Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Scope of the “reasonable & good faith belief” requirement of a Title VII retaliation claim; Title VII’s opposition clause; Wasek v Arrow Energy Servs, Inc; Montell v Diversified Clinical Servs, Inc; Admission of evidence of plaintiff’s sexual history & preferences; Applicability of FRE 412; Exception to Rule 412 for civil cases (FRE 412(b)(2)); Morristown-Hamblen Hospital Association (MHHA)
The court held that the “district court correctly interpreted Title VII’s retaliation provision to include inquiry into [plaintiff-]Graf’s reasonable and good-faith belief that she had been subjected to unwanted sexual conduct.” Further, the district court did not err in admitting limited “evidence of her sexual history and predisposition.” Thus, the court affirmed the jury verdict for defendant-former employer (MHHA, a hospital) on her Title VII retaliation claim. Plaintiff asserted that “during a lunch break and on hospital grounds, one of the hospital’s security guards” (nonparty-O] raped her. Following a limited investigation into her complaint, an MHHA “HR representative determined that the sexual interaction between Graf and [O] had been consensual. Shortly thereafter, MHHA terminated Graf on the grounds that she had violated” its policies. On appeal, she first argued that the district court misinterpreted Title VII and the court’s case law in ruling “that an individual’s belief in the veracity of their underlying sexual-assault claim is an essential element of a Title VII retaliation claim.” The court disagreed. Reviewing its case precedent, it concluded “Graf did not need to prove to the jury that the conduct she reported to [O’s] supervisor, and eventually to an HR representative, was, as a legal matter, a rape. But Graf was required to demonstrate her reasonable and good-faith belief that [O’s] conduct violated Title VII. And MHHA was entitled to introduce evidence rebutting Graf’s alleged good-faith belief in the purported violative conduct she had reported, including evidence that [she] had consented to the sexual encounter, because such evidence was directly relevant to the reasonableness of Graf’s belief in whether Title VII prohibits that conduct.” While the court found that the district court “did not err as a matter of statutory interpretation[,]” it cautioned that, to be relevant, evidence that a “complainant believed the alleged sexual misconduct was consensual . . . must be narrowly tailored to the complainant’s own belief in the consensual or nonconsensual nature of the alleged misconduct.” Turning to plaintiff’s evidentiary argument, the court held that “the district court committed no reversible error in admitting certain categories of evidence falling outside of the scope of Rule 412.”
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC § 2241; Whether First Step Act (FSA) credits can reduce a petitioner’s supervised release term; 18 USC § 3632(d)(4)(C) & § 3624(g); Guerriero v Miami RRM (Unpub 11th Cir); “In custody” on supervised release; In re Stansell; Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
Addressing an issue of first impression, the court held that because FSA time credits can shorten only a prisoner’s incarceration, not a term of supervised release, petitioner-Hargrove’s release to supervision mooted his § 2241 petition. Hargrove claimed the BOP wrongly denied him FSA credits. He was released from custody to supervised release while the case was pending on appeal. The court first rejected the government’s threshold “custody” argument, noting the Sixth Circuit has “consistently found that ‘individuals subject to supervised release in the federal system[] satisfy the “in custody” requirement’ to bring a habeas claim.” However, it found the dispute was moot because credits cannot reduce supervised release. Reading § 3632(d)(4)(C) with § 3624(g), the court explained that credits are applied “toward time in prerelease custody or supervised release” by enabling the BOP to transfer an eligible prisoner to begin supervision earlier, not by reducing the supervision term itself. It concluded that FSA credits cannot be used to reduce a supervised-release term, and when a prisoner earns credits “toward” supervised release, he moves “in the direction” of supervised release. The court aligned with the 11th Circuit’s view that credits “reduce a prisoner’s incarceration time” rather than supervised release time. Because Hargrove was already on supervision, any ruling on credits would not afford “effectual relief,” so the case was moot. Dismissed.
