Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.
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Retaliation claim under Title VII; Whether defendant-former employer offered non-pretextual reasons for terminating plaintiff; Whether her surreptitious recordings of work events motivated her termination; Work attendance & tardiness; Belief that plaintiff did not want to return to work
The court affirmed the district court’s ruling that defendant-Majestic was entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff-Bashaw’s Title VII retaliation claim where Majestic provided three independent, non-pretextual reasons for firing her. Bashaw worked as the Director of Social Services for Majestic. During her four months on the job, she had several concerns about patient care and staff performance. She eventually told Majestic’s HR Representative of her concerns, including allegations that Majestic’s Executive Director and Bashaw’s manager (B) made culturally insensitive remarks and sexually harassed employees. Majestic fired her after it was determined that her allegations were unfounded. Bashaw sued under Title VII and Ohio law, claiming that she was fired in retaliation for reporting B’s behavior and expressing concerns about resident care. On appeal, the court considered the reasons Majestic offered to support its termination decision, including that Bashaw (1) had secretly recorded work meetings and conversations; (2) was repeatedly late for work and had been absent from work without prior authorization for eight and one-half half days; and (3) had told the HR Vice President (N) that “‘she did not want to return to work.’” The court explained that only one legitimate reason was needed. It rejected her claim that her recording activity was only a pretext to discharge her since Majestic did not have an official policy regarding recording meetings or conversations. It cited several sister circuits’ cases that have held that “the lack of an official policy or law prohibiting the behavior does not itself demonstrate pretext on” an employer’s part. “Bashaw’s surreptitious recording not only undermined Majestic Care’s trust in her, but Majestic Care reasonably believed they increased its risk of legal liability. An employer may terminate an employee for creating legal risk for the company.” The court also rejected her argument that Majestic’s reliance on her attendance and tardiness issues was a pretext where other similarly situated employees were not fired. The court found that Bashaw did not offer sufficient evidence regarding the one alleged comparator to determine whether her situation was of “‘comparable seriousness’” to Bashaw’s conduct. She also claimed that there was no evidence she said that she did not want to return to work. But there was evidence that management was told that she was looking for other jobs, and N testified that Bashaw conveyed to her that “‘[s]he didn’t want to return to the building.’” The court held that N “reasonably formed an honest belief that Bashaw no longer wished to work at Majestic Care.”
42 USC § 1983; Qualified immunity; Fabrication of evidence claim; The Fourth Amendment & the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; Jackson v City of Cleveland; “Causation”; Whether “clearly established law” was violated; Pyle v Kansas; Federal malicious prosecution; Lack of probable cause; Michigan malicious prosecution; Governmental immunity under Michigan law; Odom v Wayne Cnty.; Brady v Maryland claim
[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the district court properly denied defendants-police officers (Abdallah and Smith) qualified immunity on plaintiffs-Clark’s and Harrington’s claims that defendants fabricated evidence in plaintiffs’ murder trials. It also upheld the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the federal malicious-prosecution, Michigan malicious-prosecution, and Brady claims. After nearly 20 years in prison, plaintiffs were released and their murder charges were dismissed after an investigation by the county prosecutor’s office concluded they “‘did not receive a fair trial as a result of the conduct of the original lead detective[.]’” They then sued defendants under § 1983, claiming among other things that they violated their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by introducing fabricated evidence at the jury trials through the testimony of witnesses-S and W. The court rejected defendants’ argument that the district court erred in considering plaintiffs’ fabrication-of-evidence claim as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “rather than as a violation of the right to be free from unlawful seizures under the Fourth Amendment.” It held that this argument was “a nonstarter because we have recognized fabrication-of-evidence claims under” both Amendments. As for the constitutional violation, the district court’s conclusion that there were genuine fact issues as to whether defendants fabricated S’s inculpatory preliminary exam “testimony (which was presented at their trials) rested on the following facts from the record: (1) [S] repeatedly denied knowing anything about the crime; (2) [S] told inconsistent stories; (3)” defendants were aware that Clark had an alibi witness; and (4) they “‘pressured [S] into giving a statement by threatening to take away her children.’” As to W, the district court cited among other facts that “(1) Abdallah interviewed [W] while she was in jail; (2) [he] insinuated that he would help [W] with her case if she testified against Plaintiffs (and arranged for her release without bond); (3) [he] threatened to take away [W’s] children;” and (4) she was suffering from drug withdrawal. The court noted that “even if each fact alone would not support a fabrication claim, the conclusion does not follow that the combination of facts could not support an inference that officers knew the statement they procured was false.” Defendants’ arguments that the law was not clearly established failed where the Supreme Court held that threatening witnesses to commit perjury violated the constitution as early as 1942. Affirmed and remanded.
Michigan sex offender registry under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA); Determining whether two crimes are substantially similar for SORA purposes; The “categorical approach”; Whether two crimes “correspond”; Full Faith & Credit Clause; “Foreign judgment”; MCL 691.1172; Cruel or unusual punishment; People v Kiczenski; Equal protection; Ex post facto punishment; Vagueness challenge; Fair notice; Due process
Concluding that petitioner’s “release from registry requirements in Iowa” did not come “with a corresponding requirement that [he] be relieved of his registry requirements in Michigan[,]” the court affirmed the trial court’s order denying his “petition to be relieved of the requirement to register” under SORA. Noting that neither it “nor the Michigan Supreme Court have considered what approach should be employed to determine whether an out-of-state conviction is substantially similar to a Michigan offense for” SORA purposes, the court concluded that in “this case, it would lead to an absurd result to enforce a strictly categorical approach for determining what crimes under SORA are substantially similar.” Petitioner first argued that “he was not convicted of a crime that is substantially similar to a Michigan crime.” Thus, he asserted that he was not required to register under MCL 28.722. The court held that “a person such as petitioner who is convicted of lascivious acts with a child under Iowa Code § 709.8 is subject to sex offender registration requirements as a Tier-II offender in Michigan, and the trial court did not err when it determined that Iowa’s statute concerning lascivious acts with a child, Iowa Code § 709.8(3), and Michigan’s accosting a minor for immoral purposes, MCL 750.145a, are substantially similar.” The court next rejected his arguments based on the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. He contended that, “once the Iowa courts ordered him removed from the Iowa sex offender registry, those constitutional and statutory provisions required that he be removed from the Michigan registry as well.” His argument was unavailing “because the two registration requirements are independent of one another.” His registration requirement in Michigan stemmed “from his Iowa conviction and not his Iowa registration requirement.” Due to his “Iowa conviction, Michigan’s SORA independently requires petitioner to register with the sex offender registry of this state. An Iowa court may not modify the terms or application of Michigan’s SORA through a decision regarding the enforcement of Iowa’s sex offender registry laws.” He next contended “that requiring him to report as a sex offender is excessively harsh considering the gravity of the offense and fails to advance the goals of rehabilitation.” The court held that under Kiczenski, it was “bound to conclude that petitioner’s registration under SORA does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment[.]” Finally, it held that he failed to show “that SORA’s petition process presents an equal-protection violation, and the trial court did not err when it denied [his] request to be removed from SORA’s reporting regime.”
Property rights dispute; Easement agreement; Effect of a lease agreement; Assignment of an easement agreement interest; Effect of an integration clause; Determining the intent of parties to multiple agreements relating to the same subject matter; Omnicom of MI v Giannetti Inv Co; Whether the easement was extinguished by a tax foreclosure; MCL 211.78k(5)(e); “Or”; Whether a lease was extinguished by the tax foreclosure; “All”; Whether the easement’s purpose ceased to exist
The court held that the trial court did not err in ruling that third-party defendant-Five Star’s easement was not extinguished by a tax foreclosure. But plaintiff-Outfront’s lease agreement was extinguished. The court also found that “the easement’s purpose survives tax foreclosure, even though Outfront’s lease does not.” Defendant-CHHC purchased the property at issue at a tax foreclosure sale. At that time, Outfront “allegedly was operating the billboard located on the property pursuant to” a 2007 lease agreement entered into by the then-property owner (nonparty-Eastside) with nonparty-CBS. The day after the lease agreement was entered into, “Eastside entered into a Perpetual Easement Agreement (easement agreement #1) with” a business entity affiliated with Eastside (nonparty-JJ). They later entered into easement agreement #2. JJ “assigned its interest in easement agreement #1 to” nonparty-VIP, and Eastside and JJ eventually rescinded easement agreement #2. VIP assigned its interest in easement agreement #1 to Five Star. CHHC argued among other things “that JJ was not able to assign its interest in easement agreement #1 to VIP because easement agreement #1 was rendered invalid by easement agreement #2, which contained an integration clause . . . .” But the court concluded that because the agreements “are identical, cover the same subject matter, and do not contain inconsistent terms, [they] confirm the parties’ intent that Eastside convey a perpetual easement to JJ to construct and maintain billboards on the property.” As to whether the easement was extinguished by the tax foreclosure, the court held that the easement “did not have to also be a right-of-way to survive tax foreclosure under MCL 211.78k(5)(e).” But under the statute, as to “leases, only ‘interests of a lessee or an assignee of an interest of a lessee under a recorded oil or gas lease’ survive tax foreclosure.” Next, the court disagreed with CHHC “that the extinguishing of the Lease Agreement results in the easement’s purpose no longer existing.” The easement’s purpose “was to grant JJ and its successors the exclusive right to construct and maintain a billboard, not only Outfront’s billboard.” As to CHHC’s third-party complaint, the court affirmed the order granting Five Star summary disposition and denying CHHS summary disposition. As to Outfront’s complaint, it vacated the trial court’s judgment granting Outfront summary disposition and remanded for entry of an order granting CHHS summary disposition.
Endorsed witness; MCL 767.40a; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request a hearing to determine due diligence; Hearsay statements; MRE 803(3) & (4); Right to confrontation
The court held that the “trial court did not commit plain error by failing to conduct a due diligence hearing regarding the prosecution’s efforts to produce” one of the victims (S) “as a witness at trial. Any error by defense counsel by not objecting to the absence of [S] was effectively harmless given its occurrence in a bench trial and the presumption a trial court knows the applicable law regarding a missing witness instruction, which the record bore out” here. Also, defendant was “not entitled to a new trial or a due diligence hearing. Any error by the trial court in admitting [S’s] statements under MRE 803(3) or the nurse’s statements under MRE 803(4) was harmless. There was no plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights to confront the witnesses against him.” He was convicted of AWIM and felony-firearm. Defendant contended, among other things, that “the trial court failed to conduct a hearing to determine whether the prosecution exercised due diligence to produce [S], an endorsed witness, denying him a fair trial and depriving him of due process.” The court found that even “presuming there was a violation of MCL 767.40a for the failure to hold a due diligence hearing to determine the prosecution’s efforts in producing [S], defendant ‘must show that he was prejudiced by noncompliance with the statute’ to warrant a reversal.” He could not show any prejudice. On the contrary, he “was the beneficiary of the missing witness instruction when the prosecution failed to produce” S. Defendant’s claim that S’s “testimony would be favorable to his defense is mere speculation and unsupported by any evidence.” He did not show “that the failure to hold a due diligence hearing concerning the prosecution’s efforts in producing [S] affected his bench trial verdict.” Further, contrary to his claim, “the trial court did not base his convictions solely on the testimony of” the other victim (H), defendant, and defendant’s son and codefendant, “but also on the video and audio exhibits, as well as the ballistics evidence.” The record evidence supported the trial court’s verdict. “Defendant was not denied a fair trial or deprived of due process under” the federal or state constitution. Also, he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. The court held that “even assuming defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness when he did not request a due diligence hearing, defendant has not shown he was prejudiced or a different result would have been reasonably probable.” Affirmed.
