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Providing summaries of opinions as they are released from the Michigan Supreme Court, Michigan Court of Appeals (published & unpublished), and selected U.S. Sixth Circuit. Over 60,000 cases summarized to date.

 

 

Case Summary

Includes summaries of three Michigan Court of Appeals published opinions under Constitutional Law, Municipal/Real Property, and Real Property/Tax.


Cases appear under the following practice areas:

    • Business Law (1)

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      This summary also appears under Intellectual Property

      e-Journal #: 86810
      Case: Ford Motor Co. v. InterMotive, Inc.
      Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
      Judges: Clay, Kethledge, and Nalbandian
      Issues:

      Trade secret misappropriation under the Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act (MUTSA); Motion for judgment as a matter of law; Jury instructions on damages; Apportionment between protected & unprotected elements; MCL 445.1904; Burden-shifting; Sufficiency of the evidence as to damages; Unfair competition award under the Lanham Act; Reduction by the district court to prevent duplicative recovery; La Quinta Corp v Heartland Props LLC; Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Sols, Inc v Renesas Elecs Am, Inc (Fed Cir); Enhanced remedies under the Lanham Act; 15 USC § 1117(a); Trademark infringement; Motion for enhanced damages; Exclusion of expert testimony; Disgorgement remedy; Motion in limine; Exclusion of evidence & argument on an implied contract theory

      Summary:

      [This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the district court did not err in denying plaintiff-Ford’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on defendant-InterMotive’s trade secret counterclaim under the MUTSA. It rejected Ford’s challenges to the jury instructions on trade secret misappropriation and to the sufficiency of InterMotive’s evidence on damages. The court upheld the district court’s (1) reduction of the jury’s damages award for unfair competition under the Lanham Act to prevent double or duplicative recovery, (2) denial of InterMotive’s motion for enhanced damages for trademark infringement, (3) exclusion of expert testimony related to disgorgement, and (4) grant of Ford’s motion in limine to exclude evidence and argument as to an implied contract theory. The parties had previously had a business relationship involving InterMotive’s designing an Upfitter Interface Module for Ford. On appeal, the court first declined to disturb the jury’s verdict for InterMotive on its trade secret claim, concluding the jury was entitled to credit the “testimony from InterMotive’s expert over other testimony and evidence in reaching its verdict.” As to the jury instructions on trade secret misappropriation, it found that “the district court’s burden-shifting approach and instructions to the jury were not erroneous[.]” It also agreed with the district court that the “‘jury could have reasonably found that Ford’s modules sales (and therefore module profits) were caused by Ford’s use of the trade secret, and that the stipulated number of Ford’s module sales represents the amount of additional module sales.’” As to the reduction of the unfair competition damages award, the court agreed “with the district court’s interpretation of La Quinta” and with its reliance on Texas Advanced, in which the Federal Circuit “determined that a jury verdict constituted an impermissible double recovery on very similar facts.” The court next found that InterMotive failed to show “that the district court applied the wrong law or otherwise abused its discretion in declining to enhance damages” for trademark infringement. It also upheld the exclusion of the expert testimony applying “a disgorgement of profits damages theory to InterMotive’s” contract breach claim. Finally, it held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that both it and Ford “had not been put on adequate notice that InterMotive was asserting” an implied contract claim. Affirmed.

    • Constitutional Law (1)

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      e-Journal #: 86822
      Case: Northland Family Planning Ctr. v. Attorney Gen.
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Published Opinion )
      Judges: Borrello, Bazzi, and Lievense
      Issues:

      Constitutional right to reproductive freedom; Const 1963, art 1, § 28; MCL 333.17015 & MCL 333.17015a; Facial constitutional challenge; Strict scrutiny; Mandatory 24-hour waiting period; Uniform informed-consent requirements; Physician-only mandate; Coercion-to-abort screening; Nondiscrimination mandate under § 28(2); Appellate jurisdiction

      Summary:

