Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Unfair labor practice (ULP) charges; The Public Employment Relations Act (PERA) (MCL 423.201 et seq.); Alleged coercion to pay union membership dues or nonmember service fees; MCL 423.209; MCL 423.210(2)(a); MCL 423.210(3) & (5); Taylor Sch. Dist. v. Rhatigan; Stare decisis; W A Foote Mem’l Hosp. v. Jackson; Civil fines under MCL 423.209(3); Michigan Employment Relations Commission’s (MERC) jurisdiction; Bank v. Michigan Educ. Ass’n; MERC’s powers; Saginaw Educ. Ass’n v. Eady-Miskiewicz; MCL 423.216(b); Review of MERC decisions; Calhoun Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Calhoun Intermediate Educ. Ass’n; Const. 1963, art. 6, § 28; MCL 423.216(e); Administrative law judge (ALJ)
Concluding that the case was not factually distinguishable from Taylor and that the MERC did not commit a substantial and material error of law, the court affirmed the final decision and order affirming the ALJ’s findings that respondent-union committed a ULP by violating MCL 423.210(2)(a), and entering a cease and desist order against respondent. The court rejected the charging parties-teachers’ argument on cross-appeal that the MERC erred by failing to assess civil fines pursuant to MCL 423.209(3), holding that the fines were not available because the MERC properly ruled that respondent did not violate MCL 423.209(2). The court noted that it had to follow the Taylor decision as it was binding case precedent, and it found that decision was directly applicable here. The MERC determined in both cases that ULPs in violation of MCL 423.210 occurred. The memorandum of agreement (MOA) here extended for 3 years, while the agreement in Taylor expired after 10 years. The MOA in this case established a 3% wage reduction, while “the charging parties in Taylor faced a 10% wage reduction and suspension of pay increases. Finally, in this case, MERC did not determine whether respondent breached its duty of fair representation,” while the court in Taylor held that MERC did not err by finding that the respondent-union violated its duty of fair representation and committed a ULP. “These factual differences were not relevant to the determination whether respondent’s enforcement of” the 2013 MOA after the effective date of 2012 PA 349 constituted a ULP. The court also rejected the contentions that (1) the MERC erred in concluding that the 2013 MOA “did not require charging parties to financially support the labor organization as a condition of” continued employment and (2) “the agency shop provision was valid and enforceable because it was executed before the effective date of 2012 PA 349 and was not subsequently extended or renewed.” As the MERC correctly found that respondent did not violate MCL 423.210(3), MCL 423.210(5) did not apply and render the MOA lawful.
42 USC § 1983; Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process; Violations of Brady v. Maryland; Strickler v. Greene; Moldowan v. City of Warren; Galloway v. United States; Giglio v. United States; Evidence fabrication; Gregory v. City of Louisville; Stemler v. City of Florence; Conspiracy to withhold & fabricate evidence; Robertson v. Lucas; Revis v. Meldrum; Doherty v. American Motors; The “intracorporate conspiracy doctrine”; Johnson v. Hills & Dales Gen. Hosp.; Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.; DiLuzio v. Village of Yorkville; Grider v. City of Auburn (11th Cir.); Rehberg v. Paulk (11th Cir.); Fourth Amendment right to be free from malicious prosecution; Mills v. Barnard; Sykes v. Anderson; Higazy v. Templeton; King v. Harwood; Qualified immunity; Pearson v. Callahan; Harlow v. Fitzgerald; Saunders-El v. Rohde (7th Cir.); Hope v. Pelzer; United States v. Lanier; Barbee v. Warden, MD Penitentiary (4th Cir.); Municipal liability; Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs.; D’Ambrosio v. Marino; Burgess v. Fischer; Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t; Failure to train; Ciminillo v. Streicher; City of Canton v. Harris; Deliberate indifference; Board of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown; Campbell v. City of Springboro
In an issue of first impression, the court held that “the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies in § 1983 cases to bar conspiracy claims where two or more employees of the same entity are alleged to have been acting within the scope of their employment when they allegedly conspired” to deprive a plaintiff of his or her rights. Plaintiffs were wrongfully imprisoned for decades based on eyewitness testimony that was eventually recanted. The district court granted defendant-Stoiker, a police detective on the case, summary judgment on plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim alleging that he violated Brady by withholding exculpatory evidence. It determined that there was insufficient evidence to allow a jury to find that he withheld any evidence. But the court disagreed, finding that record evidence indicated he was involved where he signed the police report regarding the witness’s (V) coerced identification. A jury could believe that he was present and thus, knew the true facts behind the identification, and “‘nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within [Brady’s disclosure] rule.’” Further, the coerced identification formed the core of the prosecution’s case. As for fabrication of evidence, there was evidence Stoiker was in the room when the identification was coerced; thus, “a reasonable jury could infer that Stoiker either drafted, or assisted [another detective] in drafting, the false statement.” A reasonable jury could also find that Stoiker and the other detective “planned to draft a false statement and coerce [V] into signing that statement and that they committed an overt act in furtherance of that plan[,]” thus supporting the claim of conspiracy to withhold or fabricate evidence. However, because they both had the same employer, the court for the first time considered the applicability of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to § 1983 cases and held that it applied. The exception for defendants that were alleged to have been acting outside the scope of their employment could not apply here because plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were acting within the scope of their employment. The court affirmed summary judgment to Stoiker on the conspiracy claims but reversed on the malicious prosecution, withholding exculpatory evidence, and fabricating evidence claims. Further, it held that plaintiffs’ Monell claims against defendant-Cleveland were improperly dismissed where there were “genuine issues of material fact both as to whether Cleveland had an official policy of permitting the withholding of exculpatory witness statements from prosecutors and as to whether Cleveland had a policy of failing to train its officers in” their disclosure obligations.