Right of confrontation; Testimonial evidence; Davis v Washington; Waiver; Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to request a jury instruction on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter; MCL 768.32(1); MCL 780.972(1)(a); People v Mitchell; People v Pennington; Adequate provocation; Trial strategy; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 9 (number of victims); MCL 777.39(1)(c); People v Teike; Proximity; Right to be sentenced based on accurate information
The court held that defendant was not denied his right of confrontation or his right to the effective assistance of counsel, and the trial court did not err by assessing 10 points for OV 9. He was convicted of second-degree murder and felony-firearm for shooting and killing his sister’s (G) boyfriend (J). The trial court sentenced him to 45 to 70 years for the former and a consecutive 2 years for the latter. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that he was denied his right of confrontation when the trial court admitted G’s statements to a police officer on the day of the shooting. Defendant stipulated that G “made the statements recorded on the officer’s bodycam video. [He] thereby waived any claim of error resulting from the admission of the statements on that basis.” In addition, he had the opportunity to question G regarding the same information she stated to the officer on the day of the shooting. The court also rejected his claim that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance when she failed to request a jury instruction on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. “Defense counsel’s choice not to request a voluntary manslaughter instruction . . . was strategic because a voluntary manslaughter defense would have required defendant to present evidence that he acted in the heat of passion rather than out of self-preservation.” Further, the facts “do not reasonably support the conclusion that defendant’s act was the product of adequate provocation.” Finally, the court rejected his contention that his sentencing guidelines were incorrectly scored because the trial court improperly assessed 10 points for OV 9, resulting in his sentence being based on inaccurate information. Immediately after shooting the victim “and while still holding the gun, defendant walked past MB, [J’s] teenage sister, who was hysterical, and told her that he would shoot her, too, if she was not quiet. Although MB did not suffer actual harm, defendant caused her to be in ‘close proximity to a physically threatening situation,’ and MB thereby qualified as a victim under OV 9.” Affirmed.
Jury selection; Excusal of a juror for cause; MCR 2.511(E); Presumption of bias; Familial relationship; MCR 2.511(E)(8); Prosecutorial error; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Trial strategy; Failure to make a futile objection; Prejudice; Cumulative error
The court held that: (1) the trial judge did not err by failing to sua sponte excuse a prospective juror, (2) defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct, and (3) he was not entitled to a new trial. He was convicted of several charges of varying degrees of CSC and indecent exposure for sexually abusing his neighbor, HS, beginning when she was age 8, and culminating with him indecently exposing himself to her when she was 15. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that he was entitled to a new trial because of the trial court’s failure to sua sponte excuse a prospective juror, Juror 170, for cause. Defendant highlighted “remarks made at sentencing to show the trial judge believed that he was guilty. But there [was] nothing to connect Juror 170 to those comments, aside from the acknowledged familial relationship and speculation.” In addition, “during voir dire, Juror 170 expressed, albeit somewhat qualifiedly, that she would be able to render a fair and impartial verdict and follow the trial court’s instructions.” The court also rejected his claim that the prosecutor improperly responded to the theory of the defense in cross-examination, and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object. “[T]he prosecutor did not commit error or misconduct when asking [defendant] about his failure to mention a corroborating witness before trial.” The court discouraged “prosecutors from asking defendants about matters of trial strategy, including knowledge of the law and criminal procedure, because doing so is outside a defendant’s wheelhouse and could promote the revealing of attorney-client confidences on the record.” But because “the omission of these questions from cross-examination would not have made a difference to” defendant’s case, it found no error affecting his substantial rights. Defense counsel’s “failure to object to the prosecutor’s conduct” was not objectively unreasonable. “And even if it were,” there was “no prejudice.” Finally, the court rejected his contention that “the cumulative effect of errors, i.e., a disqualified juror being impaneled and the prosecutor’s misconduct, denied him a fair trial.” Because he “has not identified any error, let alone several errors, that undermined the reliability of the verdict, there can be no cumulative effect of errors requiring reversal.” Affirmed.