      The court held that Michigan’s mandatory 24-hour waiting period, uniform informed-consent requirements, and physician-only abortion mandate were unconstitutional, while the coercion-screening provisions do not burden or infringe that right under § 28(1). But further proceedings were required to determine whether those provisions discriminate in the protection or enforcement of reproductive freedom under § 28(2). Plaintiffs challenged provisions of MCL 333.17015 and 333.17015a after Michigan voters adopted the reproductive-freedom amendment. The court first concluded that the amendment expressly subjects burdens on that right to strict scrutiny. Once a statute imposes burdens, the State must establish a compelling interest, as constitutionally defined, and show the restriction is the least restrictive means of achieving it. As to the 24-hour waiting period, the record showed increased costs, delays, and other burdens without improved patient outcomes. The State “failed to identify any compelling empirical support” showing that the categorical delay advanced patient health in a way less restrictive alternatives could not. The uniform informed-consent provisions likewise failed because their “rigid, one-size-fits-all approach” displaced individualized clinical judgment and required information that could be irrelevant or detrimental in particular circumstances. The physician-only provision also impermissibly restricted access by excluding advanced practice clinicians even though the record supported their ability to safely provide early abortion care. The State failed to carry its strict-scrutiny burden as to each mandate. Next, the court found no error in the determination that coercion screening itself does not burden or infringe reproductive freedom because the provisions permit individualized screening and seek to protect voluntary decision-making. But it held that facial neutrality did not resolve § 28(2). Because the statutory scheme specifically addresses coercion to abort without similarly addressing coercion to become or remain pregnant, the court concluded that this asymmetry required examination of whether the law discriminates in protecting or enforcing the full spectrum of reproductive choices. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.

    • Criminal Law (3)

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      e-Journal #: 86765
      Case: People v. Lewis
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam – Young, Redford, and Feeney; Concurrence – Young
      Issues:

      Sentencing; Proportionality & reasonableness; People v Lampe; Effect of a within-guidelines sentence; People v Posey; “Unusual circumstances”; People v Bowling

      Summary:

      Holding that defendant failed “to overcome the presumption that his within-guidelines sentence” was proportionate, the court concluded that the trial court sentenced him “to a proportionate and reasonable” sentence. He was convicted of delivery of meth and marijuana. He was originally sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender and a drug subsequent offender to concurrent terms of 15 to 40 years for the meth conviction and 2 to 8 years for the marijuana conviction. After the correction of an error as to his criminal history, the trial court resentenced him to concurrent terms of 10 to 40 years for the meth conviction and 2 to 8 years for the marijuana conviction. On appeal, the court found the record did not support his claim “that the trial court failed to meaningfully engage with the individual facts of” the case. Its reliance on the “guidelines satisfied the articulation requirement.” And while defendant asserted “that his institutional record, articulation of remorse, and comparative culpability are unusual, he” did not further articulate this argument and failed “to establish unusual circumstances that would have rendered his presumptively proportionate sentence disproportionate.” The court noted that his comments at resentencing supported “that the trial court considered his conduct while in custody and his expression of remorse.” Its statements at resentencing showed “that it thoroughly considered the circumstances of the offense and the applicable guidelines range to determine an appropriate penalty. [It] explicitly stated that it was considering the matter anew given that defendant erroneously had a cocaine conviction attributed to him. [It] reviewed briefs, considered the seriousness of the offense, and highlighted the judiciary’s role in protecting the public and community. Even though [it] made side comments about a ‘separate case,’ [it] also said that it was ‘not attributing any of that to [defendant]’ and made clear that it was ‘just commenting on the general malaise’ and drug culture in Benton Harbor. Recognizing that drug culture and drug trafficking contributed to ‘the general degradation of the community,’ the trial court stressed that the purpose of imposing its within-guidelines sentence was punishment, protection of the community, deterrence, reformation, and restitution.”

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      e-Journal #: 86764
      Case: People v. Thomas
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Wallace and Cameron; Concurrence - Cameron; Dissent – Korobkin
      Issues:

      Motion for relief from judgment; Cruel or unusual punishment; Const 1963, art 1, § 16; Parolable life sentences for offenses committed at age 18; People v Sykes; People v Eads; Stare decisis; MCR 7.215(J)(1); People v Bullock factors

      Summary:

      The court held that defendant failed to establish that his discretionary, parolable life sentences for second-degree murder and AWIM committed when he was 18 years old constituted cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution. He sought relief from judgment based on recent decisions addressing the constitutionality of severe sentences imposed on youthful offenders. On appeal, the court concluded that it remained bound by Sykes, which held that a parolable life sentence for second-degree murder committed by a 20-year-old did not violate Const 1963, art 1, § 16. Although the Supreme Court subsequently decided Eads, which held that a 50-to-75-year sentence for second-degree murder committed by a youthful offender was unconstitutional, the court emphasized that “Eads did not explicitly overrule Sykes.” The cases also involved materially different circumstances. Eads concerned a 16-year-old serving a term-of-years sentence, while defendant was 18 and received discretionary parolable life sentences. Thus, because Eads “did not clearly modify Sykes’s holding as it pertained to a parolable life sentence for an adult convicted of second-degree murder committed before the age of 21, this Court remains bound by Sykes.” The court also rejected defendant’s reliance on the Bullock factors. As in Sykes, the record contained insufficient evidence regarding sentences imposed in other jurisdictions, including whether adults under 21 receive parolable life sentences and how other jurisdictions administer parole. The court ultimately found “no facts or evidence upon which we might reasonably conclude that MCL 750.317 or MCL 750.83 constitute cruel or unusual punishment insofar as they authorize the imposition of defendant’s non-mandatory, parolable life sentences.” Affirmed.

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      e-Journal #: 86761
      Case: United States v. Cook
      Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
      Judges: Thapar and Hermandorfer; Concurring in part & in the the judgment – Moore
      Issues:

      Search-warrant affidavit; Franks v Delaware hearing; Intentional or reckless falsehood; Evidence outside the affidavit; Ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal; Sentencing; Acceptance of responsibility; USSG § 3E1.1(a); Career-offender enhancement; USSG § 4B1.1; Procedural & substantive reasonableness; 18 USC § 3553(a); Confidential informant (CI)

      Summary:

      The court held that the district court did not err in denying defendant a Franks hearing, declined to consider his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal, and concluded his substantially below-Guidelines sentence was neither procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. After officers observed two controlled drug buys outside defendant’s home, they obtained a search warrant and found drugs, firearms, ammunition, and drug-trafficking materials. He ultimately pled guilty to several drug and firearm offenses and received a 248-month sentence, 112 months below the bottom of his Guidelines range. On appeal, he argued that statements in the warrant affidavit concerning surveillance of his back door and the CI’s identification of him were false. The court concluded that he failed to make the substantial preliminary showing of a knowing, intentional, or reckless falsehood necessary for a Franks hearing. The photos he offered did not establish that officers could not see the rear of the house because “[t]he affidavit made clear that multiple officers were surveilling the house during each drug deal,” and police reports confirmed that an officer was positioned on a golf course behind the house during one controlled buy. The court also rejected defendant’s contention that the government could not rely on evidence outside the warrant affidavit at this preliminary stage, reasoning that “judges should have the whole picture before them in order to see whether an evidentiary hearing is appropriate.” His second claimed falsehood likewise failed because the affidavit only stated that the CI identified defendant’s photo as the person known as “‘JR.’ There’s not even a hint of falsehood here.” As to ineffective assistance, the court declined direct review because “the record doesn’t plainly show ineffective lawyering” and did not reveal why prior counsel declined to pursue the Franks arguments. As to sentencing, the district court properly denied an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction where defendant operated a drug-trafficking scheme while incarcerated and was caught smuggling drugs on the day he pled guilty. The court noted, it has “‘repeatedly upheld decisions denying the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction to defendants who engaged in conduct similar to the offense of conviction while awaiting the entry of a plea or sentencing.’” The career-offender enhancement was also properly applied, resulting in a Guidelines range of 360 months to life. Finally, defendant failed to show that the 248-month sentence was substantively unreasonable where the district court considered his personal history, addiction, sentencing disparities, lengthy criminal record, continued drug activity, and need for deterrence and public protection. “In short, there’s no sign that the court improperly weighed the § 3553(a) factors.” Affirmed.

    • Intellectual Property (1)

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      This summary also appears under Business Law

      e-Journal #: 86810
      Case: Ford Motor Co. v. InterMotive, Inc.
      Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit ( Published Opinion )
      Judges: Clay, Kethledge, and Nalbandian
      Issues:

      Trade secret misappropriation under the Michigan Uniform Trade Secrets Act (MUTSA); Motion for judgment as a matter of law; Jury instructions on damages; Apportionment between protected & unprotected elements; MCL 445.1904; Burden-shifting; Sufficiency of the evidence as to damages; Unfair competition award under the Lanham Act; Reduction by the district court to prevent duplicative recovery; La Quinta Corp v Heartland Props LLC; Texas Advanced Optoelectronic Sols, Inc v Renesas Elecs Am, Inc (Fed Cir); Enhanced remedies under the Lanham Act; 15 USC § 1117(a); Trademark infringement; Motion for enhanced damages; Exclusion of expert testimony; Disgorgement remedy; Motion in limine; Exclusion of evidence & argument on an implied contract theory