Double jeopardy; People v. Booker (After Remand); People v. Szalma; Whether retrial was barred; People v. Dawson; People v. Lett; Oregon v. Kennedy; The “goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial” standard; United States v. Posner (11th Cir.); Effect of defendant’s agreement to a mistrial; People v. Carter; Sufficiency of the evidence for an aggravated stalking conviction; MCL 750.411i; MCL 750.411i(2)(d); MCL 750.411h(1)(a); Hayford v. Hayford; Stalking defined; MCL 750.411i(1)(e); Harassment defined; MCL 750.411h(1)(c); Unconsented contact defined; MCL 750.411h(1)(e); Emotional distress defined; MCL 750.411h(1)(b); Other acts evidence; People v. Henry; People v. Jackson; People v. Knox; Proper purpose; People v. Johnigan; Relevance; MRE 401; People v. Houston; People v. Mardlin; Logical relevance of similar misconduct; People v. Dobek; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 10; MCL 777.40(1)(a); People v. Cannon; People v. Huston; Proportionality of a departure sentence; People v. Lockridge; People v. Steanhouse; People v. Milbourn; Drawing inferences about a defendant’s behavior from objective evidence; People v. Petri; Consideration of uncharged offenses & pending charges; People v. Coulter (After Remand); The need to protect others; People v. Armstrong; Reasons given for the extent of the departure; People v. Smith
Concluding that defendant’s agreement to a retrial waived his double jeopardy claims, the court held that there was no merit to his contention that the constitutional protection against double jeopardy barred his retrial. Further, there was sufficient evidence to support his aggravated stalking conviction, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting other acts evidence. Finally, the trial court did not err in scoring OV 10 at 15 points, and the upward departure sentence it imposed was proportionate. He was sentenced as a fourth offense habitual offender to 20 to 30 years. Even if he had not affirmatively waived the double jeopardy issue, appellate relief would not be warranted because the prosecution’s “conduct was negligent, but not intentional.” As to the sufficiency of the evidence, his “unconsented contacts with the victim at her workplace and by means of placing a note on her car fall within the categories of unconsented contacts specifically identified by the Legislature.” Her testimony also supported a conclusion “that there were two or more acts of unconsented contact that caused her to suffer emotional distress.” The fact he did not threaten her was “not dispositive of whether she suffered emotional distress.” She testified to feeling “terrified and frightened” by his contacts. Under the totality of the circumstances, the “contacts would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress.” Next, given “the multiple similarities between” his prior conduct and the charged crime, the other acts “evidence was logically relevant to show that defendant operated under a common plan, scheme, or system.” In upholding the score for OV 10, the court concluded that his conduct was predatory in nature and “directed toward a specific victim, who was made vulnerable by defendant’s attempts to isolate her.” The trial court identified several reasons for its departure sentence that the guidelines did not adequately consider, including his long history of misconduct, failure to rehabilitate, and the need to adequately protect society. Further, its reasons for the extent of the departure were clear and the sentence “satisfied the principle of proportionality.” Affirmed.
