and sibling visitation. The probate court appointed her as guardian and ordered respondents to permit and facilitate sibling visitation. On appeal, as a preliminary matter, the court found it had “jurisdiction to review whether the probate court erred by ordering enforcement of the” order. Turning to the merits, it then agreed with respondents that “the probate court abused its discretion because it lacked authority to order—and consequently, enforce—sibling visitation.” It noted that “ADW makes clear that a probate court in a minor-guardianship proceeding does not have legal authority to order sibling visitation. As such, the probate court abused its discretion when it entered an order enforcing sibling visitation” in this case. “In ADW, it is clear that this Court was concerned about the probate court’s legal authority with regard to sibling visitation, not its subject-matter or personal jurisdiction, and we conclude that this is the proper framework for assessing the issue in this case.”
Order for involuntary mental-health treatment; Request for a deferral; MCL 330.1455(6); “Person requiring treatment”; MCL 330.1401(a) & (c)
Holding that the probate court (1) did not abuse its discretion by holding a hearing despite respondent’s earlier request for a deferral and (2) did not err by finding that he “was a ‘person requiring treatment’ under MCL 330.1401(1)[,]” the court affirmed the order for involuntary mental-health treatment. The probate court recognized at the start of the hearing “that the case had originally been resolved by a deferral, but there was now a demand for hearing on the basis of noncompliance. MCL 330.1455(8) clearly allows for a hearing under these circumstances because the testimony of” a psychiatrist, Dr. D, “showed that respondent was not compliant with treatment after signing the deferral.” While respondent argued “that he complied with his treatment, [D’s] testimony established that respondent resisted increasing the dose of his medication. Respondent also did not agree with his diagnosis and refused a blood draw.” Respondent asserted that D “impermissibly relied on respondent’s mother’s claims that he would not take medication outside of the hospital, but [D] also testified that respondent himself stated several times that he would not take medication once he left the hospital. MCL 330.1455(6) requires that an individual seeking to defer a hearing ‘accept treatment as may be prescribed for the deferral period,’ and the evidence shows that respondent was not accepting treatment.” Thus, the probate “court did not abuse its discretion by holding a hearing despite [his] earlier request for a deferral.” He also took “issue with the demand for hearing form submitted in this case. While the demand for hearing form has boxes that could be checked to indicate that the individual refuses to accept treatment or that the individual orally demanded a hearing, neither box was checked.” The probate “court reasoned, under these circumstances, that the hospital’s designee inadvertently failed to check the box indicating that the individual refused to accept treatment.” Its reasoning proved correct when D “testified at the hearing that respondent had refused treatment (which was why a hearing was demanded following the request for deferral).” The court also held that respondent’s “threats, in combination with testimony about [his] paranoia, delusional thinking, and labile or unstable mood, established a reasonable expectation of harm to himself or others[.]” As a result, the probate “court did not err by finding that respondent qualified as a person requiring treatment under MCL 330.1401(1)(a).” There was also sufficient evidence that he “was not complying with recommended treatment.” Thus, the probate court did not err by determining that he “also qualified as a ‘person requiring treatment’ under MCL 330.1401(1)(c).”
Wrongful death settlement & distribution; MCL 600.2922(5) & (6); “Fair & equitable”; Lack of an evidentiary hearing; Personal Representative (PR)
Finding no errors warranting reversal, the court affirmed the order approving a wrongful-death settlement and distribution of proceeds and granting the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. Decedent-Evelyn was survived by her husband, appellant, and appellees – her sisters Black (the PR/plaintiff) and Annette, and her father. The issue related “to the distribution of damages reached through a settlement between plaintiff and defendants.” The court concluded “that the trial court’s award of proceeds to Black and Annette was adequately supported by the record.” It noted that appellant “conceded in the trial court and on appeal that Black and Annette are entitled to settlement proceeds.” The appropriate inquiry was “whether appellant was properly excluded from the distribution of settlement proceeds based on his relationship with Evelyn.” The court was “not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake when it excluded appellant from the award of settlement proceeds.” The trial court found that based “on the couple’s pending divorce and the lack of evidence that Evelyn wished to reconcile with appellant before she died, the . . . proposed distribution was fair and equitable. Contrary to appellant’s arguments, this determination was supported by the evidence.” The court determined that “the record supported the trial court’s conclusion that there was no evidence of ‘concrete overt steps’ taken by Evelyn towards reconciliation.” It found “that the trial court properly ‘assess[ed] the type of relationship [Evelyn] had with [appellant] in terms of objective behavior as indicated by the time and activity shared and the overall characteristics of the relationship,’ when it approved the settlement and distribution of proceeds.” In addition, under MCL 600.2922(6), the trial court “properly considered what was ‘fair and equitable, under all the circumstances’ by noting that appellant already recovered proceeds outside of the wrongful-death action, namely, Evelyn’s life-insurance proceeds in the amount of $100,000. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err when it granted plaintiff’s motion.” Further, it did not err in declining to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
Negligence; Whether plaintiffs established that defendant had a duty to protect a student from sexual assaults; Whether plaintiffs showed defendant’s conduct was “outrageous” to support a state claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); Whether plaintiffs established a claim for sex discrimination under Michigan’s Elliott Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); MCL 37.2102(1) & 37.2401
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ (Villareal and Chen) state-law claims relating to sexual assaults perpetuated by other students while attending defendant-Hillsdale College, holding that plaintiffs failed to show that Hillsdale owed them a duty to protect them from assault. Two Hillsdale College students, who alleged they were sexually assaulted by other students, sued Hillsdale for state-law negligence, IIED, and discrimination after they became dissatisfied with Hillsdale’s investigative and disciplinary response. The student that assaulted Chen was apparently not punished for his actions and remained at the school. Villarreal’s assailant was “put on social probation, required to do community service, and suspended indefinitely from the baseball team.” However, the College would not expel him “because, during the incident, he eventually ‘stopped’ when Villarreal told him to.” Villarreal countered that “she had never consented in the first place.” Her assailant was also allowed on the baseball team the next season. The court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss. It first considered whether the district court erred by dismissing plaintiffs’ state negligence claim. It explained the necessary elements of a Michigan negligence claim, the first of which is whether Hillsdale owed plaintiffs a duty to prevent sexual assaults committed by other students. It noted that Michigan does not impose a duty to protect against a third-party criminal act, and that there was neither a “dependent relationship” between parties, nor were the assaults “foreseeable.” Thus, Hillsdale had no duty to protect plaintiffs under Michigan law. The court declined to certify the case for review before the Michigan Supreme Court where the plaintiffs filed their case in federal court and then sought state remedies. It then considered their IIED claim under Michigan law and found they failed to show the “‘extreme and outrageous’” conduct necessary to support a claim for IIED under Michigan law. Plaintiffs’ last claim was for sex discrimination under the ELCRA, “which prohibits both ‘private and public schools from discriminating against individuals on the basis of sex.’” However, it found they failed to establish a prima facie case under both “disparate treatment” and the “disparate impact” theories.
Lease dispute; Whether property is personal property or a fixture; Ottaco, Inc v Gauze; Department of Transp v Gilling; Assignment of rights; Burkhardt v Bailey; Distinguishing Davidson v Crump Mfg Co; Tenant by sufferance; Marks v Corliss’ Estate; Premature dismissal; Peterson Novelties, Inc v City of Berkley
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendant summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff sued defendant alleging claim and delivery, statutory conversion, and common-law conversion, arising out of a lease it signed with non-party IDIG, which leased the property from non-party Birnbaum. The trial court dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that “the trial court erred in several ways when it granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition.” First, plaintiff’s “argument that the master lease favored [its] position is not convincing. Even if the [alterations] provision did define the property at issue as personal property rather than alterations or fixtures, plaintiff fails to acknowledge that it was not a party to the master lease, but was rather an unauthorized subtenant. Plaintiff was not an assignee of IDIG’s rights under the master lease or otherwise entitled to enforce the provisions of the master lease against defendant.” In addition, the “master lease provision clearly indicates that all of the tenant’s rights to property on the premises would end at the lease’s expiration unless it was removed prior to that time.” The master lease, compared to the lease in Davidson, was “much less specific about the tenant’s entitlements, but did specifically provide that unremoved property would be treated as abandoned and therefore subject to the landlord’s retention.” Second, whether “plaintiff was an unauthorized subtenant or an unauthorized assignee, it did not acquire any rights under the master lease and was not a tenant who came ‘rightfully into possession of land by permission of the owner.’ Although it does appear that plaintiff may have been wronged in this situation, plaintiff has not established that any of the fault lies with defendant. In any event, because plaintiff has not established that it was a tenant by sufferance, the trial court did not err by not declining to treat plaintiff as such.” Third, while plaintiff theorized “that Birnbaum and defendant negotiated behind the scenes to purchase the premises and deprive plaintiff of its personal property, and that discovery could have uncovered evidence supporting that theory,” this theory was “mere conjecture.” Affirmed.