      Summary:

      [This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the district court did not err in denying plaintiff-Ford’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on defendant-InterMotive’s trade secret counterclaim under the MUTSA. It rejected Ford’s challenges to the jury instructions on trade secret misappropriation and to the sufficiency of InterMotive’s evidence on damages. The court upheld the district court’s (1) reduction of the jury’s damages award for unfair competition under the Lanham Act to prevent double or duplicative recovery, (2) denial of InterMotive’s motion for enhanced damages for trademark infringement, (3) exclusion of expert testimony related to disgorgement, and (4) grant of Ford’s motion in limine to exclude evidence and argument as to an implied contract theory. The parties had previously had a business relationship involving InterMotive’s designing an Upfitter Interface Module for Ford. On appeal, the court first declined to disturb the jury’s verdict for InterMotive on its trade secret claim, concluding the jury was entitled to credit the “testimony from InterMotive’s expert over other testimony and evidence in reaching its verdict.” As to the jury instructions on trade secret misappropriation, it found that “the district court’s burden-shifting approach and instructions to the jury were not erroneous[.]” It also agreed with the district court that the “‘jury could have reasonably found that Ford’s modules sales (and therefore module profits) were caused by Ford’s use of the trade secret, and that the stipulated number of Ford’s module sales represents the amount of additional module sales.’” As to the reduction of the unfair competition damages award, the court agreed “with the district court’s interpretation of La Quinta” and with its reliance on Texas Advanced, in which the Federal Circuit “determined that a jury verdict constituted an impermissible double recovery on very similar facts.” The court next found that InterMotive failed to show “that the district court applied the wrong law or otherwise abused its discretion in declining to enhance damages” for trademark infringement. It also upheld the exclusion of the expert testimony applying “a disgorgement of profits damages theory to InterMotive’s” contract breach claim. Finally, it held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that both it and Ford “had not been put on adequate notice that InterMotive was asserting” an implied contract claim. Affirmed.

    • Litigation (1)

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      e-Journal #: 86767
      Case: Langworthy v. Tuck
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam – Ackerman, Borrello, and Korobkin
      Issues:

      Res judicata; Whether an order denying leave to amend was a decision on the merits; Martin v Michigan Consol Gas Co; Futility basis; Final judgment; Involuntary dismissal under Fed R Civ P 41(b); Challenges to the federal court’s authority to enter the order in a related federal case; Jurisdiction; Amount in controversy; Notice of voluntary dismissal; Judicial bias; Dismissal due to another pending action (MCR 2.116(C)(6)); Alternative ground for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7); Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)

      Summary:

      Holding that res judicata barred plaintiff’s ADA and breach of contract claims in this fifth lawsuit arising from defendants-attorney and law firm’s prior representation of plaintiff, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendants. She retained the law firm in 2021 to represent her in appeals. While her third lawsuit against them was pending in federal court, she filed this one. In the federal case she alleged a breach of contract claim and, after defendants answered, she moved to amend her complaint to add claims under Title III of the ADA. In a 7/24 order, the federal district court denied her motion as futile. In this case, she alleged breach of the retainer agreement and discrimination in violation of Title III of the ADA. The trial court granted defendants summary disposition of the ADA claim based on res judicata. On appeal, the court found that the question was whether the 7/24 “order was a decision on the merits of plaintiff’s ADA claim.” It concluded that the order fell “squarely within Martin.” The federal district court “denied leave to amend solely on the basis of futility. It reasoned in part that Title III of the ADA does not provide for monetary damages in a suit brought by a private plaintiff,” and this constituted “a determination that plaintiff’s claim for damages under Title III was ‘legally insufficient on [its] face.’” Thus, the order “adjudicated, on the merits, precisely the claim that plaintiff asserts here.” In addition, by “the time the trial court ruled on [6/20/25], the consolidated federal action had proceeded to final judgment: the federal court dismissed that action with prejudice” 10 days earlier. Plaintiff’s appellate arguments challenged “the federal court’s authority to enter the [7/24] order, such that the order cannot be given preclusive effect.” The court found no merit in those challenges. As to her contract breach claim, while the trial court granted defendants summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(6), that provision no longer supplied a basis for doing so when the trial court issued its ruling. But the court held that reversal was not warranted because the federal “judgment that removed the predicate for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(6) supplies an independent ground for affirmance under (C)(7)” based on res judicata. The contract breach “claim in this case was resolved in the consolidated federal action.”