Sentencing; Two-level enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1); § B1.3(a)(1)(B)(i)–(iii); Whether the government established that defendant could have “reasonably foreseen” that his co-conspirator had guns; United States v Woods; Procedural & substantive challenges to the late addendum to the PSR; FedRCrimP 32(g); Whether the FIP charge was part of the drug conspiracy; Consecutive sentencing; 18 USC § 3584(a); Consideration of the § 3553(a) factors
The court held that defendant-Brown should have “reasonably foreseen” that guns would be used in the charged drug conspiracy where, under the court’s precedent, the district court was entitled to infer that weapons were reasonably foreseeable given the “vast quantities” of meth involved in the trafficking operation. It also rejected his challenges to the third addendum to his PSR. Brown pled guilty to conspiring to distribute meth and FIP. He was sentenced to 310 months. The court first upheld the enhancement of his sentence under § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possessing a dangerous weapon. Brown’s main argument was that the government failed to establish that he could have “reasonably foreseen” that his co-conspirator had guns. The court noted the amount of drugs recovered—the meth “found was worth half a million dollars (when sold as a unit) and over a million dollars (when sold by the gram).” Brown admitted to knowing the quantity of drugs involved. The “district court relied on the ‘massive amount of drugs’ recovered nearby to infer that firearms were reasonably foreseeable.” The court explained that even though it has previously held that “mere participation in a drug conspiracy doesn’t make a co-conspirator’s firearm possession reasonably foreseeable[,]” it has “repeatedly affirmed that such possession is foreseeable ‘when there are massive amounts of drugs in a single location.’” As to Brown’s challenges to the third addendum to his PSR, his procedural challenge was that the late addendum (filed a day before the scheduled sentencing hearing) violated Rule 32(g). But the district court postponed the sentencing hearing for two weeks, allowing Brown “ample time” to prepare. The court also rejected his substantive challenge, in which he argued that his FIP “charge was relevant conduct to the drug conspiracy—and thus couldn’t factor into his criminal history.” The court disagreed, holding that considering “the two offenses’ elements, proximity, common victims, and common criminal plan or intent yields a straightforward conclusion. Brown’s [FIP] offense wasn’t a part of the” meth conspiracy. Among other things, his “guns weren’t found at the drug operation headquarters. They were found elsewhere, in a car outside [his] house, over a month after the drug conspiracy ended.” Lastly, the court upheld the district court’s ruling that his sentences were to run consecutively where this decision was within its discretion. The district court applied the § 3553(a) factors to each separate offense, and provided an explanation for imposing the sentences consecutively, stating it wished “to provide ‘sufficient punishment’ for two ‘separate’ criminal offenses.” Affirmed.
The Immigration & Nationality Act (INA); Removal after conviction of an “aggravated felony” (8 USC § 1101(a)(43)); § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); Whether a Virginia arson conviction constituted an “aggravated felony” under the INA; 18 USC § 844(i) (the federal arson statute); Whether the Virginia statute was “broader” than the federal statute; Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA); Department of Homeland Security (DHS); Immigration judge (IJ)
The court denied petitioner-Mohammed’s petition for review of the BIA’s removal order, holding that her Virginia arson conviction constituted an “aggravated felony” under the INA, making her deportable under § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Petitioner, a lawful permanent U.S. resident, is a citizen and native of Trinidad and Tobago. After she pled guilty to arson in Virginia, the DHS charged her as removable on the ground that her conviction constituted an aggravated felony. She sought cancellation of removal when she appeared before an IJ, who ruled that the conviction qualified as an aggravated felony and thus, that she was removable and ineligible for discretionary relief. She appealed, and the BIA affirmed the order. The court reviewed the INA definitions of “aggravated felony.” Relevant here, the term includes “‘an offense described in’” § 844(i), the federal arson statute. That statute provides that it is “a crime to ‘maliciously damage[] or destroy[], or attempt[] to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate . . . commerce or in any activity affecting interstate . . . commerce.’” The court had to determine whether petitioner’s Virginia arson conviction “is an offense described in the federal arson statute.” Using the categorical approach, it compared the federal and state statutes. It explained that “[i]f the state offense criminalizes a broader range of conduct than its federal counterpart, it does not qualify as an aggravated felony.” It noted that the “primary difference between the statutes is that the Virginia arson statute expressly applies to conduct that aids and abets arson while the language of the federal arson statute does not.” Petitioner relied on this to argue that the Virginia statute was “broader” than the federal one. But the court noted there is no longer “any distinction between principals and accomplices for purposes of criminal liability” under Virginia law (as with federal law). The court has “explained that ‘aiding and abetting is simply an alternative theory of liability indistinct from the substantive crime.’ . . . This matters because our ‘categorical analysis is reserved for the elements of the offense.’” The court concluded that because “the federal arson statute necessarily incorporates the aiding-and-abetting statute, the Virginia arson statute is not broader than the federal arson statute.” Thus, petitioner’s state arson conviction qualified as an aggravated felony.