Termination under § 19b(3)(b)(i); Child’s best interests; In MJC; In re White
The court held that the trial court did not clearly err in finding (1) that § (b)(i) was established and (2) that terminating respondent-father’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests. Thus, it affirmed the termination order. The child “testified that she was sleeping in her bed at respondent’s home when she awoke to [him] digitally penetrating her vagina. Her mother testified that” the child initially stated “that someone had touched the inside of her vagina, and . . . later identified respondent as the perpetrator. The mother also noted that [the child] had become withdrawn, depressed, and anxious after respondent began exercising parenting time. [The child] made similar disclosures to her school counselor and a forensic interviewer, both of whom testified at the termination hearing. [Her] therapist, who was qualified as an expert in childhood development and therapy, testified that [the child] disclosed in sessions that respondent had touched her while she was asleep. The therapist did not believe that [she] had been coached to fabricate the allegations, noting that [she] exhibited symptoms consistent with sexual abuse trauma and that children who are coached typically do not display such indicators. Two drawings [the child] made in therapy depicting the alleged abuse were also admitted into evidence. Given that record, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that respondent sexually abused [the child] and that there was a reasonable likelihood of harm if she were returned to his care.” He argued that her “testimony that the sexual abuse occurred while she was asleep ‘raises the question of whether she was even conscious, and whether she was perhaps dreaming.’ But [she] testified that she awoke to find [him] touching her vagina, resolving any such question.” While he also emphasized “that he was not criminally charged,” the court noted the “absence of criminal charges does not undermine the trial court’s findings under” § (b)(i). As to the child’s best interests, even if the trial court had erred in considering the lack of a parent-child bond here, “the remaining evidence—including [the child’s] trauma, her therapist’s opinion, and the nature of respondent’s conduct—would still support [its] best-interests determination.” Further, in the absence of a bond between respondent and the child, his “relationship with his other daughters does not meaningfully affect the best-interests analysis.”
Termination of parental rights; Reasonable reunification efforts; In re MJC; Service plan; In re Atchley; A parent’s responsibility to engage in the services offered; Child’s best interests; Parent-child bond; Relative placement; In re Olive/Metts Minors
Holding that the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, and that termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interests, the court affirmed the trial court’s termination order. Her rights were terminated on the basis of substance abuse, physical abuse, and neglect. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the DHHS failed to make reasonable reunification efforts. “The DHHS updated the case service plan five times over the course of the proceedings, and the trial court repeatedly ordered respondent to comply with and benefit from it. Nevertheless, respondent declined to participate in many of the services offered and failed to complete or benefit from the few she did attend. Her refusal to engage does not negate the DHHS’s reasonable efforts to provide reunification services.” To the extent the trial “court observed that ‘not a lot of steps were made,’ that statement does not amount to a legal finding that the DHHS failed to fulfill” its duties. “Reasonable efforts do not require exhaustive efforts. That additional services might have been available does not mean the services provided were insufficient. At both termination hearings, the trial court found that the DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, and the record supports those findings.” The court also rejected her claim that termination was not in the child’s best interests. Although the trial court acknowledged a strong parent-child bond, “it found that the bond had weakened over time. Respondent’s failure to comply with her case service plan, along with the overall evidence of abuse and neglect, likewise supported termination.” Further, the child “was thriving in his current placement, which provided the permanency, stability, and finality he needed.” And a “juvenile guardianship was not a viable alternative because [the] maternal grandparents were not willing to participate in such an arrangement.” The remaining factors considered by the trial “court, viewed together, supported its conclusion that termination was in” the child’s best interests.