Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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“Legacy claims” for U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) farm-lending discrimination under § 22007(e) of the Inflation Reduction Act; Eligibility criteria deeming applications alleging only discrimination against deceased individuals “facially ineligible”; Challenges under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA); “Arbitrary, capricious [or] an abuse of discretion”; 5 USC § 706(2)(A); Whether Congress gave the USDA discretionary authority to accept claims based on discrimination faced by deceased farmers; “Compensation” versus “assistance”; Statutory right to inherit property on the “same” basis as other U.S. citizens (42 USC § 1982); Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause claim
The court held that plaintiffs (collectively referred to as the Farmers) were not entitled to bring “legacy claims” under a program to address discriminatory USDA farm-lending practices because Congress did not give the USDA discretion to accept those claims. The court further found that its “reading of § 22007(e) creates no conflict with § 1982” and that their claim under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause also failed. The Farmers sued defendant-USDA, challenging its policy of disallowing applications to one of its programs filed on behalf of deceased relatives (legacy claims). The program (the Discrimination Financial Assistance Program) was created by § 22007(e) of the Inflation Reduction Act and was enacted to provide financial aid to farmers who were discriminated against in the USDA’s farm-lending programs. The program established eligibility requirements. Its Validation Review Guide provided: “Applications ‘[r]eport[ing] only discrimination against an individual who was deceased at the time of the application’ were deemed ‘facially ineligible.’” The Farmers sought to have the district court issue a preliminary injunction forcing the USDA to accept their legacy claims under the APA and Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that the “statute required the USDA to accept applications from living farmers only.” The court agreed that “the Program may not accept claims made on behalf of deceased farmers[,]” explaining that “a deceased farmer is not engaged in an activity that money can help complete, nor does the farmer suffer any need that money can help relieve. Money, in short, cannot ‘assist[]’ a deceased farmer.” Rather than “assistance,” as provided for in § 22007(e), the Farmers were seeking “compensation’ for past harm to deceased farmers[.]” As the USDA “could not have accepted claims made on behalf of deceased farmers,” the Farmers were not entitled to relief under the APA. The court also rejected their § 1982 argument, finding that “§ 22007(e) impairs no one’s right to inherit property.” They forfeited their Fifth Amendment claim, and the court noted that they had “no due-process-protected property interest in the ‘benefit’ program created here, given that the governing statute . . . affords them no ‘claim of entitlement to th[at] benefit.’” Affirmed.
Petition for a writ of habeas corpus; MCR 3.303(B); People v McCager; Whether nonhuman animals (chimpanzees) are eligible for habeas corpus relief; Ten Hopen v Walker; Appellate jurisdiction over a denial of habeas relief; MCL 600.308(1) & (2)(c); MCR 7.202(6) & 7.203(A); Triplett v Deputy Warden; In re Brock; People v Fairman
Finding that it had jurisdiction to hear this appeal, and holding that chimpanzees are not “persons” eligible for habeas corpus relief, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of habeas relief to plaintiff-nonprofit animal welfare organization. Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of seven chimpanzees at defendant-private zoo, seeking their transfer to a sanctuary. The trial court summarily denied the petition on the basis that nonhuman animals are not “persons” for habeas purposes. On appeal, the court first resolved a longstanding split and found that it had jurisdiction to hear the case as of right, explaining that the Legislature’s 2016 amendments incorporate “the Supreme Court’s definition of ‘final judgment’ by reference” and thus, “a trial court’s denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is appealable as of right.” Turning to the merits, the court held that habeas protects a right of personal liberty reserved to legal “persons,” and at common law that category did not include animals. The “chimpanzees are animals, and as the common law authorities all make clear, animals—including wild animals, such as these chimpanzees—are treated as property.” The court cited settled Michigan authority that dogs “‘are the property of the owner as much as any other animal which one may have or keep.’” The court also rejected plaintiff’s request to change the common law, noting that only the Supreme “‘Court has the authority to overrule one of its prior decisions,’” and that “‘such a significant departure from Michigan law should only come from our Supreme Court[.]’”
