Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Dog bite; Premises liability; Duty owed to a “licensee”; Whether a defendant knew or had reason to know of any dangerous propensities of the dog; Tripp v Baker
Concluding that the record showed no genuine issue of material fact that defendant-property owner (BBSB) did not know or have “reason to know of any dangerous propensities of the dog” that allegedly bit plaintiffs, the court held that the trial court erred in denying BBSB’s summary disposition motion in this premises liability case. BBSB’s owners are defendant-MacIntyre’s parents. It owns the condo where she hosted a party plaintiffs attended, at which they alleged that her dog bit them. BBSB argued “there was no genuine factual dispute that it could not be held liable for plaintiffs’ alleged injuries.” The court agreed. The trial court found that “fact questions precluded summary disposition on” the issue of “whether BBSB had possession and control of the condo at the time of the alleged dog bites.” The court held that it “erred by ending its analysis there, seemingly assuming that the presence of such questions necessarily meant that BBSB’s motion must be denied.” But BBSB raised other arguments in moving for summary disposition, including that it “had no knowledge of any alleged dangerous propensities of the dog[.]” The court held that this issue was “sufficient in itself to demonstrate BBSB’s entitlement to judgment as a matter of law in this case, even if it is assumed that plaintiffs were” BBSB’s licensees. Nothing in MacIntyre’s testimony suggested “that BBSB knew or had reason to know of any dangerous propensities that [her] dog may have had.” Plaintiffs pointed “to their own deposition testimony as well as that of another party guest. According to this testimony, the dog bit one other guest in addition to plaintiffs at the same party, was aggressive toward or attacked two other guests at the party, and also bit another individual on a separate occasion. Some of this testimony is hearsay, however, and plaintiffs have made no attempt to demonstrate how it would be admissible.” The court added that “none of this testimony indicates that any dog bites occurred prior to the party at which plaintiffs claim to have been bitten—let alone that BBSB knew or had reason to know of any such behavior or propensities at any point before those alleged bites.” Veterinary records showed that about two months before the party, the dog was prescribed medication after “an ‘exam for anxiety meds’” but nothing in the record indicated “BBSB knew or had reason to know about” this. Reversed and remanded.
Shareholder oppression; MCL 450.1489(1)(f); “Shareholder”; MCL 450.1109(2); Shareholder rights; Madugula v Taub; “Willfully unfair & oppressive conduct”; MCL 450.1489(3); Franks v Franks; Distinguishing Murphy v Inman; “Manipulation” of shareholder debt
The court held that the trial court (1) did not err by failing to consider the standard articulated in Murphy, or by declining to hold defendants to the standard of producing a return for shareholders and issuing distributions, but (2) did err by failing to address whether the “manipulation” of shareholder debt plaintiff was owed constituted shareholder oppression. The parties were corporate directors and shareholders of defendant-company (TLC), which was formed in the early 1980s for the purpose of holding several parcels of land. Eventually, the parties began to disagree about the issuance and transfer of shares, amount of shareholder debt, and use of TLC’s property. Plaintiff sued defendants after he was removed as TLC’s president. The trial court found defendants engaged in shareholder oppression when they took actions adverse to plaintiff’s status as a shareholder of TLC. It found no cause of action as to “plaintiff’s other allegations of shareholder oppression.” On appeal, the court first noted that “[w]hile it is true that corporate directors owe a duty to produce returns for shareholders, this is in relation to a director’s fiduciary duties. Thus, the caselaw on which plaintiff relies [Murphy] applies to claims for breach of fiduciary duties, not shareholder oppression, are thus inapplicable to this case.” As such, “the trial court did not err by failing to consider this standard. For this same reason, plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred ‘by not holding [defendants] to the standard of producing a return for shareholders,’ and issuing distributions, also fails, because . . . the duty to produce a return for shareholders applies to claims for breach of fiduciary duties, not shareholder oppression.” However, the court agreed with plaintiff that the trial court erred by failing to address whether the “manipulation” of shareholder debt he was owed constituted shareholder oppression. It was unclear as to what records were “used when determining the ‘corrected’ amount of outstanding shareholder loans. It is also unclear how the accountant allocated the loans to the individual shareholders when determining the amount of shareholder debt owed to each individual for the 2022 tax year. Moreover, the parties disputed the outstanding debt owed to the individual shareholders only two months before trial.” Because the trial court failed to “address this issue in its judgment, it must determine whether the changes made to the shareholder loans in the 2022 tax return constitute shareholder oppression.” Affirmed but remanded.