    • Municipal (2)

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      This summary also appears under Real Property

      e-Journal #: 86823
      Case: DTE Elec. Co. v. St Clair Cnty.
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Published Opinion )
      Judges: Murray, Patel, and Feeney
      Issues:

      St. Clair County Health Department (SCCHD) Regulation 25-01; De facto zoning ordinance; Michigan Zoning Enabling Act; County health department authority; Public Health Code; MCL 333.2435; Regulation of solar & energy facilities; 2023 PA 233; State-law preemption; Field & conflict preemption

      Summary:

      The court held that SCCHD Regulation 25-01 was an invalid de facto zoning ordinance that the defendant-County Health Department lacked authority to enact and, alternatively, that the regulation was preempted by 2023 PA 233. Regulation 25-01 required Health Department authorization before construction of specified solar and energy facilities in rural areas and imposed detailed requirements concerning site plans, alternative locations, drainage, emergency response, decommissioning, noise, landscaping, and visual screening. On appeal, defendants argued that it was a public-health regulation rather than zoning. The court disagreed. A zoning ordinance regulates land and buildings according to areas or locations, and Regulation 25-01 did precisely that. Its requirements controlled “how the property can be used” and addressed matters such as facility layout, landscaping, alternative locations, and decommissioning. “These requirements and standards go to the heart of traditional zoning concerns.” The Health Department could not rely on its general authority under MCL 333.2435(d) to safeguard public health because the Public Health Code does not empower county health departments to impose broad land-use controls. Rather, the Legislature authorized them to advise appropriate local agencies on matters involving physical facilities. The court summarized that “when Regulation 25-01 looks and acts like a zoning ordinance, calling it something else does not make it so.” Because the Health Department was not a local unit authorized to zone, adoption of the regulation was ultra vires. The court further held that even if the Health Department possessed such authority, PA 233 preempted the regulation. State law established standards under which qualifying energy facilities do not pose an unreasonable threat to public health or safety, while Regulation 25-01 imposed additional and more restrictive requirements, including a lower noise limit and visual-screening requirements. In doing so, it “impermissibly attempts to prohibit what the statute permits.” Affirmed.

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      This summary also appears under Negligence & Intentional Tort

      e-Journal #: 86766
      Case: Williams v. City of Detroit
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Lievense, Swartzle, and Mariani
      Issues:

      Premises liability; Governmental immunity; Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA); Sidewalk exception; MCL 691.1402a; Statutory presumption of reasonable repair; Dangerous sidewalk condition other than vertical discontinuity; MCL 691.1402a(3)(b); Actual or constructive notice; 30-day requirement

      Summary:

      The court held that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that defendant-City maintained the sidewalk in reasonable repair and to create a factual question as to whether it had the required notice of the defect. Plaintiff was injured when he stepped onto a curb adjoining a city sidewalk and loose pavement crumbled beneath his foot. In a prior appeal, the court determined that the curb was part of the sidewalk and remanded for consideration of governmental immunity under MCL 691.1402a. On appeal following remand, the City argued that plaintiff could not rebut the statutory presumption of reasonable repair because he had not established a vertical discontinuity of two inches or more. The court rejected that argument because the statute permits rebuttal by establishing either such a discontinuity or “a dangerous condition in the sidewalk itself of a particular character other than solely a vertical discontinuity.” Plaintiff relied on the latter provision. His deposition described a gap containing loose pavement, a 2019 city survey identified broken sidewalk slabs requiring repair, Google Street View images showed a crack in the relevant location, and a photograph taken shortly after the accident depicted the resulting gouge. “Taken together, these allegations and evidence adequately show as a legal matter that the sidewalk was in a ‘dangerous condition . . . of a particular character other than solely a vertical discontinuity.’” The court likewise rejected the City’s notice argument. The 2019 survey and photographs indicated that the sidewalk was already broken years before plaintiff’s fall, a city engineering coordinator confirmed that the City had identified the broken slabs, and there was evidence they were never repaired. Thus, “a jury could reasonably conclude that defendant had actual or constructive notice that the sidewalk was in a dangerous condition more than 30 days before his fall” because it was already damaged in 2019, deteriorated over time, and remained unrepaired. Affirmed.

