Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA); ERISA’s preemption provision (29 USC § 1144(a)); “Top hat” manager plans; Whether plaintiffs could pursue state-law claims for breach of fiduciary, trust, contract, & tort duties; Shaw v Delta Air Lines, Inc.; “Express preemption”; Whether the state laws have a “connection with” an ERISA plan; “Equitable relief” under § 1132(a)(3); Mertens v Hewitt Assoc; Rose v PSA Airlines, Inc (4th Cir); CIGNA Corp. v Amara
The court held that plaintiffs-plan participants could not bring their state-law claims against defendant-ERISA plan administrator (Regions Bank) because ERISA’s “express preemption” provision preempted the claims. And they could not “pursue their lost monetary benefits under a provision of ERISA that allows them to seek only ‘equitable relief’” where they simply requested “damages under another label.” After plaintiffs’ employer (Ruby Tuesday) became insolvent, they sued Regions Bank, the entity managing their retirement plans, which were “top-hat” plans. Because they could not sue for a breach of a fiduciary duty due to the plans being “top-hat” plans, they sued for breach of “state-law fiduciary, trust, contract, and tort duties. Alternatively, [they] sought to obtain their lost benefits from Regions under an ERISA provision that allows them to recover only equitable (not legal) relief.” The district court dismissed the state claims based on ERISA preemption and granted summary judgment for Regions on the ERISA claim. The court noted that it was presented with a preemption question and a remedies question. Under express exemption, “ERISA can preempt a state law either if the law makes ‘reference to’ an ERISA plan or if the law has a ‘connection with’ such a plan.” The court held that the state-law claims here had the required “connection with” the plans to support a finding of express preemption. All plaintiffs’ state claims “seek the same thing: the benefits allegedly due them under their ERISA-covered Plans.” The fact that “ERISA exempts administrators of top-hat plans from its federal fiduciary duties” was not relevant. “The statutory regime shows that Congress ‘deliberately omitted’ these duties because high-level employees can protect themselves through contract.” The court then considered plaintiffs’ claim for “equitable relief” under § 1132(a)(3). They sought “money from the bank’s ‘general assets’ not from a specific fund.” The court concluded that the “equitable surcharge” remedy they sought was not “‘typically available in equity’ under the Supreme Court’s cases[.]” It agreed with the Fourth Circuit in Rose, which “held that an ‘equitable surcharge’ for a beneficiary’s losses qualifies as a damages remedy that Mertens does not permit ERISA plaintiffs to recover under § 1132(a)(3).” Affirmed.
The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act; MCL 37.2202(1)(a); MCL 37.2103(k); Claims of quid pro quo & hostile work environment sexual harassment; McCalla v Ellis; Elezovic v Ford Motor Co
Noting that in both quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment, a plaintiff must establish “that the sexual conduct was unwelcome[,]” the court held that in “light of the totality of the evidence, plaintiff failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that the conduct was unwelcome.” Thus, it affirmed summary disposition for defendants-employer (the city) and a former city employee (Jackson). The court noted that “when plaintiff and Jackson met they were both city employees” and their jobs “served as the manner in which they met. But, Jackson did not have supervisory authority over plaintiff. Although plaintiff disputed whether she flirted with [him], it was undisputed that the two exchanged personal phone numbers. When plaintiff went to Jackson’s office to assist him in completing forms, she performed a sex act. Yet, plaintiff did not identify a demand by Jackson for the sex act in return for an employment benefit, and [she] had the burden of establishing such a nexus.” In addition, she “continued her relationship with Jackson outside of working hours.” Further, she “did not notify any of her superiors of any unwelcome acts or notify” police. When she was informed “of performance issues in her” existing role with the city, she asked him to help her find “a new position with the city. When a position opened up in Jackson’s” department, she “interviewed for and accepted the position. But, Jackson did not participate in the interview process.” The court noted that her “financial benefits from Jackson predated her employment in” his department. Further, the “financial arrangement did not reflect a nexus between an unwelcome sexual act and an employment benefit, but a personal benefit to plaintiff in light of her monetary issues. Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, reasonable minds could not differ on the issue that [her] preexisting personal and financial arrangements occurred before her employment in Jackson’s” department. The court additionally noted that she “suffered from persistent personal financial issues and poor performance evaluations while in the various positions she held at the city.”
Review of contractually shortened limitations periods in boilerplate employment agreements; “Adhesion contract”; Extension of Rory v Continental Ins Co to employment contracts; Overruling Clark v DaimlerChrysler Corp & Timko v Oakwood Custom Coating; Reasonableness; Camelot Excavating Co, Inc v St Paul Fire & Marine Ins Co; “Dictum”; Procedural & substantive unconscionability; Herweyer v Clark Hwy Servs, Inc
The court held that “an adhesive boilerplate employment agreement that shortens a limitations period must be examined for” reasonableness, and is “subject to traditional contract defenses, including unconscionability, and, as adhesion contracts, may be procedurally and substantively unconscionable.” Plaintiff sued defendant, her former employer, alleging a variety of claims related to her termination. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendant, finding plaintiff’s claims were barred by the contractually shortened 180-day limitations period contained in the Employee Handbook Acknowledgment she had signed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On leave granted, the court first found that “broad holdings outside of the insurance context were not germane to the controversy” in Rory, “especially in light of the fact that the litigants did not brief the issue.” Rory’s language “purporting to reach beyond insurance contracts cannot reach adhesive employment agreements because such an extension constitutes nonbinding dicta.” It limited Rory and held that in cases involving adhesive employment contracts, “the pre-Rory reasonableness analysis” should apply. “We now reestablish that reasonableness review is used for contractually shortened limitations periods in adhesive employment contracts.” It also overruled Timko “because it failed to apply the Camelot factors to the record before it when it held that a six-month limitations period was reasonable.” The court further held that adhesion contracts are subject to an unconscionability defense. It then found the contract at issue in this case was an adhesion contract, noting that plaintiff “lacked bargaining power when she was presented with a boilerplate employment agreement that contained a shortened limitations period of 180” days, and held that “close judicial scrutiny of the challenged shortened limitations” provision was required. In sum, “the shortened limitations period contained in plaintiff’s employment agreement was adhesive. We overrule the Court of Appeals in Clark, limit Rory to insurance contract cases, and restore Camelot and Herweyer. We also overrule Timko to the extent that it could be interpreted as accepting a shortened limitations period of 180 days as per se reasonable.” Remanded to the trial court. Concurring, Justice Cavanagh agreed “with nearly every point” in the majority opinion, but questioned its “conclusion that the holdings in Rory[] that go beyond insurance contracts are mere dicta.” She suspected “that Rory’s statement that adhesion contracts ‘must be enforced according to [their] plain terms unless one of the traditional contract defenses applies’ is properly considered a holding, not dictum.” But even if so, she supported “creating a narrow carveout from Rory’s holding for adhesion contracts in the employment context.” Dissenting, Justice Zahra noted his agreement “with the Rory Court that traditional principles of contract law—not paternalistic exertions of judicial will and policymaking from the bench—must govern which contractual terms will be enforced in Michigan. On any proper view of our jurisprudence, Rory controls the result of this appeal.” He would affirm.