42 USC § 1983 action alleging violation of a student’s First Amendment rights; Prohibiting plaintiff from wearing a hat with image of an AR-15-style rifle to school; Tinker v Des Moines Indep Cmty Sch Dist; Reasonableness of defendant-school principal’s actions; Schoenecker v Koopman (ED WI); Qualified immunity; Consideration of an untimely summary judgment motion
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] On petition for a rehearing en banc, the original panel reviewed the petition and concluded that the issues raised were fully considered in the original submission and decision (see eJournal # 83628 in the 5/5/25 edition). The petition was then circulated to the full court. Less than a majority voted in favor of rehearing. Thus, the petition was denied.
Substantive due-process & state-created-danger claims under 42 USC § 1983 for lead-contaminated drinking water; Whether plaintiffs stated a claim for violation of “bodily integrity” under the Fourteenth Amendment against defendants-city & state officials; Guertin v Michigan; Whether the right to bodily integrity was “clearly established” for purposes of qualified immunity; In re Flint Water Cases; Claim against defendant-city under Monell v Department of Soc Servs; Supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] On petition for a rehearing en banc, the original panel reviewed the petition and concluded that the issues raised were fully considered in the original submission and decision (see eJournal # 83630 in the 5/7/25 edition). The petition was then circulated to the full court. Less than a majority voted in favor of rehearing. Thus, the petition was denied.
Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to challenge a search & seizure; The Fourth Amendment; Whether an exception to the warrant requirement applied; Consent; People v Frohriep; Protective sweep; Maryland v Buie; Distinguishing People v Beuschlein; Disclosure of photographic evidence; Constitutionality of Michigan’s FIP statute (MCL 750.224f); Facial challenge; People v Deroche; District of Columbia v Heller; McDonald v Chicago; New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc v Bruen; United States v Rahimi; As-applied challenge
Concluding that the record was insufficient to determine whether defense “counsel was ineffective for failing to move to challenge the search and seizure of the firearms” based upon consent, the court remanded for the trial court to conduct a Ginther hearing. It held that the protective sweep exception to the warrant requirement did not apply. Finally, it rejected defendant’s facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to Michigan’s FIP statute. He was convicted of FIP and felony-firearm after police were dispatched to his mother’s home on a call about “a domestic altercation involving an armed man.” The issue as to his ineffective assistance claim was whether the police search of the house “was justified under a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, such that defense counsel’s decision not to challenge the search and admission of related evidence was objectively reasonable.” The prosecution relied on the consent and protective sweep exceptions. The court concluded that, based on the limited “testimony addressing any consent for the officers to enter the house, it is debatable whether the ‘typical reasonable’ person would have understood that defendant’s mother consented to law enforcement entering the residence for the sole purpose of locating defendant’s grandmother, or whether they received permission to search the entirety of the home to see whether ‘anybody else’ was inside.” It noted that the trial court “never made a finding as to the extent of any permission granted by the mother.” As to the second exception, the court held that the trial record did “not support the officers’ action of making a protective sweep of the entire house.” While the prosecution and trial court viewed Beuschlein as controlling, the court found that there were “important factual distinctions between the circumstances facing police in Beuschlein and those here.” Defendant also raised a claim related to the prosecution’s disclosure of photographic evidence, and the court directed the parties and the trial court to also address those issues on remand. As to his constitutional challenges, the court held that (1) “MCL 750.224f is not facially invalid under the Second Amendment” and (2) as applied to defendant, his “conviction under MCL 750.224f did not violate his Second Amendment right.”
Sentencing; Calculation of jail credit; MCL 769.11b; People v Prieskorn; People v Adkins; Binding precedent; People v Robar
The court held that defendant was not entitled to additional jail credit in this case. He was sentenced to 6 to 20 years, with 378 days of jail credit, after pleading no contest to AWIGBH by strangulation, as a third-offense habitual offender. He was also sentenced for an unrelated charge, at a different hearing, in another county. At his sentencing in this case, he claimed he was entitled to credit for the time he spent incarcerated in the other county before his arraignment here. The trial court found he was not entitled to jail credit until he was arraigned in this case. He received 378 days of jail credit for the time he spent incarcerated between his arraignment in the present case and his sentencing in the other case. He moved to correct his sentence, contending he should have received an additional 199 days of jail credit starting from the date of his arrest in the other county to the date of his arraignment in this case. He claimed that, because of the arrest warrant, this county had full authority over him despite his incarceration in another county. He also asserted that he was entitled to an additional 76 days of jail credit from the date of his sentencing in the other county to the date of his sentencing in this case. The trial court denied his motion. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that he was entitled to additional jail credit for both the 199 days he was incarcerated in the other county before his arraignment here, and the 76 days he served for his other conviction before he was sentenced on this one. “Under Prieskorn and Adkins, defendant is not entitled to additional jail credit. The time he spent in jail for the unrelated . . . charges was not because of an inability to post bond for the” present offense. In addition, his “assertion that he was entitled to jail credit because he wrote a letter” informing the district court here that he was detained in another county, and that the county prosecutor in this case “issued a warrant for his arrest, lacks merit under Adkins. These facts do not ‘convert the time’” he spent in jail for the other charge into time served for the offense that he was convicted of here. He acknowledged that the jail credit for his present sentence ceased when he was sentenced in the other case, “and that this was the correct result under Prieskorn. He instead” claimed Prieskorn and Adkins were wrongly decided. “However, ‘[w]e are bound to follow decisions of the Supreme Court unless those decisions have clearly been overruled or superseded.’ Prieskorn and Adkins remain good law, and we are bound by their holdings.” Affirmed.