Motion for relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f); Motion for reconsideration; Arbitration agreement; Personal injury protection (PIP) benefits
Concluding that “the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion for relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) and denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration[,]” the court reversed and remanded. The case arose out of a motor vehicle accident after which plaintiff sought PIP benefits. He argued “that the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant’s motion when it concluded that the arbitration judgment was properly entered based on defendant’s version of the arbitration agreement.” The court noted that “the trial court effectively determined the summary disposition issue concerning the validity of the arbitration agreement, which was not at issue in the underlying order or motion to set aside from which defendant sought relief, by finding that ‘judgment was properly entered based on the arbitration agreement signed by all of the parties . . . .’ Though the trial court has the ability to revise its nonfinal orders. . . it erred here by assessing the substantive question of whether the parties had a valid arbitration agreement under the standard set forth in MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f), without analysis of the underlying motions for summary disposition or reconsideration.” The court found that the “trial court applied the wrong legal standard in effectively determining this issue under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) without making a record analyzing the . . . facts. Indeed, the extent of the trial court’s analysis in determining that defendant’s version of the agreement controlled was that ‘[t]he existence of a second document, unsigned by [d]efendant, [was] not sufficient to demonstrate the invalidity of the document signed by all parties.’ The trial court should have analyzed this issue in the summary disposition context, construing the evidence in favor of plaintiff and abstaining from making its own factual determinations.” Thus, the court held that “because the trial court applied the wrong standard in granting defendant’s motion for relief on this basis, it abused its discretion.”
Fishing rights; Challenges to the 2023 Great Lakes Fishing Decree; Whether the district court had the authority to approve the 2003 Decree without one tribe’s consent; The rule of reason standard established in People v. LeBlanc (MI); “Law of the case”; Whether the district court should have held a trial to resolve objections before entering the 2023 Decree; Requirement that a federal court decree further the objectives of the law upon which the initial complaint was based; Whether the Decree remedied a violation of federal law
[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that the district court did not require the consent of all the parties before entering the 2023 Great Lakes Fishing Decree, but instead, “properly exercised its continuing jurisdiction and inherent equitable power—just as it had done in 1982, 1983, and 1985—to approve the 2023 Decree.” The 2023 Decree arose from a three-year negotiation between seven sovereign entities, including the United States, the State of Michigan, and several Native American tribes, to resolve differences “in the allocation, management, and regulation of fishing in the Great Lakes waters.” It sought to preserve the Tribes’ treaty-reserved rights as well as “the fishery waters as an ecological resource.” The 2023 Decree followed several prior decrees. Intervenor plaintiff-Sault Ste. Marie Tribe was the only party that refused to stipulate to the new 2023 Decree. Among many objections, it argued that the district court lacked the jurisdiction to enter the Decree without its consent. The district court overruled all the objections and entered the 2023 Decree. On appeal, the court first held that the district court was not required to get the Sault Tribe’s consent before approving the 2023 Decree because it was “not a consent decree; it is a judicial decree imposed pursuant to its decades long continuing jurisdiction and inherent equitable power.” The district court’s broad authority to enter the decree over the Sault Tribe’s objections was supported by “the law of the case.” The court also held that the district court did not err by not conducting a trial to resolve objections before entering the 2023 Decree where neither the court nor the district courts have “required the parties to hold a full trial on fishery allocation, even when a party does not consent to a proposed set of regulations.” In addition, the court concluded that “the district court did not abuse its discretion by entering the 2023 Decree because it remains tailored to further the objectives of the law upon which the initial complaint was based: to ensure that the Tribes’ treaty rights to a scarce natural resource would remain protected.” Affirmed.