Validity of a search warrant; The particularity requirement; Cell phone searches; People v Hughes; Riley v California; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Strickland v Washington; Motion to suppress
The court’s lead opinion held that the search warrant for defendant’s cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. But he raised this claim through a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and the lead opinion concluded he did not establish “that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel under the” Strickland standard. Thus, while it agreed “with the Court of Appeals on the underlying merits,” it disagreed that he was “entitled to reversal of his convictions on this basis.” As a result, it reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment in that regard and remanded the case to that court to consider his remaining issues. The lead opinion found it “difficult to conclude that the first sentence” of the search warrant at issue, “which arguably has some limiting language, provides any meaningful affirmative limitation on the remaining sentences—most importantly, the fourth sentence, which allows a search for ‘any and all data.’” It could not “conclude that a practical reading of the search warrant at issue would sufficiently inform an executing officer how to reasonably conduct a limited and constitutionally particular search. The lack of instruction on the scope, breadth, or focus of the search shifts the particularity requirement from the warrant, where it belongs, to the executing officer’s discretion.” The lead opinion rejected the prosecution’s assertion “that a warrant that specifies the items to be seized by their relation to designated crimes provides sufficient guidance to the executing officers,” finding that specifying “the crime under investigation is necessary, but not usually sufficient to ensure adequate particularity in the context of a cell-phone search warrant.” The lead opinion noted that it could not and did “not create a per se rule of specificity that applies to all cell-phone searches.” But it stated that “when information concerning the relevant time frame of the criminal activity exists, this time limitation should be included in the search warrant to ensure adequate particularity.” It also noted that another common particularity limit found in other states’ case law “focuses on the categories of data to be searched.” It determined that “the degree of particularity required to adequately direct a search depends on the crime being investigated and the items sought.” Turning to the ineffective assistance of counsel aspect, the lead opinion found that defendant did not show “that it was objectively unreasonable for [his] attorney not to have filed a motion to suppress on” the basis of the particularity requirement.Concurring in the result only, Justice Zahra agreed with the lead opinion that defendant was “not entitled to relief based on his ineffective-assistance challenge.” But he disagreed with it on two points. He found it (1) overreached “by addressing the Fourth Amendment particularity issue” and (2) erred in concluding “that the warrant was insufficiently particular.”Concurring in the result, Justice Bernstein agreed with the decision to reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand “because defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim” failed under the Strickland standard. He wrote separately because he disagreed “with the lead opinion’s decision to reach the” particularity requirement question.Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Justice Bolden agreed with the lead opinion that the search warrant violated the particularity requirement but disagreed as to the ineffective assistance of counsel issue. She would affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment in full.
Right to a speedy trial; People v Williams; People v Gilmore; People v Quatrail Smith; Sentencing; Scoring of OVs 7, 8, & 10; MCL 777.37(1)(a); MCL 777.38(1)(a); MCL 777.40(1)(b); “Exploit” (MCL 777.40(3)(b)); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to OV scoring; Futile objection
The court held that: (1) defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated; (2) the trial court did not err in scoring OVs 7, 8, and 10 in sentencing him; and (3) defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile objection to the OV scoring. He was convicted of AWIGBH and aggravated domestic violence, and sentenced to 47 months to 15 years in prison for the former and a year in jail for the latter. Because the delay between his arrest and trial was 4 years, it was presumed to be prejudicial and the prosecution had the burden to prove lack of prejudice. As “to the reasons for the delay, some delays were attributed to each party, but the majority of [them] were neutral or attributable to defendant. The three-month period between” his arrest and preliminary exam “may partially be attributable to the prosecution, but with minimal weight, because these were ‘delays inherent in the court system.’” The court also noted some of the delay appeared “related to a request for evaluation of competency and criminal responsibility. . . . Further, delays resulting from the withdrawal of defense counsel cannot be attributed to the prosecution.” In addition, delays due to “defense counsel’s request for adjournment and additional discovery is not attributable to the prosecution. As for the delays resulting from the pandemic,” the court held in Quatrail Smith that these “‘are not attributable to the prosecution for purposes of a speedy-trial claim.’ Overall,” the record did not show “that the majority of the delay was attributable to the prosecutor.” The factor of defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial weighed in his favor. As to prejudice, he contended “he suffered untreated dental problems and sleep apnea, plus the anxiety of awaiting trial.” However, anxiety alone “is not sufficient to establish a speedy-trial violation.” As to prejudice to the defense, he asserted “one of his primary witnesses died” before trial. But he did not explain “what this witness would have presented.” He also failed to identify unnamed witnesses, “describe the nature of their testimony, or offer proof that he” tried unsuccessfully to call them as witnesses. Thus, while he established a level of prejudice, he did not show “that the delay impaired his defense to such an extent that his right to a speedy trial was violated.” The court also upheld the trial court’s scoring of 50 points for OV 7, 15 points for OV 8, and 10 points for OV 10. Affirmed.