Scoring of PRV 6; Defendant’s relationship to the criminal justice system; MCL 777.56(1)(b) & (c); Scoring of OV 9; MCL 777.39; Correction of the sentencing information report (SIR)
Holding that the trial court properly assessed PRV 6 at 15 points, the court affirmed defendant’s conviction and sentence, but remanded for the limited purpose of correcting typographical errors in her SIR. While serving a prison sentence, she was transported to a hospital and admitted to its psychiatric unit after attempting suicide. While there, she falsely reported that the deputy supervising her sexually assaulted her. After she recanted her allegation, she was charged with false report of a felony and eventually pleaded no contest. The trial court denied her subsequent motion to withdraw her plea challenging its imposition of mandatory consecutive sentencing and failure to give her credit for time served. On appeal, she challenged the trial court’s assessment of PRV 6 and an inaccurate SIR. The court disagreed with her first argument, but agreed there was a question as to whether the SIR was correct. She claimed “no points should have been assessed for [PRV 6] because she was on bond at the time she committed the underlying offense.” However, she “was still serving her prison sentence even though she was at the hospital when she committed the offense at issue.” As such, “the trial court properly assessed PRV 6 at 15 points.” As to her second claim, however, correction of the SIR was necessary because “the parties and trial court ultimately agreed to assess” OV 9 at 0 points, but the SIR still indicated 10 points. “There is no dispute that the trial court agreed to assess 0 points for OV 9 because there were no people placed in danger of injury or loss of life by the underlying offense. There is also no dispute that” it found “the correct sentencing range was 12 to 24 months. But the SIR . . . erroneously indicate[d] 10 points for OV 9 with the correct guideline minimum range of 12 to 24 months. Confusingly, while not noted by defendant, the SIR copies also differ as to whether OV 19 was assessed at 0 or 25 points.”
Sentencing for AWIM; Consideration of defendant’s youth; Miller v Alabama; People v Boykin; Proportionality; Effect of a within-guidelines sentence; Order that defendant be moved to an adult prison when she turned 18; Abuse of discretion standard; Constitutionality of the automatic waiver statute (MCL 712A.4); People v Hana
The court concluded that the trial court considered defendant’s youth in sentencing her for her AWIM conviction, and rejected her claim that her within-guidelines sentence was disproportionate. Further, the “trial court was well within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes when it ordered” her to be moved to an adult prison when she turned 18. Finally, her challenge to the constitutionality of the automatic waiver statute failed given that the Michigan Supreme Court ruled in Hana that it is constitutional. Thus, the court affirmed her 15 to 55-year sentence. The “case arose when defendant, then 14 years old, attempted to murder her best friend.” Relying on Miller, she asserted her sentence was “invalid because the trial court failed to consider her youth.” The Michigan Supreme Court noted in Boykin that while youth must be considered in imposing term-of-years sentences on juveniles convicted of first-degree murder, “‘this consideration need not be articulated on the record.’” Here, the trial court stated at defendant’s resentencing “that it ‘listened to all of the testimony’ that was provided during the hearing and read defendant’s sentencing memorandum and attached documents. The ‘testimony’” it referenced included “that of two of defendant’s experts, who testified at length about the effects of youth on cognitive function and decision-making as well as defendant’s specific growth and development since being incarcerated. In addition, [her] sentencing memorandum addressed defendant’s psychological evaluation, which discussed the immaturity of [her] frontal lobe and its impact on her decision-making capabilities, and also addressed her growth and progress toward rehabilitation. Finally, the documents attached to [her] sentencing memorandum reviewed by the trial court included the actual psychological evaluation as well as numerous letters of support for defendant. Given the extensive discussion of [her] youth in this evidence, the trial court did consider defendant’s youth when it resentenced her, even though it did not specifically articulate doing so.” As to her proportionality argument, she failed “to explain on appeal how” the mitigating factors she cited rendered “her sentence disproportionate in light of the trial court’s stated reasons.”