    • Negligence & Intentional Tort (1)

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      This summary also appears under Municipal

      e-Journal #: 86766
      Case: Williams v. City of Detroit
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Unpublished Opinion )
      Judges: Per Curiam - Lievense, Swartzle, and Mariani
      Issues:

      Premises liability; Governmental immunity; Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA); Sidewalk exception; MCL 691.1402a; Statutory presumption of reasonable repair; Dangerous sidewalk condition other than vertical discontinuity; MCL 691.1402a(3)(b); Actual or constructive notice; 30-day requirement

      Summary:

      The court held that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to rebut the statutory presumption that defendant-City maintained the sidewalk in reasonable repair and to create a factual question as to whether it had the required notice of the defect. Plaintiff was injured when he stepped onto a curb adjoining a city sidewalk and loose pavement crumbled beneath his foot. In a prior appeal, the court determined that the curb was part of the sidewalk and remanded for consideration of governmental immunity under MCL 691.1402a. On appeal following remand, the City argued that plaintiff could not rebut the statutory presumption of reasonable repair because he had not established a vertical discontinuity of two inches or more. The court rejected that argument because the statute permits rebuttal by establishing either such a discontinuity or “a dangerous condition in the sidewalk itself of a particular character other than solely a vertical discontinuity.” Plaintiff relied on the latter provision. His deposition described a gap containing loose pavement, a 2019 city survey identified broken sidewalk slabs requiring repair, Google Street View images showed a crack in the relevant location, and a photograph taken shortly after the accident depicted the resulting gouge. “Taken together, these allegations and evidence adequately show as a legal matter that the sidewalk was in a ‘dangerous condition . . . of a particular character other than solely a vertical discontinuity.’” The court likewise rejected the City’s notice argument. The 2019 survey and photographs indicated that the sidewalk was already broken years before plaintiff’s fall, a city engineering coordinator confirmed that the City had identified the broken slabs, and there was evidence they were never repaired. Thus, “a jury could reasonably conclude that defendant had actual or constructive notice that the sidewalk was in a dangerous condition more than 30 days before his fall” because it was already damaged in 2019, deteriorated over time, and remained unrepaired. Affirmed.

    • Real Property (2)

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      This summary also appears under Municipal

      e-Journal #: 86823
      Case: DTE Elec. Co. v. St Clair Cnty.
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Published Opinion )
      Judges: Murray, Patel, and Feeney
      Issues:

      St. Clair County Health Department (SCCHD) Regulation 25-01; De facto zoning ordinance; Michigan Zoning Enabling Act; County health department authority; Public Health Code; MCL 333.2435; Regulation of solar & energy facilities; 2023 PA 233; State-law preemption; Field & conflict preemption

      Summary:

      The court held that SCCHD Regulation 25-01 was an invalid de facto zoning ordinance that the defendant-County Health Department lacked authority to enact and, alternatively, that the regulation was preempted by 2023 PA 233. Regulation 25-01 required Health Department authorization before construction of specified solar and energy facilities in rural areas and imposed detailed requirements concerning site plans, alternative locations, drainage, emergency response, decommissioning, noise, landscaping, and visual screening. On appeal, defendants argued that it was a public-health regulation rather than zoning. The court disagreed. A zoning ordinance regulates land and buildings according to areas or locations, and Regulation 25-01 did precisely that. Its requirements controlled “how the property can be used” and addressed matters such as facility layout, landscaping, alternative locations, and decommissioning. “These requirements and standards go to the heart of traditional zoning concerns.” The Health Department could not rely on its general authority under MCL 333.2435(d) to safeguard public health because the Public Health Code does not empower county health departments to impose broad land-use controls. Rather, the Legislature authorized them to advise appropriate local agencies on matters involving physical facilities. The court summarized that “when Regulation 25-01 looks and acts like a zoning ordinance, calling it something else does not make it so.” Because the Health Department was not a local unit authorized to zone, adoption of the regulation was ultra vires. The court further held that even if the Health Department possessed such authority, PA 233 preempted the regulation. State law established standards under which qualifying energy facilities do not pose an unreasonable threat to public health or safety, while Regulation 25-01 imposed additional and more restrictive requirements, including a lower noise limit and visual-screening requirements. In doing so, it “impermissibly attempts to prohibit what the statute permits.” Affirmed.