Prosecutorial misconduct; Telling the jury that a nontestifying codefendant identified defendant as his accomplice; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to safeguard defendant’s right to a fair trial; Failure to object to evidence on Confrontation Clause grounds; Distinguishing People v Washington; Comparing People v Chambers; Failure to object during the prosecution’s opening statement & closing argument; Bruton v United States; People v Bruner
Concluding that prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel denied defendant-Ivey his right to confrontation and a fair trial, the court reversed his convictions and remanded for a new trial. He was convicted of AWIM, carjacking, armed robbery causing serious injury, receiving and concealing a stolen motor vehicle, and felony-firearm. During his opening statement the assistant prosecutor (H) informed the jury that another man involved in the crime (W) “identified Ivey as his accomplice during a police interrogation.” During H’s “closing and rebuttal arguments, he again informed the jury that [W] had named Ivey as his accomplice.” Ivey’s identification as the accomplice was the sole issue at trial. Ivey claimed that his trial attorney’s “representation was deficient because he failed to object to” an officer’s (JH) testimony about what a gas station owner told JH on Confrontation Clause grounds. Ivey compared this case to Washington. The court concluded that this case was distinguishable “because the statement at issue—that a suspect was at the liquor store on [10/23/19]—was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted.” Similar to Chambers, JH’s “challenged testimony was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted—that at least one of the suspects was at the liquor store on” 10/23/19. Rather, it was offered to explain why he and another officer reviewed “surveillance video. The testimony was also admitted to lay the foundation for the still shots of the video, admitted as prosecution exhibits 5, 6, and 7. Because the communication from the gas station employees was not admitted for its truth, the evidence did not violate Ivey’s Confrontation Clause rights,” and failing to object to it did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Ivey next asserted ineffective assistance of counsel based on “failing to object when [H] told the jury during his opening statement and closing argument that [W] identified Ivey as his accomplice.” The court agreed and also concluded that H’s comments constituted misconduct because H knew that W “would not be testifying at trial and told the jury that [W] had implicated Ivey notwithstanding that evidence regarding [W’s] statement would constitute hearsay and be inadmissible on Confrontation Clause grounds.” The court held that while H’s “statements to the jury did not constitute evidence, his comments . . . had the same effect as if evidence of [W’s] statements had been admitted as evidence. [H] told the jury outright what he could not establish with evidence because doing so would constitute hearsay and violate Ivey’s right to confront” W. Finally, it found that there was “a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for [defense counsel’s] deficient handling of the matter.”
Right to a speedy trial; People v Williams; Motion to suppress postarrest statements as involuntary; People v Stewart; A detective’s threats; Harmless error; Jail credit; MCL 769.11b; People v Idziak; People v Prieskorn
The court held that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss based on his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Further, the record supported the trial court’s rejection of several of his claims related to his motion to suppress his postarrest statements. While some statements should have been suppressed due to threats, reversal was “not warranted because the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Finally, Idziak and Prieskorn foreclosed his claim as to jail credit. He was convicted of armed robbery, carrying a weapon with unlawful intent, and felony-firearm. As to his right to a speedy trial, given the 27-month delay, the first Williams factor weighed in his favor, but the court found that the presumption of prejudice was “rebutted after considering the remaining factors.” Concerning the second factor, the reason for the delay, his trial was initially scheduled for 1/7/20 and later adjourned to 3/24/20. Consistent with directives related to the COVID-19 pandemic, it “was repeatedly adjourned until [9/7/21], when a final pretrial was held and a November trial date was scheduled.” While he asserted that some adjournments were not adequately explained, “the register of actions reflects that the postponements were largely at the behest of the trial court due to pandemic restrictions. The remainder of the adjournments have not been shown to be unexplained or inexcusable such that they should be meaningfully attributed to the prosecution.” The assertion of the right factor weighed in defendant’s favor. But as to the fourth factor, there was “no identifiable prejudice to his defense arising from the delay.” As to his cited “personal hardships,” the court noted that “‘anxiety alone cannot establish a speedy-trial violation’” and the fact he did not “accrue jail credit in this case was a consequence of” his parole status, not the delay. As to his motion to suppress, his “education, intoxication, and physical condition did not overbear his will or render his statements the product of coercion.” While the court found that all statements from a point in the interrogation forward should have been excluded due a detective’s threats, “by that point, defendant had already made” several inculpatory admissions. Given those “admissions and the unequivocal eyewitness testimony, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have convicted him even without the erroneously admitted statements.” Affirmed.