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies; Motion for relief from judgment on remand; Principle that a trial court may not grant relief from an appellate court’s judgment; Sumner v General Motors Co; Scope of remand; Notices of foreclosure; MCL 600.3212; Defect in a notice of foreclosure; Arnold v DMR Fin Servs, Inc; “Harm”; Choice of law; The one-action rule; MCL 600.3204(1)(b); Greenville Lafayette, LLC v Elgin State Bank; Sanctions; MCR 2.603(D)(4); MCR 2.119(E)
Holding that the trial court properly denied plaintiffs’ and intervenors’ relief from judgment motion and properly declined to consider new evidence, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant-Amos Financial. But it remanded on the issue of sanctions. Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant to prevent the foreclosures of its Michigan properties and obtain monetary damages, including damages related to the loss of several stores in Illinois. Plaintiffs and intervenors claimed defendant “could be held liable for purchasing ‘bad debt’ and ‘continuing’ the fraud by attempting to foreclose despite knowledge of” its predecessor’s fraudulent conduct. They also challenged a variety of defendant’s actions. On appeal, plaintiffs and intervenors argued that the trial court erred by denying their motion for relief from judgment and by failing to consider plaintiffs’ new evidence. The court disagreed, noting that “the trial court correctly decided that it lacked authority to grant relief from” the court’s judgment in a prior appeal. And because they “implicitly conceded the issue [of failure to exhaust administrative remedies] before, and fail[ed] to explain on appeal their reasons for doing so,” the court declined to consider their proposed evidence. It also found their argument that defendant “hid plaintiffs’ own actions from them disingenuous . . . .” The court next rejected their argument that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition for defendant “because (1) there were various defects in [its] notices of foreclosure; (2) the foreclosures violated Illinois law; and (3) the foreclosures violated the one-action rule.” First, the mortgagors listed on one of the mortgages were proper, the amounts due were not irreconcilable, there was no alleged false statement, and the date of assignment did not need to be listed. Second, because “each mortgage explicitly lists foreclosure by advertisement as one of the lender’s ‘rights and remedies’” in the event of a default, “the procedure to enforce this right is governed by Michigan law.” Third, defendant “was entitled to foreclose on both properties at issue on the basis of the parties’ default on the 2008 loan.” Finally, the court disagreed that the trial court erred in failing to consider sanctions under MCR 2.603(D)(4), but agreed that it erred by failing to do so under MCR 2.119(E). While the court’s “prior opinion did not expressly order the trial court to assess sanctions under MCR 2.119(E), its finding that Amos was subject to such sanctions, coupled with the mandatory term ‘shall’ in the rule itself, demonstrates that the trial court was required to consider sanctions under the rule on remand. Its failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.”
Motion for disbursement of the remaining proceeds after a real property tax-foreclosure sale; The General Property Tax Act; Whether MCL 211.78t violates procedural due process; In re Petition of Muskegon Cnty Treasurer for Foreclosure; Takings Clause claims; Waived arguments
In this appeal from the denial of a motion for disbursement of the remaining proceeds after a real property tax-foreclosure sale, the court held that the claimant-trust’s preserved issues (that MCL 211.78t violates procedural due process and taking claims under the federal and state constitutions) failed in light of Muskegon Cnty Treasurer. Claimant waived the five other issues it raised for the first time on appeal, and the court also found they lacked merit. As to claimant’s preserved issues, the court noted that it held in Muskegon Cnty Treasurer “that the ‘[t]he statutory scheme set up by our Legislature . . . satisfies due process[,]’ and that, if the procedures in MCL 211.78t are followed, ‘the risk of erroneous deprivation is nil . . . .’” Because the court was bound by the decision in Muskegon Cnty Treasurer, “and petitioner followed the procedures outlined in MCL 211.78t, claimant has failed to establish that its due process rights were violated.” The court also held in Muskegon Cnty Treasurer “that the respondents did not have a compensable Takings Clause claim because the Legislature provided a statutory pathway to recover any remaining proceeds, the petitioner followed this statutory scheme, and the respondents failed to take the minimally burdensome first step to recover the proceeds by filing a timely notice of intention. Again, because” the court was bound by that holding, claimant “failed to establish that it has a compensable Takings Clause claim.” Further, the court saw no faults in Muskegon Cnty Treasurer “warranting a conflict opinion” so that a special panel of the court could review that decision.