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      This summary also appears under Tax

      e-Journal #: 86821
      Case: In re Petition for Foreclosure of Certain Parcels
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Published Opinion )
      Judges: Riordan, M.J. Kelly, and Rick
      Issues:

      Tax-foreclosure surplus proceeds; General Property Tax Act (GPTA); MCL 211.78t(9); Scope of distribution order; Future claims under other legal theories; MCL 211.78t(11); Hathon v Michigan; Res judicata

      Summary:

      Addressing an issue of first impression, the court held that MCL 211.78t(9) authorizes a trial court distributing tax-foreclosure surplus proceeds to bar future claims arising under the GPTA, but does not authorize it to bar claims arising under other legal theories. Claimant-Hamady, as trustee, sought surplus proceeds after property formerly owned by the trust was sold in a tax-foreclosure sale. The trial court ordered the State Treasurer to distribute $4,227.73 but also provided that all future claims concerning the foreclosure, sale, or proceeds were barred, including claims “under MCL 211.78t or any other legal theory.” On appeal, the court addressed an issue of first impression involving the final sentence of MCL 211.78t(9), which requires a distribution order to state that “any further claim by a claimant under this act relating to the foreclosed property is barred.” The court emphasized that although “any further claim” is broad, the statutory qualifier “under this act” is not. The trial court’s broader language rendered that limitation nugatory. Thus, “under MCL 211.78t(9), the trial court only was authorized to bar future claims arising ‘under this act,’ i.e., the GPTA.” This interpretation was consistent with decisions establishing MCL 211.78t as the exclusive mechanism for recovering surplus proceeds but recognizing that other claims, including challenges involving interest, attorney fees, or the constitutionality of the statutory process, may remain available after completion of that process. The court also rejected the State Treasurer’s reliance on res judicata. Because its application requires a fact-specific examination of an actual subsequent action, “its application is not something that a trial court might unilaterally decide with regard to hypothetical future claims.” The doctrine therefore did not authorize the trial court to prospectively extinguish claims under every conceivable legal theory. Reversed and remanded.

    • Tax (1)

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      This summary also appears under Real Property

      e-Journal #: 86821
      Case: In re Petition for Foreclosure of Certain Parcels
      Court: Michigan Court of Appeals ( Published Opinion )
      Judges: Riordan, M.J. Kelly, and Rick
      Issues:

      Tax-foreclosure surplus proceeds; General Property Tax Act (GPTA); MCL 211.78t(9); Scope of distribution order; Future claims under other legal theories; MCL 211.78t(11); Hathon v Michigan; Res judicata

      Summary:

      Addressing an issue of first impression, the court held that MCL 211.78t(9) authorizes a trial court distributing tax-foreclosure surplus proceeds to bar future claims arising under the GPTA, but does not authorize it to bar claims arising under other legal theories. Claimant-Hamady, as trustee, sought surplus proceeds after property formerly owned by the trust was sold in a tax-foreclosure sale. The trial court ordered the State Treasurer to distribute $4,227.73 but also provided that all future claims concerning the foreclosure, sale, or proceeds were barred, including claims “under MCL 211.78t or any other legal theory.” On appeal, the court addressed an issue of first impression involving the final sentence of MCL 211.78t(9), which requires a distribution order to state that “any further claim by a claimant under this act relating to the foreclosed property is barred.” The court emphasized that although “any further claim” is broad, the statutory qualifier “under this act” is not. The trial court’s broader language rendered that limitation nugatory. Thus, “under MCL 211.78t(9), the trial court only was authorized to bar future claims arising ‘under this act,’ i.e., the GPTA.” This interpretation was consistent with decisions establishing MCL 211.78t as the exclusive mechanism for recovering surplus proceeds but recognizing that other claims, including challenges involving interest, attorney fees, or the constitutionality of the statutory process, may remain available after completion of that process. The court also rejected the State Treasurer’s reliance on res judicata. Because its application requires a fact-specific examination of an actual subsequent action, “its application is not something that a trial court might unilaterally decide with regard to hypothetical future claims.” The doctrine therefore did not authorize the trial court to prospectively extinguish claims under every conceivable legal theory. Reversed and remanded.

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