Other acts evidence admitted under MCL 768.27b; People v Berklund; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Closing argument comments; Whether defense counsel conceded defendant’s guilt; Failure to make a futile objection; Lay witness opinion testimony; MRE 701 & 704; Prejudice
The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting other acts evidence under MCL 768.27b, and rejected defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Thus, it affirmed his first-degree felony murder and first-degree child abuse convictions. The victim was defendant’s then-girlfriend’s four-year-old son. The “trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce evidence of two prior acts of domestic violence by defendant under MCL 768.27b, both involving his ex-girlfriend.” The incident at issue on appeal occurred in 12/19. While this “act of domestic violence was against his ex-girlfriend rather than a child in defendant’s care, it demonstrated defendant’s propensity for committing acts of violence against individuals with whom he lived when he became upset with them. At trial, the prosecution presented ample testimony indicating that the victim often had bathroom-related accidents, that defendant had previously become upset with the victim and punished him for having a bathroom-related accident, and that the victim had a bathroom-related accident shortly before he was fatally injured. There were no witnesses to the incident that resulted in the victim’s fatal injuries,” and the other acts “evidence was probative of whether defendant did, in fact, commit an act of violence against the victim. While the propensity inference from this evidence was certainly damaging to defendant, that inference weighed in favor of the evidence’s admission under the statute, and” he failed to show “the evidence was otherwise unfairly prejudicial such that it should not have been admitted.” As to his ineffective assistance claims, while he was correct “that defense counsel may not concede a defendant’s guilt during closing argument without their consent,” the court found it “clear from the record that defense counsel did not do so in this case.” Defendant also did not show that the “testimony of the victim’s mother and the investigating detective” that he contended defense counsel should have objected to “amounted to an impermissible opinion on his guilt of the charged offenses, or that counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to it.” The court added that, even if it “were to conclude that defense counsel performed deficiently in any or all of the ways” defendant claimed, he “failed to establish prejudice warranting relief.”
Whether a charge under 18 USC § 2421 (transportation of an individual to engage in criminal sexual activity) was time-barred; Applicability of § 3282(a) or § 3283; United States v Noveck; Applicability of a “categorical approach”; “Sexual activity” & “sexual abuse”; Sufficiency of the indictment; Exploitation of a child (§ 2251(a)); Sufficiency of the evidence; Intent; The jurisdictional element of § 2251; Whether photos & videos constituted “sexually explicit conduct” (§ 2256(2)(A)(i)–(v)); Possession of child pornography (§ 2252A); “Material”; Committing sexual exploitation of a child while a registered sex offender (§ 2260A); Sentencing; Enhancement based on prior state convictions; § 2251(e); “Child” & “minor”
The court held that: (1) defendant-Deakins’s charge for violating § 2421 was not time-barred; (2) the indictment sufficiently alleged this count as well as counts for exploitation of a child; (3) the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions on all five charged counts; and (4) the district court did not err in applying a sentencing enhancement based on his prior state convictions. The case arose from defendant’s sexual abuse of three boys. He was convicted of transportation of an individual to engage in criminal sexual activity, exploitation of a child, possession of child pornography, and committing sexual exploitation of a child while a registered sex offender. He first argued that the count for violating § 2421 was time-barred by “§ 3282(a), which imposes a five-year default statute of limitations on non-capital federal crimes.” The government argued that instead, limitations § 3283 governed. This “displaces § 3282(a)’s five-year default when the offense is one ‘involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18.’” The primary support for defendant’s argument was a 1926 Supreme Court decision, Noveck. The court noted that it knew “of no case in the last three-quarters of a century in which the Court has applied something like a ‘categorical approach’ to determine the correct statute of limitations.” However, it concluded that, even assuming Noveck’s approach applied, Deakins’s argument failed. “Noveck held that perjury was not an offense ‘involving the defrauding or attempts to defraud the United States’ because ‘the alleged purpose to defraud the United States [was] not an element of the crime . . . on which the indictment [was] based.’ . . . Here, by contrast, intended sexual abuse is a necessary ingredient of the trafficking charge. So, even if Noveck’s approach applies here, Deakins’s offense was one ‘involving’ child ‘sexual . . . abuse.’” As a result, § “3283 applies, and the government’s charging of Count One was timely.” As to his indictment challenges, “Count One was constitutionally sufficient. It tracked the language of § 2421 and listed each element.” Further, it gave factual details on when (11/98 to 6/20), “where (Tennessee and elsewhere), and against whom (C.C.) the offense was committed. Those details were sufficient to ‘inform the accused of the specific offense.’” The child exploitation counts (Two and Three) “tracked the statutory language verbatim, which is generally sufficient.” In addition, “the indictment included factual details regarding when (2006 to 2007; [6 to 9/2018]), where (Tennessee), and against whom (B.A.; J.G.) the offenses were committed. Thus, [it] in fact described ‘a particular criminal act’ rather than merely ‘a type of crime.’” Affirmed.
