Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Standing; “Disappointed bidder”; Perkins v Lukens Steel Co.; 42 USC §§ 1981 & 1983; Whether corporations can allege a claim of racial discrimination under § 1981; Whether plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to plead its § 1981 claims of race or intentional discrimination; Municipal liability; Monell v Department of Soc Servs; Whether a consulting firm was a “state actor”; Whether plaintiff sufficiently alleged its due process & equal protection claims; Inner City Contracting (ICC); Fleis & Vandenbrink (F&V)
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] In an issue of first impression in this circuit, the court held that “a corporation can satisfy statutory standing under § 1981” and that a corporation alleging it was not awarded a contract based on race “clearly falls within the zone of interests protected by the statute.” And it reversed the district court's ruling that plaintiff-ICC lacked standing to sue defendant-Township and its consulting company, defendant-F&V. The Township solicited a bid for building demolition. ICC, a minority-owned business, submitted the lowest bid. The next lowest (almost $1 million higher) was made by a white-owned business (nonparty-A). The Township hired F&V to review the bids and make a recommendation. F&V recommended A. Claiming F&V’s reports were inaccurate, ICC sued it and the Township in state court for constitutional, statutory, and Michigan law violations. The case was removed to federal court, where defendants successfully moved to dismiss. On appeal, the Township argued that as a “disappointed bidder,” ICC did not have standing to assert its federal claims. The court disagreed, holding that its claim was “not merely that of a disappointed bidder alleging issues with the bidding rules. ICC alleged racial discrimination, a claim seeking to vindicate its own rights rather than those of the public.” The complaint alleged “ICC suffered a cognizable injury when it lost a lucrative award and profits as a result of alleged racial discrimination[,]” i.e., both dignity and financial harm. The court next concluded corporations can allege a claim of racial discrimination under § 1981, noting that nearly “every federal court of appeals has allowed corporations to allege racial discrimination, and none have established a contrary rule.” Defendants contended “ICC did not allege sufficient facts to plead their § 1981 claims because [it] did not plead its race or intentional discrimination in the complaint.” The court disagreed, determining “ICC met its preliminary burden.” But the Township was correct that ICC’s claims against it were improperly brought “under § 1981 rather than § 1983.” As to the § 1983 claims, ICC failed to meet its burden to show “F&V is a state actor under the nexus test. Since F&V is not a state actor, it cannot be liable under § 1983, and ICC’s claims against F&V under § 1983 were properly dismissed.” In addition, it was “unable to hold the Township responsible for claims under § 1983 because of its failure to sufficiently plead Monell liability.” Further, it did not “properly allege its equal protection and due process claims.” The court reversed in part the order dismissing ICC’s claims for lack of standing and its claim against F&V under § 1981, affirmed in part the dismissal in all other respects, and remanded.
Sentencing; People v Posey; People v Johnson; People v Stewart
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 76658 in the 1/4/22 edition) to the extent it was inconsistent with its decision in Posey, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Posey. It denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed.
Sentencing; Proportionality & reasonableness; People v Posey
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 76112 in the 9/15/21 edition) to the extent it was inconsistent with the court’s decision in Posey. It remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Posey. The court denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining questions presented.
Sentencing; People v Posey; People v King
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 76241 in the 10/5/21 edition) to the extent it was inconsistent with the court’s decisions in King and Posey. It remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of King and Posey. The court denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining questions presented.
Sentencing; Proportionality; People v Posey
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 76005 in the 8/24/21 edition), the court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it was inconsistent with its decision in Posey, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Posey. In all other respects, leave was denied because the court was “not persuaded that the remaining question presented should be reviewed by this Court.”
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 75819 in the 7/20/21 edition) to the extent it was inconsistent with the court’s decision in Posey. It remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Posey. The court denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining questions presented.
Sentencing; People v Posey; People v Stewart
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 76430 in the 11/16/21 edition) to the extent it was inconsistent with its decision in Posey, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Posey. It denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed.
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal #76669 in the 1/10/22 edition), the court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it was inconsistent with its decision in Posey, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Posey. In all other respects, leave was denied because the court was “not persuaded that the remaining question presented should be reviewed by this Court.”
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 76020 in the 8/27/21 edition) to the extent it was inconsistent with its decision in Posey, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Posey. It denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed.
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 75095 in the 3/26/21 edition) to the extent it was inconsistent with its decision in Posey, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Posey. It denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that the remaining questions presented should be reviewed.
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal #76284 in the 10/18/21 edition), the court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for reconsideration in light of Posey.
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal #74857 in the 2/22/21 edition), the court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it was inconsistent with its decision in Posey, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Posey. In all other respects, leave was denied because the court was “not persuaded that the remaining question presented should be reviewed by this Court.”
Sentencing; People v Posey
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 74765 in the 2/12/21 edition) to the extent it was inconsistent with the court’s decision in Posey. It remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Posey. The court denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining questions presented.
Jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal a restitution order
Holding that it did not have jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal the restitution order, the court dismissed this appeal. In 2014, defendant pled no contest to one count of larceny of a vehicle causing damage. “The trial court imposed a sentence of time served plus 60 months’ probation. [It] also tentatively set restitution at $13,624, and then increased it to $70,439 after a restitution hearing.” In 2022, he pled guilty to violating his probation. The trial court revoked probation and sentenced him to serve 20 to 60 months. He appealed the 2014 restitution order by leave granted. Although it was undisputed that he timely challenged the 5/22 order as it related “to the revocation of probation, the issues raised in this appeal concern only the 2014 restitution order.” Defendant argued that the court “has jurisdiction to consider his challenges to the 2014 restitution order because ‘the restitution order is a subordinate part of the underlying judgment of sentence.’” The court disagreed. His “new criminal conduct occasioned revisiting his status as a probationer or prisoner, but had no bearing on the issue of restitution.” He remained “responsible to fulfill the order of restitution from his 2014 sentence; that facet of his sentence was not obviated or supplanted by the 2022 sentence for his probation violation.” Thus, the court dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Medical malpractice; Discovery of the existence of a claim; MCL 600.5838a(2); Fraudulent concealment; MCL 600.5855; MCL 600.5838a(3); Sills v Oakland Gen Hosp; Negligence in supervision & vicarious liability; Cox v Flint Bd of Hosp Managers; Res judicata; JAM Corp v AARO Disposal, Inc; Leave to amend; MCR 2.118; Weymers v Khera
The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendants-doctor (Adeyemo) and health system (Oakwood) summary disposition of plaintiffs’ medical malpractice claim. Plaintiffs initially sued various doctors and medical facilities for medical malpractice. They later sought leave to amend to add Dr. Adeyemo, but the trial court denied the motion. Plaintiffs then filed a separate complaint against defendants. The trial court ultimately granted summary disposition for defendants, finding the action was time barred and that plaintiffs could not claim fraudulent concealment. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition for defendants because they "fraudulently concealed a cause of action against Dr. Adeyemo, thus extending the time for filing” suit. Based on the record, “it cannot be said that plaintiffs had no cause to believe they might have a claim against Dr. Adeyemo at the time their claims accrued in [1/17], which could have reasonably been included in the 2019 complaint. Thus, we are inclined to conclude that the two-year statute of limitations barred plaintiffs’ second complaint.” In addition, “regardless of how one looks at the evidence here, the fact remains that Dr. Adeyemo’s involvement in [plaintiff-patient’s] treatment and his potential liability for [his] injuries were obvious from the very beginning.” Plaintiffs could have discovered the claim against Dr. Adeyemo as early as 1/17. Further, “the statute of limitations has also expired with regard to plaintiffs’ claim against Oakwood.” Their claim against Oakwood was “predicated on the argument that Oakwood failed to properly select and train its agents, including Dr. Adeyemo. Since plaintiffs’ claims against Dr. Adeyemo are barred by the two-year statute of limitations, agency principles dictate that plaintiffs’ claims against Oakwood are also barred.” Moreover, res judicata would also bar their claim against Oakwood, which “was decided on the merits and disposed of before” they filed the second complaint. And they “knew or should have known they had a claim against Dr. Adeyemo.” As such, they could have brought the current “claim against Oakwood, which relates to their responsibility for Dr. Adeyemo’s actions, in the 2019 complaint.” Finally, there was “no dispute that both actions involved the same parties.” Affirmed.
Trip & fall; Open & obvious danger; Kandil-Elsayed v F & E Oil, Inc; Pinsky v Kroger Co of MI
In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated Part III.B of the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 76817 in the 1/26/22 edition), and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Kandil-Elsayed and Pinsky. The court denied leave to appeal in all other respects because it was not persuaded that it should review the remaining question presented.
Right against self-incrimination; Distinguishing In re Blakeman; Finding that a parent failed to benefit from services; Plain error review; Child’s best interests; In re Sanborn
Concluding Blakeman was not dispositive here, the court held that the trial court’s requirement that respondent-father admit to sexually abusing his stepdaughter “did not constitute plain error affecting his substantial rights.” The court also found no clear error in the trial court’s determination that he did not properly benefit from services or in its finding that terminating his parental rights was in his child’s best interests. Thus, it affirmed the termination order. Relying on Blakeman, he argued the trial court erred in determining statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence because its requirement that he “make a full admission violated his right against self-incrimination. Alternatively,” he asserted that “he complied with, and benefited from, his case service plan.” The court disagreed. It found Blakeman distinguishable, noting that in an agreement with his ex-wife in a custody case, he “agreed to complete the ‘Vanderbeck Safety Criteria,’ which required respondent to take responsibility for the sexual abuse by admitting it in detail.” The agreement also required him to identify and show “an understanding of the triggers, motives, and dynamics of the abuse. Moreover, unlike the Blakeman respondent who was not charged criminally with child abuse, in the present case, respondent was criminally charged and ultimately pleaded no-contest to attempted” CSC II. He also pled no-contest to an “allegation that he inappropriately touched [his stepdaughter’s] private parts for sexual purposes.” Further, he testified at the termination hearing that he did not remember the abuse, “but did not deny that [it] occurred. Given that [he] initially agreed to admit the abuse in detail and he entered no-contest pleas to the abuse in the criminal and child protection cases, the trial court did not violate [his] right against self-incrimination by questioning respondent’s progress in services without an admission to the abuse.” The court noted that this “child-protective proceeding was pending for over two years and the testimony showed that [respondent’s child] could not be safely returned to respondent’s home without supervision.” Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in ruling that statutory grounds for terminating respondent’s parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence.