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Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.

 

 

Case Summary

Includes a summary of one Michigan Supreme Court order under Criminal Law.


Cases appear under the following practice areas:

  • Attorneys (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Family Law

    e-Journal #: 74148
    Case: Gafford v. Gafford
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam - Stephens, Sawyer, and Beckering
    Issues:

    Whether attorney fees were ordered on equitable grounds without making any findings that the fees were incurred or reasonable; Reed v. Reed; MCL 552.132; MCR 3.206(D); Smith v. Khouri; Pirgu v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n; Parenting-time modification; Whether the trial court made sufficient factual findings as to proper cause or change in circumstances (CIC), an established custodial environment (ECE), & the best-interest factors; Vodvarka v. GrasmeyerShade v. Wright; MCL 722.28

    Summary:

    Holding that the trial court erred by failing to address any of the three required factors on the record, the court vacated the award of attorney fees and remanded. It also found that the trial court’s findings were sufficient to support that there was proper cause or CIC under the Vodvarka or Shade standard. But it committed legal error by failing to make a determination as to whether an ECE existed, and this "was not harmless because such a finding determines what burden of proof applies to the best-interests analysis.” Thus, the court remanded. Plaintiff argued that the trial court appeared to order her to pay the $2,000 in attorney fees on equitable grounds without making any findings that the fees were incurred or reasonable. The court agreed. “When determining whether to award attorney fees resulting from a party’s misconduct, a trial court must consider three factors: (1) whether unreasonable conduct occurred, (2) whether the attorney fees awarded were incurred due to this unreasonable conduct, and (3) whether the fees incurred were reasonable.” The trial court failed to address any of the these factors.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Criminal Law (2)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 74218
    Case: People v. Wines
    Court: Michigan Supreme Court ( Order )
    Judges: McCormack, Viviano, Bernstein, and Cavanagh; Concurring in part, Dissenting in part – Markman and Zahra; Concurrence – Clement
    Issues:

    Sentencing; The trial court’s authority at a resentencing for first-degree murder pursuant to MCL 769.25a & Miller v Alabama to consider defendant’s arguments as to his armed robbery & kidnapping sentences; People v. Turner; Whether a trial court must consider the “distinctive attributes of youth” such as those discussed in Miller where the prosecution does not seek a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP)

    Summary:

    In an order in lieu of granting defendant leave to appeal as cross-appellant, the court reversed part of the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 67375 in the 3/12/18 edition for the published opinion), holding that the trial court had authority at his resentencing for his first-degree murder conviction pursuant to MCL 769.25a and Miller to consider his arguments about his armed robbery and kidnapping sentences. It disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that these arguments were beyond the scope of his appeal. The court remanded the case to the trial court to consider his arguments as to the validity of his robbery and kidnapping sentences and to “exercise its discretion to resentence him for those convictions, in particular ‘if it finds that the sentence[s] [were] based on a legal misconception that the defendant was required to serve a mandatory sentence of life without parole on the greater offense.’” The court denied the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal because it was not persuaded that it should review the question presented.

    Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Markman (joined by Justice Zahra) agreed with the decision to reverse the part of the Court of Appeals judgment addressing defendant’s arguments on his armed robbery and kidnapping sentences and to remand to the trial court for consideration of whether to resentence him for those convictions. But they dissented from the decision to deny the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal, which argued “that the Court of Appeals erred by holding that the trial court must consider the ‘distinctive attributes of youth, such as those discussed in’” Miller where the prosecution is not seeking a LWOP sentence. They would have granted leave to appeal because they were inclined to agree with the prosecution, “and because there are significant consequences for our juvenile justice system[.]”

    Concurring in the order to deny the prosecution leave to appeal, Justice Clement concluded that “the Court of Appeals decision below stands for the unremarkable principle that traditional penological goals should guide a trial court’s sentencing discretion and that the age of a particular defendant may affect the analysis of those traditional penological goals.” She respectfully disagreed with the prosecution and the dissenting-in-part justices that the holding represented an extension of Miller “into term-of-years resentencing under MCL 769.25(4) and MCL 769.25a(4)(c).”