“Right of access”; 2000 Baum Family Trust v Babel, The Driveway Act; MCL 247.324; Smith v Edwards; Quiet title; Adverse possession; Acquiescence; Nuisance per se; Trespass
The court held that under “the circumstances, the trial court did not err by examining the competing burdens on the parties and ruling that the driveway did not interfere unlawfully with plaintiffs’ access to” the road (Cantley Road) or other property rights. Also, the trial court did not err by ruling for defendants on plaintiffs’ adverse possession, acquiescence, and nuisance per se claims or on defendants’ trespass counterclaim. The case involved “defendants’ installation of a concrete driveway, which plaintiffs argue encroached on their property, crossed over about 40% of their property frontage, and went into the public road.” Plaintiffs own lakefront property on the road, which they purchased in 6/92. Defendants own an adjacent property, which they purchased in 2000. Plaintiffs first argued “that the trial court erred by failing to recognize that defendants’ driveway encroached on their rights to” the road. They contended “that the trial court erred by examining the degree of the burden that the driveway placed on plaintiffs instead of simply examining whether an encroachment existed at all.” The central issue was whether plaintiffs’ rights to “the reversionary interest to the center of the public” road and to access their home from the road “supersede defendants’ right to reasonable and convenient access to their property from the public road.” As it related “to plaintiffs’ right to access their property from the public road, plaintiffs do not cite any law that grants them a complete right of access to Cantley Road along their entire frontage without any exception.” Rather, the court noted “there is a right to access the road—not a right to a completely unobstructed frontage.” There was “no dispute that plaintiffs have an unobstructed access point to Cantley Road through their own driveway.” The court held that “like the situation in Smith, there was no evidence that the driveway interfered with plaintiffs’ rights to access the public road, considering that [they] had access to the road and could not expand on that access by building a second (or circular) driveway on their property.” The trial court did not err by holding “that the driveway did not interfere with plaintiffs’ right to access the street.” Further, considering the “facts, the trial court did not err by concluding that the driveway was necessary to allow defendants reasonable access to their property from the public road. To the extent that the driveway interfered with plaintiffs’ reversionary interest to the center of the road, the [trial] court did not err by finding that this interest was outweighed by defendants’ competing interest in reasonable access to their property.” Affirmed.
No-contest plea to the statutory grounds for jurisdiction & termination; Principle that the trial court must inform a respondent of the consequences of his or her plea, MCR 3.971(B)(4); In re Pederson; Individualized best-interests determination; In re White; Ineffective assistance for failing to call mothers as witnesses; In re Lovitt; Anticipatory neglect inference; In re Mota
The court held that respondent-father’s challenges to his no-contest pleas, the best-interests determination, and the effectiveness of trial counsel lacked merit and affirmed termination of his parental rights. His rights to his five children were terminated after one of them, SLHP, disclosed sexual abuse. Respondent had entered no-contest pleas to jurisdiction and statutory grounds, which the trial court accepted before conducting a best-interests hearing and terminating his parental rights. On appeal, the court first found that his no-contest pleas were made with “sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” There was no outcome-determinative error. The court also rejected his challenge to the best-interests findings, emphasizing that “[t]he focus of the best-interests inquiry is on the child, not the parent,” that the trial court considered safety, trauma to SLHP, placements with the mothers, permanency and stability, bonds and preferences, and that anticipatory neglect allowed it to infer risk to the siblings. “On this record, the trial court’s individualized findings were adequate, and its best-interests determination was” not erroneous. Finally, the court rejected his ineffective-assistance claim premised on counsel’s failure to call the mothers, finding no factual predicate, reasonable strategy given the evidence and the likelihood some mothers would not support respondent, and no prejudice because he “failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome had the mothers testified directly.” Affirmed.