Whether there was a Cobbs plea agreement; MCR 6.310(B) & (D); People v. Cobbs; People v. Killebrew; People v. White; People v. Martinez; Plea agreement; MCR 6.302(C); Principle that statutes are presumed constitutional; People v. Parker; Court rule interpretation; People v. Buie; Vagueness; People v. Herron; Lanzetta v. New Jersey
The court held that there was no Cobbs agreement and thus, the trial court did not violate any of defendant’s rights under Cobbs. He pled guilty to accosting a minor for immoral purposes, as a second-offense habitual offender, as well as two counts of CSC I, also as a second offender. The parties agreed to a minimum sentence of 22 years. When it was found that defendant attempted to send letters to one of the victims, the trial court sentenced him to a longer sentence. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court did not comply with the Cobbs agreement, finding “there was no Cobbs agreement.” Given that he did not have a Cobbs agreement, “the trial court did not violate any of [his] rights under Cobbs.” Further, the added handwritten language in his plea agreement “was irrelevant to the trial court’s consideration, and therefore, it did not violate any of defendant’s rights.” It also rejected his claim that the conditions of his plea agreement were not plainly stated or made clear at the time of the plea hearing or acknowledged by him or his counsel. Because “the written terms of the plea agreement were incorporated into the record . . . defendant had sufficient notice of the terms.” Further, he “was made aware of the conditions of his plea agreement, including the condition that he would lose his right to withdraw his pleas if he engaged in misconduct between entering into the plea agreement and sentencing.” Finally, although the plea agreement did “not list examples of what may constitute misconduct, and the trial court did not place any such examples on the record for defendant, a man of common intelligence could deduce that violating a court order and attempting to break the law would constitute misconduct.” Thus, as applied to him, “the language of MCR 6.310(B)(3) is not so vague that it requires guessing nor has its application resulted in varied outcomes.” It followed that the court rule is not void for vagueness. Affirmed.
Sentencing; Motion to Correct Invalid Sentence; Scoring of OV 19; MCL 777.49; “Interference with the administration of justice”; MCL 777.49(b) & (c); People v. Hershey; People v. Sours; People v. Ratcliff; People v. Barbee; People v. Ericksen; People v. Steele; Threat of force; People v. McDonald; People v. Endres; Resentencing; People v. Francisco
The court held that defendant was entitled to resentencing based on the incorrect scoring of OV 19. He pled guilty to two counts of second-degree home invasion and one count of first-degree home invasion. The trial court sentenced him to 120 months to 15 years for each of the second-degree home invasion convictions and 130 months to 20 years for the first-degree home invasion conviction. The court previously denied his delayed application for leave to appeal, but the Supreme Court remanded. On remand, the court remanded to the trial court for a determination of indigency and, if established, the appointment of an attorney. On remand, defense counsel filed a Motion to Correct Invalid Sentence that was denied. On appeal, the court agreed with defendant that 15 points were incorrectly assessed for OV 19 and that only 10 points should have been assessed. Defendant acknowledged that the trial court could have assessed 10 points “for interfering or attempting to interfere with the administration of justice.” However, although he “failed to obey an order to show his hands while hiding under a pile of” clothes, this was “a continued attempt to avoid detection and not a threat of force against law enforcement.” Defendant “disobeyed a command, and while that was frustrating to his apprehension, it was not a threat of force.” Thus, it was error to score OV 19 at 15 points, and he was entitled to resentencing because the correction of the score from 15 points to 10 points changed his “OV level to 45 points, sentencing grid to D-IV, and sentencing guidelines range to 72 to 120 months.” The court affirmed his convictions, but remanded for resentencing.
Search & seizure; Whether the Leon good-faith exception applied; United States v. Leon; Mapp v. Ohio; Adequacy of the warrant affidavit; United States v. Stotts; Transmitting data to Iran in violation of American sanctions; Executive Order No. 13,059, 62 Fed. Reg.; Bassidji v. Goe (9th Cir.); Whether the affidavit contained reckless & intentional falsehoods; Franks v. Delaware; United States v. Atkin
The court reversed the district court’s ruling suppressing evidence, holding that the affidavit that supported the warrant to search defendant-Asgari’s emails satisfied the Leon good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Asgari was a scientist suspected of lying on his visa application and of giving information to Iran. The government obtained a warrant to search his emails, and as a result, he was indicted and charged with stealing trade secrets, wire fraud, and visa fraud. But the district court agreed with Asgari that the emails should be suppressed because the magistrate issued the warrant without probable cause based on a defective affidavit. The district court also ruled that the Leon good-faith exception did not apply. In reversing, the court held that an officer could have reasonably relied on the FBI agent’s warrant affidavit. The affidavit indicated that the agent had extensive prior experience in national security, Iranian counter-intelligence, and other “‘specialized training.’” Regarding the charge of visa fraud, the visa Asgari held did not allow him to conduct research in this country, and the emails indicating that he intended to do so showed that he misled State Department officials in obtaining a visa for “‘temp[orary] business[/]pleasure.’” Also, the visa listed his destination as New York, when it appeared that his original intention was to go to Case Western in Ohio. The affidavit also contained sufficient information about Asgari’s possible violations involving the transmission of information to Iran. The court held that this was no “bare bones” affidavit, and that it was reasonable for the officers to rely on it. The court rejected Asgari’s arguments that the emails were innocent because they were only sent to students, noting that “the students also went to a university with close ties to the Iranian government,” the sanctions were far reaching, and it was not “unreasonable to think that a graduate student might assist a professor on all of his tasks, including transmitting data back to Iran in violation of American sanctions.” The sanctions “broadly ban sending ‘any goods, technology, or services to Iran,’ covering much more than cloak-and-dagger espionage.” Asgari alleged that the affidavit contained known falsehoods but the court held that none of the alleged errors could be characterized as “a knowing falsehood or deliberate omission.” Thus, it held that “at a minimum, the affidavit satisfies the Leon good-faith exception . . . .” Remanded.