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 74151
    Case: People v. Carter
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam - Boonstra, Markey, and Fort Hood
    Issues:

    Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request a jury instruction on consent as a defense to CSC I; Trial strategy; Whether defendant was denied due process when the charges from both assaults were joined & he was tried jointly; Plain error review; People v. Carines; People v. Traver; MCR 6.120

    Summary:

    Holding that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, and was not denied due process when the charges from both assaults were joined and he was tried jointly, the court affirmed his convictions. The case involved “sexual assaults that occurred at the same location, but on different dates and against different individuals.” Defendant argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on consent as a defense to CSC I. The evidence did not support a jury instruction on consent as to either of the assaults. “Both victims testified that, even though they initially met with defendant for the purpose of at least possibly exchanging money for sex, they immediately sought to leave after entering the house. The evidence indicated that defendant prevented both victims from leaving the house by use of weapons and physical force.” Further, it indicated that he forced them “to engage in multiple sexual acts. Both victims testified that they did not want to engage in the acts, and they both testified that they complied out of fear. The mere idea that the victims might have been open to engaging in sexual acts at one time—without more—simply does not support the necessity of a jury instruction on consent.” Thus, defense “counsel did not err by failing to request such an instruction.” Moreover, the court noted that “the trial court did instruct the jury that in order to convict defendant of the CSC I charges, it had to find that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant engaged in sexual penetration while he was armed with a weapon, or led a victim to reasonably believe that he was armed with a weapon.” The evidence established that he “did indeed engage in sexual penetration while armed with a weapon. Even if the jury had been instructed on consent as a defense, it is not reasonably probable that a different result would have occurred.”

    Full Text Opinion

  • Family Law (2)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Attorneys

    e-Journal #: 74148
    Case: Gafford v. Gafford
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam - Stephens, Sawyer, and Beckering
    Issues:

    Whether attorney fees were ordered on equitable grounds without making any findings that the fees were incurred or reasonable; Reed v. Reed; MCL 552.132; MCR 3.206(D); Smith v. Khouri; Pirgu v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n; Parenting-time modification; Whether the trial court made sufficient factual findings as to proper cause or change in circumstances (CIC), an established custodial environment (ECE), & the best-interest factors; Vodvarka v. GrasmeyerShade v. Wright; MCL 722.28

    Summary:

    Holding that the trial court erred by failing to address any of the three required factors on the record, the court vacated the award of attorney fees and remanded. It also found that the trial court’s findings were sufficient to support that there was proper cause or CIC under the Vodvarka or Shade standard. But it committed legal error by failing to make a determination as to whether an ECE existed, and this "was not harmless because such a finding determines what burden of proof applies to the best-interests analysis.” Thus, the court remanded. Plaintiff argued that the trial court appeared to order her to pay the $2,000 in attorney fees on equitable grounds without making any findings that the fees were incurred or reasonable. The court agreed. “When determining whether to award attorney fees resulting from a party’s misconduct, a trial court must consider three factors: (1) whether unreasonable conduct occurred, (2) whether the attorney fees awarded were incurred due to this unreasonable conduct, and (3) whether the fees incurred were reasonable.” The trial court failed to address any of the these factors.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 74157
    Case: Wood v. Goodale
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam - Stephens, Sawyer, and Beckering
    Issues:

    Custody & parenting time; Liberman v. Orr; Johnson v. Johnson; Michigan’s Child Custody Act; Motion to change custody; MCL 722.27(1)(c); Proper cause of a change in circumstances (CIC); Vodvarka v. Grasmeyer; Corporan v. Henton; Personal protection order (PPO)

    Summary:

    The court held that because the facts alleged in defendant-father’s “motion for modification of custody and parenting time failed to establish the threshold requirement of proper cause or a material [CIC] to warrant a reexamination of the previous custody order,” the trial court properly denied his motion for lack of a factual basis to revisit the custody issue. It also properly declined to conduct “an evidentiary hearing on the threshold issue of proper cause or [CIC] because such a hearing is generally not required.” Thus, the court affirmed the custody order because the trial court did not err or make findings of fact against the great weight of the evidence. The father argued, among other things, that “the trial court erred by denying his motion to modify custody and parenting time without an evidentiary hearing and without making any factual findings regarding the existence of proper cause or a [CIC], despite the allegations” in his motion supporting such findings. He claimed that the following events supported a proper cause or a CIC determination: (1) plaintiff-mother continuously obstructed his “ability to exercise reasonable parenting time” and (2) she had a dysfunctional relationship with another man. He asserted that plaintiff committed misconduct as to custody arrangements by denying him reasonable parenting time and limiting his contact with the “child to one hour of supervised visitation each week. However, ‘minor allegations of contempt or visitation complaints’ are insufficient to establish proper cause" or a material CIC warranting reevaluation of a child custody order. Further, even if the trial court took his allegations that plaintiff’s “relationship with another man was dysfunctional or that mother had a history of anxiety and panic attacks as true, these bald assertions alone without any explanation regarding how those facts had ‘or could have a significant effect on the child’s life’ were insufficient to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that proper cause for a reevaluation of custody existed.” Similarly, he did not “explain how his ability to exercise parenting time was inhibited” by a PPO. In fact, he admitted that the mother facilitated visits between him and the child at the “father’s house before the default judgment was entered and continued to do so on a regular basis for a couple months before making arrangements for supervised parenting visits as required by the default judgment.” Thus, his allegations as to the PPO also failed to establish proper cause or a material CIC.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Insurance (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Negligence & Intentional Tort

    e-Journal #: 74178
    Case: Ramenaden v. Olds
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Boonstra, Markey, and Fort Hood
    Issues:

    Auto negligence; Third-party action under the No-Fault Act (MCL 500.3101et seq.); MCL 500.3135(1); “Serious impairment of body function”; MCL 500.3135(5); McCormick v. Carrier; Exclusion of evidence plaintiff attended independent medical exams (IMEs) conducted by doctors retained by a defendant but neither defendant called them to testify; Relevance; MRE 401 & 402; Principle that a party should not be bound by the rejected opinions of experts hired to help evaluate the case; Kissel v. Nelson Packing Co.; Distinction between the adverse-presumption jury instruction & suggesting to the jury an inference should be made based on that party’s interpretation of the evidence; Ward v. Consolidated Rail Corp.; Barringer v. Arnold; Reetz v. Kinsman Marine Transit Co.; Troyanowski v. Kent City; Kubisz v. Cadillac Gage Textron, Inc.

    Summary:

    While plaintiff was correct that he should not be prohibited from arguing that defendants’ failure to call certain witnesses (doctors who conducted IMEs) “could give rise to an inference that” they were adverse to defendants’ case, the court held that his mere attendance at the IMEs was irrelevant to the McCormick factors. The inference he sought to present to the jury was impermissible. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence that he attended the IMEs conducted by doctors retained by defendant-Olds. Plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to admit into evidence that he attended the two IMEs but neither defendant called the doctors to testify. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that whether plaintiff attended two IMEs “that were not substantively introduced into evidence was irrelevant to” the McCormick factors. There was no connection between his mere attendance at medical exams that would make the existence of any of the McCormick “prongs more or less probable absent the examinations being substantively introduced in some manner or form, and plaintiff was clear before the trial court that he had no intention to either call the examining physicians to testify or otherwise seek introduction of their reports into evidence.” While defendants relied on case law on the adverse-presumption jury instruction, the court noted that there is a difference between the instruction “and a party’s ability to merely suggest to the jury that an inference should be made on the basis of that party’s interpretation of the evidence.” Plaintiff was correct that in general, a party is “permitted to comment on another party’s failure to produce certain evidence[.]” However, he sought to make his attendance at the IMEs more relevant by also introducing the fact that the doctors who conducted them were retained by Olds. “This is not a permissible practice.” The court noted he argued that the value of the evidence stemmed “directly from the fact that the medical examiners were originally retained by defendant, which is itself evidence that would have been inadmissible.” The court concluded that the fact he attended two IMEs “had little to no bearing on the question of whether plaintiff sustained a serious impairment of body function.” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Litigation (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 74166
    Case: Pogue v. Principal Life Ins. Co.
    Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
    Judges: Thapar, Sutton, and Readler
    Issues:

    Issue preclusion; Herrera v. Wyoming; J.Z.G. Res., Inc. v. Shelby Ins. Co.; Effect of an alternative holding in a related case that the court did not consider on appeal; Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 27, cmt. o.; Jennings v. Stephens

    Summary:

    The court reversed the district court, holding that it erred by giving preclusive effect to a prior alternative holding in a related case that the court had not considered. Plaintiff-Pogue, a doctor, submitted claims to his two long-term disability insurance providers, Northwestern Mutual and defendant-Principal Life Insurance Company. However, he neglected to mention that Tennessee had suspended his medical license. Pogue sued both companies, alleging contract breach and other claims. The district court granted summary judgment for Northwestern in Pogue I, ruling that (1) Pogue was suspended before he became disabled or, in the alternative, (2) his suspension contributed to his disability (a severe anxiety disorder). The court in Pogue I affirmed on the first ground, and did not consider the second. In this case against Principal, the district court applied issue preclusion in granting Principal summary judgment based on the district court’s alternative ruling in Pogue I—"that the suspension of Pogue’s license contributed to his disability.” Pogue appealed, arguing that “the district court erred by giving preclusive effect to an alternative holding on which this court declined to opine.” The court agreed. It relied on the Restatement’s position that “‘once an appellate court has affirmed on one ground and passed over another, preclusion does not attach to the ground omitted from its decision.’” Thus, the issue not considered in Pogue I—whether his suspension contributed to his anxiety disorder—could not be given preclusive effect. Reversed and remanded.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Negligence & Intentional Tort (2)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under School Law

    e-Journal #: 74150
    Case: Davis v. Flint Cmty. Schs.
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam - Stephens, Sawyer, and Beckering
    Issues:

    Governmental immunity; Tellin v. Forsyth Twp.; Principle that the operation of a public school is a governmental function; Stringwell v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch. Dist.; The public-building exception to governmental immunity; MCL 691.1406; Renny v. Department of Transp.; Reardon v. Department of Mental Health; Whether the bench lid that caused the child’s injury was poorly maintained in relation to the room’s purpose as a special education classroom; Bush v. Oscoda Area Schs.; Gross negligence; MCL 691.1407(1) & (8)(a); Maiden v. Rozwood; Tarlea v. Crabtree; Vermilya v. Dunham

    Summary:

    The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendants-school and teacher summary disposition of plaintiff-mother’s claim. Plaintiff sued defendants on behalf of her six-year-old son with autism who was injured when his hand was caught in a bench lid that he had been holding open. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendants on the basis of governmental immunity. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the public-building exception to immunity applied. “Because plaintiff did not provide any evidence to suggest that the bench lid used to have a safety device that had fallen into disrepair, the lack of a safety device is a design defect.” It also rejected her claim that there was a material question of fact as to gross negligence “because reasonable minds could not determine that defendant teacher acted with willful disregard of precautions or safety.” She took precautions “by instructing the students not to open the bench lids and by not opening the bench lids in front of the students.” Although she could have closed the lid herself, her decision to instruct plaintiff’s son “to close the lid did not indicate an almost reckless disregard of safety, because her instruction to not enter the bench and to close the bench lid demonstrated her concern for his safety as she attempted to make him stop playing with the bench and the bench lid.” The mere fact that she “could have done more by walking over to the bench lid and closing it herself does not prove gross negligence.” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Insurance

    e-Journal #: 74178
    Case: Ramenaden v. Olds
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam – Boonstra, Markey, and Fort Hood
    Issues:

    Auto negligence; Third-party action under the No-Fault Act (MCL 500.3101et seq.); MCL 500.3135(1); “Serious impairment of body function”; MCL 500.3135(5); McCormick v. Carrier; Exclusion of evidence plaintiff attended independent medical exams (IMEs) conducted by doctors retained by a defendant but neither defendant called them to testify; Relevance; MRE 401 & 402; Principle that a party should not be bound by the rejected opinions of experts hired to help evaluate the case; Kissel v. Nelson Packing Co.; Distinction between the adverse-presumption jury instruction & suggesting to the jury an inference should be made based on that party’s interpretation of the evidence; Ward v. Consolidated Rail Corp.; Barringer v. Arnold; Reetz v. Kinsman Marine Transit Co.; Troyanowski v. Kent City; Kubisz v. Cadillac Gage Textron, Inc.

    Summary:

    While plaintiff was correct that he should not be prohibited from arguing that defendants’ failure to call certain witnesses (doctors who conducted IMEs) “could give rise to an inference that” they were adverse to defendants’ case, the court held that his mere attendance at the IMEs was irrelevant to the McCormick factors. The inference he sought to present to the jury was impermissible. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence that he attended the IMEs conducted by doctors retained by defendant-Olds. Plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to admit into evidence that he attended the two IMEs but neither defendant called the doctors to testify. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that whether plaintiff attended two IMEs “that were not substantively introduced into evidence was irrelevant to” the McCormick factors. There was no connection between his mere attendance at medical exams that would make the existence of any of the McCormick “prongs more or less probable absent the examinations being substantively introduced in some manner or form, and plaintiff was clear before the trial court that he had no intention to either call the examining physicians to testify or otherwise seek introduction of their reports into evidence.” While defendants relied on case law on the adverse-presumption jury instruction, the court noted that there is a difference between the instruction “and a party’s ability to merely suggest to the jury that an inference should be made on the basis of that party’s interpretation of the evidence.” Plaintiff was correct that in general, a party is “permitted to comment on another party’s failure to produce certain evidence[.]” However, he sought to make his attendance at the IMEs more relevant by also introducing the fact that the doctors who conducted them were retained by Olds. “This is not a permissible practice.” The court noted he argued that the value of the evidence stemmed “directly from the fact that the medical examiners were originally retained by defendant, which is itself evidence that would have been inadmissible.” The court concluded that the fact he attended two IMEs “had little to no bearing on the question of whether plaintiff sustained a serious impairment of body function.” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

  • School Law (1)

    Full Text Opinion

    This summary also appears under Negligence & Intentional Tort

    e-Journal #: 74150
    Case: Davis v. Flint Cmty. Schs.
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam - Stephens, Sawyer, and Beckering
    Issues:

    Governmental immunity; Tellin v. Forsyth Twp.; Principle that the operation of a public school is a governmental function; Stringwell v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch. Dist.; The public-building exception to governmental immunity; MCL 691.1406; Renny v. Department of Transp.; Reardon v. Department of Mental Health; Whether the bench lid that caused the child’s injury was poorly maintained in relation to the room’s purpose as a special education classroom; Bush v. Oscoda Area Schs.; Gross negligence; MCL 691.1407(1) & (8)(a); Maiden v. Rozwood; Tarlea v. Crabtree; Vermilya v. Dunham

    Summary:

    The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendants-school and teacher summary disposition of plaintiff-mother’s claim. Plaintiff sued defendants on behalf of her six-year-old son with autism who was injured when his hand was caught in a bench lid that he had been holding open. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendants on the basis of governmental immunity. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the public-building exception to immunity applied. “Because plaintiff did not provide any evidence to suggest that the bench lid used to have a safety device that had fallen into disrepair, the lack of a safety device is a design defect.” It also rejected her claim that there was a material question of fact as to gross negligence “because reasonable minds could not determine that defendant teacher acted with willful disregard of precautions or safety.” She took precautions “by instructing the students not to open the bench lids and by not opening the bench lids in front of the students.” Although she could have closed the lid herself, her decision to instruct plaintiff’s son “to close the lid did not indicate an almost reckless disregard of safety, because her instruction to not enter the bench and to close the bench lid demonstrated her concern for his safety as she attempted to make him stop playing with the bench and the bench lid.” The mere fact that she “could have done more by walking over to the bench lid and closing it herself does not prove gross negligence.” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

  • Termination of Parental Rights (2)

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 74159
    Case: In re Garrett/Spears/Garrett-Robertson
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam - Meter, Shapiro, and Riordan
    Issues:

    Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), & (j); Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Rood; A respondent’s responsibility to participate in the services that are offered; In re Frey; Infant mental health (IMH); Family reunification program (FRP)

    Summary:

    Holding that the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, the court affirmed termination of respondent-mother’s parental rights. Her parental rights were terminated because she “did not have housing, failed to maintain consistent contact with her case workers, and failed to cooperate with the terms of the reunification.” On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify her with her children because it did not assist her with housing. It noted that the record showed the DHHS provided her “with numerous resources, including parenting classes, individual therapy, IMH services, FRP services, a parent partner, and visitation with her children.” The record also showed she “received housing resources and assistance throughout the proceedings from her case workers and FRP workers.” However, respondent failed to participate in the services offered. “Throughout the proceedings, [she] was often uncooperative, refused assistance when offered resources, and failed to inform workers where she was living, which in turn, prevented the workers from being able to assist her.”

    Full Text Opinion

    Full Text Opinion

    e-Journal #: 74156
    Case: In re LM
    Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
    Judges: Per Curiam - Stephens, Sawyer, and Beckering
    Issues:

    Termination based on release or consent; MCL 710.29(7); Adjudication as a court ward pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b) of the Juvenile Code (MCL 712A.1 et seq.); “Statement to Accompany Release”; MCL 710.29(6); Validity of a release or consent executed in accordance with the law at the time of execution; MCR 3.801(B); Principle that a parent may execute a release before either a judge or a referee; MCL 710.29(1); Requirement that a release be accompanied by a verified statement containing certain information prescribed by statute & signed by the parent; Whether the release was knowingly & voluntarily made; In re Burns; Requirement that the trial court enter a termination order upon the execution of the release; MCL 710.29(8); Principle that a parent’s change of heart alone is not a ground to set aside a release that is otherwise knowingly & voluntarily made after proper advice of rights is given; In re Curran

    Summary:

    The court held that the trial court did not err by terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights to her child. The child was adjudicated a court ward. A supplemental petition was later filed to terminate respondent’s parental rights. At the termination hearing, she elected to release her parental rights and signed a release along with a “Statement to Accompany Release.” On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the trial court erred by terminating her rights because it failed to ensure that her decision to release her rights was knowingly and voluntarily made and because there was no evidence to support its determination that the release was in the child’s best interests. “The trial court advised [her] of the nature of her parental rights and informed her that by executing the release, she would be voluntarily and permanently relinquishing those rights.” She indicated that she “understood the nature of the proceedings, that she wanted to ‘[r]elease [her] rights,’ and that she had an opportunity to speak with her attorney.” The trial court specifically asked her “whether she was signing the release knowingly and voluntarily and she clearly and unequivocally answered in the affirmative.” Her release was valid “because it was ‘executed in accordance with the law at the time of execution.’” Further, the trial court complied with the best interests requirement “by specifically stating that the release was ‘in the best interest of the child at this time.’” She failed to identify “any facts or circumstances indicating that the trial court’s determination was incorrect.” Affirmed.

    Full Text Opinion

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