Double jeopardy; Scoring of OV 19; Interference with the administration of justice; MCL 777.49(c); People v Hershey; People v Sours; Failure to appear at sentencing; Principle that an OV score is not a form of punishment; People v Gibson; An appellant’s failure to develop an argument
Holding that the assessment of points under OV 19 was not a form of punishment and did not implicate defendant’s double-jeopardy protections, the court affirmed her conviction and sentence. She pled guilty to conducting a criminal enterprise for operating a prostitution ring. After she failed to appear at sentencing, the trial court sentenced her to 60 days in jail for contempt, which it later reduced to 30 days. It later sentenced her as a second-offense habitual offender to 5 years and 10 months to 30 years. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the trial court violated double jeopardy by assessing points under OV 19 on the basis that she interfered with the administration of justice by failing to appear at sentencing. She claimed it had already considered her failure to appear and sentenced her to jail for that conduct. “In accordance with Gibson, the trial court’s assessment of 10 points for OV 19 did not constitute punishment and therefore did not implicate” defendant’s double-jeopardy protections. Further, although she did “not contend that the assessment of 10 points for OV 19 was itself improper,” the trial court did not err by scoring 10 points on the basis that she “‘interfered with or attempted to interfere with the administration of justice.’” It noted that “‘[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of “interfere with the administration of justice” for purposes of OV 19 is to oppose so as to hamper, hinder, or obstruct the act or process of administering judgment of individuals or causes by judicial process.’” In addition, OV 19 “‘is generally scored for conduct that constitutes an attempt to avoid being caught and held accountable for the sentencing offense.’” By failing “to appear at sentencing and fleeing the jurisdiction for approximately seven months, [defendant] obstructed the trial court’s ability to administer judgment and hold her accountable for the sentencing offense.”
FOIA request; MCL 15.235(1); Effect of a denial; MCL 15.240(1)(b); Principle that appellate review is limited to the trial court record; Amorello v Monsanto Corp; Principle that parties must fully present their legal arguments to the court; Walters v Nadell; Principle that courts will not develop arguments for an appellant; Mitcham v Detroit
The court held that “when plaintiff failed to state or support his claim, the trial court did not err when it granted” defendant summary disposition in this FOIA case. Plaintiff sued defendant-county related to his requests for information under the FOIA. The trial court found that his “complaint did not explain what information [he] had requested or when [he] had been denied information. Plaintiff’s daughter clarified that [he] was seeking information regarding his real property and that his FOIA requests to defendant had been denied or left unanswered. The trial court explained to plaintiff and his daughter that plaintiff needed to submit a ‘clearly labeled’ FOIA request.” On appeal, the court noted “several critical problems with plaintiff’s appeal.” First, the attachments he presented “on appeal that were not attached to, or even referenced in, his complaint, and were never filed with, or considered by, the trial court,” were not properly before the court. As such, it declined to “consider the improperly submitted documents.” Second, the trial court “did not err by determining that plaintiff failed to state clearly his claims or requested relief.” Plaintiff asked the court to “‘interpret FOIA Law as cited on brief and complaint,’ alleging that his requests for information were ignored or denied. In the lower court, however, [he] did not identify or present any specific FOIA denials, appeals, or related correspondence from defendant, nor did [he] clearly identify what information or equitable relief he sought.” Third, an appellant may not “‘simply [] announce a position or assert an error and then leave it up to [the court] to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, or unravel and elaborate for him his arguments.’” Plaintiff listed “eight questions presented in his brief on appeal, which generally relate to FOIA and the trial court’s decision.” But he did not “provide a comprehensible argument or explanation as to how the authorities that he cites support his claims and requested relief.” Affirmed.