Attempt to obtain alimony & child support arrearages; Interpretation of a trust agreement; Discretionary trusts; MCL 700.7103(d); In re Johannes Trust; Support trusts; Miller v. Department of Mental Health; Distinguishing between discretionary trusts, support trusts, & spendthrift trusts; In re Hertsberg Inter Vivos Trust; Good v. Armstrong; Coverston v. Kellogg; “Shall”; Wilcoxon v. Detroit Election Comm’n; Determining the settlor’s intent; In re Herbert; In re Kostin; Public policy; Duty to support; Malnar v. Malnar
The court held that the probate court did not err by denying petitioner’s petition for distribution from the trust at issue in this case. She sought to compel respondents-successor co-trustees to make income distribution payments to her ex-husband (A), out of which she could then seek payment of A’s child support and alimony arrearages. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the probate court erred in denying her petition for distribution based on a finding that the trust is a purely discretionary trust, and that she was not entitled to compensation for A’s outstanding child support and alimony arrearages out of income distributions made to him from the trust. “[I]t is apparent that the use of the word ‘shall’ was not intended to mandate that respondents authorize income distributions to [A], from which petitioner could recover child support and alimony arrearages. Instead, it appears that the words ‘sole and absolute discretion’ give respondents the right to use their discretion when deciding whether to make distributions to” A. It found that the trust provisions at issue gave “respondents discretion to determine whether to distribute the income and principal of the trust to its beneficiaries, including [A], as contemplated in MCL 700.7103(d).” As such, it concluded that the trust was discretionary, and that, because it was discretionary, “creditors, including petitioner, cannot reach the trust assets.” The court also rejected her claim that public policy supported the argument that she should be compensated for A’s child support and alimony arrearages via income distributions from the trust, noting that “because the trust is a discretionary trust, and not a spendthrift trust, petitioner’s argument must fail.” Affirmed.
Applicability of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine; Winkler by Winkler v. Marist Fathers of Detroit, Inc.; Chabad-Lubavitch of MI v. Schuchman; Conveyances of land; Statute of frauds; MCL 566.106; A deed as a contract; In re Rudell Estate; Covenants & conditions in a deed; Ditmore v. Michalik; Contract interpretation; Michigan Nat’l Bank v. Laskowski
In these consolidated appeals, the court held that the trial court should have applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, and that it erred to the extent that it considered plaintiff/defendant-Leica’s donative intent. Thus, it reversed the order granting the motion by Leica and plaintiff/defendant-Holy Trinity Romanian Orthodox Monastery for declaratory judgment and quiet title. It remanded for entry of judgment consistent with the defendant/plaintiff-Romanian Orthodox Episcopate of America’s (ROEA) determinations as to the disputed property and of orders as necessary to fully effectuate the court’s decision. The ROEA created the Holy Ascension Romanian Orthodox Christian Monastery, a Michigan nonprofit corporation. Defendant-Duvlea served as the monastery’s abbot. Leica conveyed two parcels of real property to the monastery. The ROEA and the Orthodox Church in America later suspended Duvlea and demoted him. Duvlea and others on Holy Ascension’s board of trustees conveyed the property by quitclaim deed to “Holy Trinity, a Michigan nonprofit corporation they created, and they dissolved Holy Ascension without the knowledge of the ROEA and the Orthodox Church in America.” These cases concerned whether “Holy Trinity, a monastic corporate entity formed by a schismatic faction that left the ROEA, could claim ownership of the property that the faction conveyed from Holy Ascension before dissolving it.” The court concluded that under Schuchman, the trial court should have “determined that this case involved hierarchical religious organizations and that the actual adjudication of the legal claims required the resolution of ecclesiastical questions respecting the interrelationships of the entities within the hierarchical denomination and its interpretation of the ownership and ability to transfer or convey properties by such entities.” Based on the evidence presented by the ROEA, it “should have declined to apply the ‘neutral principles of law’ approach and applied the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.” Further, Leica’s intent for donating the property was irrelevant in deciding the issues presented.