Motion for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) findings; In re Velasquez; 8 USC § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 CFR § 204.11; Juvenile’s best interests; MCL 722.23 & 710.22(g); Standard of proof; Appointment of a foreign language interpreter; MCR 1.111; In re Guardianship of DRRR
While the trial court applied the correct preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, the court held that it abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for SIJ findings. The court made the predicate factual findings relevant to the juvenile’s (DARL) SIJ status and determined that she satisfied the criteria. Thus, it vacated the trial court’s order denying petitioner’s motion for SIJ status and remanded for entry of the court’s special findings as to DARL’s SIJ status. On appeal, the court first rejected petitioner’s claim that the trial court erred in rescheduling the “motion hearing due to interpreter unavailability, instead of allowing a virtual language interpreting service.” It noted that in contrast to DRRR, while the trial court here “initially failed to procure an interpreter, [it] took care to conduct the SIJ hearing with the requisite interpreter and make its determinations before DARL reached the age of majority. Therefore, any initial failure to secure an interpreter at DARL’s SIJ hearing did not deny her meaningful access to justice.” As to the denial of the motion for SIJ findings, the court looked to the SIJ status criteria and found a preponderance of the evidence established “that: (1) DARL was declared dependent upon the State of Michigan Kent Circuit Court by virtue of guardianship proceedings, resulting in the appointment of petitioner as her temporary guardian until DARL reached 18 years of age; (2) DARL’s reunification with her father is not viable because of her father’s neglect, abuse, and abandonment of DARL; and (3) DARL’s best interests would not be served by returning to her country of origin, Guatemala.” The court concluded a preponderance of the evidence showed “DARL’s father neglected and abused DARL and her mother,” to the extent that they fled from him. It was “definitely and firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake by finding that reunification with DARL’s father was viable.” Further, because the statute only requires “that reunification with one parent is not viable,” the court’s findings as to the father were “sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement.” It also concluded that, whether “‘using the child custody factors, adoption factors, or a combination of factors,’ a preponderance of the evidence supports our finding that it is not in DARL’s best interests to return to Guatemala.” Finally, the court found “that the trial court made an error of law when it determined that the SIJ process was not intended for minors like DARL.”
Subject-matter jurisdiction; A circuit court’s appellate jurisdiction; MCR 7.103; Court of Appeals jurisdiction over a circuit court order; MCR 7.203(A)(1); Abandonment of an issue; Berger v Berger; Board of Water & Light (BWL); Administrative Procedures Act (APA)
The court held that “the circuit court correctly determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s appeal of a fellow circuit court judge’s order granting defendant summary disposition of” his claims. According to defendant-city, plaintiff filed a complaint against it in 2018, challenging the actions of its BWL. The circuit court apparently dismissed that action. Plaintiff then initiated a second action against defendant in 8/24, which was also dismissed. Rather than file a claim of appeal, plaintiff appealed to another judge in the circuit, who dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. “It is this order from which plaintiff has appealed,” not the 8/24 order summarily disposing of plaintiff’s claims. “Nevertheless, both parties have directed their appellate arguments to the merits of the summary disposition order,” which was not before the court. “Consequently, plaintiff has abandoned any argument that the circuit court erred when it determined it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over” his appeal. “Regardless, the circuit court did not err when it dismissed plaintiff’s appeal.” As the circuit “court reasoned, a circuit court’s appellate jurisdiction is governed by MCR 7.103, which grants jurisdiction over an appeal of right to a circuit court from a final judgment or order of a district or municipal court, a final order or decision of an agency governed by the” APA and a “final order or decision of an agency from which an appeal of right to the circuit court is provided by law, MCR 7.103(A)(1) to (3), none of which apply here. Instead, under MCR 7.203(A)(1),” this court “has jurisdiction over an appeal of right from a final order of the circuit court, like the” 8/24 summary-disposition order. Affirmed.
Class certification; FedRCivP 23(b)(3); Whether the class members had standing; TransUnion LLC v Ramirez; Breach of contract as a “concrete injury” for standing purposes; Whether undergoing appraisals mooted their claims; Whether the putative class satisfied the Rule 23(a) requirements; Whether the named plaintiff’s claims were “typical” of the class; Adequate class representative; “Predominance” prong of Rule 23(b)(3); Superiority; Rule 23’s implicit “ascertainability” requirement
The court held that the district court did not err by certifying the class in this case for contract breach. It rejected defendant-State Farm’s argument that the putative class members lacked standing, concluding that “even without a claim of damages, breach of contract is a concrete injury in fact for standing purposes.” It also found that the class satisfied all seven prerequisites under Rule 23. Plaintiff-Clippinger was in an accident, and her car was a total loss. She initiated this class action, challenging State Farm’s method of calculating the “actual cash value” of a vehicle. State Farm contended that her “breach of contract claim stemming from the alleged underpayment in the initial valuation had been resolved by” payment after an “appraisal, and thus her action could no longer be maintained.” The district court certified a class made up of State Farm-insured Tennessee plaintiffs. Relying on TransUnion, State Farm argued that the putative class lacked standing because “a purported breach which does not ultimately lead to damages cannot be a breach in the first place—and thus no injury has occurred.” But the court explained that this was not a “standing argument” but was instead “a theory of the contracts at issue in the case,” going to the actual merits. The court held “that private rights created by valid contracts between private parties are the kind of rights that have traditionally been cognizable in American courts.” It further found that to “the extent State Farm argues that Clippinger lacks standing only after appraisal, its argument is based on mootness and not standing.” It noted that State Farm did “not make a mootness argument and likely would not prevail if it had.” Turning to Rule 23(a)’s requirements, the court rejected State Farm’s argument “that Clippinger’s claims are not typical of the class because, after undergoing appraisal, her individual case is no longer affected by any erroneous initial valuation.” It concluded she was “still a member of the class because she is still seeking a finding of liability for the same alleged breach as the rest of the class.” As to Rule 23(b)’s requirements, the court found that “State Farm’s predominance arguments are unsuccessful for similar reasons as are its typicality arguments.” Further, the court upheld the district court’s determination that a class action in this case “is superior to other forms of litigation or resolution.” And State Farm did “not contest ascertainability on appeal.” The court affirmed the certification order and remanded for further proceedings.
Negligence action arising from a horse-drawn carriage accident; Immunity under the Equine Activity Liability Act (EALA); Amburgey v Sauder; MCL 691.1663; MCL 691.1665; “Participant” in an equine activity; MCL 691.1662; Statutory interpretation; Manuel v Gill
Holding that a passenger on a horse-drawn carriage is “engaging in an equine activity” for purposes of the EALA, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendants based on EALA immunity. Plaintiff was injured when riding in a horse-drawn carriage after one of the horses bolted and the carriage driver had to steer into a lamp post to stop the runaway. She argued on appeal that as a passenger in the carriage, she did “not qualify as a ‘participant’ in an equine activity as defined under the EALA.” After reviewing the statutory provisions and case precedent, the court considered the issue of “whether a passenger on a horse-drawn carriage is ‘[e]ngage[d] in an equine activity’ for purposes of the EALA.” Among other things, it noted that “the statutory definition of ‘engaging in an equine activity’ includes the act of ‘being a passenger upon’ (MCL 691.1662(a)).” It found it significant “that the term ‘equine’ in this context is grammatically associated with the subsequent clause, regarding ‘providing or assisting in veterinary treatment of an equine.’ Therefore, ‘being a passenger upon’ does not narrowly apply only to individuals physically seated on an equine.” As a result, it found “that ‘being a passenger upon’ encompasses those riding in a horse-drawn carriage.” It determined that this interpretation aligned with the “Legislature’s comprehensive definition of what constitutes engagement in equine activities under the EALA, as well as” its prior decision in Amburgey and the Supreme Court’s holding in Manuel. Thus, the court concluded plaintiff failed to show the trial court erred in granting defendants summary disposition based on the EALA’s immunity provisions.