Dismissal of the case with prejudice as a sanction; Failure to consider lesser sanctions; Vicencio v. Ramirez; VandenBerg v. VandenBerg; Kalamazoo Oil Co. v. Boerman
Holding that the trial court abused its discretion because it failed to evaluate the Vicencio factors and all available options in determining an appropriate sanction, the court reversed the order dismissing plaintiff’s no-fault insurance case, and remanded. After she and her attorney “failed to appear at a mandatory settlement conference, the trial court held that this missed appearance, coupled with plaintiff counsel’s failure to attend case evaluation and certain depositions of key witnesses, warranted dismissal.” The court tended to agree with plaintiff that the trial court “should have, at least, considered other options on the record.” The record showed that it failed to “carefully evaluate several relevant Vicencio factors or adequately explain why the conduct attributed to plaintiff’s counsel warranted dismissal of plaintiff’s case with prejudice when lesser sanctions were available.” It did not address whether she “had a history of failing to comply with court orders” and the record did not support defendant’s claim that the trial court ordered her attorney to attend the case evaluation. While the scheduling order required both she and her attorney “to attend the settlement conference, the trial court explicitly stated that it did not consider tardiness a basis for dismissal. Although plaintiff counsel’s apparent failures in accurately maintaining his calendar and informing opposing counsel when he did not plan to appear as expected at the case evaluation or certain depositions was unprofessional, these are failures of common courtesy and professionalism. They do not amount to a violation of a court order.” Further, there was no significant prejudice to defendant’s case and “the trial court did not address why it believed that monetary sanctions would not adequately serve” the interest of justice. The court noted it did not condone plaintiff’s attorney’s actions or rule out the possibility dismissal was warranted. But because the trial court failed to evaluate the Vicencio factors or “consider all of its options before taking the drastic step of dismissal,” it reversed and remanded for the trial court to “carefully consider and apply the Vicencio factors, explaining its determination on the record.”
Poverty exemption from property taxes; MCL 211.7u(1); Smith v. Forester Twp. (Smith I); Due process; Cummings v. Wayne Cnty.; Great Lakes Div. of Nat’l Steel Corp. v. Ecorse; Burden of proving entitlement to a tax exemption; ProMed Healthcare v. Kalamazoo; Effect of State Tax Commission (STC) bulletins; Ferrero v. Walton Twp.; STC Bulletin No. 5 of 1995
The court held that petitioner-Smith was afforded due process, and that the Tax Tribunal (TT) did not err in accepting his 2017 poverty exemption application (including a “Part H Schedule”) into evidence. Further, the TT did not err in rejecting his appeal from respondent-township’s denial of his request for the exemption. His appeal as to his 2017 taxes was the third year in a row he appealed denial of the exemption. The court decided his appeal as to his 2015 taxes in Smith I, determining that “reverse-mortgage payments impact a landowner’s ability to pay property taxes” and thus, are properly counted against the landowner. The $6,580 in reverse-mortgage payments he received in 2017 exceeded “the $4,500 asset limit under the poverty exemption.” Alternatively, they raised his “income over the $12,060 federal poverty level. He received $9,922 in Social Security benefits, $6,580 in reverse-mortgage payments, and only suffered a business loss of $1,691, or a total income of $14,811.” The court found that the TT did not deny him due process by permitting respondent to raise the reverse-mortgage payments issue for the first time at a referee hearing. He “was on notice from the outset of his 2017 application” that these payments could be counted against him. They “were used to calculate his income in 2015 and the inclusion of those payments was the subject of” Smith I. He included the 2017 payments “on his 2017 poverty exemption application and included a statement of why” he believed they should not count against him. “It should have come as no surprise to Smith when the issue was raised” in the TT appeal of his 2017 exemption denial following the issuance of Smith I. Further, his 2017 application including the Part H Schedule was necessary for the TT to consider his appeal and he should have provided it “in the first instance as he bore the burden of proof.” The TT also did not err in considering and relying on the “recent, relevant, binding” authority of Smith I. Given the Smith I holding that “the reverse-mortgage payments, whether considered income or assets, resulted in Smith being ineligible for” the exemption, there was no way for him to show that they were irrelevant to whether he was entitled to the exemption. Affirmed.